In my recent spate of ACW reading, my image of Robert E. Lee has been downsized. His tenacious desire for the tactical offense bled the ANV, a luxury it could not afford. His greatest victory, Chancellorsville, was a near thing, resulted in a higher casualty rate than the AOP (to include more killed), and can be partly explained by the concussion suffered by Hooker - quipped Lincoln, "If Hooker had been killed by the shot which knocked over the pillar that stunned him, we should have been successful." He poorly adapted his leadership to the leadership style of his subordinates - his deferential manner of orders to Jackson was sufficient, but to some of his later corps commanders, led to confusion/inaction.
Had it not been for the forest fires in the battle of the Wilderness that forced some units further south during the initial fighting, it's very likely that the Union Army would have flanked the ANV to the south and rolled it up while it was still divided. In fact, the positioning of Longstreet's Corps is a demonstration of Lee's potentially poor grasp of operational distances and timing. He never again held the initiative once Grant took command of the Union Army and planted himself near Meade's AOP HQ. While people often praise Lee for his generalship, the irony is that had he not defeated the inferior commander, McClellan, during the Peninsular Campaign, it's possible that the war would have been lost, slavery would have remained intact within the South itself, and all the destruction that followed would have never occured.
In the end, I see Lee as a supreme tactician, but okay to lacking in the realms of operational maneuver, strategy and leadership (Grant faced similar challenges in trying to mold the eastern generals to his liking and in similar style to the western generals).
What am I missing? Does Lee deserve the reputation he carries today or is more a matter of a successful PR campaign by the Lost Cause narrative?
Had it not been for the forest fires in the battle of the Wilderness that forced some units further south during the initial fighting, it's very likely that the Union Army would have flanked the ANV to the south and rolled it up while it was still divided. In fact, the positioning of Longstreet's Corps is a demonstration of Lee's potentially poor grasp of operational distances and timing. He never again held the initiative once Grant took command of the Union Army and planted himself near Meade's AOP HQ. While people often praise Lee for his generalship, the irony is that had he not defeated the inferior commander, McClellan, during the Peninsular Campaign, it's possible that the war would have been lost, slavery would have remained intact within the South itself, and all the destruction that followed would have never occured.
In the end, I see Lee as a supreme tactician, but okay to lacking in the realms of operational maneuver, strategy and leadership (Grant faced similar challenges in trying to mold the eastern generals to his liking and in similar style to the western generals).
What am I missing? Does Lee deserve the reputation he carries today or is more a matter of a successful PR campaign by the Lost Cause narrative?
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