Lee vs. Grant

[astralis]

shek,

In thinking about this, Grant clearly was an operational/strategic level thinker. He understood the concept of a center of gravity (even though he wouldn't have recognized the term since Clausewitz, while published at the time, probably wasn't available in English, and even if so, wouldn't have been part of Grant's curriculum at any point), and that while it'd be nice to defeat the CoG at once (the ANV), it wasn't part of his expectation. Thus, tactical setbacks, while not preferred, simply meant that it was time to devise another means to attack the CoG. In looking at Grant's continual effort to devise a way to maintain the initiative and bring battle to the ANV on his terms, it becomes clear that an argument about "refusing to admit defeat" in large part misses the genius of Grant's generalship (although it does speak volumes to his character).

the question is, to what degree did lee recognize that grant was the holding force while sherman was the true killing force? and what parameters did davis allow lee to act?

ie it always surprised me that lee stayed with the ANV even after it was fixed in place following the siege of petersburg. do we know if he was commanded to do so, or was this a failure of imagination on lee's part? to the extent that he did think strategically, he acceded to longstreet's request to be transferred west in late 1863-- the question is why he did nothing when the situation worsened dramatically by mid-1864.

[Shek]

shek,
the question is, to what degree did lee recognize that grant was the holding force while sherman was the true killing force? and what parameters did davis allow lee to act?

I'd disagree with the notion that Sherman was the "true killing force." I wouldn't even term his actions as decisive, but rather as shaping. He never did crush Johnston's army, although I've read arguments that he "let" Johnston escape because even though he reputation was as a cold and heartless general, he really was ready to see the killing end and didn't see any benefit in pursuing the defeated army to its destruction. Regardless of one's take, the point remains that had Lee had the ability to outrun the Union corps following Five Forks, he still could have linked up with Johnston, although I don't see this doing anything other than prolonging the fighting another month or so.

Furthermore, while his marching through the heartland of the South was an impressive feat, and he did hurt the Confederacy's ability to produce food, his swath of destruction was only 60 miles wide at its maximum, and the South could have eventually repair the railroads. In my mind, I think that his biggest feat was the psychological blow by demonstrating that a Union Army Group could march wherever it pleased, although I'd be curious to read some primary source material or a good secondary source book that speaks to this and verifies it as being such a large blow.

For me, it's the utter gutting of the ANV by April and defeating the personality that defined the Confederacy, Robert E. Lee.

ie it always surprised me that lee stayed with the ANV even after it was fixed in place following the siege of petersburg. do we know if he was commanded to do so, or was this a failure of imagination on lee's part? to the extent that he did think strategically, he acceded to longstreet's request to be transferred west in late 1863-- the question is why he did nothing when the situation worsened dramatically by mid-1864.

Lee never saw himself as anything more than the ANV commander. He refused higher command until he was forced to by the Confederate Congress and Davis in the spring of 1865. I'm sure he understood the strategic situation as he consulted with Davis on strategic dispositions. However, I think he saw strategic dispositions through the lens of the ANV, although I haven't read any primary source materials that would provide the true answer on this (i.e., I haven't read his personal letters and only very little of the official correspondence, so this point could go either way). In the end, I think that Lee was more comfortable at the tactical end of the spectrum. Even his strategic gambits were or a tactical nature, attempting to defeat the AoP in the decisive battle, as opposed to a campaign.

[astralis]

shek,

Furthermore, while his marching through the heartland of the South was an impressive feat, and he did hurt the Confederacy's ability to produce food, his swath of destruction was only 60 miles wide at its maximum, and the South could have eventually repair the railroads. In my mind, I think that his biggest feat was the psychological blow by demonstrating that a Union Army Group could march wherever it pleased, although I'd be curious to read some primary source material or a good secondary source book that speaks to this and verifies it as being such a large blow.

the psychological/economic blow pretty much ruined the south-- it'd be interesting to see the desertion rates in the ANV say, november 1864 compared to feb 1864.

grant's genius on the strategic level was to make both the capture of richmond AND the destruction of the ANV largely irrelevant. for that matter, he made the existence of the ANV irrelevant.

think about it this way-- imagine if lee had destroyed the AoP in detail (say, 66-75% losses) in october 1862. that would most certainly have meant confederate independence. had lee done this in july 1863, he probably still would have won independence, although kentucky would in remain union hands.

but imagine if lee had done this in july 1864, or march 1865. i don't think in either case lee could have won independence for the south anymore. in this case, by july 1864 grant had not only taken away the initiative from lee, but fixed him in place. that, to him, was about as good as actually destroying the ANV.

[Shek]

shek,

the psychological/economic blow pretty much ruined the south-- it'd be interesting to see the desertion rates in the ANV say, november 1864 compared to feb 1864.

The problem with this is that you've got a cold Virginia winter, major offensive operations by the North, and starvation all playing havoc on the ANV psyche. Other than getting news at Christmas about the capture of Savannah, it was almost as if Sherman had orbited to the dark side of the moon. I suspect that his march probably had a very minimal impact on the ANV, although I could be wrong.

grant's genius on the strategic level was to make both the capture of richmond AND the destruction of the ANV largely irrelevant. for that matter, he made the existence of the ANV irrelevant.

think about it this way-- imagine if lee had destroyed the AoP in detail (say, 66-75% losses) in october 1862. that would most certainly have meant confederate independence. had lee done this in july 1863, he probably still would have won independence, although kentucky would in remain union hands.

but imagine if lee had done this in july 1864, or march 1865. i don't think in either case lee could have won independence for the south anymore. in this case, by july 1864 grant had not only taken away the initiative from lee, but fixed him in place. that, to him, was about as good as actually destroying the ANV.

I'd disagree with the July 1864 assessment, and the March 1865 scenario would make waves in the north, although I think that Lincoln would have still stayed the course. Of course, with his assassination in April, staying the course may or may not be a sure thing.

I'd also disagree with fixing Lee in place making him irrelevant. Grant hammered away at Lee with nearly monthly offensives around Petersburg/Richmond, slowly attriting the ANV and maintaining a constant pressure. While I agree that Richmond wasn't really a prize, bagging the ANV was. If Lee remained, then there was always hope for the Confederacy.

[astralis]

shek,

I'd disagree with the July 1864 assessment,

really? by mid-July Sherman beats Hood outside Atlanta. if anything, an Eastern defeat would push Sherman to force a capitulation even earlier than the end of August. the Union armies don't even need to beat the South so comprehensively that Lincoln is elected-- they just need to keep a Copperhead from getting elected. depending on how close they were to finishing the job by jan 1865, i wouldn't be surprised if the union army turns a blind eye to orders even if a Copperhead WAS elected.

and even with a comprehensive victory, i'm not sure the ANV could recuperate and take the war to the north in that timeframe. they couldn't seize washington dc-- too many forts-- they'd have to seize philadelphia for the war-winner.

While I agree that Richmond wasn't really a prize, bagging the ANV was. If Lee remained, then there was always hope for the Confederacy.

was the destruction of the ANV really the death knell of the confederacy, in comparison to the fall of atlanta, savannah, the devastation of georgia, and sherman's carolina campaign? i'm not trying to make this a "sherman vs grant" comparison-- after all, holding the enemy is just as important as the killing force.

but the success of sherman, and by definition the success of grant's strategy, meant that the ANV really had nothing left to defend-- their "country" was absolutely shattered.

[Blue]

I'll put this one to bed. Did any yankees ever name thier car after General Grant?

[Tarek Morgen]

does the M3 Variant count?

[Blue]

does the M3 Variant count?

Nope. Thats a govt tag. It has to be public adoration.;)

[astralis]

meh, the only thing good about THAT show was the re-make, with jessica simpson in daisy dukes washing said car

[Shek]

shek,



really? by mid-July Sherman beats Hood outside Atlanta. if anything, an Eastern defeat would push Sherman to force a capitulation even earlier than the end of August. the Union armies don't even need to beat the South so comprehensively that Lincoln is elected-- they just need to keep a Copperhead from getting elected. depending on how close they were to finishing the job by jan 1865, i wouldn't be surprised if the union army turns a blind eye to orders even if a Copperhead WAS elected.

and even with a comprehensive victory, i'm not sure the ANV could recuperate and take the war to the north in that timeframe. they couldn't seize washington dc-- too many forts-- they'd have to seize philadelphia for the war-winner.

was the destruction of the ANV really the death knell of the confederacy, in comparison to the fall of atlanta, savannah, the devastation of georgia, and sherman's carolina campaign? i'm not trying to make this a "sherman vs grant" comparison-- after all, holding the enemy is just as important as the killing force.

but the success of sherman, and by definition the success of grant's strategy, meant that the ANV really had nothing left to defend-- their "country" was absolutely shattered.

If Lee defeats the AoP in July, then Johnston is much more likely to remain in command, Sherman doesn't take Atlanta for many more weeks if not a month or two, and that's if he's not recalled with his army to take over and reconstitute the AoP. Even if Johnston is relieved and Hood still recklessly maneuvers into Sherman's hands, Sherman is then still likely to be recalled to reconstitute the AoP. However, if none of the above scenarios play out, there's still a change. Hood is no longer forced to make the Hail Mary play into Tennessee and can pressure Sherman through Georgia. His march, if he even attempts it, changes big time.

Furthermore, if old Jubal's raid in 1864 stirs up the home crowd much with forces locked at Petersburg and the ability to steam home a corps, then the effect is magnified after a catastrophic defeat of the AoP. Even with the 6th Corps (IIRC) steaming back from City Point, they arrived just in time to bolster the defenses before Early's Corps captured a foothold into DC. Of course, it's also possible that the defeated remnants of the AoP, which would comprise over a corps strength of soldiers would have then been garrisoned in DC, but facing a full ANV with its blood up would also present a new wrinkle.

[astralis]

shek,

Sherman is then still likely to be recalled to reconstitute the AoP.

interesting, even with grant disgraced? i would have imagined meade or sheridan would have taken over the AoP.

but facing a full ANV with its blood up would also present a new wrinkle.

given civil war type losses, the ANV would have probably lost at least a third of its manpower in dealing 66-75% losses on the AoP. the south of mid-1864 wasn't the south of mid-1863...not sure if it could take chancellorsville-type losses, do another long slog back to pennsylvania, and be ready for a fight in a few month's time like it could earlier. after all, the preceding overland campaign took a serious toll on the ANV.

the AoP in this scenario would just need to stay alive and prevent lee from taking philadelphia, maybe baltimore, at least until end of november 1864

[Shek]

shek,
interesting, even with grant disgraced? i would have imagined meade or sheridan would have taken over the AoP.

Grant never was the AoP commander. He was the General-in-Chief of the Union Armies and traveled with the AoP. The AoP commander from June 1863 until the end the of the war Meade.

given civil war type losses, the ANV would have probably lost at least a third of its manpower in dealing 66-75% losses on the AoP. the south of mid-1864 wasn't the south of mid-1863...not sure if it could take chancellorsville-type losses, do another long slog back to pennsylvania, and be ready for a fight in a few month's time like it could earlier. after all, the preceding overland campaign took a serious toll on the ANV.

the AoP in this scenario would just need to stay alive and prevent lee from taking philadelphia, maybe baltimore, at least until end of november 1864

If Washington falls before the election, then the peace faction would have prevailed. Additionally, Philly was poorly defended and the PA home guard showed itself to be quite apathetic and inept during Lee's 1863 invasion of PA. Taking Philly would not nearly be the task that DC would have been.

Lastly, defeating the AoP means that Lee can replace his losses in the ANV by concentrating the forces that were spread out across NC, SC, and in Richmond/Petersburg. After losing 40% of his forces during the first three weeks of the Overland campaign, he was able to boost the ANV back to it's original strength through the addition of the forces that had faced Hunter, Sigel, and Butler. So while the Confederacy had limited manpower, it wasn't at the complete end of the barrel.

[astralis]

shek,

Grant never was the AoP commander. He was the General-in-Chief of the Union Armies and traveled with the AoP. The AoP commander from June 1863 until the end the of the war Meade.

yes, but he so closely supervised meade and superceded him on several decisions that he might as well have been. sherman was known to be a grant "protege" or at least close colleague-- the association might have damaged him. Meade might well have been told to reconstitute the AoP, with sherman later taking Grant's position. the chain of command wasn't very clear, especially as the "General-in-Chief" position was so relatively new and poorly handled by Halleck before.

If Washington falls before the election,

washington i can't see-- those forts were too strong, even fairly minimally manned, for lee to handle. philly, maybe, but even concentrating his forces would take time out of a limited fighting season-- he has what, three-four months to concentrate, rest + refit, advance on philly, defeat the remnants of the AOP + whatever the union has scraped up or sent from the western theater, and then occupy philly.

if he could, i wonder what the philly/atlanta trade off would have looked like. how capable was lee in holding on to philly? what type of reaction would it provoke? would lee just take philly, hold on to it until the elections, and then retreat? how would the confederacy look by jan 1865?

well, you've provided me some good food for thought while i slack away in rosslyn

[Shek]

shek,
yes, but he so closely supervised meade and superceded him on several decisions that he might as well have been.

No disagreement there.

washington i can't see-- those forts were too strong, even fairly minimally manned, for lee to handle. philly, maybe, but even concentrating his forces would take time out of a limited fighting season-- he has what, three-four months to concentrate, rest + refit, advance on philly, defeat the remnants of the AOP + whatever the union has scraped up or sent from the western theater, and then occupy philly.

Petersburg was strong, too, but for Hancock getting lost (bad maps) and a lack of audaciousness on Baldy Smith's part, it would have been taken on June 15. Instead, it took another 9 1/2 months.

Flip the roles, and you nearly triple Early's force, add in the audaciousness of Lee, and mix it with the psychology of defeat/fear/panic stemming from the AoP defeat, and I see the ANV exploiting all of this in turning out whatever defenders remained. It wouldn't take him 3-4 months; instead it'd take him at most 3-4 weeks to get to DC in my book.

Any suggestions on books on the DC defenses during the war?

if he could, i wonder what the philly/atlanta trade off would have looked like. how capable was lee in holding on to philly? what type of reaction would it provoke? would lee just take philly, hold on to it until the elections, and then retreat? how would the confederacy look by jan 1865?

well, you've provided me some good food for thought while i slack away in rosslyn [/QUOTE]

[Albany Rifles]

No disagreement there.



Petersburg was strong, too, but for Hancock getting lost (bad maps) and a lack of audaciousness on Baldy Smith's part, it would have been taken on June 15. Instead, it took another 9 1/2 months.

Flip the roles, and you nearly triple Early's force, add in the audaciousness of Lee, and mix it with the psychology of defeat/fear/panic stemming from the AoP defeat, and I see the ANV exploiting all of this in turning out whatever defenders remained. It wouldn't take him 3-4 months; instead it'd take him at most 3-4 weeks to get to DC in my book.

Any suggestions on books on the DC defenses during the war?

if he could, i wonder what the philly/atlanta trade off would have looked like. how capable was lee in holding on to philly? what type of reaction would it provoke? would lee just take philly, hold on to it until the elections, and then retreat? how would the confederacy look by jan 1865?

well, you've provided me some good food for thought while i slack away in rosslyn

[/QUOTE]


VI Corps rolled into DC the afternoon prior to the Battle at Fort Stevens

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_St...ashington,_D.C.)

They stood out compared to soldiers of the garrison with their sunfaded uniforms and lank an dlean appearance. They marched from the docks up 16th Street to the fort and arrayed the forces in front. The main unit engaged with Early was 3rd BDE, 2d DIV, VI Corps (43rd NYVI was part of them). While repulsing Early (who really attacked in a half hearted manner) the birgade suffered every field grade officer has killed or wounded.

The remainder of the troops in the Washington Defenses in the summer of 1864 were mostly 100 Day regiments.

Early was eventually run to ground in the Valley but there were too many departments coming together in the area to have a unified control...until Sheridan showed up with that charter.

Right behind VI Corps came the Xth Corps and the XVIIIth Corps from West Virginia soon followed.

So if Early heded north instead of South I believe the Xth and VIth Corps could either ride the rails or been shipped towards Philly AHEAD of Early.

As for an overall defeat of Grant by Lee in the summer of 1864? Wasn't going to happen. Lee's true offensive capability wash shredded beyween May 63 and June 64. He HAD to fight on the defensive.