Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

[Double Edge]

As many as 100 people feared dead in Chinese earthquake

Rest in peace.

Last time that happened (2008?) we air dropped supplies and tents to them

[Double Edge]

India media needs to pick up such videos and showcase them across National TV Channels. There are plenty of these. And then, send a questionairre to the Chinese embassy the next day for answers. So many things can be done.

They will get the the same answer as the producers of this video got when they presented it to the Chinese embassy in London back in 2008. What i found concerning is this implicit threat to go into violence. The wisdom of the Dalai lama was to keep it non-violent up to this point. That's kept them alive. If they become extreme then the repression will increase and more innocents will suffer. It allows the authorities to treat them all as extremists which is what they want.

Wiped out in three generations ? does the CCP expect to last that long.

They are even going after moderate uighurs. And recently we heard no beards and forbidden names. Can't see that sitting well with the Paks somehow.

[Oracle]

Last time that happened (2008?) we air dropped supplies and tents to them

Unfortunate incident. India should help in any way it can.

[Oracle]

By needling 3 great powers simultaneously, China probably just punctured its own future

Great empires and countries often fall victim to hubris. The realisation that you are on top of things can sometimes make you act recklessly in conflict. The mighty Americans experienced this in Vietnam and a few decades before that Nazi Germany, tried to grab everything in Europe only to suffer the most humiliating of defeats. The Turks in the 17th century, when they tried to stretch their hands to grab the most important of all prizes, Vienna, and the British Empire’s short-lived excursion into Afghanistan are examples of reverses suffered by great powers when their ambitions tried to defy reason and logic.

Modern-day China is in a similar situation. Two years ago, the Middle Kingdom’s problems were only economic. There was a dispute with Japan and another dispute over islands with South-east Asian nations but that was it. China’s biggest problem then was to stop its economy from sliding into middle to low single digits and accomplish the great triple transition, the shift from investment to consumption, manufacturing to services and exports to domestic market.

The fate of that transition today still hangs in balance but China has unwisely managed to get itself embroiled in some ugly geopolitical disputes. What is more, these disputes are with powerful countries who have the ability to hurt its interests.

Whether China has done its due to overconfidence, hubris or just plain recklessness is unclear but what is clear is that China’s ambitious attempt to project power only tells a part of the story. It hides a problem, a problem that is likely to get bigger the more intransigent its leaders get.

Let’s examine more on this issue. North Korea is a festering sore with the US continuously haranguing China for its inaction in tackling the nuclear menace. The spat over South China sea islands continues and may get uglier. The Trump administration may be more assertive in dealing with Chinese infractions than the Obama national securitystate department team and that is not good news for Xi Jinping.

The biggest problem of them all is the stand-off with India in Doklam. China’s intrusion into the Bhutan-Tibet-India trijunction, its desire to build a road and get access to the commanding heights overlooking the Siliguri corridor is an example of the assertive politics that Chinese leaders and generals are willing to play. In 1962, China took advantage of Indian weakness and the foolish Forward Policy brinkmanship of the Jawaharlal Nehru-Krishna Menon duo to quickly teach India a lesson. In Doklam, as things stand today, we don’t know what will happen.Military experts and writers have talked about India’s strategic ground advantage and its tough stance and how China could be forced into looking for a face-saver given that India is not backing down. There could a war. Even if there is, is India better prepared than it was in 1962? We will never know for sure till it happens, but there is some evidence to believe that we are.

But let’s not talk of military action. Let’s look at trade where China is vulnerable and we are not. If China continues to be intransigent, can India hit back at investments and trade? Can India show that it can hurt China by stopping, reversing investments and clamping down on imports? This, to some extent, is already happening and it should know that trade is its soft underbelly and that India can hit where it hurts.

Trump, for China, is a far bigger threat. The US president has been warning China of trade repercussions if it does not behave. So far China has played ball only reluctantly and Trump has not been afraid of using the stick when he wants it. A recent China-US trade meet was not a happy one and Chinese banks and individuals have been targeted for sanctions. Chinese investments in US may be next on radar.

India, US and Japan, either together or separately have the ability to damage and thwart China’s ambitions. It can be done through trade, through joint military or diplomatic posture and even joint approach to strengthening relations and building investments in the emerging world. In 1962, India had no trade leverage over China. That’s not the case today. Will China be able to stomach a billions of lost opportunity in investment and trade if India decides to apply pressure? With the US, the lost opportunity in trade is bigger.

A recovering Chinese economy can ill-afford this hit. Some experts believe that Trump, despite his bravado, will not act against China. But that may be a hasty conclusion. Trump has shown that he is not afraid to act when it comes to protecting US interests and won’t hesitate to poke the dragon in the eye if he feels that it will serve him well politically.

Yes, China can probably not be defeated on the battlefield by a single nation without using massive power. But a club of nations, acting together or alone, can definitely peg back China’s ambitions. China should realise that the world has changed drastically since 1962.

[Double Edge]

Andrew Small on the Doklam standoff | The wire | Aug 06 2017

Why do you think the standoff happened? Was it India taking a step it wasn’t expected to or was China trying to test India’s commitment to Bhutan. Or any other reason?

There are several factors at play. China often has longer-term negotiating positions in mind with steps of this sort, which include the Sino-Bhutanese border – a frustrating lacuna among Chinese land border settlements – and the wider question of infrastructure development in these areas. There are also elements of miscalculation – India undoubtedly acted more forcefully than China had expected and Beijing likely thought this was far enough into the grey zone that it wouldn’t elicit such a response.

Meanwhile, the political environment in China leaves it more boxed-in than usual: the PLA’s 90th anniversary celebrations and the run-up to party Congress are not an ideal context in which to show flexibility. That combination – China’s underestimation of India’s response and a domestic context that limits its room for manoeuvre – can partly explain the unusually escalated tensions.

It’s hard to get away from the timing issue, though. While it’s always possible to lay out an overall guiding logic for China’s behaviour, that doesn’t answer the question: Why now? In that respect, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US has to be seen as providing immediate context while the general deterioration in Sino-Indian relations is the wider one.

China is looking to determine how various states’ dealings with the new US administration may condition their behaviour on strategic issues – is this an emboldening or an inhibiting backdrop for Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea and others? That’s increasingly the prism through which Beijing looks at relations with India too – inaccurately, I think, in this instance, but China’s proclivity is still to believe that, in the absence of US backing, its neighbours would take a more accommodating stance. With the present turmoil in Washington, China is putting this to the test by means of both inducements and pressure. In that sense, the lessons that Beijing will take from Doklam extend well beyond the border issues


How do you read the current domestic situation in China – the impending party Congress, the elimination of at least potential rival and Xi’s attempt to project power? Does it have anything to do with the border situation?

It provides a context for the border situation: there is always less room for compromise or manoeuvre during this phase. I’m not inclined to see it as a driver of China’s behavior in the first place though – I don’t think you get to Doklam via Sun Zhengcai.

An earlier interview with the former NSA

The only way to deal with the Chinese is directly, says Shivshankar Menon | Hindu | Jul 12 2017

Some suggest the stress point is internal for China, and President Xi Jinping is showing strength ahead of a possibly difficult Chinese Communist Party National Congress this October-November.

As a general rule, I don’t think foreign policy affects domestic politics in either India or China, certainly not to the extent most foreign policy wonks [assume it does]. India and China have very complex internal politics. None of our elections, for example, hinge on foreign policy. And in China too, like before 1962 with the Sino-Soviet polemic, foreign policy can be used in domestic debates, but it’s not what drives it. We should deal with what is on the ground and what we have, rather than where it has come from. This is not a mind-reading exercise. It is clear that we are not on the same page, which is why we need to evolve a new modus vivendi.

A Chinese scholar has suggested that if India could come to Bhutan’s aid, then a “third country” would be justified coming to “Kashmir’s aid”, referring to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Is China playing for a broader equivalence here?

I have lived long enough to hear all kinds of rhetoric from China, from the Cultural Revolution onwards. I am not going to judge China’s official policy by what a scholar or someone trying to build a reputation says, or someone who seeks fame at home by riding a wave of nationalism. We have scholars like that too, and let them deal with each other. But I’d rather go by what China does officially, and what they communicate to us officially.

Since the Chinese Foreign Ministry has invoked 1962, our Defence Minister has responded with an equally aggressive tone…

That’s an extreme, but part of any negotiation is also the threat of violence. Some of the rhetoric is often meant to make space for negotiation. So right now, we are working out the terms of engagement, but I don’t see it in either side’s interest to have a military conflict.

[Oracle]

DE, to be honest, I am confused and bored with all the commentary from all sides. I am thinking of taking a spiritual break. Will eat only broiler chicken for a week. And maybe travel to Pondicherry and visit Sri Aurobindo Ashram. And on my way back, smuggle some booze. Been long since I had an encounter with the police.

[Double Edge]

Have a good one : )

Indian forces strong enough to meet any challenge, says Arun Jaitley | HT | Aug 09 2017

“I agree that some challenges are still there. Some people are targeting our country’s sovereignty and integrity. But I am fully confident that our brave soldiers have capabilty to keep our country secure, may it be challenges on the eastern border or the western border,” he said. “The armed forces can give any kind of sacrifice for the security of the nation.”

Jaitley’s message assumes significance as it comes amid a two-month-long border standoff with China in Doklam even though he did not specifically mention it.

Now, the part that got my attention..

“Initially (after Independence), we faced a crisis. Our neighbour had an eye on Kashmir. Even today, we cannot forget that a part of the country has got separated. It is a wish of every Indian today as to how to retrieve that part,” the minister said.

Jaitley, who is leader of the Rajya Sabha, said today was the day to commit to make India a strong, just and economically-progressive country.

hint, hint...our reply to both our neighbours : D

Good enough response to the latest Kalapani hypothetical

If it isn't crystal clear by now that the existing border agreements with the Chinese as a result of over twenty years work are worthless. The time has come to hammer out something new like a comprehensive border settlement. Thing is the Chinese have stalled on that for years. They don't want that as it cramps their space. Then we will have a another hot border with them until change their mind.

[LongLurker]

Question to anyone who might know, I'm reading that China is increasing its buildup of forces in the area (admittedly from secondhand sources), while India is not reciprocating.

Can anyone establish whether this is true? Because if that is the case it strikes me that India will either back down, or be forced to back down, and China will continue road construction.


In a conventional war, can India go toe to toe with China on their borders?

I thought I read sometime back that China's side of the border has more infrastructure, and so they are able to get more forces where they need to be quicker than India can.

The sources have a Chinese bias though, but India seems to be focusing on a negotiated outcome and not preparing for the possibility of war while China is doing so (?)

How determined is India in this standoff?

[Double Edge]

What i've understood is the Indians have forces at the ready but the Chinese haven't moved any in. What have you read?

I've heard India is able to defend her borders. If you want to know more, read

https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/ha...er-with-china/

They can get people in, but they need to be acclimatised, also there are any number of choke points on the way that India can close

I cannot see a war achieving anything here for either side, China has to win, India has to not lose and in all likelihood a stalemate will occur which is no different to right now without a shot fired in nearly half a century. The knock on effect of a conflict now would lock both into an unending spiral in which both lose.

That they would go in and evict the road builders tells me of the confidence they have. The sundurng chu incident in '86 ended up as a big standoff with no shots. Op Prakaram in 2001 was the same.

The end goal here is a new border agreement if the Chinese are willing but business as usual isn't going to continue. Most analysts including the former NSA are supportive of our action to date. If we back down now or did not act earlier the same incursions would just continue as usual.

They move into contested territory claim its theirs and then threaten war if we don't retreat. A retreat implies territory isn't disputed and we have ceded Butanese territory to them by default. No talks. Nothing. All this over a difference in perception of around 5km where a peak should be They come across as unhinged if you ask me.

We were not going to allow them to build their road then have a discussion about when they will remove that road.

[LongLurker]

What i've understood is the Indians have forces at the ready but the Chinese haven't moved any in. What have you read?

As I've said, they are biased secondhand sources, but there are photos given. Cannot personally verify whether they are in fact going to the standoff, but The poster isn't really known for lying despite the chest beating.

https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/ind...t5934/page-392

I tend to ignore the chest thumping there though. Discussion has gone downhill in any thread related in anyway to territorial disputes involving China, I just view it as a better place for potential updates.

I've heard India is able to defend her borders. If you want to know more, read

https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/ha...er-with-china/

The original war college write up is very interesting, but it seems to reinforce the whole lack of infrastructure (though India is trying to make up for lost time?). I'm unsure how the manpower, artillery, and aircraft advantage distribution plays into this specific standoff, as I don't know the distribution, so I won't comment on those aspects. But it doesn't paint a pretty current picture in general, though India is no kitten.

They can get people in, but they need to be acclimatised, also there are any number of choke points on the way that India can close

I cannot see a war achieving anything here for either side, China has to win, India has to not lose and in all likelihood a stalemate will occur which is no different to right now without a shot fired in nearly half a century. The knock on effect of a conflict now would lock both into an unending spiral in which both lose.

Is India reinforcing its position? Because unless those photos are misrepresented, it seems like China is doing so. I can't see either side 'winning' a protracted conflict, but a short sharp conflict seems to be what both are envisioning.

That they would go in and evict the road builders tells me of the confidence they have. The sundurng chu incident in '86 ended up as a big standoff with no shots. Op Prakaram in 2001 was the same.

The end goal here is a new border agreement if the Chinese are willing but business as usual isn't going to continue. Most analysts including the former NSA are supportive of our action to date. If we back down now or did not act earlier the same incursions would just continue as usual.

Surely there must be conviction that they have an advantage, or that China won't be quick to escalate, but assumptions have been wrong before.

In the event China does not back down though and goes on the offensive, is the necessary support available for the troops there?

I agree that it would be very politically unpalatable for India to back down here, especially with the general election in 2019. A negotiated agreement would be optimal for India, but China has to play ball, and India should imo be prepared for the possibility that it doesn't, as China seems to be preparing for that outcome.

They move into contested territory claim its theirs and then threaten war if we don't retreat. A retreat implies territory isn't disputed and we have ceded Butanese territory to them by default. No talks. Nothing. All this over a difference in perception of around 5km where a peak should be They come across as unhinged if you ask me.

We were not going to allow them to build their road then have a discussion about when they will remove that road.

I'm not getting into the morals of it, but the tactic has worked out well for them before, if not producing results all the time, and it seems to be a common occurrence.

[Double Edge]

As I've said, they are biased secondhand sources, but there are photos given. Cannot personally verify whether they are in fact going to the standoff, but The poster isn't really known for lying despite the chest beating.

https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/ind...t5934/page-392

I tend to ignore the chest thumping there though. Discussion has gone downhill in any thread related in anyway to territorial disputes involving China, I just view it as a better place for potential updates.

No way to verify when those photos were taken and they are hosted at def.pk

The original war college write up is very interesting, but it seems to reinforce the whole lack of infrastructure (though India is trying to make up for lost time?). I'm unsure how the manpower, artillery, and aircraft advantage distribution plays into this specific standoff, as I don't know the distribution, so I won't comment on those aspects. But it doesn't paint a pretty current picture in general, though India is no kitten.

The part i learnt is India isn't as weak as reported in the north east. China wants to weaken that advantage. The disputed area in Bhutan just abuts the currently disputed area. Paper i posted earlier makes the whole plan clear. China doesn't want to get that advantage with bullets if a pen will work. Good luck getting the Bhutanese to cooperate, in which case there is always bullying.

Is India reinforcing its position? Because unless those photos are misrepresented, it seems like China is doing so. I can't see either side 'winning' a protracted conflict, but a short sharp conflict seems to be what both are envisioning.

This just in, we'll see if other outlets pick it up

Army Moves Troops of Sukna-Based 33 Corps to India-China Border | Quint | Aug 09 2017

(Note: it already happened 20-25 days back, no idea what the buildup is right now but we will find out eventually)

Key word i see there is 'posturing'. See my earlier post about Sumdurng Chu. 20k troops a side 'posturing' for close to a year.

if its short and sharp then its capture territory and then swap after cease fire. We aren't operating under the constraints we had in 1962. Frm the war on the rocks article posted earlier

As one army colonel candidly noted, mountainous terrain “can favor the first mover,” adding,

Once the Chinese seize a position, it may be very difficult to dislodge them. Rather than expend much blood and treasure attempting to storm impregnable positions, we should pursue a strategy of horizontal escalation and capture territory elsewhere.

Another Indian Army officer concurred, telling me that, “If the PLA strikes at Tawang (a town in Arunachal Pradesh), we can provide a mechanized Indian response via Ladakh.”

Ladakh and Northern Sikkim are both considered good locations for mounting such a mechanized riposte. Indeed, they provide some of the few staging areas along the Indian side of the LAC conducive to mechanized warfare and overlook main axes of approach (the plateau of Aksai Chin and the Sora Funnel) and logistical lifelines, such as the China Western Highway. In the event of conflict, India’s mechanized forces would sweep down from these mountain plains in order to conduct pincer movements behind advancing Chinese formations, with the hope of breaking the enemy’s troop concentration. India’s mechanized counter-offensive would only form one component of a wider theater strategy, however. In addition to these movements, Indian air and missile power would be brought to bear on transport and communication nodes deep within the Tibetan Autonomous Region, with the goal of delaying or preventing the arrival of PLA reinforcements.

Thing is India already has the troops there , Chinese have to arrive , acclimate then we start the shindig. If there is to be any.

Surely there must be conviction that they have an advantage, or that China won't be quick to escalate, but assumptions have been wrong before.

In the event China does not back down though and goes on the offensive, is the necessary support available for the troops there?

This

The absence of agreement on a formally delineated border, however, has not made China any less reluctant to progressively annex piecemeal more strategically-placed Bhutanese territory and attempt to move the tri-junction in the southerly direction by building border roads and presenting a new fait accompli to Thimpu each time. This is how the earlier tri-junction on the Batang La line at Gymochan – consolidated by a motorable border – is now sought to be pushed to the Doklam plateau. Such aggression has been happening in the face of the standstill accords of 1998 and 1999 signed by China and Bhutan. The two sides had agreed that pending a final resolution of the border, neither would disturb the status quo. In the event, when Thimpu complained of the Chinese road building around Doka La this time, the Indian army sprang into action. The rest is recent history.

India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj has calmly explained in Parliament that India will be happy to talk with Beijing, but only after it drops any preconditions and withdraws all its troops to the Batang La line, simultaneous to which, Indian troops would get out of Doka La. Beijing doesn’t have an option other than to agree to this offer. The PLA simply cannot muster the forces necessary to overcome the three Indian army Divisions in the Doka La vicinity in a short, intense, war. Delhi has publicly indicated that its military jump-off threshold would be if elements of the two Tibet-based group armies (each the size of an Indian division) begin crossing any of the 11 bridges over the Tsangpo River that runs parallel to the Line of Actual Control and enters India as the Brahmaputra.

Because the PLA has refrained from this provocation, India has been restrained as well.

But assuming it can mobilise and deploy the forces necessary to take on the Indian Army, the PLA will have to brave a very difficult logistics problem that its units will face.

The PLA has just about another month to start an affray before the weather begins closing in. Beijing apparently doesn’t rate the PLA’s chances highly. Otherwise, it would, by now, have done something instead of just raving and ranting.

I agree that it would be very politically unpalatable for India to back down here, especially with the general election in 2019. A negotiated agreement would be optimal for India, but China has to play ball, and India should imo be prepared for the possibility that it doesn't, as China seems to be preparing for that outcome.

Then we will have to treat each other as adversaries until such time both sides soften up. The present agreements are worthless.

I'm not getting into the morals of it, but the tactic has worked out well for them before, if not producing results all the time, and it seems to be a common occurrence.

Well there are ways to counter if one looks at a couple of incidents in the south China sea

Countering Chinese coercion in martime Asia | CSIS | May 2017

Two incidents are the vietnamese Oil rig and the second Thomas Shoal come under contestation and exploitation of physical control. Read those parts. The way to do it is to accept risk of escalation. India showed that determination thirty years ago. The Chinese know it.

[n21]

In a conventional war, can India go toe to toe with China on their borders?

India has 12 dedicated already deployed divisions for the Chinese front.Indian divisions are roughly 10-15k in strength. Some of the division facing Pakistan can be brought in fairly quickly as they are deployed in similar heights (10-15k feet). Armour (T-72) in Western LAC. So can be assumed T-90s will work here as well.

Roads are difficult but sort of deliberate to make it difficult for any Chinese offensive. However India has decent airlift capability. C-17,C-130,IL76,An32,Mi17,Dhruv,Dornier etc.. If the Chinese do manage to break through, they will be travelling through narrow passes, with drops of 2000 feet!. Near the town of Tawang, it is around.... 1KM!

Add to this, these mountains are thickly forested, where ATGM teams can create havoc.

Mountain warfare eat men. So the Chinese need atleast 12(actually they need 24) divisions to face off the Indian defensive and offensive units along the 2500KM front. You cannot hide 12 divisions in a arid and flat place like Tibet. Moreover inducting 12 divisions in Tibet cannot be done in couple of weeks. Most of the troops will fall sick due to lack of oxygen.

There are no rail networks from Lhasa to the border regions in Tibet. So any PLA mobilization would have to be by road and cannot be hidden. The offical strength PLA strength in Tibet before the standoff was 3-4 brigades.

The current standoff is happening in a area where PLA is in the valley and Indians on the ridges. Not an area PLA would want to fight in.

[Double Edge]

As i understood it China is threatening to wage war with India because India took over a patch of land that goats pasture in for four months of the year.

[Double Edge]

China has intruded into Doklam in the 60s

Doklam may bring Bhutan closer to India | Mint (Op-Ed) | Aug 09 2017

If India remains firm in its commitment to Bhutan, the Doklam standoff against China will only serve to deepen the India-Bhutan ties even further

The Doklam standoff on the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan is well into its second month and Beijing continues with its hardline position and refuses to negotiate on equitable terms. What it aims to gain out of this crisis has been subject to much speculation in New Delhi. Most likely, it hopes to peel Bhutan away from India’s orbit. However, perhaps it should recall the last Doklam crisis between India, China and Bhutan in 1966. That imbroglio only ended up strengthening the India-Bhutan alliance.

Sino-Bhutanese relations first took a nosedive in the late 1950s, mirroring the growing tensions between India and China over their boundary dispute. From 1958, Chinese maps began showing large swathes of Bhutanese territory as part of China. In 1959, as it suppressed the Tibetan rebellion, China also took over certain Bhutanese enclaves in Tibet. At the same time, around 4,000 Tibetan refugees entered Bhutan, straining the country’s limited economy.

Thimphu viewed these developments with alarm and responded by closing its northern border. It also moved closer to India and embarked on an ambitious project to modernize the country’s military and economy. While it had a special treaty relationship with New Delhi since 1949, the two countries did not share any formal defence arrangement until then. Fear of China changed the situation. The Indian Army began training Bhutanese forces. India also began pouring in economic aid into the country (increasing it by 1,000%), most of which went into building roads and airfields of strategic value.

The 1962 Sino-Indian war nudged Thimphu even closer to New Delhi, culminating in a formal security guarantee announced by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1963. For the rest of the decade, the threat of China always loomed over Bhutan, as the People’s Liberation Army maintained a large presence in Tibet. Accusations of border intrusions by both sides remained a common occurrence, usually followed by fiery rhetoric.

The most significant of such incidents occurred in October 1966, when Bhutan accused Chinese troops of intruding into the Doklam region. The Bhutanese trade adviser in Kolkata issued a press statement requesting India’s help. New Delhi immediately issued a note of protest to China along with the Bhutanese view that “the area was traditionally part of Bhutan and the Chinese government had not so far disputed the traditional boundaries which ran along recognizable natural features” (at the time, the Indian media misspelt the name of region, causing confusion for later historians).

The news generated an outcry in the Indian Parliament, with Balraj Madhok calling for the government to take a hard line. Atal Bihari Vajpayee even used the incident to urge India to develop a nuclear weapon. Four days after the initial statement, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi renewed India’s vow to protect Bhutan against any aggression. The minister of state for external affairs, Dinesh Singh, was immediately dispatched to Thimphu to assure the Bhutanese government of Indian commitment. China’s response, which called the news of intrusion an “out and out lie” and accused India of bullying its neighbours, stoked even further resentment in New Delhi.

While the Chinese troops withdrew from Doklam by the end of the month, the whole incident led to a flurry of exchanges between India and Bhutan and served to strengthen their defence ties. By 1969, 3,400 Indian military personnel were in Bhutan training its army, up from 100 a decade earlier. Hundreds more were attached to the Border Roads Organisation which was building roads in the country. A separate contingent of Indian police trained the Royal Bhutan Police.

In fact, in the mid-1960s, India and Bhutan had differences of their own. Bhutan’s internal politics was in turmoil (the Bhutanese prime minister was assassinated in 1963 by some of his own generals). More significantly, at the time, Bhutan was keen on receiving greater aid and investment from the rest of the world and joining international organizations like the UN. India was reticent on the issue, considering it “premature”. Either of these two factors could have easily derailed the bilateral relationship, had it not been for the constant Chinese threat highlighted by incidents like the Doklam intrusion.

By the end of the decade, the Chinese hostility had begun to recede, largely due to an unexpected development. From 1967, Radio Moscow began reporting Chinese troop movements on the Bhutanese border (often inaccurately). By this time, China and the Soviet Union were on the brink of war over their own boundary disputes. Russian reports were likely a menacing signal from the Soviet Union to the Chinese leadership to back off. By the beginning of the 1970s, China did soften its approach to Bhutan and many of its claims on Bhutanese territory stopped appearing on Chinese maps. However, by then the India-Bhutan alliance was stronger than ever before.

In 1966, it was believed that the Chinese intrusion into Doklam was an attempt to force Bhutan into a bilateral border negotiation, without Indian involvement. It is likely that Beijing hopes to go a step further with the current Doklam standoff. In the long run, a Sino-Bhutanese border resolution would be mutually beneficial, as would a Sino-Indian boundary agreement. However, forcing the issue by aggression is no way to go about it. If India remains firm in its commitment to Bhutan, the standoff will only serve to deepen the India-Bhutan alliance even further.

Sandeep Bhardwaj is a researcher at the Centre for Policy Research specializing in South Asian geopolitics.

[Oracle]

The area where the face-off is, the Indian Army controls the commanding heights. The PLA need 9 men versus 1 man from the IA to even seriously consider forcing India to back off. There is a Brahmos missile regiment in Arunachal Pradesh, which even a layman would guess have had their co-ordinates incase of war breaking out. An Indian mountain division has 15,500 men.

When Modi won in 2014, he made sure he wins 2019. This current incident will have near zero effect on his re-election chances, though I will not vote for BJP, if they make the mistake of backing down. This is Xi's nightmare, not Modis'. Border infrastructure. What is the infrastructure there? Road is the infrastructure there. China has not built a sky-walk in their border areas so that the PLA can come jogging. It's mostly a hype, as with most things Chinese. Climate acclimatization in makeshift tents/RCC buildings is pre-requisite. China doesn't maintain much of a presence in the border areas, India does. Rest, n21 has briefed what needs to be known.

Mountain goats are very tasty, I have grown up eating them.