Chamberlain a new look.

[zraver]

A paper for class, once again looking for peer review. I had to either defend or refute the argument by Martin Gilbert's position in Roots of Appeasement, that Chamberlain's actions at Munich were, "an emergency plan, intended to buy peace at the expense of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia..." Moreover, "Munich was a policy , dictated by fear and weakness, which Neville Chamberlain devised as means, not of postponing war but, as he personally believed, of making Anglo-German war unnecessary in the future."

I chose to refute it on two grounds. First that what Neville Chamberlain really believed in late 38 is in doubt base don both his actions during the May Crisis and on the fact that what a politician says they believe is more often than not mere expedient. Instead I argue that Britain lacked the means, the will and the allies to do more than accept the German fait accompli.

Document saved in word 97-03 format.

[Mihais]

Very quick one for lack of time.Romania was not a potential aggresor but one of the few friends of Czechoslovakia.3 arguments:-the offer to incorporate several Romanian inhabited areas was rejected(even if the Czechs themselves later reiterated the offer)for the sake of mantaining the alliance and good relations with a future to be restored Czhechoslovakian state.
-the Western army was mobilized to either deter a joint German-Hungarian attack on us or prevent the Hungarian army joining the attack on Czechoslovakia in the event of war.
-the Czech government offered to donate its entire stock of military equipment and ammunition to Romania prior to April 39,a plan which was not materialized by the Romanian delayed response and the German actions.
I'll look for the exact documents if it helps you.

More comments another time.

[Triple C]

I think it's solid, Zraver. :) I recall from a lecture that Chamberlain, after Munich, approved more funding for the antiaircraft network in Great Britain, which implied that he was as not confident in the success of his diplomacy as he pronounced in public. You do need to proof read it, but I am sure you are well aware of that.

[zraver]

Very quick one for lack of time.Romania was not a potential aggresor but one of the few friends of Czechoslovakia.3 arguments:-the offer to incorporate several Romanian inhabited areas was rejected(even if the Czechs themselves later reiterated the offer)for the sake of mantaining the alliance and good relations with a future to be restored Czhechoslovakian state.
-the Western army was mobilized to either deter a joint German-Hungarian attack on us or prevent the Hungarian army joining the attack on Czechoslovakia in the event of war.
-the Czech government offered to donate its entire stock of military equipment and ammunition to Romania prior to April 39,a plan which was not materialized by the Romanian delayed response and the German actions.
I'll look for the exact documents if it helps you.

More comments another time.

Because it was a defend or rebut argument I was limited to the one source he provided and the other 2 quick sources I grabbed to avoid plagarism. That being said, those documents would be interesting.

In the source I could use, Romania is not portrayed favorably.

send me a PM if you don't have access to the the source I used.

[zraver]

I think it's solid, Zraver. :) I recall from a lecture that Chamberlain, after Munich, approved more funding for the antiaircraft network in Great Britain, which implied that he was as not confident in the success of his diplomacy as he pronounced in public. You do need to proof read it, but I am sure you are well aware of that.

I'd like to see documentation that Chamberlain to concrete actions after MUnich but before the next crisis erupted to strengthen Britain, it would be the smoking gun for my argument even though I would probably not be allowed to use if for this paper.

Yup, my wife is my editor she catches most of my grammatical mistakes.

[astralis]

chamberlain was limited in what he could do-- if he took a much harder line against the germans, not only would hitler definitely welcome the war but the british government would collapse. he also correctly saw that in the case of a war, the UK was not in a good position to decisively act against the germans.

the french, on the other hand...

[1979]

Instead I argue that Britain lacked the means, the will and the allies to do more than accept the German fait accompli.

Interesting choice of words...
I will not argue about the will part but G.B. chose to confront Germany in 1939 under worse conditions than in 1938.
In september 1939 G.B. still had two minor allies ( Poland and Romania ) these two nations could cut off ( simply by being there) the german supply with strategic materials from the URSS.
Combined with the Royal navy, Germany is basically surounded...
After september however, G.B. lost Poland and Romania redirected her loyalties ( and OIL ) toward Germany.
G.B. still had her navy but that was irrelevant since Germany was not longer surrounded on the continent.

[Officer of Engineers]

1979, you're using hindsight. What Z has done was to try to see what Chamberlain saw, not what actually happenned afterwards. In hindsight, London should have gone to war over the Sudetenland. Hitler would still have won but he would have been bled white and in no position to start WWII. Instead of inheriting the Czech guns, tanks, and horses he needed to start WWII, they would have been burning his German guns, tanks, and horses.

Also, I don't think anyone at the time foresee that Hitler would have added Czech machines to his own.

It is difficult trying to avoid using hindsight but necessary to understand the decisions (bad or good) being made.

[1979]

1979, you're using hindsight.

I am willing to admit to that but :
For a leader off a nation is required to foresee the result of his actions ( and words ) on medium and long term.
To quote Winston Churchill , G.B. " sustained a defeat without a war "

[TopHatter]

In hindsight, London should have gone to war over the Sudetenland. Hitler would still have won but he would have been bled white and in no position to start WWII.

And if France had sprang out from behind the Maginot Line (or even made the moves to) and headed straight for the Ruhr, Germany would've probably folded like a house of cards: No Ruhr, no Waffenschmied. No Waffenschmied, no Reich.

[Officer of Engineers]

For a leader off a nation is required to foresee the result of his actions ( and words ) on medium and long term.

He did. He foresaw peace, at least long enough for GB to prepare herself. He also happened to be wrong.

[Kansas Bear]

BUT, would France have moved against Germany in '38?

Was France prepared to move against Germany in '38?

Remember the "Sitz-krieg"? The months of nothing after the declaration of war?(Granted that is a bit of use of hindsight, but still...)

[astralis]

KB,

politically the french were not, as both france-UK were nudging each other: "no, you first."

the worst thing about it was that BOTH chamberlain and daladier KNEW the germans were screwing them-- daladier more so than chamberlain.

this is probably hindsight speaking, but had daladier made MOTIONS of moving against germany, there was the real chance that nervous German army officers might have carried off a coup against hitler rather than wage war against france.

finally, i was always surprised that the czechs agreed to Munich. seeing as how they were just screwed by the french/british, why did they put confidence in the alliance working the second time around?

[Bluesman]

I think it is revisionist history, and I think history's original verdict was correct: Chamberlain appeased because he believed in it, not because he was compelled by hard power circumstances.

He was weak, his political opponents were strong, and to think that he was just doing the best he could with bad cards would be to slander Churchill as a political opportunist that simply made political hay out of a pore ole victimised but ultimately wise Chamberlain.

Well, Churchill was The One Single Human Being that saved the entirety of human civilization from barbarism, and Chamberlain was a weakling that risked it by empowering a brute that need not have been any threat to anybody, but for that very weakness.

By forgiving Chamberlain his completely avoidable error that cost so many so much, you imply that Churchill was not merely wrong, but mendacious. And the historical record isn't as muddy as you'd like to make it to score your point: it was CLEARLY seen by the eyewitnesses to these events that Chamberlain was weak, dishonorable, and it was HIM that had made a political calculation that placed the national interest second. All of those supposedly crucial details that you've cited really doesn't accumulate to make anything near the weight of his error on the side that HE BELIEVED IN, which was that he would have literally done ANYthing to avoid war.

And Churchill knew exactly what that decision meant when he said that the choice was between dishonor and war, and Chamberlain's choice brought both to Great Britain and the world.

It should be pointed out that we face a similar choice in the world today, and I expect that we're going to have our own 'peace in our time'. I certainly hope we'll also be granted a Churchill, too. Because Chamberlain - then AND NOW- is a loser.

[zraver]

finally, i was always surprised that the czechs agreed to Munich. seeing as how they were just screwed by the french/british, why did they put confidence in the alliance working the second time around?

The Czech's were in an untenable position, Germany poised to strike from three directions, Poland and Hungary ready to swoop in, a hostile minority and the only real aid (USSR) blocked by the other nations of Eastern Europe. If France was not willing to come out from behind the Maginot Line and thus force Poland into choosing ambitions on Czechoslovakia or keeping its alliance with France there was no one in the Czech's corner.

Britain could offer moral support as the leader of the European democracies, but a tiny army meant they could not offer much else. Limited credits to buy arms from whom ever was selling them, naval action against Germany etc, not nearly enough to rescue a landlocked country.