BB trivia

[TopHatter]

You are correct. What makes that Turrett so different?

I don't know. The only thing I could think of is that it's a usually delgated to the "training" turret where the new guys are put. But that's probably so far off the mark it's not even funny.

No, If the gloves had been taken off then the RoE for ground forces and the Air would have changed. Thoses things didn't.
If the gloves had been taken off then we would have been weapons free. At least for self protection. That didn't happen. If the NCA requires you to have tape over your magazines, and the mag be in the pouch vice locked and loaded when on post, the gloves are not off.

I get the distinct impression that you were actually there on the ground and somebody else decidedly was not.

[HazeGrey]

Some pics

Going through the archives. To bad can't download more than 1M. Enjoy Battleship Forum>>>

[Shipwreck]

If the gloves had been taken off then we would have been weapons free. At least for self protection. That didn't happen. If the NCA requires you to have tape over your magazines, and the mag be in the pouch vice locked and loaded when on post, the gloves are not off.

In the context of the present discussion, I interpreted your initial post as being specifically about naval gunfire, hence my comment about Suq Al Gharb.

My bad for the misunderstanding.

[Gun Grape]

In the context of the present discussion, I interpreted your initial post as being specifically about naval gunfire, hence my comment about Suq Al Gharb.

My bad for the misunderstanding.

Even that isn't correct. Suq Al Gharb was a key position, that both the State Dept and the Reagan admin decided would have special RoEs. A concession to SE McFarlane. In NO OTHER AREA did we have freedom to respond to fire or support the Lebanese Army.

[Shipwreck]

No special ROE for Suq Al Gharb

Even that isn't correct. Suq Al Gharb was a key position, that both the State Dept and the Reagan admin decided would have special RoEs.

"When defeat of the LAF appeared imminent, the National Command Authorities (NCA) authorized the use of naval gunfire and tactical air strikes in support of the LAF at Suq-Al-Gharb. Occupation of the dominant terrain in the vicinity of Suq-Al-Gharb by hostile forces would pose a danger to USMNF positions at BIA. Direct support of the LAF in those circumstances was to be considered as an act of self-defense authorized by the existing ROE."

source : Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, page 46.

[Shipwreck]

In NO OTHER AREA did we have freedom to respond to fire

Before the terrorist bombing of BIA on October 23, 1983, and excluding Suq Al Gharb, naval gunfire was used *in response to ennemy fire* on 5 occasions : September 8, September 16, September 20, September 21, September 23. A cease-fire went into effect at 0600 on September 26.

or support the Lebanese Army.

Between the Israeli withdrawal of September 4 and the cease-fire of September 26, there was virtually NO OPPORTUNITY for naval guns to be used in direct support of the LAF other than Suq Al Gharb.

[Gun Grape]

Before the terrorist bombing of BIA on October 23, 1983, and excluding Suq Al Gharb, naval gunfire was used *in response to ennemy fire* on 5 different occasions : September 8, September 16, September 20, September 21, September 23. A cease-fire went into effect at 0600 on September 26.




Between the Israeli withdrawal of September 4 and the cease-fire of September 26, there was virtually NO opportunity for naval guns to be used in direct support of the LAF other than Suq Al Gharb.

I should have been more specific.

Suq Al Gharb was the only built up area that we were allowed to fire into.

At the start, SE Mcfarland wanted to move portions of the MEU into SAG.
Both DoS and DoD thought that was going a bit overboard in regards to the mission. Reagan woulfd have had to go before congress, there were rumblings about his use of the War Powers Act. In the end we decided that somehow supporting the LAF in a built up area was within the standing RoE.
Of course, any request for the same type of support for US Marines would not be cleared untill shot all the way up the chain. Neither would request from our French, Italian or British allies.

None of those NGF missions were in populated areas. All against firing positions in the mountains. Even after 23 Oct, wehad to get the LAF to shoot "downtown" missions.

It wasn't until Feb 7th, When the Pres announced our redeployment to shipping that he authorized use of Air and NGF against any units that fire at peacekeeping forces.

Thats the day we took the gloves off.

[Shipwreck]

As far as being told not to hit targets as a reason that Mr. Landgriff gave for missing. No, after Oct 23d, the gloves came off.

It wasn't until Feb 7th, When the Pres announced our redeployment to shipping that he authorized use of Air and NGF against any units that fire at peacekeeping forces.

Thats the day we took the gloves off.

First you said it was October 23, 1983 and you're now saying it was actually February 7, 1984 ?!?!

[Shipwreck]

It wasn't until Feb 7th, When the Pres announced our redeployment to shipping that he authorized use of Air and NGF against any units that fire at peacekeeping forces.

On February 7, 1984, President Reagan also OK'd the use of "naval gunfire and air support against any units firing into greater Beirut from parts of Lebanon controlled by Syria".

In the context of the fierce battle that erupted on February 2, 1984, between the LAF and the Druze/Shiite militias in Beirut and across the surrounding hills, - the heaviest fighting since Suq Al Gharb -, Reagan's statement was a rather explicit indication naval gunfire would be used once again to support Gemayel's regime.

Indeed on February 8, 1984, USS New Jersey did her pyrotechnic prowesses (288 x 16" bullets), you and I knowing too well how poor this shooting actually was.

On February 15, 1984, John Lehman confirmed naval gunfire was being used to support Lebanese Armed Forces, indicating this was "a definite shift in emphasis."

[Gun Grape]

First you said it was October 23, 1983 and you're now saying it was actually February 7, 1984 ?!?!

Well I did sound a little wishy washy there. Let me explain.

After 23 Oct, those of us on the ground had more leeway on what we could respond to fire with. We got to use Tanks, LAAWs and other fun stuff. And Gen Joy had more leeway on what he, as on scene Cdr could authorize, vice having to go to CinCEur for everything.

However, since we are framing this as regards to NGF support, the date would have to be Feb 7th.

[Shipwreck]

After 23 Oct, those of us on the ground had more leeway on what we could respond to fire with. We got to use Tanks, LAAWs and other fun stuff. And Gen Joy had more leeway on what he, as on scene Cdr could authorize, vice having to go to CinCEur for everything.

However, since we are framing this as regards to NGF support, the date would have to be Feb 7th.

Are you saying that what the 5" popshooters did after February 7, 1984 was something they hadn't done before, especially at Suq Al Gharb ?

Or perhaps you're specifically referring to USS New Jersey, the typical instance the wrong tool in the wrong place at the wrong time IMO ?

[Bill]

1. The 16"/50 Mark-7 and the previous 16"/50 Mark-2 had the same ballistics.

2. The 16"/45 had better dispersion than the 16"/50.

3. The 16"/50 is definitely no match for best-in-class land artillery (e.g. the South African 155m/52 can achieve a PEr @ 40,000 yards less than half that of the 16"/50).

Not with circa 1940s shells it can't, and you know it.

Comparing apples and oranges is a waste of time...and yes, even when you do it.

If there were modern ERFB or equivelant shells (let alone 'state of the art' modern powder bags) for the 16" we could make a comparison to the best modern land based artillery systems. There aren't, so really, we can't. If there were, suffice it to say that the accuracy of the 16" guns would be vastly improved.

Just as the accuracy of a typical rifle is greatly improved with match grade ammunition.

[Bill]

After Suq Al Gharb (19 Sep 1983), it was pretty obvious to all factions that the *gloves were off*.

No one was ever *told to miss* after that day.

Simple question...were you there?

[Bill]

I'll defer to the experts on this one But,

I read a report long ago that stated that 8 inch NGB was the most accurate.
And later on that the Des Moines class8"/55 were the most accurate.

The Des Moines class had some very special 8" guns. Fully automated mounts that matched the ROF of every version of the USN Mk45 5" gun. There is simply NOTHING in US fleet service like that gun system today. Which is a real shame because, as you say, they were the most accurate, longest ranged, most automated, most rapid firing 8" guns ever mounted on any US chassis or hull. The Des Moines were in service up until something like the early 80s weren't they?


USS Des Moines heavy cruiser.

[Dreadnought]

The Des Moines class had some very special 8" guns. Fully automated mounts that matched the ROF of every version of the USN Mk45 5" gun. There is simply NOTHING in US fleet service like that gun system today. Which is a real shame because, as you say, they were the most accurate, longest ranged, most automated, most rapid firing 8" guns ever mounted on any US chassis or hull. The Des Moines were in service up until something like the early 80s weren't they?


USS Des Moines heavy cruiser.

Hey Snipe,
The Desmoines class accompanied the Iowa class a few times throughout their lives. From what a few USN say they were very impressive with the auto eights. We actually got a peek at them before she left Philly Navy Yard for the razor factory. To get a better look go visit the USS Salem (a sister to DesMoines) as she is museumed in Quincy Mass.;)