The European Central Bank yesterday surprised the markets with a rate cut to stave off the coming threat of deflation. The cuts have not saved Greece which is a lost cause at this point, as their statistics office measured their inflation rate to -1.9%. This is Depression-era economics, when you're heavily in debt and you're deflating, it means what you owe goes up even if you're making the payments. In Greece's case, it makes systematic default more likely which will carry on to everyone they owe money to. Other countries in the eurozone though tip-toeing above the deflation category, narrowly deflating, on the verge, or have incredibly low inflation rates.
Prompt action required on eurozone deflation - FT.com
Prompt action required on eurozone deflation - FT.com
Despite the promising title of this article - deflation IS likely to become the key issue confronting the ECB in the coming months - I have to admit to having been disappointed by the end product. The writer seems to be talking about a world which existed before the start of the crisis, using stereotypes that seem to show their age. For example.
Right, Germany doesn't look like Japan in 1990, but it does look incredibly like Japan in 1997. The working age population is about to start to decline, there is a lot of debt still lingering in the banks that hasn't yet been cleaned up, and above all the economy is totally export dependent running a large current account surplus. Germany faces all the demographic challenges today that Japan did in 1997, which is actually when it really fell into deflation.
Germany is at risk of deflation today as the other Euro Area partners sink in. The Irish economist Philip Lane made the point at the start of the crisis that a short sharp deflation shock on the periphery might be no bad thing, since the deflation wouldn't necessarily become self-fulfilling as competitiveness would correct between countries and then the inflation rate would stabilise. Fair enough, but what he didn't consider, and I think we now should, was that THE PERIPHERY MIGHT DRAG GERMANY DOWN WITH IT.
What do I mean? That an ongoing drop in the price level on the periphery would force Germany to respond by also cutting costs in order that all the work they have recently generated didn't just move out to the periphery. There is no obvious win win dynamic from an internal Euro Area rebalancing due to the fact that the whole region is now ageing fast.
So you could end up getting a lose-lose dynamic where instead of a currency war between the various member states you get a price and wage cutting one. I mean, German domestic demand and inflation is not very strong at the best of times.
Here's another example of this old fashioned reasoning:
Look, this problem is now beyond conventional monetary policy help. Going down to zero won't make any significant difference to the deflation dynamic on the periphery. This one size fits all argument belongs broadly to the pre crisis era, even if perhaps countries like France, Holland and Finland are still being kept afloat by low rates alone.
Then there's more:
Again, we are behind the curve. Italy is already having nominal wage cuts via labour force churn made possible through the labour market reform. Old workers leaving and younger ones being employed on newer less remunerative contracts. My sense is that this is now happening all along the periphery. Nominal wages (on aggregate) are now falling. That is precisely why the deflation is coming.
Only yesterday afternoon the head of Italy's business lobby Confindustria told Reuters that Italy is in a worrying "situation of deflation". "There is a very negative sign, and that is that despite the one point increase in VAT the latest data show inflation is falling. This means we are well and truly in a situation of deflation. It is worrying," Giorgio Squinzi told reporters.
Now back to the FT article:
Well this is where we get to the heart of it. The Eurozone is now the biggest source of the CA surplus, since the periphery has now joined Germany in becoming export dependent for growth. This is what the US Treasury is kicking up all the fuss about. So together the Euro Area can finance, and this point won't be missed in countries like Italy and Spain. I expect the pressure for Japan style QE to become massive as the problem grows.
The two big questions about the future are:
Will Abenomics hold together long enough for it to still be seen as a plausible alternative?
Would Germany - in extremis - accept it. Which would be the worst scenario for Germany, accepting QE, or leaving the Euro?
"Within the very diverse monetary union Germany looks nothing like Japan did at the start of its long period of economic stagnation from 1990."
Germany is at risk of deflation today as the other Euro Area partners sink in. The Irish economist Philip Lane made the point at the start of the crisis that a short sharp deflation shock on the periphery might be no bad thing, since the deflation wouldn't necessarily become self-fulfilling as competitiveness would correct between countries and then the inflation rate would stabilise. Fair enough, but what he didn't consider, and I think we now should, was that THE PERIPHERY MIGHT DRAG GERMANY DOWN WITH IT.
What do I mean? That an ongoing drop in the price level on the periphery would force Germany to respond by also cutting costs in order that all the work they have recently generated didn't just move out to the periphery. There is no obvious win win dynamic from an internal Euro Area rebalancing due to the fact that the whole region is now ageing fast.
So you could end up getting a lose-lose dynamic where instead of a currency war between the various member states you get a price and wage cutting one. I mean, German domestic demand and inflation is not very strong at the best of times.
Here's another example of this old fashioned reasoning:
"That brings us to the heart of what is different about these two episodes. Any potential challenge from deflation in the eurozone lies primarily in Italy and the other peripheral countries. And the challenge is greatly exacerbated by the dynamic of a flawed monetary union. Just as a one-size-fits-all monetary policy gives an interest rate that is too low for Germany, it gives one that is too high for the weaker members of the eurozone."
Then there's more:
"The eurozone countries with the biggest competitiveness problems have no exchange rate flexibility. They will have to address their cost disadvantage through internal devaluation. That is where the latest eurozone inflation numbers become disturbing, because it is much easier to reduce real wages if there is inflation. With deflation workers would have to accept falls in nominal wages. In unionised countries such as Italy this is unlikely to happen without considerable strife, if it happens at all."
Only yesterday afternoon the head of Italy's business lobby Confindustria told Reuters that Italy is in a worrying "situation of deflation". "There is a very negative sign, and that is that despite the one point increase in VAT the latest data show inflation is falling. This means we are well and truly in a situation of deflation. It is worrying," Giorgio Squinzi told reporters.
Now back to the FT article:
"The eurozone is also in a less comfortable place than Japan in relation to government debt. Japan, as a big international creditor, has no need of external funds to finance its deficits..................... Because these countries have been forced into fiscal austerity and borrow at interest rates that exceed the growth rate of nominal GDP, public sector debt rises inexorably. Deflation would further increase that debt burden."
The two big questions about the future are:
Will Abenomics hold together long enough for it to still be seen as a plausible alternative?
Would Germany - in extremis - accept it. Which would be the worst scenario for Germany, accepting QE, or leaving the Euro?
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