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Earlier this year I wrote a paper in response to James Holmes' "China and Imperial Germany" article arguing that the PLAN in particular currently doesn't pose, nor will it pose in the future, as significant threat to the USN as the Kaiserliche Marine did to the RN during the turn of the 20th century up to WW1.
As part of my concluding remarks I speculated the purpose of their current carrier program and, in a larger sense, their aspirations of greater projection capabilities. However, that brought me to a question that I didn't quite answer in the paper. Why bother with a significant carrier program at the moment? Granted, a carrier is the epitome of naval power projection and the PLAN's carrier program is more or less the public poster child of their growing capabilities. But from a pragmatic stand point, how useful would a carrier or possibily in the near future a few carriers be? The PLAN would be at a significant disadvantage re carrier numbers for the near future when matched against the USN. Clearly, they've been working to narrow that gap by developing their infamous "carrier-killers", but no doubt their carriers are just as vulnerable as oursare, if not more so.
I suppose what I'm getting at is, is a legitimate carrier program for the PLAN necessary? I went on further in my paper speculating that the PLAN might be better off allocating resources to developing amphibious capabilities through more LPDs etc. The PRC would like to portray itself as being nowhere near as "imperialistic" as the US in their regional and international influence, but carriers are inherently a highly visible, offensive asset. On the other hand, if it enhanced its amphibious capabilities through LPDs, LHAs and the sort, they not only avoid the public exposure of wanting to build its offensive naval capabilities (although admittedly they lose the public appearance of building its naval capabilities) but they also assets more suited for MOOTW abroad as well as build a more credible threat in the Taiwan straits as a gambling chip.
This idea might be complete madness, but thoughts?
As part of my concluding remarks I speculated the purpose of their current carrier program and, in a larger sense, their aspirations of greater projection capabilities. However, that brought me to a question that I didn't quite answer in the paper. Why bother with a significant carrier program at the moment? Granted, a carrier is the epitome of naval power projection and the PLAN's carrier program is more or less the public poster child of their growing capabilities. But from a pragmatic stand point, how useful would a carrier or possibily in the near future a few carriers be? The PLAN would be at a significant disadvantage re carrier numbers for the near future when matched against the USN. Clearly, they've been working to narrow that gap by developing their infamous "carrier-killers", but no doubt their carriers are just as vulnerable as oursare, if not more so.
I suppose what I'm getting at is, is a legitimate carrier program for the PLAN necessary? I went on further in my paper speculating that the PLAN might be better off allocating resources to developing amphibious capabilities through more LPDs etc. The PRC would like to portray itself as being nowhere near as "imperialistic" as the US in their regional and international influence, but carriers are inherently a highly visible, offensive asset. On the other hand, if it enhanced its amphibious capabilities through LPDs, LHAs and the sort, they not only avoid the public exposure of wanting to build its offensive naval capabilities (although admittedly they lose the public appearance of building its naval capabilities) but they also assets more suited for MOOTW abroad as well as build a more credible threat in the Taiwan straits as a gambling chip.
This idea might be complete madness, but thoughts?
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