Russia claims new tank invisible to radar/IR

[snapper]

Your fall back positions should have been well defended. They weren't. In fact, you had no fall back positions. In fact, you had no reserves. Your strategic and operational plans might have been in shambles because of Minsk 2 but your tactical positions leave much to be desired. There was no security screen and your reccee screen was non-existing. The Russian tank company should have been detected well before they were on you.

The fact is that in the lead up to Ilovaisk the plans were altered due to an insane change in the Command; Koval (who had been MOD) was replaced by Heletey (3rd July 2014) and Krutov (ATO Commander) was replaced by Hrytsak (9th July. The 'two Ks' were replaced by the 'two Hs'. Heletey was effectively a policeman and Hrytsak, who now heads the SBU, had formerly been in charge of Yanukovych's anti corruption bureau. The people who designed the original plans were the two Ks among others and these plans were made at the start of the Slovyansk seige - which was largely successful; it fell on 5th July.

Politically (in Kyiv) there was some frustration with the slowness of events and the failure to "follow up and capitalise" on the success at Slovyansk. The point was this was NEVER the plan; the Command team under the 'two Ks' knew the troops were nowhere near ready for complex operations so planned a series of staged battles along Slovyansk lines but all together driving a 'corridor of separation' between Donetsk and Luhansk; Horlivka, Debaltseve etc etc all repeats of Slovyansk. The border east of Donestk could then be cleared with a defencive line drawn up from Krasni Luch through the heights of Saur-Mohyla to Amroviiska (Sector D for Defence). The process of reduction could then be carried on Donetsk. These plans were made this way because the troops were nearly all 'green', vastly under trained and hugely lacking in equipment. It would safely continue the ATO while buying time - caution being the primary requisite. Personally I was in favour of this approach, seemed like sense to me.

The 'two Hs' were evidently brought in to 'shake things up'; the politicos want 'action' and Heletey in his first speech as Minister of Defence spoke of "celebrating victory in Sevastapol". They inherited the 'corridor of separation' plans - never had any original ideas themselves to my knowledge - but decided that instead of series of set piece seiges they would attempt a form of limited 'Blitzkreig'; once they were on the run we would keep chasing, go around 'centres of resistance' etc... There was a LOT of argument about this as most of the Officers concerned prefered the 'gradual approach' as the original plan was conceived. Mihai's claim that

We saw Ilovaisk before the Ukrainians did.

is frankly not correct. The Muscovites were already shelling over the border when the 95th Airmobile Brigade (designated for approach to Sector D from the South) was prematurely sent off by Hrytsak on August 2nd on what has been described as the "longest raid in history" (http://www.mnogovbloge.com/?p=7922&lang=en). If they were going to shell the 95th from their side of the border clearly the Muscovites may do more. We were well aware of their mobile forces just across the border and many, including myself, argued against these changes to the original plans where caution had been the priority. That it all went wrong is needless to mention; Control over Horlivka was never achieved, the 95th Airmobile Brigade prematurely and went too far - for in their madness they sought to close the border east of Luhansk as well so Sector D (Krasni Luch - Saur-Mohyla to Amroviiska) was never really set up so when the 'follow up' got to Ilovaisk it was a weak 'follow up' with virtually no 'shield' toward the border which could not easily be supported. The reinforcements on their way to Ilovaisk ran head long into the Muscovites and did them substantial damage but then the 'corridor' for evacuation was suggested (by Putin) and of course massacre ensued. The fact is that the changes to the original plan asked too much of an under equipped, under trained, and untested army and Command. Command in particular was 'top down'; Heletey was trying to run a series of ongoing battles from Kyiv with Hrytsak as his 'eyes on the ground' in Kramatorsk.

The failures of July to early September did NOT cause a collapse of our position; it merely left Debaltseve and Mariupol (particularly in the area to the north of Mariupol). The Mariupol immeadiate threat was cleared by the attack on Shyrokine and holding the high ground there. Debaltseve should have been secured by the clearance of Horlivka but the politicians prevented this due to Minsk 2; another f*ck up since it didn't stop them attacking Debaltseve after Minsk 2 was signed. The same 'Command from Kyiv' was in place although Heletey had gone in October and the new MOD (Poltorak, still in place) left battles issues to the Chief of Staff Muzhenko. The Commanders in Debaltseve made their own decision to withdraw when it became obvious that no reinforcement was coming. This prompted a near revolt and when the review of the Command and Organisational performance was presented it was accepted wholeheartedly by the NSDC and the Staff - even Muzhenko. The independent Sektor Commands were the greatest breakthrough - independence from 'Kyivs say so' on everyday operational matters; a propper chain of command in other words. After that the logistically supply issues were examined and changed; Sektor supply from Regional supply was instituted and lastly procurement issues. In a way Debaltseve was the nadir of the changes the 'two Hs' made to the original plan and the start and impetus for a more automous Command system. Officer training schools days and alot more training exercises are also instituted and the whole thing, outside the MOD itself, has changed. This is NOT the same Ukrainian army of 2014 or even 2015; it is in a process of evolution to becoming a professional army.

It is NOT that people in Ukraine did not think of the issues and problems in these operations - they were heavily debated and argued. Mistakes were made (imv) and ended in disasters. But neither they nor I are entirely stupid and we learn from our mistakes - even Poroshenko has had to.

That's a Russian advantage, not yours.

That depends on where their tanks are when ours strike.

German. And ANAKONDA-16 was 31,000 troops of which 16,000 were Poles, ie no added support needed. You want to show me how EE can support 200,000 allied troops?

Anglo German;

Poroshenko? A baby wannabe Mafioso.

I didn't ask about Poroshenko - read what I wrote - I asked about Ukraine which fights unlike everyone else.

Sure there is. Putin would know a fighter when he sees one.

[Officer of Engineers]

The fact is that in the lead up to Ilovaisk the plans were altered due to an insane change in the Command; Koval (who had been MOD) was replaced by Heletey (3rd July 2014) and Krutov (ATO Commander) was replaced by Hrytsak (9th July. The 'two Ks' were replaced by the 'two Hs'. Heletey was effectively a policeman and Hrytsak, who now heads the SBU, had formerly been in charge of Yanukovych's anti corruption bureau. The people who designed the original plans were the two Ks among others and these plans were made at the start of the Slovyansk seige - which was largely successful; it fell on 5th July.

Politically (in Kyiv) there was some frustration with the slowness of events and the failure to "follow up and capitalise" on the success at Slovyansk. The point was this was NEVER the plan; the Command team under the 'two Ks' knew the troops were nowhere near ready for complex operations so planned a series of staged battles along Slovyansk lines but all together driving a 'corridor of separation' between Donetsk and Luhansk; Horlivka, Debaltseve etc etc all repeats of Slovyansk. The border east of Donestk could then be cleared with a defencive line drawn up from Krasni Luch through the heights of Saur-Mohyla to Amroviiska (Sector D for Defence). The process of reduction could then be carried on Donetsk. These plans were made this way because the troops were nearly all 'green', vastly under trained and hugely lacking in equipment. It would safely continue the ATO while buying time - caution being the primary requisite. Personally I was in favour of this approach, seemed like sense to me.

The 'two Hs' were evidently brought in to 'shake things up'; the politicos want 'action' and Heletey in his first speech as Minister of Defence spoke of "celebrating victory in Sevastapol". They inherited the 'corridor of separation' plans - never had any original ideas themselves to my knowledge - but decided that instead of series of set piece seiges they would attempt a form of limited 'Blitzkreig'; once they were on the run we would keep chasing, go around 'centres of resistance' etc... There was a LOT of argument about this as most of the Officers concerned prefered the 'gradual approach' as the original plan was conceived. Mihai's claim that



is frankly not correct. The Muscovites were already shelling over the border when the 95th Airmobile Brigade (designated for approach to Sector D from the South) was prematurely sent off by Hrytsak on August 2nd on what has been described as the "longest raid in history" (http://www.mnogovbloge.com/?p=7922&lang=en). If they were going to shell the 95th from their side of the border clearly the Muscovites may do more. We were well aware of their mobile forces just across the border and many, including myself, argued against these changes to the original plans where caution had been the priority. That it all went wrong is needless to mention; Control over Horlivka was never achieved, the 95th Airmobile Brigade prematurely and went too far - for in their madness they sought to close the border east of Luhansk as well so Sector D (Krasni Luch - Saur-Mohyla to Amroviiska) was never really set up so when the 'follow up' got to Ilovaisk it was a weak 'follow up' with virtually no 'shield' toward the border which could not easily be supported. The reinforcements on their way to Ilovaisk ran head long into the Muscovites and did them substantial damage but then the 'corridor' for evacuation was suggested (by Putin) and of course massacre ensued. The fact is that the changes to the original plan asked too much of an under equipped, under trained, and untested army and Command. Command in particular was 'top down'; Heletey was trying to run a series of ongoing battles from Kyiv with Hrytsak as his 'eyes on the ground' in Kramatorsk.

The failures of July to early September did NOT cause a collapse of our position; it merely left Debaltseve and Mariupol (particularly in the area to the north of Mariupol). The Mariupol immeadiate threat was cleared by the attack on Shyrokine and holding the high ground there. Debaltseve should have been secured by the clearance of Horlivka but the politicians prevented this due to Minsk 2; another f*ck up since it didn't stop them attacking Debaltseve after Minsk 2 was signed. The same 'Command from Kyiv' was in place although Heletey had gone in October and the new MOD (Poltorak, still in place) left battles issues to the Chief of Staff Muzhenko. The Commanders in Debaltseve made their own decision to withdraw when it became obvious that no reinforcement was coming. This prompted a near revolt and when the review of the Command and Organisational performance was presented it was accepted wholeheartedly by the NSDC and the Staff - even Muzhenko. The independent Sektor Commands were the greatest breakthrough - independence from 'Kyivs say so' on everyday operational matters; a propper chain of command in other words. After that the logistically supply issues were examined and changed; Sektor supply from Regional supply was instituted and lastly procurement issues. In a way Debaltseve was the nadir of the changes the 'two Hs' made to the original plan and the start and impetus for a more automous Command system. Officer training schools days and alot more training exercises are also instituted and the whole thing, outside the MOD itself, has changed. This is NOT the same Ukrainian army of 2014 or even 2015; it is in a process of evolution to becoming a professional army.

It is NOT that people in Ukraine did not think of the issues and problems in these operations - they were heavily debated and argued. Mistakes were made (imv) and ended in disasters. But neither they nor I are entirely stupid and we learn from our mistakes - even Poroshenko has had to.

What has any of this got to do with a proper reccee screen?

That depends on where their tanks are when ours strike.

Absent an actual battle, Russian equipment and preparations are superior to the Ukrainians.

Anglo German;

Doesn't change the fact that it ain't the Poles.

I didn't ask about Poroshenko - read what I wrote - I asked about Ukraine which fights unlike everyone else.

You were responding to my statements about a responsible leadership. I answered you within the context that was established.

[snapper]

What has any of this got to do with a proper reccee screen?

If the plans had not been altered that deficiency at Ilovaisk would not have occurred as I explained regarding Sektor D.

Absent an actual battle, Russian equipment and preparations are superior to the Ukrainians.

In 2014 and 2015. Whether they are now is a not proven.

Doesn't change the fact that it ain't the Poles.

But NATO partners came to a Polish exercise.

You were responding to my statements about a responsible leadership. I answered you within the context that was established.

Ukraine fights. Others will if needed. If Putin doesn't recognise that he is a fool.

[Officer of Engineers]

If the plans had not been altered that deficiency at Ilovaisk would not have occurred as I explained regarding Sektor D.

This was war. Shit happens. You're supposed to be as prepared as you can. This is simple Battle Book. You're supposed to have contingencies and a reserves. And a reccee screen so you do find out when shit happens. So why didn't they?

In 2014 and 2015. Whether they are now is a not proven.

It takes more than 2 years to undo 20 years of Ukrainian military neglect.

But NATO partners came to a Polish exercise.

You will note that no Polish troops were involved in that bridge laying. Makes you wonder about inter-operational capabilities.

Ukraine fights. Others will if needed. If Putin doesn't recognise that he is a fool.

I said that EE needs leaders who can stare eyeball-to-eyeball, nose-to-nose with Putin. You responded with what Putin thinks of Ukraines. Within context of my statement, I answered.

[snapper]

This was war. Shit happens. You're supposed to be as prepared as you can. This is simple Battle Book. You're supposed to have contingencies and a reserves. And a reccee screen so you do find out when shit happens. So why didn't they?

Heletey was a policeman, Hrytsak remains little more than a flatterer. The politicos wanted 'more action'. What can I say? You mix them and add an implacable foe and you get needless disasters. The 'recce screen' by the time of Ilovaisk was barely more than 200men in all Sector D, none ahead. I do not seek to justify these decisions or anything - hell many argued such lunacy with an unprepared army. But they fought and still would have won had not 3 Muscovite Brigades got directly involved. I am merely describing the events. Hrytsak was adamant as the Muscovites were coming over the border on August 28/29th that they wouldn't/couldn't. 'Recce screen' wasn't in their minds.

It takes more than 2 years to undo 20 years of Ukrainian military neglect.

Fully agree but war makes fast improvement imperative and a process of elimination at worst.

You will note that no Polish troops were involved in that bridge laying. Makes you wonder about inter-operational capabilities.

NATO or Polish? In regards to NATO inter operational capability I would say it was effective.

I said that EE needs leaders who can stare eyeball-to-eyeball, nose-to-nose with Putin. You responded with what Putin thinks of Ukraines. Within context of my statement, I answered.

Not sure what good these type of boxing look offs do. When he meets even Poroshenko he knows Ukraine is and will fight. We do not need to face the dwarf down 'man to man' or 'eye to eye'... pure 'Wild West' macho movies thinking imv. We have to make it not worth his while to stay in Ukraine or try his hand anywhere else.

[Officer of Engineers]

'Recce screen' wasn't in their minds.

A recee screen is 32 men. 45 on the outside. And recee screens should not be on the "H's" minds. It should be on the battalion and brigade commander's minds and most certainly, it should be on the holding force's cmdr's mind.

Fully agree but war makes fast improvement imperative and a process of elimination at worst.

Modern tanks can't be built any faster.

NATO or Polish? In regards to NATO inter operational capability I would say it was effective.

Except it wasn't a NATO exercise. Brussels did not planned this or designed anything in it. It's just a bunch of small exercises bunched up together with zero focus on any operational outcome. In short, a dog and pony show.

Not sure what good these type of boxing look offs do. When he meets even Poroshenko he knows Ukraine is and will fight. We do not need to face the dwarf down 'man to man' or 'eye to eye'... pure 'Wild West' macho movies thinking imv. We have to make it not worth his while to stay in Ukraine or try his hand anywhere else.

It's a measure of the man opposing you and to see if he can lead and fight just as ruthlessly effective as Putin could. Poroshenko obviously can't.

[Mihais]

Sara,the point is we saw what the Russian intent was.Bait you eastward and cut your maneuver forces.
What we had not seen,at least at dumbass like me level,was how limited their operation was.We did not assumed they planned to lose the war,instead of winning it in a week.
But we knew those Russian battlegroups were over the border,why,and where they were going.
That your army is now a vastly superior force that cannot be defeated without an effort they're unwilling to make,is a wholly different thing.

[snapper]

A recee screen is 32 men. 45 on the outside. And recee screens should not be on the "H's" minds. It should be on the battalion and brigade commander's minds and most certainly, it should be on the holding force's cmdr's mind.

No idea what was on their minds by that point; wasn't near either of them. My point is that many people in Ukraine were aware of the insanity but at the time none had the rank to stop it. The politicals were mostly with El Chocky and wanted 'results' - they got them, just not the ones they intended.

Modern tanks can't be built any faster.

Not just building new ones but restoring and upgrading old ones.

Except it wasn't a NATO exercise. Brussels did not planned this or designed anything in it. It's just a bunch of small exercises bunched up together with zero focus on any operational outcome. In short, a dog and pony show.

So if Poland is attacked NATO will shrug and say "your problem"?

It's a measure of the man opposing you and to see if he can lead and fight just as ruthlessly effective as Putin could. Poroshenko obviously can't.

Putin's a tin pot thug nothing more. Anyone with self belief could 'face him down' for all the good that would not do. He has more than likely broken 'Greater Muscovy' and will go down in history as an 'Ozymandias'. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ozymandias)

[Officer of Engineers]

No idea what was on their minds by that point; wasn't near either of them. My point is that many people in Ukraine were aware of the insanity but at the time none had the rank to stop it. The politicals were mostly with El Chocky and wanted 'results' - they got them, just not the ones they intended.

The freaking point is that your Generals, Colonels, Majors, and Captains were not doing their freaking jobs. A reserve force, reccee screen, and contingencies are simple Battle Book. The Battle Book was written 40 years ago.

Not just building new ones but restoring and upgrading old ones.

Still does not make you even close to Russian armoured forces.

So if Poland is attacked NATO will shrug and say "your problem"?

The point you're trying to make is that your CEE can go it alone and you're using ANAKONDA-16 to prove it when it clearly was nothing more than a dog and pony show, even by Russian standards.

Putin's a tin pot thug nothing more. Anyone with self belief could 'face him down' for all the good that would not do. He has more than likely broken 'Greater Muscovy' and will go down in history as an 'Ozymandias'. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ozymandias)

That's the freaking point. Putin's a thug. An experienced deadly thug. He can recognize another thug. He can clearly see Poroshenko as a wannabe thug. We all can.

You want to face him down? You'd be dead before you can leave his office. But that's not the freaking point about anyone with "self belief." It has to be someone witht he power to challenge him. A freaking low life thug, no matter how tough, can't command armies needed to face his armies. So, get off that crap. Leaders have followers. Poroshenko don't have enough to stare Putin down.

[Albany Rifles]

Colonel,

A small point.

Regarding the bridge and the Poles. Absent or not, I don't think the lack of a Polish engineer unit proves or disproves anything. In 2002 the Poles had at least 1 capable bridging unit...I know because I rode a tactical assault bridge across a small river in the Drawsko Pomorskie Training area in NW Poland. And we all know the Poles have if anything gotten better since then.

ANAKONDA 16 was not a whole lot different than some of the set piece battles which went on in NATO even in Bad Old Days. But it did restart the process of having the NATO allies working together in other than terrain board conditions.

As for the Ukraine Army...it has a way to go. But battle experience counts for something. They were not prepared in 2014 but I would hope they are better prepared in 2016. Hell the Iraqis got their asses kicked by ISIS a year ago...after reorganizing and retraining, and integrating all components of combat power, the Iraqis have gotten a lot better from a year ago.

[Officer of Engineers]

Regarding the bridge and the Poles. Absent or not, I don't think the lack of a Polish engineer unit proves or disproves anything. In 2002 the Poles had at least 1 capable bridging unit...I know because I rode a tactical assault bridge across a small river in the Drawsko Pomorskie Training area in NW Poland. And we all know the Poles have if anything gotten better since then.

I was just answering Sarah's point pointing this out to be a NATO exercise when it's not and that this proves nothing towards her suggestions that the Poles can guarrantee the Baltic's safety.

ANAKONDA 16 was not a whole lot different than some of the set piece battles which went on in NATO even in Bad Old Days. But it did restart the process of having the NATO allies working together in other than terrain board conditions.

But there's no thought to it. The Canadians are in this exercise just because they were there, not because it was planned. Hell, it came as a surprise to a lot of people in NDHQ that there was an exercise.

As for the Ukraine Army...it has a way to go. But battle experience counts for something. They were not prepared in 2014 but I would hope they are better prepared in 2016. Hell the Iraqis got their asses kicked by ISIS a year ago...after reorganizing and retraining, and integrating all components of combat power, the Iraqis have gotten a lot better from a year ago.

Sarah is jumping all over the place. You and I can recognize what the Ukrainians are doing and what they are not doing. They've built 2 defensive belts with a 3rd on the way. If they don't get breached, then Russian tanks are effectively stopped but that is a far cry from stating that Ukrainian armoured forces are the Russian equals.

[Albany Rifles]

Okay sir

Now I am tracking. Yeah, I know ANAKONDA grew quickly in a response to Russian actions. I was in a few meetings where the "Hey You!" taskers were developed to US FORSCOM, Guard & Reserve units.

It has knocked the rust off of some processes and got folks to relearn old lessons.

[zraver]

The actual fight is not the question here. The question is, without the Americans, can you deter the Russians from making a mess of things.

Poland can, maybe the EE states if they care enough to defend themselves, but not the Baltics, they need an imperial patron or they end up joining one empire or another. Think Armenia or Georgia during the Roman/Persia or Byzantine/Ottoman eras.

[Doktor]

Sara,the point is we saw what the Russian intent was.Bait you eastward and cut your maneuver forces.
What we had not seen,at least at dumbass like me level,was how limited their operation was.We did not assumed they planned to lose the war,instead of winning it in a week.
But we knew those Russian battlegroups were over the border,why,and where they were going.
That your army is now a vastly superior force that cannot be defeated without an effort they're unwilling to make,is a wholly different thing.

It was never a Russian intention to conquer Ukraine, just to render it unuseful. Something they did in Georgia as well.

[snapper]

I was just answering Sarah's point pointing this out to be a NATO exercise when it's not and that this proves nothing towards her suggestions that the Poles can guarrantee the Baltic's safety.

Sarah is jumping all over the place. You and I can recognize what the Ukrainians are doing and what they are not doing. They've built 2 defensive belts with a 3rd on the way. If they don't get breached, then Russian tanks are effectively stopped but that is a far cry from stating that Ukrainian armoured forces are the Russian equals.

A total and blatant misrepresentation of my words: A. I never said the bridge building exercise - or Anakonda 16 - was a NATO exercise; it was NOT. The pontoon bridge exercise was conducted by Anglo German troops is all I said during Anakonda 16, I mentioned it merely as an example that allied troops could be stationed (based) in Poland. B. I never even suggested in the slightest that Poland can guarantee the Baltic's safety, on the contrary I said that Baltic's are currently indefencible. C. I never claimed that Ukrainian armoured forces are equal to Muscovies either - we do not and should not seek a head to head battle in armour as we would lose proportionally worse then they could; even if Ukraine 'won' such a head to head the victory would be Pyrrhic.