Lee vs. Grant

[Shek]

VI Corps rolled into DC the afternoon prior to the Battle at Fort Stevens

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_St...ashington,_D.C.)

They stood out compared to soldiers of the garrison with their sunfaded uniforms and lank an dlean appearance. They marched from the docks up 16th Street to the fort and arrayed the forces in front. The main unit engaged with Early was 3rd BDE, 2d DIV, VI Corps (43rd NYVI was part of them). While repulsing Early (who really attacked in a half hearted manner) the birgade suffered every field grade officer has killed or wounded.

The remainder of the troops in the Washington Defenses in the summer of 1864 were mostly 100 Day regiments.

Early was eventually run to ground in the Valley but there were too many departments coming together in the area to have a unified control...until Sheridan showed up with that charter.

Right behind VI Corps came the Xth Corps and the XVIIIth Corps from West Virginia soon followed.

So if Early heded north instead of South I believe the Xth and VIth Corps could either ride the rails or been shipped towards Philly AHEAD of Early.

As for an overall defeat of Grant by Lee in the summer of 1864? Wasn't going to happen. Lee's true offensive capability wash shredded beyween May 63 and June 64. He HAD to fight on the defensive.

Buck,
If you read further back, the scenario is that the AoP is defeated with 70% casualties. Suspending disbelief on this hypothetical, give those numbers, Lee has a ratio that could support offensive operations. Instead of Corps strolling back from Petersburg, you make have random regiments instead garrisoned somewhere in the DC vicinity, but the Corps structure wouldn't have existed in the form you laid out.

[astralis]

shek,

Flip the roles, and you nearly triple Early's force, add in the audaciousness of Lee, and mix it with the psychology of defeat/fear/panic stemming from the AoP defeat, and I see the ANV exploiting all of this in turning out whatever defenders remained. It wouldn't take him 3-4 months; instead it'd take him at most 3-4 weeks to get to DC in my book.

it'd have to take a complete collapse of morale for lee to break through in 3-4 weeks. at the time of early's raid the dc defenses were almost completely denuded, and even then early knew he couldn't take it. having 68 forts, complete with sited heavy batteries and trenches (not just rifle pits) would make DC an insanely hard nut to crack. petersburg was strong but couldn't hold a candle to a place which had been in the process of fortification for two-three years (defense renovation was finished spring '64).

with any AoP defeat dc would be a natural fall back position. it would take approximately 23,000 men to fill the forts and if the AoP was called upon to fill a garrison role, there would be a lot of vets, not panicky draftees, filling in those positions.

i used to have a book with a map of the DC defenses, complete with photos. pretty awesome to behold, abatoirs, bombproofs, trenches-- it would suck to be on the attacking end.

another book i'd look at is:

Amazon.com: Mr. Lincoln's Forts: A Guide to the Civil War Defenses of Washington…

[astralis]

AR,

Buck,
If you read further back, the scenario is that the AoP is defeated with 70% casualties. Suspending disbelief on this hypothetical, give those numbers, Lee has a ratio that could support offensive operations. Instead of Corps strolling back from Petersburg, you make have random regiments instead garrisoned somewhere in the DC vicinity, but the Corps structure wouldn't have existed in the form you laid out.

to give some context, we were discussing how relevant the ANV was after grant took over. my contention was that by july 1864 or so, a bad defeat of the AoP still wouldn't mean southern independence, the way it would if it occurred in 1862 or even 1863.

[Albany Rifles]

AR,



to give some context, we were discussing how relevant the ANV was after grant took over. my contention was that by july 1864 or so, a bad defeat of the AoP still wouldn't mean southern independence, the way it would if it occurred in 1862 or even 1863.

Concur.

And I am sorry I came in and squelched the discussion...but I am still hard pressed to find an occasion where Lee could have administered anything like that kind of defeat in 1864...unless Lincoln removed Grant and restored McClellan!

[Shek]

I came across some great material on the magnanimity and coolness of Grant yesterday:

http://deadconfederates.wordpress.co...t-chattanooga/

Giles was captured during a confused skirmish in the early morning hours of October 29. After running smack into a big, burly German private of the 136th New York in the dark, Giles and about twenty of his comrades were rounded up and marched back behind Union lines.

We were marched back and halted near General Hooker’s headquarters. By that time it was daylight, and the whole earth appeared covered with bluecoats. I was a Sergeant at that time, and the only noncommissioned officer in our squad. I was ordered to report to General Hooker, and was escorted to headquarters, between two muskets. Hooker was rather a pleasant-looking man, and returned my salute like a soldier. Then he began to interrogate me. He asked me a hundred questions and wound up by saying that I was the most complete know-nothing for my size he had ever seen.

That evening we started to Chattanooga under a heavy guard. We crossed the Tennessee River about four miles below Lookout Mountain. Near the middle of the bridge we were halted and formed in one rank on each side, to let some General Officers and their escorts pass. General Grant and General Thomas rode in front, followed by along train of staff officers and couriers. When General Grant reached the line of ragged, filthy, bloody, starveling, despairing prisoners strung out on each side of the bridge, he lifted his hat hat and held it over his head until he passed the last man of that living funeral cortege. He was the only officer in that whole train who recognized us as being on the face of the earth. Grant alone paid military honor to a fallen foe.

Grant doesn’t mention this encounter with Giles and his fellows in his memoirs, but he does mention encountering Confederate troops in the field, apparently that same day:

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured. In the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. This creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. As I would be under short-range fire and in an open country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left. When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the call, “Turn out the guard for the commanding general.” I replied, “Never mind the guard,” and they were dismissed and went back to their tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their post called out in like manner, “Turn out the guard for the commanding general,” and, I believe, added, “General Grant.” Their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps. General Longstreet’s corps was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General Longstreet’s corps. I asked him a few questions—but not with a view of gaining any particular information—all of which he answered, and I rode off

.

[Shek]

For those who aren't familiar with the story of Grant writing memoirs, here's a blog post on Grant by a blogger at The Atlantic.



These Are the Last Days of U.S. Grant - Personal - The Atlantic

[Albany Rifles]

B.t.w.

Happy Monocacy Day!

And as a result of Wallace's delaying Early for 2 days, the following occurred on 10 July

From Three Years With The Sixth Corps by George Stevens, regimental surgeon of the 77th NYVI


pp. 372-373. Arrival at Washington.

“ The process of disembarking occupied but little time. President Lincoln stood upon the wharf chatting familiarly with the veterans, and now and then, as if in compliment to them, biting at a piece of hardtack which he held his hand.
The column was formed and we marched up Seventh Street, past the Smithsonian Institute, the Patent Office and the Post Office, meeting on the way many old friends, and hearing the people who crowded upon the sidewalks exclaiming, “It is the old Sixth Corps!” “Those are the men who took Marye’s Heights!” “The danger is over now!” We had never before realized the hold which the corps had upon the affection of the people. Washington, and hour before was in a panic; now as the people saw the veterans wearing the badge of the Greek cross marching through their streets, the excitement subsided and confidence prevailed.


pp. 373. “...The forts were manned by a small force of heavy artillery, hundred days men, and detachments of the Invalid corps; and, as we reached the rear of the defenses, regiments composed of clerks and employees of the quartermaster’s department, with convalescents from the hospitals, marched past us to take their places on the front. These hasty levies were placed in the forts for the night, to be replaced by veteran troops in the morning.”



Three Years in the Sixth Corps - Google Books


And this was the best dispatch sent on 11 July regarding the battle of FT Stevens


WASHINGTON, D. C., July 11, 1864-11. 35 p. m.

Brigadier General J. R. WEST,

Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York:

We have five times as many generals here as we want, but are greatly in need of privates. Any one volunteering in that capacity will be thankfully received.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

[Shek]

Happy Monocacy Day!

And as a result of Wallace's delaying Early for 2 days, the following occurred on 10 July

From Three Years With The Sixth Corps by George Stevens, regimental surgeon of the 77th NYVI


pp. 372-373. Arrival at Washington.

“ The process of disembarking occupied but little time. President Lincoln stood upon the wharf chatting familiarly with the veterans, and now and then, as if in compliment to them, biting at a piece of hardtack which he held his hand.
The column was formed and we marched up Seventh Street, past the Smithsonian Institute, the Patent Office and the Post Office, meeting on the way many old friends, and hearing the people who crowded upon the sidewalks exclaiming, “It is the old Sixth Corps!” “Those are the men who took Marye’s Heights!” “The danger is over now!” We had never before realized the hold which the corps had upon the affection of the people. Washington, and hour before was in a panic; now as the people saw the veterans wearing the badge of the Greek cross marching through their streets, the excitement subsided and confidence prevailed.


pp. 373. “...The forts were manned by a small force of heavy artillery, hundred days men, and detachments of the Invalid corps; and, as we reached the rear of the defenses, regiments composed of clerks and employees of the quartermaster’s department, with convalescents from the hospitals, marched past us to take their places on the front. These hasty levies were placed in the forts for the night, to be replaced by veteran troops in the morning.”



Three Years in the Sixth Corps - Google Books


And this was the best dispatch sent on 11 July regarding the battle of FT Stevens


WASHINGTON, D. C., July 11, 1864-11. 35 p. m.

Brigadier General J. R. WEST,

Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York:

We have five times as many generals here as we want, but are greatly in need of privates. Any one volunteering in that capacity will be thankfully received.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

I think that Oliver Wendell Holmes has one of the most fascinating stories of the war, between his service, his multiple wounds, and the honor of calling President Lincoln a "damned fool" and being right.

[Albany Rifles]

I think that Oliver Wendell Holmes has one of the most fascinating stories of the war, between his service, his multiple wounds, and the honor of calling President Lincoln a "damned fool" and being right.

As much as I admire the Yankee from Olympus, alas, the quote attributed to him at FT Stevens is apocryphal....though I am sure he said it under his breath!

He represented the Harvard Regiment..who fought without poetry in their hearts!

[Shek]

[QUOTE=Triple C;730884]On a tangentially related topic. I have an amateur question that requires more informed insight: Why is it that the Confederacy routed Union forces in Chancellorsville, where Lee lost 25% of his army to casualties and inflicted barely more than 10% on Hooker, but failed to do so in the Wilderness, when AoV both inflicted more and suffered less punishment at 20% each, proportionally?]

I still need to read an in-depth study of Chancellorsville, but the ANV didn't rout the AoP. Hooker lost his nerve and withdrew after overriding his corps commanders, who wanted to attack. Otis Howard and the "damned Dutch" of the 11th Corps were the ones that got routed (with a repeat performance at Gettysburg to boot). As to your point about the change is ratios, you can look to two factors - who was trying to seize the tactical initiative through assaulting and the use of earthworks that sprung up as the Wilderness progressed.

I understand that Hooker and his divisions turned tail; what I don't understand is the physical mechanism that caused Grant's army to stand firm whereas Hooker's disintegrated. Was Lee's victory achieved psychologically, in the sense that he put the AoP in a position wherein continuing resistance meant being wiped out, even though its losses up to the point of defeat was comparatively light?

It was psychological. The AoP's last effort before Chancellorsville had been the Mud March and Fredericksburg, so it didn't have the W's under its belt. Also, Hooker was suffering from a concussion, which probably exacerbated his sudden case of cautiousness, after having done a brilliant job in stealing a march on Lee. When you look to the Wilderness, it had won a clear cut victory at Gettysburg, so Lee was no longer invincible. However, it came down to Grant, who had a clear strategic vision of the way ahead - there's a great vignette about how once Warren's Corps realizes that it's turning south instead of north (to recross the Rapidan River and end the campaign) after disengaging from the lines at the Wilderness, it lets out a huge cheer.

Additionally, would any of you gents consider Fuller's study on Lee and Grant worth reading?

I just finished reading it, and while I would recommend it, I would recommend it as something to read after Grimsley's Amazon.com: And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864 (Great Campaigns of the Civil War) (9780803271197): Mark Grimsley: Books (for a survey read of the Overland Campaign) and/or Gordon Rhea's five volume set on the Overland Campaign (book 5 has yet to be published).

While I agree with his conclusions (Grant was the better of the two) and agree with the thrust of much of his analysis, he overstates his case. He places Grant as far above Lee, and while I fully agree that Lee grasped strategy poorly and allowed his attachment to Virginia to blind his military judgment, the difference is as great as he makes it, and he undervalues the potential that the Antietam "campaign" could have had if Lee had experienced success. What is interesting is to read this after having read some of the recent seminal works and to see how some of the conclusions the Fuller makes have long since been eclipsed by more nuanced and accurate analysis.

[Albany Rifles]

Shek

I wish I was writing my thesis today rather than in 1992. The scholarship which is available today is so much greater than what was available then!

Good analysis.

I would also add a couple of the keys for the Union's tenacity at the Wilderness as compared to Chancellorsville were 1) the morale soldiers of the AOP were strengthened by the large number who had renenlisted. They knew they were there for the duration. 2) The division and brigade comamnders of the AOP were an excellent group and much of the political infighting was over and done with.

[Triple C]

[ As to your point about the change is ratios, you can look to two factors - who was trying to seize the tactical initiative through assaulting and the use of earthworks that sprung up as the Wilderness progressed.

Hi Shek,

Thank you for your reply. My understanding is that Chancellorsville was a confused battle in terms of who's attacking who because Hooker was confused. He was supposed to seize the initiative by attacking Lee, but once he made contact with Lee, he decided to sit idle where he was and neither attacked nor defended. Was Chancersville fought at a stage of the war where earthworks was still uncommon?

[Shek]

Hi Shek,

Thank you for your reply. My understanding is that Chancellorsville was a confused battle in terms of who's attacking who because Hooker was confused. He was supposed to seize the initiative by attacking Lee, but once he made contact with Lee, he decided to sit idle where he was and neither attacked nor defended. Was Chancersville fought at a stage of the war where earthworks was still uncommon?

Yes. The Overland Campaign marked a turning point in earthworks - they went from uncommon to absolutely necessary because of the very close and continuous contact. Earl J. Hess has written three books on the topic - one that covers '61-'64 in the East, then the Overland and Petersburg Campaigns. I still need to read a detailed history of Chancellorsville, but there were some minor earthworks that were constructed by some Union elements. Even at Gettysburg, where the two armies were in relative close contact with fighting everyday, you see only one unit digging earthworks - BG Greene at Culp's Hill, a decision that became very fortuitous when his brigade was able to hold off a numerically superior assault from Ewell after the rest of Greene's Corps had been removed from the hill.

[astralis]

i thought little mac used earthworks fairly extensively during the peninsula campaign. i know there was a considerable culture where hiding in earthworks was supposed to be unmanly, but that's a long time to go without it.

[Shek]

i thought little mac used earthworks fairly extensively during the peninsula campaign. i know there was a considerable culture where hiding in earthworks was supposed to be unmanly, but that's a long time to go without it.

My comment was on the extent of earthworks, to include in the offense and as a feature of particular battles in a war of maneuver. Mac had a siege mentality and not one of maneuver. The first couple of pages from Hess' Overland Campaign fieldworks book captures the difference between 1864 and earlier pretty well.

Trench warfare under Grant & Lee ... - Google Books