My ideas for a futuristic BB

[fitz]

Would you settle for sea bass? They are mutated.

Are they ill-tempered?

[Shipwreck]

Wouldn't it be neat if...

It wouldn't be neat to have three (or four) different *major* calibers on a single platform anyway. It would actually be pretty daft.

[Shipwreck]

I am to be sure no expert but I have studied NGFS - particularly from Korea and Vietnam - in some detail. One factoid that I came across interested me greatly. 6-inch and 8-inch gunfire tended to be used almost exclusively at ranges the 5-inch guns could not reach. 16-inch in turn tended to be used almost exclusively at targets outside the range of 8-inch gunfire.

a. 16" vs 8"

In Korea, only 20% of the 16" missions were outside the range of an 8" cruiser.

In Vietnam, 51.4% of the 16" missions (between September 1968 and February 1969) were outside the range of an 8" cruiser.

b. 8" vs 5"

In Korea, about 80% of the 8" missions (between May 1951 and March 1952) were outside the range of a 5"/38 (though only about 10% would have been outside the range of a 5"/54).

In Vietnam, for the period considered (Sept. 68 - Feb. 69), only 12.1% of the 8" missions were outside the range of a 5"/54 (though about 80% were outside the range of a 5"/38).

[B.Smitty]

a. 16" vs 8"

In Korea, only 20% of the 16" missions were outside the range of an 8" cruiser.

In Vietnam, 51.4% of the 16" missions (between September 1968 and February 1969) were outside the range of an 8" cruiser.

b. 8" vs 5"

In Korea, about 80% of the 8" missions (between May 1951 and March 1952) were outside the range of a 5"/38 (though only about 10% would have been outside the range of a 5"/54).

In Vietnam, for the period considered (Sept. 68 - Feb. 69), only 12.1% of the 8" missions were outside the range of a 5"/54 (though about 80% were outside the range of a 5"/38).

And all of which would have been within range of a modern, 52-cal 155mm gun firing nothing more than base bleed ammunition.

[fitz]

a. 16" vs 8"

In Korea, only 20% of the 16" missions were outside the range of an 8" cruiser.

In Vietnam, 51.4% of the 16" missions (between September 1968 and February 1969) were outside the range of an 8" cruiser.

b. 8" vs 5"

In Korea, about 80% of the 8" missions (between May 1951 and March 1952) were outside the range of a 5"/38 (though only about 10% would have been outside the range of a 5"/54).

In Vietnam, for the period considered (Sept. 68 - Feb. 69), only 12.1% of the 8" missions were outside the range of a 5"/54 (though about 80% were outside the range of a 5"/38).

Just a quckie...

Major General Donald M. Weller in his 1977 analysis of NGFS in WWII, Korea and Vietnam found that most 16-inch gunfire missions were fired at ranges that exceeded those of the 8-inch guns. About 25% of 8-inch gun missions were fired at ranges that exceeded the 5"/54 (not used until Vietnam anyway) - and thus likely a vast majority outside the range of the more widely employed 5/38.

[Shipwreck]

Just a quckie...

Major General Donald M. Weller in his 1977 analysis of NGFS in WWII, Korea and Vietnam found that most 16-inch gunfire missions were fired at ranges that exceeded those of the 8-inch guns. About 25% of 8-inch gun missions were fired at ranges that exceeded the 5"/54 (not used until Vietnam anyway) - and thus likely a vast majority outside the range of the more widely employed 5/38.

For Vietnam, Weller used the exact same source I quoted the figures from, i.e. CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-69, entitled "Main battery missions of NEW JERSEY, two 8-inch cruisers, and one 5-54 destroyer" (see the footnote on page 40 in Weller's paper).

This Staff Study 3-69 uses the following maximum ranges (page 8) :
* 5"/38 : 18,000 yards
* 5"/54 : 25,900 yards
* 8"/55 : 29,800 yards
* 16"/50 : 41,600 yards

Based on these ranges, 4 distinct range bands are defined :
* 0 - 18,000 yards
* 18,000 - 25,900 yards
* 25,900 - 29,800 yards
* beyond 29,800 yards

Then, the study gives a breakdown of the destruction missions fired in each range band for the 16"/50, the 8"/55 and the 5"/54 (table 9, page 14) :

Results in brief are :
* For the 16"/50 : 51.4% of the missions beyond 29,800 yards
* For the 8"/55 : 12.1% of the missions beyond 25,900 yards
* For the 8"/55 : 22.4% of the missions @ 18,000 yards or less

[Gun Grape]

Quick reply. The first paragraph. Right on, but even with CAS etc, if the battleships are there, why risk the pilot and the bird if the target is within reach of the guns? With a mix of 5", 16", and CAS, we would have even more options at our disposal.

Because they can be hit with an SDB from a B-52 loitering 60 miles from the target.

16in guns are not direct support weapons. They are the arm of the TF commander or LF commander. If it warrants something that big than I'm sure we can spare s JSOW/JDAM or SDB.

And a B-52/B-2 that drops them can be anywhere in the world in less than 36 hours. The planes and bombs are already in service, no recommissioning cost. The crews are already trained.

[ArmchairGeneral]

Good grief. Will it never die? I think this thread needs some butter cookies...

[fitz]

FF to 1991 and the average range for NGFS missions (excluding a few random events with 76mm) was about 35,000 yards IIRC.

[gunnut]

Are they ill-tempered?

Oh very.

[Doomarias]

Slap some of these on and you can have fun
http://content.answers.com/main/cont...-Paris_Gun.jpg


75mile range right ?

[Shipwreck]

Slap some of these on and you can have fun
http://content.answers.com/main/cont...-Paris_Gun.jpg

75mile range right ?

The Paris Gun was more than twice heavier than a 16"/50 Mark-7, with a barrel almost twice longer.

The Paris gun had a barrel life of 65 rounds. The caliber of the gun increased fractionally with each round fired, so that successive shells had wider driving bands to seat them (210mm for round #1; 235mm for round #65).

Each time the Paris gun was fired, the front of the chamber advanced forward around seven centimeters, and around an extra 10 kgs of propellant were needed to maintain range.

The 104-106 kg projectiles fired by the Paris gun had a high explosive payload limited to a mere 7 kg, because of the thick walls needed to withstand the enormous barrel pressure.

Accuracy of the Paris Gun was measured in miles, while precision simply didn't exist at all.

Max. ROF was 20 rounds per day.

[Doomarias]

The Paris Gun was more than twice heavier than a 16"/50 Mark-7, with a barrel almost twice longer.

The Paris gun had a barrel life of 65 rounds. The caliber of the gun increased fractionally with each round fired, so that successive shells had wider driving bands to seat them (210mm for round #1; 235mm for round #65).

Each time the Paris gun was fired, the front of the chamber advanced forward around seven centimeters, and around an extra 10 kgs of propellant were needed to maintain range.

The 104-106 kg projectiles fired by the Paris gun had a high explosive payload limited to a mere 7 kg, because of the thick walls needed to withstand the enormous barrel pressure.

Accuracy of the Paris Gun was measured in miles, while precision simply didn't exist at all.

Max. ROF was 20 rounds per day.

Yes im into ww1 arty, was kinda a joke. I know tapered bores were used in ww2 can we apply that tech to increase muzzel velocity, and therefore range of smaller calibre guns on ships.

[Shipwreck]

I know tapered bores were used in ww2 can we apply that tech to increase muzzel velocity, and therefore range of smaller calibre guns on ships.

This was a developmental blind alley.

[Shipwreck]

Collateral Damage

We need to maximize collateral damage around X target, the 16" will do the job and so on and so forth.

UTTER NONSENSE.

Among numerous reasons, *maximizing collateral damage* is NOT a legitimate objective in the US Navy.

From the COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (July 2007 Edition) :

(emphasis added)

8.9.1 General Rules

The United States is a party to Hague Convention No. IX (1907) Respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War. That convention establishes the general rules of naval bombardment of land targets. These rules have been further developed by customary practice in World Wars I and II, Vietnam, the Falkland/Malvinas Conflict, the Arabian Gulf, and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Underlying these rules are the broad principles of the law of armed conflict that belligerents are forbidden to make noncombatants and civilians the target of direct attack, that superfluous injury to, and unnecessary suffering of, combatants are to be avoided, and that wanton destruction of property is prohibited. To give effect to these concepts, the following general rules governing bombardment must be observed.

Link

Only Terrorists will seek to *maximize collateral damage* as an organizational goal.