Russia claims new tank invisible to radar/IR

[Officer of Engineers]

IIf so, how Rathke achieved dismissal by the Colonel from this is difficult to fathom?

55 years of nuclear doctrine and nothing to date has change its fundamental nature. There is no such thing as a limited nuclear war. When one flies, they all fly. So automatically, this assertion of nukes can easily be dismissed. You are so adamant that Putin is a Cold Warrior. Cold Warriors understand nuclear war better than anyone else.

The fallacy of limited nuclear war has been discussed verbatim. I'm not going to repeat them but suffice to say nuclear weaponeers from both sides of the Iron Curtain dismissed the concept. Rathke could be easily dismissed about this.

IMV, the key component lies in our present strategic security architecture and the paralysis generated by dilemmas not fitting a pre-conceived box. Anybody here who is prepared to argue that NATO/Europe/U.S. immediately presented Russia with a coherent, firm and rapid response to Georgia, Crimea or Donetsk/Luhansk is full of sh!t. Further, anybody who'd suggest that paralysis in decision-making is resolved is, equally, full of it.

Not our fight and no where in the entire history of war has any army been prepared to fight a war that is not theirs to fight. To suggest that we should have been ready takes the cake since the Ukraines less than 20 years before was ready to join Russia and Serbia against us.

But to suggest that we couldn't crush any Russian incursion into Poland is also equally full of shit.

If so, you'd damned well best be ready for the worst...and least likely. It's a gambit to present NATO's leadership with a fait accompli occupation of eastern Estonia, maybe all of Latvia and Poland east to the Bug. I believe they've the forces to accomplish this and the means to assemble inside our response cycle. If compounded with a limited tactical nuclear strike(s) on ostensibly militarily-significant targets absent in large measure of civilians, our present civil-military leadership would be utterly freaked...

...and paralyzed.

By the time they arose from their insensibility and collectively got their act together, we'd be faced with military operations to recapture seized NATO territory...or acquiesce to the accomplished fact and begin spinning our after-the-fact rationales/blame game.

Well, that depends on the elected leaders, doesn't it? We didn't have troops in China during the Cold War but it was well understood they were under our nuclear umbrella. Nixon went so far as to warn Brezhnev not to attack China.

By the same token, we had Jimmy Carter who did the ill fated venture in Iran.

What makes Rathke's commentary relevant is recognition that circumventing such a nightmare BEGINS with rotating ground forces of no less than battalion size into each threatened environ as a matter of present defense policy. Doing so immediately ups the ante for the Russians and increases likelihood of early detection of assembling forces. Slinging even a few tactical nukes might cause U.S. or German troops to immediately become victims of a pre-emptive nuclear strike. That would dispel, by itself, much of the haze and paralysis within our respective NCAs that might otherwise accompany a limited land grab. The Russians likely appreciate this would cap the benefit to a limited tactical strike and leave them having to immediately confront NATO ground forces conventionally on the intended objective.

The key is the constant forward positioning of NATO ground forces as an active deterrent which must be immediately included into any Russian calculus for attack.

Then, let's be clear about this. This is not a NATO decision. If the Poles and the Baltic States can't deter a Russian nuclear strike, then the only force that matters are the Americans. The loss of a German, Canadian, or even a British Battle Group to a Russian nuclear strike is not going to invite a nuclear retaliation from Obama.

This article revises a whole bunch of defunct Cold War concepts. Attacks from the Barracks. Limited Nuclear War. The Soviets couldn't do it then and the much less capable Russians certainly could not do it today and NATO is the superior force.

[S2]

"...But to suggest that we couldn't crush any Russian incursion into Poland is also equally full of shit."

Smacks of unjustified arrogance despite missing the point that we've already lost if they even attempt as much. I'll suggest it, though, and I'm definitely not full of sh!t.

Rathke makes plain the net effect upon our collection assets of no-notice Russian exercises that have already occurred multiple times recently-

WE DIDN'T KNOW A THING (thought you'd appreciate the caps thingy).

"...Well, that depends on the elected leaders, doesn't it? "

Don't see Maggie Thatcher, do you? It's a net loss if NATO has to crush anything after-the-fact. It's also highly conceivable that's the case given our present lot of elected leaders.

Rathke talks about a seven day window as minimally necessary for deployment presently. Offhand, that sounds likely. That's with a prompt, decisive civil political response. I very reasonably fear that won't be happening with our present collection of civilian and military leaders. Each day of dithering will translate on the back end of any eastern deployment. Not as a one day for day cost either. With each passing day of indecision our ability to move east will fall back upon us yet may prove more difficult as transportation networks nearing the combat zone get sucked into the growing maelstrom.

McMaster is JUSTIFIABLY concerned, IMV. You disagree. So too Air Force Deptula. Not the first time the U.S. Army finds detractors within our air force or allied officers.

But it will almost certainly be our U.S. Army required to re-capture what we're presently unprepared to deter or defend from attack. If recapturing lost territory, then we were never prepared. If defending, then we've inadequately prepared. If deterring, then we'll never know how much less might have achieved the same.

Count me in for scenario three. The cost of deterrence will prove immeasurably cheaper than the least expensive war.

[Officer of Engineers]

"...But to suggest that we couldn't crush any Russian incursion into Poland is also equally full of shit."

Smacks of unjustified arrogance despite missing the point that we've already lost if they even attempt as much. I'll suggest it, though, and I'm definitely not full of sh!t.

Rathke makes plain the net effect upon our collection assets of no-notice Russian exercises that have already occurred multiple times recently-

WE DIDN'T KNOW A THING (thought you'd appreciate the caps thingy).

They were battalion/brigade level, not required by treaty to notify us and we've done the same. F-22s were rushing their airspace before they knew anything. In fact, they didn't know until we told them. A few battalions is not going to scare me. F-22s wiping out a few HQs drastically changes the picture.

"...Well, that depends on the elected leaders, doesn't it? "

Don't see Maggie Thatcher, do you? It's a net loss if NATO has to crush anything after-the-fact. It's also highly conceivable that's the case given our present lot of elected leaders.

Rathke talks about a seven day window as minimally necessary for deployment presently. Offhand, that sounds likely. That's with a prompt, decisive civil political response. I very reasonably fear that won't be happening with our present collection of civilian and military leaders. Each day of dithering will translate on the back end of any eastern deployment. Not as a one day for day cost either. With each passing day of indecision our ability to move east will fall back upon us yet may prove more difficult as transportation networks nearing the combat zone get sucked into the growing maelstrom.

McMaster is JUSTIFIABLY concerned, IMV. You disagree. So too Air Force Deptula. Not the first time the U.S. Army finds detractors within our air force or allied officers.

But it will almost certainly be our U.S. Army required to re-capture what we're presently unprepared to deter or defend from attack. If recapturing lost territory, then we were never prepared. If defending, then we've inadequately prepared. If deterring, then we'll never know how much less might have achieved the same.

Count me in for scenario three. The cost of deterrence will prove immeasurably cheaper than the least expensive war.

I'm not even counting on the West. I have extreme confidence the Poles can take care of themselves with our air support. The Poles are asking for 3 re-enforced battalions. One American, One German, One Canadian. In the scheme of things, the Poles would be doing the bulk of the fighting if and when it comes to that and they themselves believe they can do the job, else, they would be asking for more than 3 battalions and if they believe they would be targets of nukes, they certainly would be begging for American nukes or at the very least the shield.

[S2]

"They were battalion/brigade level, not required by treaty to notify us..."

I guess Rathke would submit those are some rather large "...battalion/brigade level..." exercises. Not discounting, of course, that the Russian Army is generally operating at much higher training tempos for all sized units than previously. Exercises of the size suggested by Rathke, however, are confirmed facts and do require notification. At least until the CFE (Conventional Forces Europe) treaty was suspended by Russia in 2008 and, again, rejected in 2011.

"...As Russia demonstrated in 2014 in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, when a 150,000-man exercise took place simultaneous with Russia’s intervention, it can concentrate forces along its western borders without significant warning to neighbors or to NATO allies. This has been underscored throughout 2014 and 2015 in other no-notice “snap” exercises, the largest of which numbered 100,000 troops..."

"... and we've done the same..."

C'mon, Colonel. You know better. We've no exercise in nearly two decades remotely close to 100,000 troops and nothing at all, nada, east of the Oder before 2014/15. Why should we when we've a "partner for peace" on NATO's eastern flank?

[Officer of Engineers]

"...As Russia demonstrated in 2014 in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, when a 150,000-man exercise took place simultaneous with Russia’s intervention, it can concentrate forces along its western borders without significant warning to neighbors or to NATO allies. This has been underscored throughout 2014 and 2015 in other no-notice “snap” exercises, the largest of which numbered 100,000 troops..."

Oh come on! We knew well in advance that 100,000+ troops were mounting an exercise. We just did not know they were going into Crimea.

"... and we've done the same..."

C'mon, Colonel. You know better. We've no exercise in nearly two decades remotely close to 100,000 troops and nothing at all, nada, east of the Oder before 2014/15. Why should we when we've a "partner for peace" on NATO's eastern flank?

I meant deploying military assets (ie, F-22s) without letting them know about it until well too late.

[S2]

"...We knew well in advance that 100,000+ troops were mounting an exercise. We just did not know they were going into Crimea."

I'm not certain I understand why you'd previously assert "...battalion/brigade level..." in light of what was evidently known by you, if not also by myself. Otherwise you'd be very correct that we didn't know they'd be going into Crimea.

Point well-made. If I recall we strongly encouraged the Ukrainians to "stand down" lest anything silly happen. Good thing too.

Hope that won't be our advice to the Polish government.

[Officer of Engineers]

"...We knew well in advance that 100,000+ troops were mounting an exercise. We just did not know they were going into Crimea."

I'm not certain I understand why you'd previously assert "...battalion/brigade level..." in light of what was evidently known by you, if not also by myself. Otherwise you'd be very correct that we didn't know they'd be going into Crimea.

Your point was that "WE DIDN'T KNOW A THING (thought you'd appreciate the caps thingy)." BTW, I do appreciate the caps. We knew the 58th Army was in the area conducting exercises. That part wasn't a surprise. We knew they were on the border but we didn't expect them to move into Crimea.

Point well-made. If I recall we strongly encouraged the Ukrainians to "stand down" lest anything silly happen. Good thing too.

There were some in NATO (NDHQ for one) who expected the Ukrainians to fight. I was actually surprised that Kiev chosed to surrender without a fight.

Hope that won't be our advice to the Polish government.

They've asked for only 3 battalions. Obviously, we're not the deciding force in their decision.

[GVChamp]

If so, you'd damned well best be ready for the worst...and least likely. It's a gambit to present NATO's leadership with a fait accompli occupation of eastern Estonia, maybe all of Latvia and Poland east to the Bug. I believe they've the forces to accomplish this and the means to assemble inside our response cycle. If compounded with a limited tactical nuclear strike(s) on ostensibly militarily-significant targets absent in large measure of civilians, our present civil-military leadership would be utterly freaked...

...and paralyzed.

Just to throw this out there, I fully expect "panic" to happen in my lifetime, but it's not there yet. The response of US political leadership to China's Air Defense Zone was to fly B-52s through it. The response to NK's artillery barrage was joint military exercises with SK. The response to the Ukraine invasion was to parade Stryker's a few feet from the Russian border.
By 2017, we're supposed to have three full brigades in Europe at all time, with enough equipment to pre-positioned equipment to put another in the field.
So I think the US response to a Russian nuclear attack, even a limited one, would be best characterized as "aggressive."

[snapper]

we didn't expect them to move into Crimea.

Everyone involved in the Ukrainian business feared the Crimean move - that is why the Feb 21st 'agreement' was done that would have allowed Yanukovych to remain in power. What we did not know at the time was that the decision on Crimea had already been taken in Moscow (on Feb 20th). The 'agreement' was just a hoax and of course Yanukovych fled (to a regional Party Conference supposedly) in the early hours of the 22nd Feb. That was their plan. They had a plan and at the time we were acting blind.

There were some in NATO (NDHQ for one) who expected the Ukrainians to fight. I was actually surprised that Kiev chosed to surrender without a fight.

There were some in Kyiv who favoured fighting Crimea but the fact is that HAD Ukraine contested Crimea the full invasion would have occurred; all Ukraine would have been lost. They would have presented it as 'fascist repression' (against their 'little green army'), Yanukovych would have appealed for help to 'restore order' and Kyiv would have been occupied. The game would have been lost at the get go.

They've asked for only 3 battalions. Obviously, we're not the deciding force in their decision.

The Poles have asked for permanently based units.

[Officer of Engineers]

There were some in Kyiv who favoured fighting Crimea but the fact is that HAD Ukraine contested Crimea the full invasion would have occurred; all Ukraine would have been lost.

I strongly doubt that. The Russians could field at most 2 corps. Hardly anywhere close to enough to take on 7 cities even if those citizens were only armed with AK47s.

The Poles have asked for permanently based units.

It is still 3 battle groups at around 1000 men each. Hardly a decisive force.

[S2]

"You are so adamant that Putin is a Cold Warrior…"

That wouldn't be me. He was commissioned late in the game. Later than myself. Further, his profile reveals a guy hardly stuck in the rut of viewing problems and solutions. He is a Russian nationalist with a decidedly independent and different view of this world than we've anticipated. A new animal entirely IMV despite his legacy.

"...The fallacy of limited nuclear war has been discussed verbatim. I'm not going to repeat them but suffice to say nuclear weaponeers from both sides of the Iron Curtain dismissed the concept…"

I'd suggest you revisit this "fallacy". I've now read three independent assessments from IISS, the Heritage Foundation and CSIS which make serious note of the limited use of nuclear weapons in a gambit known as "De-escalation". It is a Russian concept that has been put forward and included in Russian military exercises-

http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-ca...-de-escalation
Maybe you should acquaint yourself as well?

[Officer of Engineers]

http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation[/url]
Maybe you should acquaint yourself as well?

And this ignores a most fundamental flaw in the concept - a panic response. You've just received a confirmed nuclear hit. Do you hit back now or risk losing your ICBMs? We've gotten away from Launch-On-Warning because it's way too dangerous. Can you honestly predict how your oppenant can react under panic?

In order for this to work, you have to give your oppenant time and space to evaluate your nuclear strike and you have to present a clear case that you will not escalate. How the hell is the other guy going to believe you, especially when he got less than a 30 minute window to digest all you're giving him. And especially when you hit first.

[S2]

Colonel,

The "…concept…" is not dismissed now on either side. There is new doctrine evolving from direction provided by a new Russian leadership which refuses to view this world under the same old lens.

Predictability of state actors, as such, is clearly not presently the case.

At least on one side.

The Russians are operating from an entirely new playbook for some time now. It may borrow from the past in some respects but, with others, there's a decided change. Up to us to decipher where and when these doctrinal deviations have occurred. The Russians are quite content with whatever confusion is sown in western NCAs…

…and there's most certainly been confusion.

[Officer of Engineers]

The Russians are operating from an entirely new playbook for some time now.

No, they haven't because their nuclear force posture precludes any of this. At 10% ready to launch, there's no way for them to de-escalate any further and the only alternative is to escalate.

[snapper]

I've been saying it since this whole sh*thole in Ukraine started but will repeat it again; at present the Baltic States are indefencible. You do not need any journos or retired Generals to look at the deployments and maps.