comparing fighter performance of the same generations; important factor in war

[Jimmy]

Ok,even I get it,but why bother with the pilot at all?Robin Hood can be taken by an arqebusier or musketeer.The pilot,an embodiment of human physical and intelectual perfection naw can be taken by a a few geeks driving drones.

Until someone figures out how to jam your control signal, or break the encryption and take control of it, or a drone loses contact and shoots down an airliner because of a preprogrammed ROE...

AWACS controllers used to be enlisted. Someone realized that in the event of a friendly fire or civilian mass-casualty incident, sending a sergeant to prison wouldn't be good enough. Now all controllers are officers. If an enlisted aircrew member isn't big enough to take the blame, how can a computer be?

[USSWisconsin]

I said that export MiG-21/AA-11 could have achieved 50:1 ratio against Typhoon or F-18 WVR decade ago.

Kill ratio? Are you serious? A 1950's SU platform against a front line US 1990's platform?

But real life is not video-game.

IMHO, The video game where this could happen would be in the fantasy games section.

[adriann]

Guys do not take that personal, just as in AIM 9x case

[Chunder]

"There is no substitute for doing it real".

Oh, ok, so we'll sent up a man in a QF-4 Drone, and repeat the process.

What a load of junk. The footage is there, the different aspect scenarios are there, with the decoy's.

Hard footage of EO DAS exists. Hard footage of Missile performance exists. The concept of Integrated C&C networking is understood, and done for real but yet we have to actually fly bodies at one another. Until then, 'Buy our stuff'.

Put quite simply, in commercial terms there is no play. Because if you wanted to buy X from say China, or Russia, they simply do not have the experience or comparable funding to produce such integration - so rely on the hard sell of the platform (and frankly I can understand the crisis of confidence that would occur if the former was truly understood). Everything that mattered to the west was bought in the 90's when the crumbling state put it up for sale.

[Chunder]

Its not system v solo, but system v system.

If they are not networked with one another - you see what I see across multiple platforms, then the information doesn't have redundancy.

I.E If Chinese fighter can see USAF fighter - (low observable fighter) but can't track or command, then SAM's have SFA chance of engaging.
If Chinese fighter with network gets shot down, and older chinese fighter does not have networking, fait accompli.

Doesn't matter if Chinese fighter shoots down one F-35, the whole network knows where that F-35 was. The shabby return that got discounted by AWACS, for example, is now a positive contact, Airforce, Navy, Marine F-35's see it. AEGIS might also see it.

Every system for war is a system, it's it's architecture that counts.

But like rumours of AshBM, I suspect it's more propaganda aimed at seeking out alarmist caution. G Roughead wasn't phased by the idea. Like many of these things, it isn't quantified. We had problems with the F-22. You can bet your bottom dollar they are having them with their Pak-FA, and the rest of it. None of it really matter though if you get your ass bounced by a L/O fighter before you see the ships, or none of your fighters return, or none of them even hit, or the Navy adds another booster. The Navy usually floats around with 40 A/C on deck nowadays, instead of 75. The sortie rate stays up, because the maintenance has gone down. We beat around about like a bunch of alarmists about the F-35, but are all too ready to give credibility to something we haven't seen. No wonder your 'military industrial' complex is doing relatively well, it seems to get defence appropriations from committees who have some sort of military equivalent to a hypochondriac alarmist!

[Blademaster]

I can think of one flaw in that logic. The Russians/Chinese sends up a bunch of MiG-21s as missile magnets exhausting your inventory.

Good luck finding the saps who would be dumb enough to fly those planes. Meanwhile, anti-guns have come to the point where they can take down MiG-21s easily saving those missiles for higher value targets. Moreover, radars are now powerful enough to determine the difference of Mig-21s from other kind of planes.

[Officer of Engineers]

Good luck finding the saps who would be dumb enough to fly those planes.

They already have them as does the InAF or do you think that the InAF never did contemplate kamikaze missions against the Big E?

Meanwhile, anti-guns have come to the point where they can take down MiG-21s easily saving those missiles for higher value targets. Moreover, radars are now powerful enough to determine the difference of Mig-21s from other kind of planes.

Same idea. If you want to waste time in a turning fight against MiG-21s, go right ahead. Their bellycrawlers can sure use the time to do what they need to do.

[zraver]

If they are not networked with one another - you see what I see across multiple platforms, then the information doesn't have redundancy.

The Chinese use(d) GCI so the redundancy is there.

I.E If Chinese fighter can see USAF fighter - (low observable fighter) but can't track or command, then SAM's have SFA chance of engaging.

Your backwards here, SAM's have much better radars than fighters thanks to bigger arrays and more power. If an enemy fighter is out of the clutter then the right type of radar can track it to some extent. Even if you can't lock a missile onto the bug sized object leaving a bus sized trail of disturbed air, you can get enough info to vector fighters or aim FLIR systems.

If Chinese fighter with network gets shot down, and older chinese fighter does not have networking, fait accompli.

Doesn't matter if Chinese fighter shoots down one F-35, the whole network knows where that F-35 was. The shabby return that got discounted by AWACS, for example, is now a positive contact, Airforce, Navy, Marine F-35's see it. AEGIS might also see it.

And when Chinese fighters start dropping they know the area of penetration. Unless we want to saturate an area using drones, then as anti-stealth technology improves the size of strike packages will remain small 2-4 craft either low and fast or very very high and in both cases looking for areas with the least radar coverage to minimize the need to waste fuel threading multiple needles to remain unseen.

Every system for war is a system, it's it's architecture that counts.

Thinking the other guy isn't thinking hard about how to use what he has to kill you is bad architecture...

But like rumours of AshBM, I suspect it's more propaganda aimed at seeking out alarmist caution. G Roughead wasn't phased by the idea.

Not sure he was considering the impact the AshBM would have on the Aegis ability to contribute to an air battle. I don't think the AshBm even if it exists is much of a threat to a force covered by SM-3 plus DEWS in the near future. But an Aegis system that has to devote even just 5% of its missile load overall has 5% fewer missiles to add to the air to air fight and each radar looking at the stars like a high school astronomy club isn't looking for aircraft.

Like many of these things, it isn't quantified. We had problems with the F-22. You can bet your bottom dollar they are having them with their Pak-FA, and the rest of it. None of it really matter though if you get your ass bounced by a L/O fighter before you see the ships, or none of your fighters return, or none of them even hit, or the Navy adds another booster. The Navy usually floats around with 40 A/C on deck nowadays, instead of 75. The sortie rate stays up, because the maintenance has gone down. We beat around about like a bunch of alarmists about the F-35, but are all too ready to give credibility to something we haven't seen. No wonder your 'military industrial' complex is doing relatively well, it seems to get defence appropriations from committees who have some sort of military equivalent to a hypochondriac alarmist!

I am sure they are having problems, doesn't change the fact that the threat is increasing. In the end it does not matter how many aircraft a carrier has on deck, if a L/O strike bomber puts a bunch of missiles in her or a sub puts some torpedoes in her, those aircraft are not flying. The navy is "hopefully" trying hard to (re)develop a force that can fight effectively together in a multi-environment engagement. Hopefully the Chinese are not trying even harder to develop stratagems designed to find the holes and exploit them.

The CCP can survive fighting and losing Taiwan, they can't survive not fighting over Taiwan. More importantly, can our commitment to Taiwan survive to US v China war #2 if we lose a carrier or two in war #1? We are broke and led by people who live on 2 year cycles, for whom compromise and take the easy path are matter of course, and who mostly do not understand how to effectively use our military.

[Chunder]

The Chinese use(d) GCI so the redundancy is there.

F-16A's in the 1980's used GCI for bears in the 1980's, but we don't believe such a system is adequate by itself anymore. We use a multitude of assets, ground, sea & air based.

Your backwards here, SAM's have much better radars than fighters thanks to bigger arrays and more power. If an enemy fighter is out of the clutter then the right type of radar can track it to some extent. Even if you can't lock a missile onto the bug sized object leaving a bus sized trail of disturbed air, you can get enough info to vector fighters or aim FLIR systems.

This is the quote Z;
"I.E If Chinese fighter can see USAF fighter - (low observable fighter) but can't track or command, then SAM's have SFA chance of engaging."

I am trying to make the point that if GCI can't see the object, but an aircraft can - how do they distribute that information back to their network.

And when Chinese fighters start dropping they know the area of penetration. Unless we want to saturate an area using drones, then as anti-stealth technology improves the size of strike packages will remain small 2-4 craft either low and fast or very very high and in both cases looking for areas with the least radar coverage to minimize the need to waste fuel threading multiple needles to remain unseen.

It's not that simple. They know that a contact exists in that area - but they do not know where. They do not know what bearing, what altitude, they can't triangulate, anything. You can make educated guesses as to how many. In any event, stealth isn't necessarily about avoiding the area of most radar coverage although it is to it's advantage, but controlling your aspect towards known radar coverage. In any case, as much as the enemy may know it's asset is in the area, you yourself will be taking that into account. It is a solid two way street.

Thinking the other guy isn't thinking hard about how to use what he has to kill you is bad architecture...

It's not thinking - it's a demonstrated paradigm. The west develops something, insecure elements demand a response, insecure elements must be satisfied that such a response is adequate. We're not talking about killing a platform, we are talking about killing a system networked system where multiple platforms share information as if they were tied together seamlessly, vs a fragmented GCI system that we know is not. One that can detect Missile launch, produce and map a response to the threat, download that information to every other platform that is available to respond, so if or when said platform doesn't live to fight another day to satisfy the juiciest of propaganda victories, there's a whole Armada out there that knows where you are.

No one is saying that you cannot shoot down X - it's just that your chances of doing so and living to tell the tale are not particularly great.

Not sure he was considering the impact the AshBM would have on the Aegis ability to contribute to an air battle. I don't think the AshBm even if it exists is much of a threat to a force covered by SM-3 plus DEWS in the near future. But an Aegis system that has to devote even just 5% of its missile load overall has 5% fewer missiles to add to the air to air fight and each radar looking at the stars like a high school astronomy club isn't looking for aircraft.

Not quite sure where all those fighters and bombers are going to be coming from with the amount of intel you guys have got to pose a serious risk to the U.S Navy I don't want to say it, but it's time you guys pretty much hardened up. If you loose one carrier, 50 aircraft and 5000 men you have another 9 aircraft carriers. If you loose a destroyer, you have another 50+ of them. If your willing to float one into harms way, be prepared to loose it.

I am sure they are having problems, doesn't change the fact that the threat is increasing. In the end it does not matter how many aircraft a carrier has on deck, if a L/O strike bomber puts a bunch of missiles in her or a sub puts some torpedoes in her, those aircraft are not flying. The navy is "hopefully" trying hard to (re)develop a force that can fight effectively together in a multi-environment engagement. Hopefully the Chinese are not trying even harder to develop stratagems designed to find the holes and exploit them.

As development continues, the threat always increases. But that threat should be assessed by those that know their tech and specifically to the debate - how to make that tech contribute to the fight/strategy and what exactly is the strategy. What you should know is the the U.S has a fleet of GPS satellites, supplanted by a fleet of Electro Optical Satellites that provide precise targeting information for it's guided missiles. The Navy will be working on a networked, outer layer of defence and a strategy.

The Chinese hope to find the CVBG in the middle of the ocean via the use of satellite surveillance - and then saturate attack. The calculations to be able to provide that find, are roughly 100 low earth orbit sats, flying on 3 parrallel tracks (at least according to Loren Thompsen whom I don't really hold much affinity for) Then point to launchers in that direction, and hope that a few missiles find the carrier group - through the screen, through the decoys, have adequate terminal homing to have any practicality, and hit not just any old ship, but the carrier - of which you have more than enough to threaten or undermine complete Chinese control.

The best way to influence Chinese Strategy, is to be good at what aim to do. Threaten Trade, threaten imports. Good enough to be confident that we will win at our game to stop them from taking something that doesn't belong to them, and let them know so by having confidence in our ability to do so.

The U.S Navy isn't worried about Chinese subs but that threat isn't actually increasing so im inclined to disagree with you there. If I were a Chinese sub, I wouldn't even be leaving port, put it that way!

The Following is part of an article from David Axe dated October 20 2011 - It is a little lengthy but the gist is there.

Crunching the Numbers

In early 2011, the PLAN possessed ‘more than 60 submarines,’ according to the Pentagon’s Congressionally-mandated annual report on Chinese military capabilities.

That force included five nuclear-powered attack submarines: three of the 1980s-vintage Type 091 Han-class SSNs that are rapidly reaching the ends of their service lives, plus two Type 093 Shang-class boats. The next-generation Type 095 SSN is due to enter service around 2015, according to Pentagon estimates.

The PLAN's diesel-sub fleet is much larger than the nuclear fleet: more than 50 in all, including 13 Songs, four of the newer Type 041 Yuan class, plus a dozen Russian-made Kilos. Obsolete Romeo- and Ming-class vessels round out the total for diesel boats.

Four or five experimental ballistic-missile submarines or ‘boomers’ – all but one of them nuclear-powered – comprise the remainder of the PLAN undersea force. By comparison, in 2011 the US Navy possessed 53 attack submarines, four guided-missile submarines and 14 ballistic-missile boats: 71 in all.

Just five years ago, US analysts predicted the Chinese submarine fleet would outnumber the American sub fleet by 2011. Writing in China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force, Richard Fisher of the International Assessment and Strategy Center predicted the PLAN would have around 74 boats in 2010 –a figure at least a dozen higher than the real, current total.

Something happened between 2006 and 2011 that changed the calculus for the PLAN submarine force – and by extension for China’s regional aspirations. Actually three things happened: China stopped importing submarines, while also putting the brakes on domestic sub production; and the US Navy successfully doubled its submarine production.

Moscow factored in the former changes. The purchase of a dozen Russian Kilos helped to boost the PLAN’s acquisition rate for submarines in 2005 and 2006. In both of those years, Beijing added seven submarines to its fleet, including seven Kilos overall.

But Russia is unlikely to resume supporting such a high rate of Chinese submarine acquisition, as Beijing is a potential strategic rival to Moscow – and since the Russian Navy’s own sub force is steadily declining to long-term levels of just a dozen each nuclear attack, nuclear ballistic-missile and diesel-attack boats. ‘There are powerful incentives for Russia to keep China just below its future submarine capabilities,’ Fisher noted.

With an end to Russian imports, China must build all its own submarines. But here, too, Beijing relies on Russian assistance. As late as 2003, ‘Russia continued to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India’s and China’s naval nuclear propulsion programs,’ the US Central Intelligence Agency reported.

The high rate of Chinese sub procurement in 2005 and 2006 justifiably drew the attention of Western analysts. But by using those years as their baseline, analysts often projected PLAN sub force levels that were unrealistically high.

From 2007 on, China acquired only domestically-built submarines, meaning the growth of the PLAN undersea force was constrained by the not inconsiderable limitations of the Chinese arms industry, which can’t function without Russian-provided engines and electronics – and which, even at the best of times, struggles with safety and quality control.

A possible case in point: in early August, there were unconfirmed reports that a Type 094 boomer leaked radiation during work on its electronic systems in the port of Dalian, apparently prompting the PLAN to cordon off the area and crack down on media coverage of the alleged incident.

With the Kilo purchase complete, Beijing added just two boats in 2007, none in 2008 and two each in 2009 and 2010. It appears that, barring a major reversal of the current trend, the PLAN will acquire no more than two submarines a year over the medium term.

That’s the same submarine production rate as in the United States – though only recently. In the early 2000s, Washington purchased just one submarine a year, on average. A cost-savings initiative launched in 2005 drove the price of the current Virginia-class attack submarine down to around $2 billion apiece, allowing the US Navy to purchase two Virginias annually starting this year.

US-built submarines traditionally last up to 35 years, versus fewer than 30 for lower-quality, Chinese-built boats. With similar pre-existing force levels and identical production rates, the US undersea fleet will level off at a higher level than the Chinese fleet will.

‘Excluding the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia, the total number of domestically produced submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2007 is 30, or an average of about 1.9 per year,’ wrote Ronald O’Rourke from the US Congressional Research Service. ‘This average rate of domestic production, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steady-state force of domestically produced submarines of about 38 to 56 boats of all kinds, again assuming an average submarine life of 20 to 30 years.’

And that’s being optimistic. ‘It’s possible that the greater resources required to produce nuclear-powered boats might result in a reduction in the overall submarine production rate,’ O’Rourke wrote. ‘If so, and if such a reduced overall rate were sustained indefinitely, it would eventually result in a smaller steady-state submarine force of all kinds.’

According to current Pentagon projections through 2040, the US submarine fleet should never dip below 51 boats, with a peak of 73 in 2013 and 2014. And all of those boats are nukes – a not insignificant distinction.

Sub versus Sub

Even under the most favourable projections, the PLAN will possess just a handful of nuclear-powered attack submarines at a time over coming decades. China’s SSN fleet could actually decline in the short term, as the three ancient Type 091s are likely to leave service before an equal number of Type 095s are ready.

That matters because only nuclear-powered submarines, with their high endurance, are capable of true ‘blue-water’ operations far from shore bases. It’s for that reason that all of the US Navy’s submarines are nuclear-powered: Washington’s global military presence demands it.

To project power beyond its own coastal waters, Beijing needs nuke boats. The fact that China isn't building large numbers of SSNs reflects either a lack of serious interest in a true, global naval presence – or an inability to back up grand military ambitions with working hardware.

China is left with an undersea fleet composed mostly of diesel attack submarines, which by virtue of their short range tend to be defensive in nature. ‘Current Chinese diesel submarines rarely deploy outside the first island chain (west of the Philippines) and essentially never deploy beyond the second (east of the Philippines),’ Cote wrote. ‘Nor would these submarines be well-suited for extended deployments into the Pacific or Indian Oceans because of range and crew habitability constraints.’

Even as defensive weapons, China’s diesel submarines lack flexibility. For one, ‘the PLA has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea,’ according to the Pentagon’s annual China report. Moreover, the PLAN’s subs are optimized for attacking surface targets such as US aircraft carriers. Lacking the most sophisticated sensors and weapons, they’re far less useful for hunting US submarines. ‘China has very limited (Anti-Submarine Warfare) capabilities and US submarines are the most difficult ASW target in the world,’ Cote wrote.

‘Thus, China would have difficulty preventing US submarines from operating in its shallow coastal waters,’ Cote continued. That’s important because one of the American subs’ main tasks is to destroy enemy submarines. China’s undersea fleet cannot prevent the United States’ undersea fleet from hunting it down in its own home waters.

Considering the imbalance between large, sophisticated, ASW-optimized US submarines and their smaller, less flexible, surface-attack-focused Chinese rivals, a census of the two nations’ undersea boats can create a false impression of near parity: 60 Chinese subs versus 70 US ones. But if the American vessels can hunt the Chinese vessels almost with impunity, it almost doesn’t matter how many submarines Beijing possesses.

Even if numbers really did matter, the trends aren’t in China’s favour. Beijing might match the United States in submarine production rates, but it can’t possibly keep up with the combined sub acquisitions of Washington and its closest Pacific allies. Japan is in the process of adding six diesel attack boats to its current force of 16. Australia aims to double its fleet of six diesel boats. South Korea is also doubling its six-strong undersea fleet. Two years ago, Vietnam purchased six Kilos from Russia.

In other words, more bluntly. A hole in an aircraft carrier doesn't mean that much if the U.S achieves her goal. You can't flinch in your willingness to achieve that goal. China will have to keep coming.

The CCP can survive fighting and losing Taiwan, they can't survive not fighting over Taiwan. More importantly, can our commitment to Taiwan survive to US v China war #2 if we lose a carrier or two in war #1? We are broke and led by people who live on 2 year cycles, for whom compromise and take the easy path are matter of course, and who mostly do not understand how to effectively use our military.

Z, China is ferked in a war. WE control the sea lanes, WE control the subs. Oil and export will evaporate overnight "If you owe the bank a dollar, they own you, if you owe the bank 1 million dollars, you own them". China's interest is to get us not to put up a fight over Taiwan period. It's whole rhetoric is aimed at scaring us, and getting us not to commit. The USN/Japanese/Sings/RAN are under no illusion as to the importance of controlling trade. The West only needs enough access at sea that threatens to destroy trade and curtail energy imports . Does anyone actually acknowledge how smurfed the PLAN will be against USN Subs? Does this actually sink in and gel with you why it is so critically important that the U.S Navy continues to sail through the South China sea, and not take any notice of Chinese rhetoric. Because it creates DOUBT in their mind. What you are creating is 'doubt' in our mind, if ignorant politicians on your 2 year cycle are worried about their paypacket think there is an electoral issue of another bad war through a mis-informed public, and not particularly interested in Military capacity then their tendency is to sign pacts and agreements increases. They (China) can't afford the dictum we will issue them with, hence their issue is to change the dictum we see fit to issue i.e we lost it before it ever begun.

Meanwhile the West's is dropping hundreds of billions on common networking to help increase situational awareness, shared sensor data, shared multi spectrum platform weapons release and I'm trying to talk to you when your stuck back in GCI land and claiming that we aren't thinking of how the enemy is planning to kill us. I'm not, I never stated as such and I never said they couldn't. I think, however, we are thinking about better ways in which to kill the enemy.

No real reason to be too fussed about any one platform. Every dog has it's day. The problem with platform centric thinking is that it ends up like the F-22. Death Spiral. It must be the best at everything, all the time, to silence the critics. Think of Death Spiral across every single platform. You couldn't do anything.

[Doktor]

How this got to USN-PLN?

[Chunder]

It wasn't intended to. But the mere fact we were crossing from network, to a platform centric commentary meant something had to occur I suppose I bought it upon myself though because I chose to say 'Chinese Fighter, rather than 'A fighter'. Illustration purposes only, no 'Chicom' paranoia here!

The whole thread is about being platform centric. It says so in the title. What you have to understand, is that the west isn't much about comparing fighter performance any more. That and engagements are offloaded onto weapons. It is rather conducting the fight. It isn't and wasn't my intention to get into PLN - USN, and I won't be continuing it. My interest in pursuing it was purely academic - I put forward an argument that there are multiple platforms that go into finding and executing an attack that share data, vs ones that are only mooted or don't exist, or if they do, certainly not really networked the way we intend them to be. Because nobody seems to know whether they are or not, the argument is always a pointless platform debate, in less polite terms, a pissing contest of platform v platform. There isn't any point in that. We simply don't have the knowledge, nor never will of what those platforms are capable of so it will never go anywhere.

To start off with, after that whole advertisement thing, the thread went into turn radius. We don't need to worry about that, because we have off bore sight missiles. Highly manoeuvrable. The debate went from there to 'well, it can only be tested for real'. Presumably because highly credible testing that exists, doesn't matter, One vs One this engagement has to be!

Well the West doesn't plan on fighting 1 vs 1, and it plans on having as much battlefield data available to it as possible, sensor sharing, and platform engagement sharing in so much is readily achievable. Which is probably a problem when a distant platform cues the launch of your missile, onto some bloke that your sensors couldn't use to guide your own tube. 1vs1 doesn't exist in as much is possible in the networked world.

To be clear, my knowledge on the subject is plebian. It pales in comparison and has probably misrepresented and insulted the sensibilities of some of the defence professionals active in the field. But you either get the potential of the capability, or your don't.

[dundonrl]

Doesn't matter if Chinese fighter shoots down one F-35, the whole network knows where that F-35 was. The shabby return that got discounted by AWACS, for example, is now a positive contact, Airforce, Navy, Marine F-35's see it. AEGIS might also see it.

if it's a modern version of the SPY-1 radar, such as the SPY-1D(V), and if the target is within range, yes the radar will see it.. (AEGIS is the entire combat system, from radar to computers to weapons)

[gunnut]

Manoeuvrability? 'Knife fighting' Why even bother ?

Point taken?

Don't be too proud of this technological terror you've contructed. The ability to of a missile to turn at 42G is insignificant next to the power of Pugachev's Cobra.

[Chogy]

The march in technology in this area is simply mind-boggling. If you showed those promo videos and missile shot videos to us in our squadron in 1987, I think you'd have guys damn near faint dead away. It makes me a little sad, because the technology has removed much of the man from the picture. We took great pride in our comm discipline, our sorting ability, our merge capabilities, and that is now in the hands of digital systems. Yet all that we've seen and discussed was in the pipeline or on the drawing boards back then. It was inevitable. I think it was also the reason the F-22 took so long. With these incredible advances not quite ready, the ATF was slowed down, placed on hold a bit, because the potential for these systems was so very high, and it made no sense not to get them on the jet.

When I ponder stuff like this, I think of the space battle scenes in the Star Wars movies. Ol' George couldn't quite grasp what the future held, and his space fighters were executing WW2-style attacks, guns only, against crew-served cannon-defended ships. X-wings were maneuvering to the six of the Imperial TIE fighters and opening up with a guns-equivalent weapon. He got it a little better in that Clone Wars movie where intelligent missiles (hundreds of them) were flying about at 100+ G on that planet-side battlefield. ;)

As for soaking up the missile inventory, our missile stocks during the cold war seemed astronomic to us. I can assume the numbers of modern missiles in any future conflict would be appropriate. If each sortie caused the destruction of 4 to 6 of the enemy, it would be only a matter of days before the enemy would be attrited to a desperate state, and national pride would not allow unopposed sorties over critical areas; up come the flanker equivalents, who would probably fare no better.

F-15, 16, 18 platforms will be with us for some time as well, and they are capable of handling low-tech threats.

[S2]

It's good for us when you muse.