Chamberlain a new look.

[Bigfella]

Only a few?:)) I'm ok with probable, but the probability of anything changes when events change.

Sounds good to me.

Why "suffers considerably"?

I was talking about the Polish military. if I recall your counterfactual they join in the war with Russia. Given that Hitler covets a fair chunk of Polish territory I struggle with the idea that he will simply be happy to leave the whole Polish Army sitting over his supply lines. They will get good & bloody before the war is over (perhaps they get sent off to Finland to attack from the Nth).

We don't know what would have happened to Poland had it allied with Germany, because it didn't. But we do know that refusing to ally with Germany cost Poland dearly. So, let's replay the tape. Poland becomes an ally of Germany. Now what? Yes, maybe Germany strips off some territory later, but why?

Why? Because one of Hitler's driving forces was undoing the wrongs of Versailles & reuniting the German 'volk' under one nation. He was prepared to risk war with Britain & France to take Territory that had never belonged to modern Germany (sudetenland). I can't see him being squeamish about making demands of a Polish ally in a MUCH weaker position in order to reclaim territory that was German 20 years earlier. Do you really think he will allow Germans & German lands to continue under the rule of 'subhumans'?

In addition, Poland sits over the lines of communication to the new Empire & occupies bits of that too. Poland will be a rump vassal state.

But more to the point, Britain and France do not fall on their sword over Poland. No war there. Now Hitler, true to his dream, strikes east and, without having to do war with Britain, etal., defeats
the Soviets in a year or two at most. Meanwhile Britain, France and by now the US are increasing their military strength along with Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, Greece, the Commonwealth countries... Germany wins and consolidates its gains. Does it then make war on the rest of the world? Not likely, is it?

On the rest of the world? no, not likely. On some remaining bits of Europe? perhaps? You now have a battle hardened German military & a nation that controls the resources of Western Russia. It also has Black Sea access & owns the Caucases.

Which way do you think Turkey leans? Hitler can promise the Turks bits of Russia & probably Greece, plus a bunch of surpluss Russian equipment at cost (which was nothing). What can Britain & France realistically offer?

I think you also make a good point in your next line - Hitler was not much of a peacetime leader. He may not send the tanks south or west the moment the dust settles in Russia, but he will be looking to extend his influence. The notion that there was an 'enough' at which Hitler would stop is a victory of hope over experience. he still had unfinished business with France in particular.

And since we're in counterfactual land, with Germany not having all its resources drained by war there are penty of resources for some 'special projects'. Imagine facing a Germany in 1944 in possession of a viable force of jet aircraft, a more advanced missile program & with the resources to get serious about nuclear weapons. Better hope the Manhattan Project is as good in the ATL as it was in OTL, and even then there is no guarantee that America actually joins the war.

That's a nasty twist... have to think it over. Best scenario: Hitler dies, is assassinated, or marginalized... Germany now needs a peacetime leader which Hitler probably can never be.

Nasty indeed. Hitler called Russia 'our India', but the plan was straight out of the colonization of the New World - depopulation & slavery.

Unfortunately Hitler probably has a good few years to go. Once he has his victory in Russia he is politically unassailable & unlikely to me the ongoing target for assasination by anyone in a position to actually do it. The military caste in Germany only seemed to have the stomach for serious attempts when they were under serious threat, one way or another. With a mighty victory in Russia he will command greater loyalty than ever. Best hope for a plane crash.

Counterfactuals are fun.

[Tarek Morgen]

Do you really think he will allow Germans & German lands to continue under the rule of 'subhumans'?

He was willing to let South Tyrol to Italy to ensure that they keep on friendly termns. There was a time when a Italian-German war was not considered unlikely.

[zraver]

So, a further question for Z: Your argument is that Chamberlain made a flawed judgement call that was based on careful evaluation of the situation and rationally calculated, not that it was a right decision, correct?

yup, based on the situation he was presented with and without the benefit of hindsight, war was a losing option in 1938. That he was forced into this was due more to the actions of others years before who shaped the situation. Maginot winning the argument in France, previous British PM's allowing German rearmament etc. Chamberlain was left holding the bag.

[astralis]

zraver,

As "in dies the fire" SM Stirling?

yup. PM me if you're interested in the listserv.

[JAD_333]

I was talking about the Polish military. if I recall your counterfactual they join in the war with Russia. Given that Hitler covets a fair chunk of Polish territory I struggle with the idea that he will simply be happy to leave the whole Polish Army sitting over his supply lines.

Seems simple enough to me. Poland doesn't dare mess with its ally's supply lines. It would have been to Germany what it later became to the Soviets. There are a lot of potential avenues for goods to flow to and from German to the Ukraine, etc.

Map of Europe and the Middle East, 1939 to 1942

Why? Because one of Hitler's driving forces was undoing the wrongs of Versailles & reuniting the German 'volk' under one nation. He was prepared to risk war with Britain & France to take Territory that had never belonged to modern Germany (sudetenland). I can't see him being squeamish about making demands of a Polish ally in a MUCH weaker position in order to reclaim territory that was German 20 years earlier. Do you really think he will allow Germans & German lands to continue under the rule of 'subhumans'?

Yes, as long as he can control the controllers. From a practical standpoint, complete absorption of all the lands inhabited by German-speaking people would have been a administrative nightmare. However, the effect is the same if he can dictate their foreign policy and military makeup.

Which way do you think Turkey leans? Hitler can promise the Turks bits of Russia & probably Greece, plus a bunch of surpluss Russian equipment at cost (which was nothing). What can Britain & France realistically offer?

Turkey's best course is to remain neutral at least until it sees how Hitler fares in his fight with the Soviets and, if he wins, how he shapes his gains into a functioning state and whether he adopts a policy of coexistence. I see him craving respect from the whole world, not just from within his domain. Where does that respect come if the whole world is his? This is a question for Freud.:)

The notion that there was an 'enough' at which Hitler would stop is a victory of hope over experience. he still had unfinished business with France in particular.

It all depends on which is larger, Hitler's ego or his ambition. Insatiable ambition is every successful leader's downfall. From great victory to ignominious defeat is not a flattering chapter in history. Does he want that, or does it even matter to him? Going after France would be ambition gone too far (as if ambition had not already gone too far). It meant going after Britain too. A re-militarized Britain would be a tough nut to crack...and then there's the US lurking in the background...shades of Lafayette...does America abandon it's savior during the Revolutionary War?

And since we're in counterfactual land, with Germany not having all its resources drained by war there are penty of resources for some 'special projects'. Imagine facing a Germany in 1944 in possession of a viable force of jet aircraft, a more advanced missile program & with the resources to get serious about nuclear weapons. Better hope the Manhattan Project is as good in the ATL as it was in OTL, and even then there is no guarantee that America actually joins the war.

Well, all that came and more. Remember the Cold War. :))

Counterfactuals are fun.

Somewhat like theoretical chemistry and physics rolled into one, isn't it? Every action has a reaction and every alteration of the ingredients creates a new concoction.

[redco]

Yes, "a" war was inevitable, but of what scope? We have to see it as leaders saw it then, not from the perspective of 2009 where we know all the outcomes. If Poland had become an ally of Germany, it would have had to align its national interests so as not to be in conflict with Germany's. But that would hardly make it a vassal state.

Unfortunately for your scenario the Poles had no wish to align their national interests to Germany. There are occasions when nations do ally themselves to larger nations and are willing to modify at least some of their interests to do so, if in the larger picture the overall result is beneficial, but the Poles in 1939 didn't see any benefit in an alliance with Germany, especially seeing Hitler was making aggressive territorial demands on them, and offering nothing in return.

To be precise, Hitler didn't want a war with any of them, at least not in 1939. And it wasn't strictly dominance over Poland that he wanted. He wanted access to Danzig and an alliance. The first was a political necessity; the second a military expediency. Hitler's ultimate goal lay beyond Poland. When Poland became allied with Britain and France, foreclosing any possibility of a settlement with Poland on either count, he had "no choice" but to destroy Poland and confront her allies.

He did want a war with Poland in early 1939 when it became clear that Poland wasn't willing to hand over access to Danzig, and 'dominance' is the correct word to use when describing the relationship Hitler wanted with Poland, because he wasn't interested in treating the Poles as equals, all he wanted was for them to co-operate with his demands.

Even a politician/commander can count. How much better is it to sail through to your objective and gain 5 divisions along the way than to expend lots of war material and troops battling your way through? Although it turned out to be a cakewalk for Hitler, that was by no means certain before the invasion.

The Polish army was 39 divisions when fully mobilized, and I'm fully sure Hitler would have like to have gotten what he demanded without force, but once he had realised that Poland wasn't willing to cave in to his demands, he quickly decided that he would use force to destroy Poland as a nation.

March 1939, The British Guarantee to Poland, by Simon Newman, 1976.

I have not read the book. I don't even know whether Newman is a respected historian.

From what I've found out from a bit of digging is that the American writer Simon K. Newman's book is a revisionist book in which its argued that Chamberlain and Halifax had decided on provoking a war with Germany after Munich

I only have it second hand that Newman "believed" that Halifax was the force behind the guarantee. He was the one who hastily called the cabinet meeting where it was discussed and decided upon. He had argued forcefully for it.

Possibly, Halifax had come to realise at Munich that appeasement was a failed policy, but its equally true that the events of March 1939 had shocked Chamberlain to the core, and that he also felt the need for a line in the sand against any further aggressive German territorial demands.

Halifax, who believed erroneously that Hitler was about to invade Poland is also quoted as saying later, "there was probably no way in which France and ourselves could prevent Poland and Roumania from being overrun." From this it is possible to construe that Halifax wanted war.

Actually, all it proves is that Halifax was aware how little military help Britain and France could give in the short term, if Britain and France did go to war over these two nations.

Buchanan says the guarantee was foolish because Britain's national interests weren't at play in Poland. I wonder about that.

There is a saying 'Whoever dominates Europe, dominates Britain', I don't see how a Europe dominated by a rogue state like Nazi Germany which was willing to use threats and force and a total disregard for international agreements to get its way, was in Britain's national interest.

If it's true that Halifax wanted war, wouldn't it be in Britain's interest for the initial phase to be fought in another country? Halifax is also said to have believed that war was necessary to protect Britain's economic status. He was concerned that Germany was rolling up too many countries without a fight, and it had to be stopped to continue the effectiveness of Britain's blockade of Germany.

Any claim that Halifax wanted war is nonsense, Halifax hated war, but it was also true that he was concerned that Germany was getting too powerful for Britain, so he had come to the conclusion that a 'line in the sand' had to be drawn on any attempts by Germany to force other European nations to cave into her territorial demands. His hope was that the French and British commitment to Poland, which the two nations repeatedly made clear to Hitler in the run up to September 1939 would be enough to stop him resorting to force, but he had also accepted, as the rest of the British government had, that if Hitler did resort to force Britain would have to make a stand and declare war.

To me all the facts and theories about WWII are historical post-it notes that can be arranged and rearranged to make many different and opposing arguments. Some facts are rock solid. I know there was a war because I was born in the south of France 5 weeks before Germany invaded Poland, and I can remember the sirens going off when the war ended. I know I grew up in America because of the war. Well into my 20s, I heard my parents' friends, many who were displaced by the war, talking about their war experiences. It's quite different hearing about the war from people who were there in the middle of it than from people who weren't born until much later and got their understanding from books. I have nothing against good scholarship, and there has been some here.

The only thing you need to remember is that if Germany hadn't attacked Poland on the 1st September 1939 there would have been no war with Britain and France.

[redco]

He was willing to let South Tyrol to Italy to ensure that they keep on friendly termns. There was a time when a Italian-German war was not considered unlikely.

In the Nazi's racial mindset the Italians weren't considered subhumans, the Poles being Slav's were, and I'm quite sure given Hitlers high regard for international agreements any Italian ownership would have been viewed as merely temporary.

[cape_royds]

JAD,

I can't see any possible advantage for Poland in making an alliance with Germany to war upon the USSR, or vice-versa.

The only reason Polish independence had ever been power-politically conceivable in the first place, was that in 1918 both Germany and Russia were crippled. Once those two recovered, Poland's situation became most unenviable.

Note that even in our current era the same power-political logic applies: by 1989 both Germany and Russia were crippled as major powers, hence Polish independence revived.

Bigfella is quite correct about what would lie in store for Poland if they decided to embark on an inglorious career as "Crocodile Feeder." If Germany proceeds to beat the USSR, it all goes bad for the Poles afterwards. Cessions of Silesia and West Prussia would be called "territorial adjustments" (maybe the Germans generously give the Poles a bit of the Pripet Marsh to enjoy in compensation, i.e. it would be much like the 1945 displacement, but in the opposite direction). An isolated Polish rump state would soon result, under a "coordinated" government that exploits the considerable Polish anti-semitism and chauvinism to carry out a purge of "contaminating elements."

If by chance that war doesn't go well, and the old Entente revives, as I think it probably would under those circumstances (remember it was only Polish obstructionism that had aborted an Anglo-French compact with the USSR in 1938/39), then Germany eventually gets beaten, and Poland shares in the German downfall. Their independence gets ignominiously extinguished at the peace table, and nobody in the world would shed a salt tear for them.

Win or lose, there would be no future for an independent Poland in a German alliance.

Since it has been historically demonstrated that there was no future for an independent Poland under the Soviet aegis, then the question arises as to what the Poles could possibly have done in the late 1930's to preserve their independence in the face of the revival of their two great power neighbours.

I can't think of much. "Sux 2BU," about sums it up. It's the kind of story that makes it easy to understand the world's urgent need for nuclear proliferation.

[JAD_333]

Unfortunately for your scenario the Poles had no wish to align their national interests to Germany.

Y'mean I can't consider a make-believe scenario wherein the opposite of an actual event takes place because the actual event took place? :)

From what I've found out from a bit of digging is that the American writer Simon K. Newman's book is a revisionist book in which its argued that Chamberlain and Halifax had decided on provoking a war with Germany after Munich

Did you read it yourself? To clarify, rightly or wrongly (mostly wrongly) Halifax believed war was unavoidable. He, therefore, did not envision himself provoking the war, but rather provoking an earlier start to it. He feared that the more countries Hitler rolled up bloodlessly, the worse it was for Britain's standing in the world and its economy.

Possibly, Halifax had come to realise at Munich that appeasement was a failed policy, but its equally true that the events of March 1939 had shocked Chamberlain to the core, and that he also felt the need for a line in the sand against any further aggressive German territorial demands.

You are quite right that Chamberlain was shocked by the failure of his Munich deal. But he reversed policy (drew a line in the sand) for political as well as geopolitical reasons. He wanted to co-opt Churchill who was rallying support in Parliament for abandonment of the policy of appeasement. Had Churchill prevailed, Chamberlain's government might have fallen. Second, Chamberlain believed a guarantee would block any possibility of a German-Polish alliance and threaten Hitler with a two-front war. (Romania had signed trade treaty with Germany a few days before, and he feared Poland would follow.) They also wanted Poland's 55 divisions facing Germany not Britain and France.

Any claim that Halifax wanted war is nonsense, Halifax hated war, but it was also true that he was concerned that Germany was getting too powerful for Britain, so he had come to the conclusion that a 'line in the sand' had to be drawn on any attempts by Germany to force other European nations to cave into her territorial demands.

This is pure Sophistry. A leader can hate war, not want it, and yet initiate it for the good of his country. We don't want to pay taxes, but we do.

Halifax clearly backed a policy he knew or should have known would certainly trigger war. Maybe he hated doing it, but he believed it had to be done.

The only thing you need to remember is that if Germany hadn't attacked Poland on the 1st September 1939 there would have been no war with Britain and France.

But wait...that's what I said from the start, and it was also the main premise in my scenario, which you dismissed...I feel like I'm in a taffy pull...:)

[zraver]

Since it has been historically demonstrated that there was no future for an independent Poland under the Soviet aegis, then the question arises as to what the Poles could possibly have done in the late 1930's to preserve their independence in the face of the revival of their two great power neighbours.

I can't think of much. "Sux 2BU," about sums it up. It's the kind of story that makes it easy to understand the world's urgent need for nuclear proliferation.

Not really, Poland big downfall was the poor disposition of its military in September 1939 and the low amount of tanks and fighters. Both of these are reversible errors if a brighter mind had been at the helm.

A robust chicken-bone defense that concentrated on preserving the core polish areas while inflicting the most attrition possible on an enemy. A Poland that can defend its core areas is a serious problem for Germany. Hitler might be able to take Poland, but if the Germany army chokes to death doing it he hasn't gained anything.

The Soviet Union is a different problem. The sheer size of the Russian army is a problem. Denied the snow and broken terrain of Finland all Poland would ahve would be its own skill at arms and Soviet ineptitude.

[JAD_333]

JAD,

I can't see any possible advantage for Poland in making an alliance with Germany to war upon the USSR, or vice-versa.

Well, for starters, not getting it's butt kicked by the Germans would be nice and secondly not having the Soviets raping and pillaging would be nice too. A big bonus would be seeing the Soviets get a major haircut. Perhaps in time the price of an alliance would prove to be worse than having been invaded. You can assert that, but not prove it.

The only reason Polish independence had ever been power-politically conceivable in the first place, was that in 1918 both Germany and Russia were crippled. Once those two recovered, Poland's situation became most unenviable

.

All the more reason to settle on Dansig and strike an alliance with Germany. Hell, the Germans gave the Poles the opportunity for what amounted to protection from the Soviets. Beck miscalculated.

Note that even in our current era the same power-political logic applies: by 1989 both Germany and Russia were crippled as major powers, hence Polish independence revived.

I don't see the logic, just the parallelism.

Bigfella is quite correct about what would lie in store for Poland if they decided to embark on an inglorious career as "Crocodile Feeder."

With all due respect to Big's excellent hypotheses, he cannot be "quite correct" about Poland's fate as a German ally for the simple reason no alliance came about. One could argue that it would not have been in Germany's interests to treat its allies severely, even those they controlled. If Polish forces, fighting on the German side, were to learn that its ally was running roughshod over their homeland, just how reliable would they be?

If by chance that war doesn't go well, and the old Entente revives, as I think it probably would under those circumstances (remember it was only Polish obstructionism that had aborted an Anglo-French compact with the USSR in 1938/39), then Germany eventually gets beaten, and Poland shares in the German downfall. Their independence gets ignominiously extinguished at the peace table, and nobody in the world would shed a salt tear for them.

A credible scenario. Perhaps that's what Beck had in the back of his mind when he repeatedly turned down all of Germany's proposals, some quite generous, to settle the Danzig question. And in a way, he was right, although it took more than 40 years and a lot of suffering and oppression to prove it. Surely, Poland would not be in such good shape today had it allied with Germany in 1939.

Since it has been historically demonstrated that there was no future for an independent Poland under the Soviet aegis, then the question arises as to what the Poles could possibly have done in the late 1930's to preserve their independence in the face of the revival of their two great power neighbours.

Punt. Ally with Germany, help knock off the Soviets, assassinate the German-blessed Polish dictator as allied troops (minus the Soviets) near Warsaw, and surrender. Worked for Italy.

It's the kind of story that makes it easy to understand the world's urgent need for nuclear proliferation.

:)

[Triple C]

JAD,

Sir, I politely disagree. To argue Britain's policy initiated the war is to presume Germany did not want war. There is no evidence to suggest Hitler was not itching for a fight. Invasion of Russian was an issue already decided even before he came to power and what are the chances that Hitler would go East before he settled accounts with the French and the British? Anyone who could read a map knew conquering Russia would take all of Germany's divisions and then some. Would Hitler do that without securing his rear against a rigorous French or British response?

We know from hindsight that the French and the British had no stomach for a fight at that time, but Hitler did not know that--until Munich. As Bluesman said, Hitler could now tell his generals that the West was weak and ripe for destruction. =(

[cape_royds]

zraver,

Poland needed to not only defend its capital region, but no less the regions of Poznan, Cracow, and Lodz. Trouble is, the latter three are virtually within the German jaws from the start.

And of course there's no solution whatever to the strategic problem posed by the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement to repartition Poland.


JAD,

The Poles simply had no reason to trust the Germans.

The Germans during the Great War did everything they could to stymie the "Austro-Polish solution" of giving Poland autonomy in exchange for cooperation against Russia. The German occupation policy in Poland during that war was hardly conciliatory.

The late Pilsudski had volunteered to fight for Austria-Hungary during the Great War. Later on, the Germans threw him in jail for refusing to swear allegiance. Friends like that...

Józef Pi?sudski - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Also check:

Kingdom of Poland (1916?1918) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So why on earth would the Poles' nationalist government ever accept German blandishments at face value?

[JAD_333]

JAD,

Sir, I politely disagree. To argue Britain's policy initiated the war is to presume Germany did not want war. There is no evidence to suggest Hitler was not itching for a fight. Invasion of Russian was an issue already decided even before he came to power and what are the chances that Hitler would go East before he settled accounts with the French and the British? Anyone who could read a map knew conquering Russia would take all of Germany's divisions and then some. Would Hitler do that without securing his rear against a rigorous French or British response?

We know from hindsight that the French and the British had no stomach for a fight at that time, but Hitler did not know that--until Munich. As Bluesman said, Hitler could now tell his generals that the West was weak and ripe for destruction. =(

I appreciate your politeness.:) Let me be clear. Britain's policy, that is, its decision to guarantee Poland's independence triggered the invasion of Poland and, as expected, Britain's declaration of war on Germany. That left Hitler no choice but to fight a war in Western Europe against France and against Britain, a war he didn't want. That's not my argument; that's fact.

To answer your point about Hitler securing his rear as he launched war with the Soviets, if he could, as he did, topple Western Europe and chase the British back to their island in a matter of weeks, he could just as well remained an ever-present threat to do it. Poland changed that.

However, you are absolutely right in saying that Hitler was itching for a fight, but the fight he had in mind was eastward against the Soviets. Poland stood in his way. As events played out, he took Poland down in 6 weeks, but for well over a year before that he tried to woo Poland with diplomacy. Although Poland turned him down several times, he still hoped for an accommodation right up to the day when Britain announced Poland had accepted its offer of a guarantee. That effectively ended any chances he had of making a deal with Poland. A week earlier he had told his general staff that he DID NOT want a war with Poland. Now he immediately reversed course and ordered his general staff to plan an invasion.

Britain hoped its guarantee would deter Germany from attacking Poland, in part because, if Germany attacked it would have to fight Britain and France, as well as his main target, the Soviets. Hitler did not want a two-front war, but such was his burning desire to strike eastward that he was willing to risk it, and did.

Britain (Chamberlain, Halifax etc) thought, or rather hoped, Hitler would be deterred by their guarantee. Hoped because Britain knew it could not really save Poland if Germany invaded. Halifax said so later in clear terms. Nor could France help much.

We, with the benefit of hindsight, know a good deal about what the British, the Poles, the French and Germans were thinking back then, what they were right about and wrong about. For example, Chamberlain and Halifax rushed through the Polish guarantee because of false intelligence that Germany was planning to invade Germany within weeks. As I mentioned above, the exact opposite was true. Beck thought his 55 divisions could stand up to the Germans and with British and French help, fight the Germans to standstill.

British leaders were operating in an extremely tense and foreboding period. They did the best they could with what they knew and had to work with. When appeasement failed, they drew a line in the sand. They misread Hitler's intentions. Had they known, or had they been confident that Hitler's often-repeated goal of spreading eastward to feed a growing Germany was in fact his plan, not the conquest of Western Europe and Britain, there might have been no Polish guarantee, no invasion of Poland and no war with Britain and the US (at least not until the Soviets were defeated). IMO, we would have had to fight Germany sooner or later, but later (a year or two) would have been better.

I don't mean to be harsh with the British and apologetic for Hitler. Hitler's planned aggression is to be condemned. Britain's mistake lay in issuing a guarantee it could not keep. The idea that it could deter Hitler was badly thought through. Germany was well aware that Britain's military was weak and that the French were not much better off. To a madman, an ultimatum is an invitation to fight.

[JAD_333]

JAD,

The Poles simply had no reason to trust the Germans.

The Germans during the Great War did everything they could to stymie the "Austro-Polish solution" of giving Poland autonomy in exchange for cooperation against Russia. The German occupation policy in Poland during that war was hardly conciliatory.

The late Pilsudski had volunteered to fight for Austria-Hungary during the Great War. Later on, the Germans threw him in jail for refusing to swear allegiance. Friends like that...

So why on earth would the Poles' nationalist government ever accept German blandishments at face value?

I don't disagree with anything you said. However, I would point out that alliances with former enemies or even with traditional enemies is not unheard of. As the Arabs say, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." In Poland's case in the 1930s it was a choice of enemies, Germany or the Soviet Union. If either choice means pain, you choose the one that promises the least. It seems to me Germany was that for Poland.

BTW, Pilsudski, tried to get France and Britain to snuff Hitler back in the early 1930s; couldn't pull it off. So he signed a 10 yr non-aggression pact with Germany in 1932(?). There's a leader who thinks in terms of his nation's vital interests. He held his nose and dealt with the Germans. Beck, his successor seemed oblivious to his nation's interests, preferring instead to nurture old enmities.

Countries must always look to their vital national interests. Number one is security. Security means continued national existence. Doesn't always pan out, but that is no excuse for not acting.