Rafale Wins MMRCA Bid

[Officer of Engineers]

Not that I have seen. Engineers don't make HQ level Staff and makes a hell of a lot more money outside the military.

[Skywatcher]

It could be that the Chinese are putting off settling the border dispute because they have to date not found an Indian administration that could seriously consider and deliver on it.

Isn't Aksai Chin tied to the Kashmir dispute, which makes a border resolution rather distant? Beijing understandably wouldn't want to drop the Arunachal Pradesh claim if New Delhi won't do the same on Aksai Chin.

[Cactus]

Whether the idea of the IAF raising a missile corps holds any deterrence value is what i'm trying to understand.

Yes and no. Regiments of Brahmos and Prahaars would be operationally useful, but A-3s with conventional payloads would be self-defeating. In the event of tensions, if the Chinese observe you readying the A-3s, they cannot be sure whether it is a conventional or special weapons payload. They will have to respond accordingly. Neither of you will place any value on the other's doctrine, and it will be Guns of August II.

The Chinese can move forces into the area much faster than before. There will be a bottleneck to get through but with their LOC's will be good up to the border and to an extent beyond. So they can take territory but its much harder to hold it. Which if things play out means the Indians push back and we end up with a stalemate of sorts. Status quo as holds presently. If so then why bother in the first place.

I can rattle-off at least three possible scenarios where the Chinese may not want to grab the land for themselves, but still clobber you along the Indo-Tibetan borders: (a) to strengthen their link-up with the Pakistanis in Kashmir, (b) to hit you over a resource war in some other part of the world where they are a military disadvantage (ex Africa), (c) to send a message to us (like they attacked Vietnam in 1979 and 84 to signal the Soviets).

[Officer of Engineers]

Yes and no. Regiments of Brahmos and Prahaars would be operationally useful, but A-3s with conventional payloads would be self-defeating. In the event of tensions, if the Chinese observe you readying the A-3s, they cannot be sure whether it is a conventional or special weapons payload. They will have to respond accordingly. Neither of you will place any value on the other's doctrine, and it will be Guns of August II.

You might want to rethink this. Both Indian and Chinese nuclear warheads are kept in component form and not mated to missiles. Meaning, they have to put the warheads together before they can mate it to the missiles.

Now, if you want immediate launch, even if it's a nuke, flight time is 10-15 minutes before impact. Even if the other side has their nukes mated, way too short of a period to make a decision. Do the math. Launch. 3 minutes before detection. 2 minutes to verify. 3 minutes to notify the person in authority. That's 8 minutes before the person has to decide. Even if he took 1 second to decide, launch warning takes 2 minutes. Doing the math, 10 minutes. Impact.

You would know at that point if it's a nuke or not.

[Cactus]

Sir, in your experience what is the best practice regarding separation of platforms for conventional and special roles?

[Double Edge]

Right, so the idea of whether a missiles corp can deter the 2nd artilery is still pending. I wish the air marshal had given a little more insight into the idea, it was just asserted like that and to a layperson like me does not tell me much.

There is no nuke threat here, limited wars are possible. The idea is to make that harder. right now they have an advantage in missiles with the Indian side coming up wanting.

[Officer of Engineers]

Sir, in your experience what is the best practice regarding separation of platforms for conventional and special roles?

Get rid of nukes. They're more headaches than they're worth. As a deterrent and a thought out retallitory strike, ie after receiving a nuke it, surviving it, assessing what assets you have left, devised a strike package, and then deliver. That would work.

But as an immediate strike force? More freaking headaches than the crap end of the stick. India and China do not have a counter-force arsenal and no way in hell does Pakistan. I don't freaking care what the propaganda says. For a strike against military targets, you need timing as well as positional accuracy. It does not help your people being bombed one single bit if you hit the airbase after the bombers have left or hitting an empty silo after the missile has launched.

That means you have to ask the PM for permission to launch while the Chinese are already busy launching themselves.

This is precisely why the 2nd Artillery Force went conventional. Even during exercises, getting release authority from the CMC was worst than pulling teeth and then they had to reprogram targetting according to a new target list than the one they were trained for.

Going conventional, the 2AF bypasses the CMC and hit their targets without having to beg the CMC for the launch codes and then being told what they can hit ... and what's worst, it's egg heads (scientists) who has zero ideas about military priorities dictating the targets.

[Double Edge]

Isn't Aksai Chin tied to the Kashmir dispute, which makes a border resolution rather distant? Beijing understandably wouldn't want to drop the Arunachal Pradesh claim if New Delhi won't do the same on Aksai Chin.

Aksai chin in exchange for Arunachal was on the table by deng in 1982. This was politically unacceptable at the time. However in 1985, they Chinese 're-interpreted' their position and asked for concessions to be made in the eastern sector as well thereby putting off a solution even longer. To date they have not changed their stance. it remains to be seen whether its possible to revert back to Deng's solution.

An Out of the Box Solution to the India-China Boundary Dispute? | TheWire | May 12 2015

BY SHYAM SARAN ON 12/05/2015

During her visit to Beijing in January/February 2015, Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said at a press conference that “an out of the box solution may still come on this (The Sino-Indian boundary) issue”. She did not elaborate but her remarks followed other straws in the wind. Chinese commentators have been putting forth the line that since both India and China now have strong and decisive leaders at the helm, they have a window of opportunity to deliver a political deal on the boundary issue. There was also much excitement when former Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, who visited New Delhi after a series of interactions in Beijing in March this year, told a number of his Indian interlocutors that China was planning to present a “surprise package” on the border issue when Prime Minister paid a visit to China later in the year in May. Is the “surprise package” the “out of box solution” that the two countries are looking for? The answer to this question is undoubtedly important since a satisfactory and mutually acceptable solution to the long standing boundary dispute would remove a bitter and corrosive legacy from India-China bilateral relations generating a potentially game –changing realignment in Asia and the world.

Before we explore what could be an out of the box solution, it may be worthwhile to briefly recapitulate the different phases through which the India-China boundary negotiations have proceeded since they were resumed in 1980. From 1980-85, the Chinese side reiterated the offer made in 1960, that is, it would be prepared to accept an alignment in the Eastern Sector, in general conforming to the McMahon Line, but India would have to concede Aksai Chin to China in the Western Sector, this being critical at that time to the latter in view of the strategic road connecting Xinjiang to Tibet. For the Central Sector, the differences were regarded as relatively minor and manageable. This so-called “package proposal” was advanced by no less a person than the then paramount Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1982. In an interview to the India journal Vikrant, he had said, “….. for instance in the Eastern Sector, can we recognize the existing status quo, I mean the so-called McMahon Line? This was left over from history but in the Western Sector, the Indian government should also recognize the existing status quo.”

This was repeated in a meeting that Deng had with Shri G. Parthasarthy, the then Chairman, Policy Planning Committee, in Beijing later that year.

In subsequent backchannel talks between A.P. Venkateswaran, the then Ambassador of India and a senior advisor to the then Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, there were indications that China may be willing to an LAC plus solution, whereby the status quo in the Eastern Sector would be maintained, while China would make some, admittedly undefined, territorial concessions in the Western Sector. This was the bait held out to enable a historic visit to China by Smt. Indira Gandhi, the then Indian Prime Minister and since 1983, Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. However, this initiative was not followed through on the Indian side, even though it represented, until then, the best option .

Chinese re-interpretation
In 1985, the Chinese side re-interpreted the package proposal to convey that in order to arrive at a solution, the Indian side would have to make significant and meaningful concessions in the Eastern Sector, the largest area in dispute, for which China would make corresponding but undefined concessions in the Western Sector. In addition, for the first time, an explicit demand was made for the “restitution” of Tawang as indispensable to any boundary settlement. The Chinese had moved the goal posts and hardened their position, making it even less likely that a settlement could be found. This may have been due to a growing power asymmetry between the two countries thanks to Chinese economic reforms and support of the West. It may also have been due to the declining strategic importance of the Aksai Chin road since, in the meantime, the Chinese had progressed considerably in building up their transport infrastructure to and within Tibet. It was, therefore, no longer as important as before to make a concession in the East to secure Chinese interests in the West. To date, this post 1985 Chinese posture has remained unchanged.

In these circumstances, what “out of the box” solution is possible?

In informal, track-2 conversations recently, Chinese interlocutors have conveyed, though somewhat ambiguously, the following observations:

1. Pointing to the method adopted to settle the Sino-Russian and Sino-Vietnamese land borders, it has been suggested that the two sides take the disputed territory as a whole, and split it in some agreed proportion. With Russia, the disputed area was split 50:50. Since the area of dispute is larger in the Eastern Sector, it could mean that India would have to concede significant territory, even if it was 60:40 or 70:30 in favour of India, in that sector. This is a non-starter particularly when combined together with the insistence that Tawang be conceded to China.

2. An observation made repeatedly at track-2 interactions by some Chinese interlocutors may suggest a reversion to the “package proposal”. For instance, it was pointed out it was inconceivable that India would go to war with China to recover the territory it claims; similarly it was inconceivable that China would go to war with India to recover territory it claims. If the two sides, recognized this reality, it was said, the border dispute could be eventually settled. To be fair, this observation was contested sometimes by other Chinese voices, who stuck closely to the official line.

The question, therefore, is not so much whether a border deal is possible, but on what terms? One possibility could be a Chinese offer to convert the Line of Actual Control into an agreed boundary, with some minor adjustments. This would essentially conform to Deng Xiaoping’s “package proposal”, but this had not been found politically acceptable to India, in the 1980s. In the changed circumstances prevailing today, would this now be acceptable? I still believe that only an LAC plus solution would work politically for India, even if the “plus” was a limited concession. Furthermore, on the Chinese side, would it be possible to drop the demand for Tawang, having taken a public posture on its restitution? For India, it would be politically unacceptable to give up Tawang.

Putting aside the Tawang question

One possibility is an informal suggestion made already in the past to the Chinese side: the two sides set aside the issue of sovereignty over Tawang for the time being, but the Indian side allow free movement of Tibetan pilgrims to the monastery town. In return, China could extend the same facility to Indian pilgrims going to Kailash –Mansarovar. The Chinese side had not responded to this suggestion, but it is worth exploring even as a Confidence Building Measure.

Taking into account current political sensitivities on both sides, it appears difficult to envisage an “out of the box” solution, which would still remain within the bounds of political acceptability on either side. Historically, the boundary dispute was intimately linked with the Tibetan issue, and the latter remains a looming shadow over the bilateral relationship. The boundary issue would be much easier to resolve if the process of reconciliation between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities got seriously under way as seemed likely when Xi Jinping took over the reins of leadership a couple of years ago. The hardline posture on Tibet is back and the recent White Paper on Tibet released by Chinese authorities is ample evidence of this.

Essentially adversarial relationship

There is also the influence of Chinese and Indian perceptions of the regional and global geopolitical situation and likely trends in the foreseeable future. Do the two sides have strong enough incentives to seek a compromise on the border and are these incentives aligned? It would appear that despite significant convergence on some issues, the relationship is and likely to remain essentially adversarial for reasons that go beyond the boundary dispute. China’s relations with Pakistan is a case in point.

To sum up, the spectrum within which a boundary settlement could realistically be sought is an LAC-plus solution at one end and a Package Proposal, without Tawang on the other. If the ‘plus’ on the Indian side could be made a limited Chinese territorial concession, while China could settle, for the time being, for only free access to Tawang for its pilgrims, then there could be a meeting ground somewhere in the middle of the spectrum.

It would seem more realistic that the two sides will settle for more Confidence Building Measures to maintain peace and tranquility on the Sino-Indian border. The clarification of the LAC which the Chinese have so far resisted, after having agreed to do so earlier, could be a starting point. Not quite out of the box but perhaps a step towards an eventual deal.

Shyam Saran is a former Foreign Secretary. He is currently Chairman, RIS, and Senior Fellow, CPR.

[Officer of Engineers]

Right, so the idea of whether a missiles corp can deter the 2nd artilery is still pending. I wish the air marshal had given a little more insight into the idea, it was just asserted like that and to a layperson like me does not tell me much.

The only way I can see are mobile batteries. Instead of silos, roads and launch sites (ie, concrete pads). Since the Chinese would not know (or at least, they should not know) where the missiles are at any given moment, they would have to hit the launch site (ie, crater it to make it unsuable) and thus chew up valuable missiles.

In other words, make the Chinese run out of missiles before they run out of targets.

Still expensive as hell but laying concrete is a hell of a lot faster than building a factory to build missiles.

[Oracle]

No need for 126 Rafales: Parrikar

[Doktor]

The only way I can see are mobile batteries. Instead of silos, roads and launch sites (ie, concrete pads). Since the Chinese would not know (or at least, they should not know) where the missiles are at any given moment, they would have to hit the launch site (ie, crater it to make it unsuable) and thus chew up valuable missiles.

In other words, make the Chinese run out of missiles before they run out of targets.

Still expensive as hell but laying concrete is a hell of a lot faster than building a factory to build missiles.

Some 40 years later you can make a buker tourism like Albania did.

[Double Edge]

Found this an interesting watch.

[popillol]

Can't post in any other thread.


Well, I was going through another site, came across an interesting discussion:
What if Japan changes side to China? With all the technology, reserves and assets outside its territorial limits, won't USA crumble under the combined weight? After all, 50 years down the line, Japan will have to live right next to China.
Just like Israel secretly supports the monarchs/dictators (may be) of its hostile neighbours to tame general hostility of their respective citizens.

What would USA do to save itself?

[SteveDaPirate]

How would a China/Japan alliance cause the US to crumble or be required to save itself?

Losing Japan as an ally would certainly be a setback for the US, but such an alliance wouldn't be in any position to turn around and attack US. On the military front, any attack on the US by the China/Japan alliance would trigger a number of collective defense arrangements on behalf of the US. Most of the EU would enter the conflict due to NATO obligations, the rest of the Americas would enter the fight due to the Rio Treaty, as well as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines who all have mutual defense obligations with the US. There would undoubtedly be a number of other US allies who would agree to assist despite the lack of mutual defense obligations.

In addition to having to fight most of the world, the US itself is a pretty tough customer. The US battle fleet has about triple the tonnage of China and Japan's fleets combined, and the US maintains by far the most capable nuclear forces and a large margin of superiority in space based assets.

One of the reasons the US has been able to put together so many alliances is that it is simultaneously powerful, but not in a good geographical position to invade and annex territory outside North America. This makes the US a great friend to have watching your back without worrying about being stabbed in the back and taken over. The US can destroy other great powers, but doesn't pose much of a threat of conquest the way a neighbor does.

[popillol]

How would a China/Japan alliance cause the US to crumble or be required to save itself?

Losing Japan as an ally would certainly be a setback for the US, but such an alliance wouldn't be in any position to turn around and attack US. On the military front, any attack on the US by the China/Japan alliance would trigger a number of collective defense arrangements on behalf of the US. Most of the EU would enter the conflict due to NATO obligations, the rest of the Americas would enter the fight due to the Rio Treaty, as well as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines who all have mutual defense obligations with the US. There would undoubtedly be a number of other US allies who would agree to assist despite the lack of mutual defense obligations.

In addition to having to fight most of the world, the US itself is a pretty tough customer. The US battle fleet has about triple the tonnage of China and Japan's fleets combined, and the US maintains by far the most capable nuclear forces and a large margin of superiority in space based assets.

One of the reasons the US has been able to put together so many alliances is that it is simultaneously powerful, but not in a good geographical position to invade and annex territory outside North America. This makes the US a great friend to have watching your back without worrying about being stabbed in the back and taken over. The US can destroy other great powers, but doesn't pose much of a threat of conquest the way a neighbor does.

The combined holdings of Japan/China in US treasury is currently 2.48 Trillion dollars. Should increase considerably more in the coming 2 decades. If they pull out simultaneously, won't the US economy crumble? Or change the world currency to Renminbi? The economy won't be able to support the US fleet much longer. If that does happen, will US militarily attack Japan/China?
Militarily, the Japanese might have significant knowledge of US weapons like AB destroyers, US' sensors in the China Sea to locate PLAN vessels, F-35 fighters. Won't the US be significantly compromised?