Whats Your Favourite Strategy?

[Officer of Engineers]

Once you've killed the reserves, you've rendered the remaining force irrevelent. So, why the hell are you doing the fancy footwork when you don't have to.

You don't know a thing.

[lwarmonger]

Once you've killed the reserves, you've rendered the remaining force irrevelent.

How is that sir? Once you've killed the enemy reserves, the main force is still capable of manuever. And in modern mechanized warfare, aggressive movement by independant battlegroups would make a defending force still capable of turning to meet envelopments (thus making the main element act as the reserve would have had it not been destroyed). Not to mention the relatively unknown effect that anti-tank missiles in quantity can have on manuever warfare (a missile behind every window and embankment can take the steam out of an armoured charge, and slow down any aggressive movement).

[Officer of Engineers]

How is that sir? Once you've killed the enemy reserves, the main force is still capable of manuever.

No, the main force is not capable of manouver. Your backdoor has been cut off. Which only leaves 3 movements - flanking and straight forward. That leaves a problem. The enemy knows where you are but you don't know where the enemy is. Which leaves you recee by death - advance until contact before you can contact to manouver, meaning that you're now walking into a trap. The enemy knows when and where you're coming.

Better to let the enemy find you in strength which means a prepared defence.

And in modern mechanized warfare, aggressive movement by independant battlegroups would make a defending force still capable of turning to meet envelopments (thus making the main element act as the reserve would have had it not been destroyed).

But the envelopment has already been completed. The reserves are destroyed and you are now fixed in place - irrevelent. And if you do advance forward, you're now moving forward as a single independent echelon (battalion or company) and with no support from brigade or division.

Not to mention the relatively unknown effect that anti-tank missiles in quantity can have on manuever warfare (a missile behind every window and embankment can take the steam out of an armoured charge, and slow down any aggressive movement).

MOUT is another kettle of worms but a city again can be isolated and hence made irrevelent.

[lwarmonger]

No, the main force is not capable of manouver. Your backdoor has been cut off. Which only leaves 3 movements - flanking and straight forward. That leaves a problem. The enemy knows where you are but you don't know where the enemy is. Which leaves you recee by death - advance until contact before you can contact to manouver, meaning that you're now walking into a trap. The enemy knows when and where you're coming.

Only if your reserves have been destroyed by an enemy armoured force. If it is by airpower, as we are saying here, than the commander of the main element still has options. Decentralized decision making at the battlefield level is what made the Wehrmacht so effective during WWII, and while set piece battles have their appeal, I've always been a big believer in manuever warfare.

Better to let the enemy find you in strength which means a prepared defence.

An engineers answer! :)

But the envelopment has already been completed. The reserves are destroyed and you are now fixed in place - irrevelent. And if you do advance forward, you're now moving forward as a single independent echelon (battalion or company) and with no support from brigade or division.

You are only fixed in place if you choose to be. Fighting for fixed objectives is often the recipe for defeat, as it makes a commanders decisions predictable, and is, in my opinion, best avoided if their is another alternative. An attacker can plan to take a fixed objective much easier than he can plan to try and destroy an enemy division that is manuevering properly. I understand that this is not a concept for defense that everyone will agree with, and there are strong points to either, but it is the one that I believe would produce the best results in todays world.

I agree with you that an independant echelon has limited combat power, and is much weaker than a brigade operating in concert, however it is still quite capable of doing damage, especially to an enemy strung out in an enveloping manuever. Also, if a unit is designed to operate as a battlegroup (thus much of the necessary elements are integral to the manuever units, and not centralized), then the disadvantage associated with the destruction of the reserves backing it up is minimal, and only the loss of control from higher is truly inhibiting (assuming that happens).

[Officer of Engineers]

Only if your reserves have been destroyed by an enemy armoured force. If it is by airpower, as we are saying here, than the commander of the main element still has options. Decentralized decision making at the battlefield level is what made the Wehrmacht so effective during WWII, and while set piece battles have their appeal, I've always been a big believer in manuever warfare.

You're mixing up alot of concepts here. Decentralization requires a strong Chain-of-Command (contrary to popular belief but the fact is that the General has enough faith in his Colonels to let them go on their own and be appraised of any situation where they cannot handle their situation).

In manouver warfare, you need excellent communications, in particular with the reserves because they're the only real help you've got in case you over-extended yourself, left a hole, or require support on a breach. Your flank echelons are way too busy on their own frontage and cannot possibly collapse their frontage to come to support you. However, your reserves are destroyed which leaves you with very limited possibility of support.

Also, since the General is killed (as he is being protected by the reserves), you have no Chain-of-Command to co-ordinate your actions with your flanking echelons. If you move forward (or backwards), you will expose their flanks.

You are only fixed in place if you choose to be. Fighting for fixed objectives is often the recipe for defeat, as it makes a commanders decisions predictable, and is, in my opinion, best avoided if their is another alternative. An attacker can plan to take a fixed objective much easier than he can plan to try and destroy an enemy division that is manuevering properly. I understand that this is not a concept for defense that everyone will agree with, and there are strong points to either, but it is the one that I believe would produce the best results in todays world.

Three words - Defence In Depth

I agree with you that an independant echelon has limited combat power, and is much weaker than a brigade operating in concert, however it is still quite capable of doing damage, especially to an enemy strung out in an enveloping manuever. Also, if a unit is designed to operate as a battlegroup (thus much of the necessary elements are integral to the manuever units, and not centralized), then the disadvantage associated with the destruction of the reserves backing it up is minimal, and only the loss of control from higher is truly inhibiting (assuming that happens).

If the enemy can find your reserves, then they have already found you. You're operating in the blind without the benefit of the reserves to dig you out. Attacking blindly in such situtions against an unknown enemy who can see and hear you is a bigger recipie for disaster.

[lemontree]

Better to let the enemy find you in strength which means a prepared defence.

An engineers answer! :)

Colonel sir, is an engr, but the concept is about desert warfare. Its called nodal point defence. In deserts, clear fields of fire are available enabling a commander to fight set piece defensive battles from well prepared and stocked defenses.

[lemontree]

A-10's and F-117s.

-Tink

Will the enemy airforce allow you?
You have not mentioned CAPs for the A-10s and F-117s.
What is the spread of an a reserve formations deployment?
The number of sorties and ac required for destroying them will be not be simple. Enemy air force will have a field day with the A-10s and F-117s.

[lwarmonger]

You're mixing up alot of concepts here. Decentralization requires a strong Chain-of-Command (contrary to popular belief but the fact is that the General has enough faith in his Colonels to let them go on their own and be appraised of any situation where they cannot handle their situation).

That also gets the Colonels used to using their initiative, which is a huge advantage when operating independantly of the parent unit. I'm not saying it's better than acting without direction, but it is a good habit to get into, and if your units are fairly self-contained, it is viable.

In manouver warfare, you need excellent communications, in particular with the reserves because they're the only real help you've got in case you over-extended yourself, left a hole, or require support on a breach. Your flank echelons are way too busy on their own frontage and cannot possibly collapse their frontage to come to support you. However, your reserves are destroyed which leaves you with very limited possibility of support.

Frontage generally isn't too much of an issue in desert warfare, operations tend to be more centered around battlegroups, are they not?

Also, since the General is killed (as he is being protected by the reserves), you have no Chain-of-Command to co-ordinate your actions with your flanking echelons. If you move forward (or backwards), you will expose their flanks.

True, but that is a negative thing no matter what happens. What I am trying to say is that as long as the commanders on the ground are aware of their missions, and they are organized in the manner I've suggested, it shouldn't be over.

Three words - Defence In Depth

Manpower intensive, especially if there is a large front.

If the enemy can find your reserves, then they have already found you. You're operating in the blind without the benefit of the reserves to dig you out. Attacking blindly in such situtions against an unknown enemy who can see and hear you is a bigger recipie for disaster.

No disagreement there, but those circumstances are dependent upon the situation (you may know where the enemy is located, ect), and subject to change.

[Officer of Engineers]

That also gets the Colonels used to using their initiative, which is a huge advantage when operating independantly of the parent unit. I'm not saying it's better than acting without direction, but it is a good habit to get into, and if your units are fairly self-contained, it is viable.

Doesn't work that way. All battle groups would have to fit within an overall plan and a specific AO. Deviating from that would either expose other battle groups or worst, interfere with other battle groups and their operations.

Frontage generally isn't too much of an issue in desert warfare, operations tend to be more centered around battlegroups, are they not?

You're still talking about a line of march and its frontage which is even more exposed than a prepared defence.

True, but that is a negative thing no matter what happens. What I am trying to say is that as long as the commanders on the ground are aware of their missions, and they are organized in the manner I've suggested, it shouldn't be over.

But they don't know their mission. You're saying that they go ad-hoc once their reserves are destroyed and fly by the seat of their pants.

Manpower intensive, especially if there is a large front.

On the contrary, it is extremely manpower efficient. It is extremely both fire and manouver intensive, especially when you collapse from the current line of defence to the next line of defence. The point remains that once you lose your reserves, you've lost your flexibility and intently, most of your capability. You might reduce your operations from brigade group to battle group but that is not an acceptable, not even a tolerable exchange. A brigade group is much more than mere 3 battle groups. By extension, brigade level operations is much more than 3 independent battle group operations.

No disagreement there, but those circumstances are dependent upon the situation (you may know where the enemy is located, ect), and subject to change.

You will know where the enemy is once he starts shooting. The question is are you going to find him on your terms or on his?

[Bill]

A single unit cut off from it's LOCs or deprived of it's reserve force is totally naked to flanking and envelopment attacks.

The Colonel has this one right(as usual).

"On the contrary, it is extremely manpower efficient. It is extremely both fire and manouver intensive, especially when you collapse from the current line of defence to the next line of defence."

He's right about that part too.

[Officer of Engineers]

The Colonel has this one right(as usual).

The inevitable result of being wrong all the time up until I made Captain (then, you learned to shut up until you're absolutely right).

[Blademaster]

How would you counter the enemy's reserves?

You can counter the enemy's reserves by putting a roadblock, a metaphor to use, in their way if you can't destroy them.

[lwarmonger]

Doesn't work that way. All battle groups would have to fit within an overall plan and a specific AO. Deviating from that would either expose other battle groups or worst, interfere with other battle groups and their operations.

If your reserves are gone, then odds are your other battlegroups are already exposed. However, your ability to influence the situation is not at an end, because odds are the enemy is strung out and vulnerable. Such is the case in most battles of encirclement.

You're still talking about a line of march and its frontage which is even more exposed than a prepared defence.

True, but since the enemy is most likely using the same methods (battlegroups, instead of closely connected frontage), that disadvantage is mutual.

But they don't know their mission. You're saying that they go ad-hoc once their reserves are destroyed and fly by the seat of their pants.

Their mission can still continue, can it not? Their job is to defend against an enemy attack, and while they may not have much of a shot of defeating the enemy offensive without any instructions from higher, they are far from through. They know that the enemy is in their rear, but that means that their supply lines become vulnerable, and that they are somewhat stretched out from the envelopment. If the reserves have been destroyed by airpower, then it is a matter of surviving until effective command can be reestablished over the main elements.

On the contrary, it is extremely manpower efficient. It is extremely both fire and manouver intensive, especially when you collapse from the current line of defence to the next line of defence. The point remains that once you lose your reserves, you've lost your flexibility and intently, most of your capability.

If you are fighting from fixed positions. If you are fighting for fixed objectives. Out in the desert, the goal isn't to seize locations, it is to destroy the enemy forces opposing you. There is a lot of room to manuever around fixed positions, as the British found out during WWII, and it is only when one's opponent makes a mistake that a good commander can gain that advantage (the "Cauldron", where Rommel suckered the British armour right into his 88s, is a perfect, but relatively rare, example). When your main element(s) are your flexibility, and you aren't fighting for fixed positions, then losing your reserves doesn't hurt as much as it would in a place like West Germany. The biggest mistake the British (and eventually Rommel as well) made in North Africa, was fighting from fixed positions to begin with. Once the British were outflanked, they were forced into a battle of manuever that they hadn't prepared for, and they lost. It wasn't until El Alamein, where manuever was limited due to impassible terrain in the south, that fighting from fixed positions was actually a good option for the British.

You might reduce your operations from brigade group to battle group but that is not an acceptable, not even a tolerable exchange. A brigade group is much more than mere 3 battle groups. By extension, brigade level operations is much more than 3 independent battle group operations.

I agree, and am not debating that with you, because it is entirely correct. Where I am disagreeing with you is on whether, once a forces HQ and reserves are destroyed, that force becomes worthless or not. It may be severely damaged, however it can still serve a purpose (Soviet defense strategy during Barbarossa), and assuming it survives long enough, a chain of command can be reestablished.

You will know where the enemy is once he starts shooting. The question is are you going to find him on your terms or on his?

And in order to find him on your terms, it is best to know, or at least have a good idea, of where he's at before your forward element runs into him. Much easier to do when he's fighting for fixed objectives.

[lwarmonger]

I'm not saying that a force that has just lost it's headquarters and reserves is going to win. That is highly unlikely. However, it can still serve a purpose, and help make sure the next battle turns out differently.

[lemontree]

You can counter the enemy's reserves by putting a roadblock, a metaphor to use, in their way if you can't destroy them.

If the reserves are a division. Then how do you road block a division?
....by deploying your division/bde. But then you have denuded your own strike potential.
You never deploy your units in a piecemeal manner, they need to be kept as a potent force.