No ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, India tells US

[lemontree]

No they can't, but what they can do is attrit and slow the advance. Also fortifed villages and towns can be turned into atgm hell holes that can dominate several kilometers around them unless the Indians want to storm each location. On the defnesive vs a a heavy armor invader Pakistan's light forntier forces are likely to mimic the plans of the German territorials during the cold war. That bieng to attrit, slow down and canalize the attackers so that the invaders time table is thrown off and the defenders reserves get a clear pitcure of the main effort and weaknesses of the invader for a counter attack or reneforcement move.

By passing strong points and hitting comm centers / command centers, will render the strong points useless. Lack of supplies will fold up these strong points.

[kuku]

Will Indian naval forces (especially with the billions of dollars being invested into them) be able to enforce a naval blockade? May be impossible to do that till the US is in Afghanistan, but then so is attacking Pakistan (getting the eastern fleet with the western fleet perhaps will take a long time in itself).

How much time before the fuel runs out (along with naval blockades and attacks on fuel dumps from air)?

[Skywatcher]

By passing strong points and hitting comm centers / command centers, will render the strong points useless. Lack of supplies will fold up these strong points.

That'll take too long. By the time you starve out such strong points, either the whole thing will have gone nuclear or there will be outside intervention to stop the fighting.

[zraver]

By passing strong points and hitting comm centers / command centers, will render the strong points useless. Lack of supplies will fold up these strong points.

Captain, IIRC your experience is with some rather exceptional infantry. If I am right we are arguing from two vastly different perspectives. I will try to explain this and if I fail perhaps the colonel or the Major can chime in.

Bypassing is not always an option. A heavily mechanized column can more easily bypass a major city than a series of towns or hamlets on a critical road. The reach of modern ATGM's means even a small location can dominate several kilometers of terrain. Thus while the tracked vehicles can go around the obstacle the fuel trucks with much poorer all terrain capability cannot.

Tanks for all the wonderful capabilities they give modern armies must have huge amounts of fuel. Just filling a single company of 14 t-90's requires 22,400 liters of fuel for the tanks, roughly two trucks per company for each fueling or 1 truck per day. Yet the true number of trucks needed goes up as the distance increases. That same company will need twice as many trucks after it has advanced 100km as it did when it was only 100km from the staging area ( 1 truck fueling, 1 truck refueling, 1 traveling to the POL depot, 1 traveling from the POL depot).

Similar rules apply for units like artillery which if tracked need not only fuel, but ammo and if wheeled still need truckloads of ammo. Without which the artillery support is either outrun, or rationed. similar problems face other combat support units.

In areas where the terrain mostly restricts heavily loaded wheeled vehicles to roads and hard surfaces a series of fortified positions can stop an advance and throw off its time table as each position is reduced. each assault also being with it the promise of lost combat power before the decisive battle and perhaps more importantly lost time and initiative given to the enemy.

This is why the Germans' planned to use territorial forces equipped with missiles and panzerjagers stationed in the multitude of villages dotting the North German plain to slow the Soviets. Now I am not familiar with the Terrain along the Indo-Pak border. But in Germany due to the needs of pre-mechanized agriculture these villages are often less than a missile's range apart and provide a huge area of potentially interlocking fields of fire and mutual support. They did this to buy time for the BAOR, French, Reg German Army and Dutch to get into the fight. The plan was to not only let them get into the fight, but also give the Americans, Canadians and Germans time to win their battle and to develop where the main Soviet efforts) in the North were.

In areas along the Indo-Pak birder where ancient agriculture has created small but numerous villages any Indian attack risks the same problems facing the Soviets that I outlined above. If an army depends on speed to minimize an enemy's combat power, then delay=death.

A recent example of the danger of multiple ATGM equipped strong points was the 2006 war in Lebanon. While the number of missiles was far beyond the norm and with significant failures in Israeli leadership the essential truth remains: Israel could not simply bypass them and was forced to engage and reduce them.

[Cactus]

Will Indian naval forces (especially with the billions of dollars being invested into them) be able to enforce a naval blockade? May be impossible to do that till the US is in Afghanistan, but then so is attacking Pakistan (getting the eastern fleet with the western fleet perhaps will take a long time in itself). How much time before the fuel runs out (along with naval blockades and attacks on fuel dumps from air)?

Yes, Indian Navy can do it. The Paks claim 45 day strategic reserves for full tempo warfare. BUT it (blockade) has been declared as one of the thresholds for a Pakistani first-strike with nuclear weapons. So, yeah, Pakistanis have basically declared that they reserve the right to screw around with India as much as they wish using non-uniformed Islamist terrorists... but if India tries to hit back in any form of meaningful and forceful manner, it would be an excuse for nuclear war. It is a pointless discussion. Let us wait and see how the pieces fall in next year or so; if I were India I would simply concentrate on building overall capabilities and hold off on trying to make predictions.

[xinhui]

Good post Cactus.

[Skywatcher]

Yes, Indian Navy can do it. The Paks claim 45 day strategic reserves for full tempo warfare. BUT it (blockade) has been declared as one of the thresholds for a Pakistani first-strike with nuclear weapons. So, yeah, Pakistanis have basically declared that they reserve the right to screw around with India as much as they wish using non-uniformed Islamist terrorists... but if India tries to hit back in any form of meaningful and forceful manner, it would be an excuse for nuclear war. It is a pointless discussion. Let us wait and see how the pieces fall in next year or so; if I were India I would simply concentrate on building overall capabilities and hold off on trying to make predictions.

What about pipelines from Iran and Central Asia terminating at Pakistan or going through to China?

[Officer of Engineers]

Going back on topic. If the original assertion is right, that the InA has no doctrine called Cold Start ... because the damned thing NEVER MADE SENSE. I initially termed it to be fast, bold, and decisive. Holding land after a decisive action makes the action indecisive. It allows the enemy to regroup, refocus, and then to re-assert.

I do not have any Indian-Pakistani example but I have two Chinese examples - the two Sino-VN Wars. In the 1979 1st Sino-VN War, the war lasted less than 45 days after the Chinese Army destroyed 3 Vietnamese provincial capitals and then retreated across the border. The action was, at least operationally wise, fast, bold, and decisive. In the 1984 2nd Sino-VN War, the PLA retook hills that they claimed to be theirs. That war lasted 5 years. It was neither fast, bold, nor decisive.

Holding land ALWAYS allow the enemy to regroup, refocus, and then to re-assert.

[kuku]

If the cold start is just a term for improving the military and border infrastructure, what would be the economic consequences of something like the '2001–2002 standoff', on both nations?

Is it necessary to carry out a offensive campaign, last time there was a standoff i thin the economic situation on both sides of the border suffered, what i am asking is the feasibility of a quick standoff (on the sea, air and land), as a punishing force in itself, instead of the actual act of aggression?

The last time it happened there were a lot of casualties on the Indian side as a result of such a quick movement of troops and equipment.

Parakram cost put at Rs 6,500 crore

[Cactus]

Kuku,

You are beginning to think in the right direction, but you are minimizing the significance of certain things - so you are missing the big picture. Capt Lemontree can tell you, if he so wishes, why limited counter-offensive action by forward area troops should not be discounted + some tid-bits of the same from OP Parakram (more than your report will ever tell you). India has learnt valuable lessons from that episode. Adding increased mobility and firepower to the Holding Corps' and improving border area infrastructure all around, thus serves a greater purpose.

[Deltacamelately]

OoE Reply

Sir,

Cold Start or no Cold Start, the question should be -

"Can the Indian Army launch a lightening assault on the PA's vital assets in a limited time frame of say, 90 hours?"

"Do they have the wherewhithal and resources to by pass the ATGM hell holes that Z mentioned?"

Imho, after Operation Parakram and the lessons learnt, the series of exercises that the InA conducted on the western sector speak a lot if you have watched it (And that is discounting the horse and pony shows). Granting the pivot corps heavy offensive firepower and manouverability means, the strike corps are not going to fkuck around with the light frontier forces and hence, contrary to Z's analysis, the main axis(or plural) of thrust will remain in smoke. And here I have not considered the birdies yet.

And Sir, I know we have beaten this horse before, but NO, we are not concentrating on holding ground. Yes, we know that our political leadership believes that any incursion deeper than 50 miles, specially if it is the plains of Punjab, will rain nukes, but our commanders have better brains than that, if that rings bells.

[bolo121]

Sir,
Yes, we know that our political leadership believes that any incursion deeper than 50 miles, specially if it is the plains of Punjab, will rain nukes, but our commanders have better brains than that, if that rings bells.

Delta Sir, do you mean to say that next time round the army plans to push beyond 50 miles right from the start? Is the intention to present the civilian leadership with a fait accompli, saying we have pushed forward already so give permission anyway?

[nvishal]

A question:

So if another mumbai thing happens, we attack.

But what is the point? The only reason to do that would be to "teach pakistan a lesson". And how we do that? Get the PA to sign a piece of paper which says "i surrender"? Hold a few hundred square miles of pakistani territory? Send the PA elite packing to scandinavian countries?

So if another attack means war then what exactly are the conditions for this war to end?

[zraver]

Sir,

Cold Start or no Cold Start, the question should be -

"Can the Indian Army launch a lightening assault on the PA's vital assets in a limited time frame of say, 90 hours?"

"Do they have the wherewhithal and resources to by pass the ATGM hell holes that Z mentioned?"

Imho, after Operation Parakram and the lessons learnt, the series of exercises that the InA conducted on the western sector speak a lot if you have watched it (And that is discounting the horse and pony shows). Granting the pivot corps heavy offensive firepower and manouverability means, the strike corps are not going to fkuck around with the light frontier forces and hence, contrary to Z's analysis, the main axis(or plural) of thrust will remain in smoke. And here I have not considered the birdies yet.

Even if the Strike Corps are actually an explotation and reserve rather than assault forces, you can't hide the main effort, only maks it for a short time. Not in a breach by fire invasion scenario anyway. There are really only 3 options: 1- single or few axis assault, multiple axis assault, or general assault. obviously number 1 is the hardest to mask, but offers the most combat power where the combat needs to occur to achieve the mission. Number 2 is diluting of strength for more oppurtunites to mask, but it can still telegraph intentions to the astute observer. Number 3 gives up the most combat power but can offer either the best chance of masking the main effort or the oppurtunity to reenforce success and develop the battle from there.

India has to breach, exploit and defend in any war where she seeks to punish Pakistan through the use of ground forces. She also has to make sure she does not have her formations defeated in detail. Because of the deserts, the way Pakistan can be effectively cut in half, and the fact she has few major centers of gravity, for a rapid break through the Indians are likely to go with number 1. It allows the maximum amount of combat power to be avaible if the PA can send in an armored counter strike.

[lemontree]

Captain, IIRC your experience is with some rather exceptional infantry. If I am right we are arguing from two vastly different perspectives.

Yes our perspectives are different, as our two armies train rather differently.

Bypassing is not always an option. A heavily mechanized column can more easily bypass a major city than a series of towns or hamlets on a critical road. The reach of modern ATGM's means even a small location can dominate several kilometers of terrain. Thus while the tracked vehicles can go around the obstacle the fuel trucks with much poorer all terrain capability cannot.

It all depends on the terrain, habitation and weather conditions.

Tanks for all the wonderful capabilities they give modern armies must have huge amounts of fuel. Just filling a single company of 14 t-90's requires 22,400 liters of fuel for the tanks, roughly two trucks per company for each fueling or 1 truck per day. Yet the true number of trucks needed goes up as the distance increases. That same company will need twice as many trucks after it has advanced 100km as it did when it was only 100km from the staging area ( 1 truck fueling, 1 truck refueling, 1 traveling to the POL depot, 1 traveling from the POL depot).

I am aware of the logistics, but when we discussion "cold start" the objectives are not very deep.

In areas along the Indo-Pak birder where ancient agriculture has created small but numerous villages any Indian attack risks the same problems facing the Soviets that I outlined above. If an army depends on speed to minimize an enemy's combat power, then delay=death.

A recent example of the danger of multiple ATGM equipped strong points was the 2006 war in Lebanon. While the number of missiles was far beyond the norm and with significant failures in Israeli leadership the essential truth remains: Israel could not simply bypass them and was forced to engage and reduce them.

In the Indo-Pak context the ATGM/ anti-tank weapon concentration is even higher.

But there nothing that good arty pounding cannot solve.