USS Iowa vs. IJNS Yamato??

[Shinytop]

One of the great strengths of forums is that you can get information from or about individuals that is not often published in history books. Thank you for the been there done that viewpoint of your father.

[Monash]

I believe that by 1944, the US Navy was at its Zenith in terms of what it was bringing to the table, technologically, but more importantly, in terms of training and experience to take that technology and operate it at its peak efficiency. Both the German, and Japanese navies had long since retreated from their respective high water marks. At that point in time, the US navy sailor, and the officers that led them, were about as good as it gets. That is not intended as a slight against our British (to include the other members of the Commonwealth) cousins. No, it's just that there were so many more of us operating in the Pacific in particular, and that force had undergone changes, both evolutionary and revolutionary, in nature, and learned on the fly how to bring those changes to bear as a cohesive unit. Our training pipeline alone put us light years ahead of the Japanese. One thing we never did was succumb to the temptation of keeping our best and brightest at the front until the war was either won, or they were killed. We brought them home to teach our new officers and men how to do it. One can talk until one is blue in the face regarding the merits of one ship class over another, but until one stops and smells the coffee, one will not realize that the war in the Pacific was not won on the decks of battleships or aircraft carriers, but in the classroom, in the rear training areas, and perhaps most importantly, in the 6000 mile long supply train we dragged with us everywhere we went. That's what sank Yamato and Musashi; not airplanes or another battleship, but training and logistics. Boring yes? But true nonetheless.

Desert 2, for what it's worth coming from an amateur I think you hit most of the key points spot on. However couldn't it be argued that what really sunk the Yamato, the IJN and indeed Imperial Japan itself was the U.S submarine warfare campaign combined with simple geology. In the Pacific war both sides had powerful navies and long logistics chains. What differed was the efficient, almost clinical way the U.S severed Japanese supply lines combined with the fact that unlike the U.S Japan had to import every critical raw material for it's war effort (oil, iron ore, and aluminum etc) from outside it's own geographic boundaries.

Japan could have driven the U.S out of the Western Pacific, pushed the British back into India, isolated Australia and captured the Hawaiian Islands, the Aleutians and Alaska, and they would still have lost the war - because the U.S. had access to all the raw materials it needed to rebuilt it's armed forces within the boundaries of the continental U.S.A. Japan on the other hand had to import everything except for a small amount of coking coal and iron ore by sea. Add America's (at least then) vastly more efficient and effective war industries and as far as I can see there was nothing Japan could reasonably have hoped to accomplish in the time available to it that would have prevented it's defeat. I believe Isoroku Yamamoto himself commented to the effect that Japan would lose the war if it couldn't force the U.S to the negotiating table in short order. Pity they didn't listen.

[desertswo]

Desert 2, for what it's worth coming from an amateur I think you hit most of the key points spot on. However couldn't it be argued that what really sunk the Yamato, the IJN and indeed Imperial Japan itself was the U.S submarine warfare campaign combined simple geology. In the Pacific war both sides had powerful navies and long logistics chains. What differed was the efficient, almost clinical way the U.S severed Japanese supply lines combined with the fact that unlike the U.S Japan had to import every critical raw material for it's war effort (oil, iron ore, and aluminum etc) from outside it's own geographic boundaries.

Japan could have driven the U.S out of the Eastern Pacific, pushed the British back into India, isolated Australia and captured the Hawaiian Islands, the Aleutians and Alaska, and they would still have lost the war - because the U.S. had access to all the raw materials it needed to rebuilt it's armed forces within the boundaries of the continental U.S.A. Japan on the other hand had to import everything except for a small amount of coking coal and iron ore by sea. Add America's (at least then) vastly more efficient and effective war industries and as far as I can see there was nothing Japan could reasonably have hoped to accomplish in the time available to it that would have prevented it's defeat. I believe Isoroku Yamamoto himself commented to the effect that Japan would lose the war if it couldn't force the U.S to the negotiating table in short order. Pity they didn't listen.

And how do you think those submariners learned their craft, of the supplies they needed arrived first at Pearl Harbor, and then in Australia. Magic, right?

[Monash]

And how do you think those submariners learned their craft, of the supplies they needed arrived first at Pearl Harbor, and then in Australia. Magic, right?

Err..no. In fact I believe I was in agreement with your statements about the key importance of US logistical support to the success of the Pacific War effort. My point was that while the US could and did truncate Japan's supply lines Japan didn't and ultimately couldn't do the same in return - geography and geology being what they were. For Japan it was a case of no inputs, no outputs.

[Officer of Engineers]

And no clue.

[Monash]

The Imperial War Cabinet certainly deluded themselves regarding the probable outcome of the war and America's likely reaction to the commencement of hostilities - even assuming they had been able to pull off the Peal Harbor operation.

[85 gt kid]

Not to hijack the thread but what could they have done differently to win a war over us (or have made it much harder). I have 2 things that come to mind:

1) Launch a third strike on Pearl Harbor, destroying docks and fueling sites etc maybe even hit a flat top if they got a bead on one. Supposedly they were gonna do this and obviously didn't but if they had it would have slowed us down by a year or so but the end result would still be us winning (they'd still piss us of and we have to much resources to conquer there).

2) Keep provoking us to start the war by continuing to attack the Chinese and other countries, make us do the first move. Create a war where the American people do not want anything to do with and would eventually just pull out. I see this as being the better scenario BUT people were different back then so maybe they wouldn't have that mindset and we still would have won. The Japanese also didn't think like we do and may have seen that as weak or something.

Just my thoughts :D

[Monash]

Not to hijack the thread but what could they have done differently to win a war over us (or have made it much harder). I have 2 things that come to mind:

1) Launch a third strike on Pearl Harbor, destroying docks and fueling sites etc maybe even hit a flat top if they got a bead on one. Supposedly they were gonna do this and obviously didn't but if they had it would have slowed us down by a year or so but the end result would still be us winning (they'd still piss us of and we have to much resources to conquer there).

2) Keep provoking us to start the war by continuing to attack the Chinese and other countries, make us do the first move. Create a war where the American people do not want anything to do with and would eventually just pull out. I see this as being the better scenario BUT people were different back then so maybe they wouldn't have that mindset and we still would have won. The Japanese also didn't think like we do and may have seen that as weak or something.

Just my thoughts :D

Re; point (1) above and again speaking as a novice. It certainly was possible for Japan to a least temporarily neutralize Pearl Harbor as the main staging point for the Pacific Fleet via the oft talked about third strike at the fuel depots etc. But the effect would still be just that - temporary, a few months at best. The damage inflicted on PH could (and was) repaired fairly quickly after the attack. In order to be assured PH was neutralized permanently (i.e for 12 months or more) Japan would have had to commit forces to an invasion/occupation of the Islands immediately following on from their attack at PH. I'll let others talk to the difficulties that would have imposed on Japans timetable for its Pacific operations. The point is however that other than by catching all or most of the carriers in port along with the BBs there wasn't much Japan could have done to neutralize PH for the year or so you are talking about.

Regarding point 2 - As for making the first move, in a sense the allies did. They threatened to cut off Japan's access to oil if it didn't end it's military campaign in China. Given it only had something like 3-6 months of reserves (someone will know the correct figure) Japan either had to acquiesce to the Allies demands or else quickly initiate military operations to secure their all important oil resources - and guess which option they picked? Provoking a war with the US and then waiting for US public opinion to turn would have been disastrous from their perspective. Apart from using the time to mobilize and go onto a full war footing (as well as reinforcing their Pacific garrisons) all the US would have to have done was actually turn off the oil tap and then sit back and watch as both Japan's industrial capacity and it's armed forces wound to a halt! Once Japan declared war on the US it had no choice but to force a major confrontation and to do so quickly, it simply couldn't afford to adopt a defensive posture and wait for the US to make the first move. Not when every passing month would see the US grow proportionally stronger while it grew ever weaker.

Avoiding PH and just moving to seize non US possessions in South East Asia wouldn't have worked either. Firstly, invading those possessions would have had the same effect as ignoring the Allies original demands for a withdrawal from China i.e. the the British and US would have moved to put an immediate oil embargo in place - which again would have left Japan with two choices, give up or declare war on the US. Secondly they couldn't just leave the Philippines in US hands because geography made it the perfect location from which to interdict Japan's precious oil imports. So this option would have let the US strengthen it's positions in the Philippines and PH, place them on full alert and have it's fleet deployed for action.

Finally and as always once the war starts Japan only has 12 months or so before the weight US war production and manpower starts to swamp it. So I just don't see any war winning options for the Japanese as soon as they decide to declare war on the US.

[DonBelt]

point 1, the fuel depots, drydocks and facilities at Pearl and vicinity and getting lucky and catching the carriers in port. To that I would have added commence unrestricted submarine warfare along the west coast of the US to prevent resupply of Hawaii and other Pacific bases. Make every effort to take out the Panama canal by bombing the locks and mining the area and maybe they would have bought more time.
point 2, Attacking only asian countries to provoke the US into the first attack. I don't see how that would have given them an advantage either militarily or politically. Could they have kept that up in the face of an embargo which the allies would have had the forces to enforce? At some point in that scenario they still would have had to face American or allied forces in combat, but if it had been put off they would have done so with fewer resources as the embargo took it's toll. (I think pretty much Monash said the same thing) The question is, if they had successfully accomplished the goals in point 1, as well as prevented resupply from the west coast of the US, would they have been in a position that they could have offered a cease fire and some concessions to the US in return for the US allowing Japan to have greater influence in their " Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"? Ultimately I think not, but it was probably the closest chance they had. Just my unqualified opinion, but as others have said war mostly hinges on logistics and the material side and the US had the upper hand in that game.

[zraver]

Not sure the Panama Canal was feasible. Hitting Pearl a third time could ahve added six months or a year to the war, invasion longer than that. Winning at Midway would have added six months to a year as well. But nothing could stop the eventual US counterattack. Japa had too many weaknesses when it came to strategic depth- lack of ships building, lack of modern aircraft designs after 1942, shortage of pilot replacements, ineffective submarine doctrine, tendency towards complex plans, bureaucratic infighting, fighting on multiple fronts, lack of a merchant fleet big enough to support the war effort, lack of raw materials, lack of skilled technicians in the feild... each any every one a critical flaw and combined they were fatal to Japan's ambitions

[Officer of Engineers]

Hitting Pearl a third time could ahve added six months or a year to the war,

I strongly doubt it. Once the Japanese missed the carriers, they could not afford a 3rd strike. That was their operational reserves. The last thing the Japanese needed was American carriers on the horizon when they were bingo fuel and bombs.

[zraver]

I strongly doubt it. Once the Japanese missed the carriers, they could not afford a 3rd strike. That was their operational reserves. The last thing the Japanese needed was American carriers on the horizon when they were bingo fuel and bombs.

Sir they were not out of ordnance or av-gas, but the destroyers were critically low on fuel. Better planning on their part could have such as an at sea replenishment ship provided a 3rd strike. Japan had done underway replenishment going back into the 30's.

Sir we know for sure that Japanese carriers carried enough fuel and ordnance for at least 3 strikes (because of Midway where 3 strikes were launched/loaded). But it seems foolish to think the strike force at Midway only had 2 ground and 1 naval strikes (leaving it unable to support the invasion, or launch a follow on naval strike). It seems likely that the carriers carried at least 6 strikes worth of fuel and ordnance. The weakness was the Destroyers which (like US designs) were small 1500-2500 tonners with limited range (5-6K) miles.

[gunnut]

2) Keep provoking us to start the war by continuing to attack the Chinese and other countries, make us do the first move. Create a war where the American people do not want anything to do with and would eventually just pull out. I see this as being the better scenario BUT people were different back then so maybe they wouldn't have that mindset and we still would have won. The Japanese also didn't think like we do and may have seen that as weak or something.

Just my thoughts :D

What if the US doesn't bite, but only keeping the oil embargo in place? Japan only had enough oil reserve for 6 months to 1 year of operation in Asia. They had to take Dutch East Indies and Malaya. They had to transport oil from south Pacific back home. Philippines was in the way. A military planner had to eliminate this potential threat. Philippines led to Hawaii. That's exactly what happened. Japan was out of options. The only other option was to call it quits in China, lose face, and commit suicide. That wasn't gonna happen.

[Monash]

Gunnut, more or less my points, in the absence of readily accessible oil reserves in Manchuria or its other occupied territories Japan absolutely had to control the areas you mentioned if it wanted to continue its then ongoing campaign for empire. The US simply stood in the way.

[gunnut]

Gunnut, more or less my points, in the absence of readily accessible oil reserves in Manchuria or its other occupied territories Japan absolutely had to control the areas you mentioned if it wanted to continue its then ongoing campaign for empire. The US simply stood in the way.

Japan got into the game too late. It tried to play an 18th century game in the 20th century, against established players. The result was...predictable.