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[Officer of Engineers]

Iraq: Heavy Forces and
Decisive Warfare



WILLIAM R. HAWKINS

© 2003 William R. Hawkins


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From Parameters, Autumn 2003, pp. 61-67.


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The Iraq War was a stunning example of the new paradigm of “decisive warfare,” even more so than had been the Afghanistan campaign. The Bush Administration came into office defining this new paradigm as the ability to march on an enemy’s capital and overthrow its regime.1 The thinking behind this paradigm is often linked to the failure of the United States to march on Baghdad in 1991, but there is also a link back to the indecisive “limited war” doctrine which led to failure in Vietnam. In Southeast Asia only Hanoi waged decisive warfare by sending an army south to capture Saigon and impose a regime change that ended the war. US attempts to bomb North Vietnam to a negotiated settlement did not result in victory. Regimes that cannot be persuaded to change their behavior must themselves be changed, or else conflicts will drag on, and America is at a political and diplomatic disadvantage in wars of attrition.

While other recent wars are remembered for gun-camera footage of missiles flying through windows, the most memorable images of Operation Iraqi Freedom are of American armored columns roaring along highways, and of icons of Saddam Hussein being dragged through the dust. While a lucky bomb hit might have decapitated the regime, a ground offensive to seize the center of government and break its hold on the country was the essential factor defining victory.

The war showed the ability of fast-moving, heavily armed troops to disrupt defenses before they could be established. Technology played its part in a permissive environment provided by American air supremacy. A profusion of aerial platforms detected enemy forces in the open, attacked them in a variety of settings, and provided close support with precision weapons. Air transports and helicopters provided reinforcement and resupply for friendly ground forces. Improved com-

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munications and surveillance systems allowed Army brigade groups and Marine regimental combat teams to operate independently like small divisions. These combined-arms units performed in accord with many of the theories put forth about transformation by Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki.2

The rapid advance centered on Baghdad was the real “shock and awe” part of the campaign as it ensured that the regime was doomed. Iraqi Republican Guard units that were initially deployed outside Baghdad to block approach routes were so rapidly engaged by interdiction and maneuver that they could not pull back into the city and mount the kind of urban warfare coalition planners had been concerned about.

This “speed kills” doctrine is not really new, however. It predates even the theories of blitzkrieg with which the US campaign has been compared. Two centuries ago, Napoleon argued that to wage war “energetically and with severity” is the only way to “make it shorter.” But it takes exceptional troops and a brilliant operational plan to actually pull it off in any era.

Napoleon also argued that God fights on the side with the heaviest artillery. The heavy, combined-arms units of the Army and Marines executed rapid maneuver with brilliance, and their firepower and protection enabled them to overcome whatever resistance or counterattacks they encountered. It was reported that Iraqi irregulars resorted to trucks armed with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades because that had worked in Somalia. But one of the central controversies about Somalia was the lack of armor deployed with US forces. Against the “thunder runs” of US tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, such tactics were suicidal.

If enemy light troops proved ineffective against American heavy units, US light troops were also not used as spearheads. The heavy components, the 3d Infantry Division, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, and British 7th Armoured Brigade, were given the toughest assignments where resistance was most likely. Lighter units from the 101st and 82d Airborne divisions were kept to the west, where opposition was much lighter.

The 173d Airborne Brigade, though composed of crack troops with air support, had a rougher go of it in the north because it lacked integral armor and adequate artillery. The offensive there finally got moving after M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles from the 1st Infantry Division were flown into captured airfields to reinforce the paratroopers two weeks after they had made their dramatic airdrop.3 Turkish opposition had blocked the deployment of the heavy 4th Infantry Division on the northern front.

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Looking to the Future

Part of defense transformation has been the recognized need to increase the firepower of light forces. The Army is fielding new brigades built around the Stryker wheeled armored infantry fighting vehicle. This 19-ton vehicle will come in a variety of configurations including those armed with anti-tank missiles, heavy mortars, and 105mm guns, as well as engineering, medical, and reconnaissance variants. The Army hopes to field six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, each with more than 300 Strykers, by converting light infantry and cavalry brigades currently in the force. After the 101st Airborne Division had seized airfields in western Iraq, Stryker brigades could have been flown in to reinforce the airborne infantry, giving them both increased combat power and mobility. But the first Stryker brigade will not be ready for deployment until near the end of 2003.

The issue then will be how much airlift will be available to move how many of the Stryker brigades. While size and weight are critical factors in air-landing operations, there is not much practical difference between moving a Stryker brigade and a traditional mechanized brigade by sea. The differences between a Stryker and an M1 or M2 within the context of the total load of a combat brigade being moved by a convoy of ships will not affect how soon the convoy will reach its destination. The main difference will be in what capabilities the brigade will bring to the fight once unloaded, and it is the mission that should determine what capabilities are needed.

Few question the need to up-gun light units with air-transportable armored systems that can get American ground troops into action quickly, but without putting them at too great a disadvantage against enemy forces that will probably contain heavy units of tanks and artillery. The debate is whether the Army should become a predominantly light force and scrap many of its own tanks and artillery. Here is where those planning to base the Objective Force on more lightly armed and armored units need to take a second look at their simulations and wargames compared to the actual experience of war in Iraq.

It is open to question whether the proposed diminutive Future Combat System (FCS) could conduct the same high-paced Iraq-style campaign in the face of a well-armed enemy with a will to resist. The FCS will be a group of manned and unmanned ground and airborne weapon systems weighing 20 tons or less. The size and weight limit for the high-tech, futuristic FCS was set so that they can be deployed via C-130 transport planes, the first of which flew nearly 50 years ago. The Objective Force is set for fielding in 2010, with the first prototype unit equipped by 2008.4

The FCS is too often portrayed, even by proponents, as skulking around or hiding while it waits for airpower to destroy through attrition any opposing forces before it dares advance. For example, a video presented by Boeing (the prime FCS contractor) at the 23d Army Science Conference demonstrated how the FCS might perform in combat. In the simulation, robotic sensors spot three

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enemy vehicles and immediately send the information via satellite to a naval vessel that launches missiles which destroy two of the targets. The remaining enemy vehicle is then knocked out by an Air Force fighter-bomber. Only with these enemy threats eliminated could the FCS “cells” (of three vehicles each) move forward.5 It is thus difficult to envision the lightly armed and armored FCS making “thunder runs” through enemy defenses.

There is a major conceptual flaw in this depiction of future war common to much of the romance associated with precision strike technology. What is presented is an ultimate form of attrition warfare. Every enemy unit encountered is apparently to be destroyed by some exotic means before American units are to venture forth to carry out any type of maneuver. Indeed, there seems to be little envisioned need to maneuver on the battlefield, only hide until the smoke clears and then advance across the craters left by the bombs and missiles. This attitude is more reminiscent of the World War I notion that “the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies” rather than of the blitzkrieg operations that broke the defensive stalemate of modern warfare.6

Airpower and precision strike—along with tube and rocket artillery— are vital parts of the larger ground battle of annihilation, not a substitute for it. Airpower is needed to help protect the flanks of rapidly advancing armored and mechanized units, and for providing on-call fire support for their lead elements. Indeed, the tactical mobility of airpower across the battlefield gives it the kind of flexibility that makes it the ideal joint partner with mechanized ground forces in maneuver warfare. The number of kills racked up by the bombers is less important than their shock effect in disrupting enemy deployments and slowing enemy reactions so that friendly ground units can pin, envelop, and rout opposing forces.

One of the constants in military history from ancient times to the present is that the real destruction of an army occurs when it is forced to retreat. As Napoleon said of retreats, “the loss of life is often greater than in two battles.” And when the enemy is surrounded by rapid maneuver as well as subject to vigorous pursuit, he can be annihilated as a fighting force. The majority of his soldiers will end up as prisoners or deserters rather than casualties, and the bulk of his weapons and equipment will be abandoned rather than engaged in any shootout. The great encirclement battles on the Eastern Front in World War II are the ulti-

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mate examples of this approach, as was General Douglas MacArthur’s landing at Inchon in Korea and Israel’s counterattack across the Suez in 1973. The drive on Baghdad can now be added to the list, as the bulk of the Iraqi army was bypassed and subsequently disintegrated.

As retired Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., has argued, “Rarely has superior firepower determined the outcome of a war. Armies and nations have displayed remarkable resiliency in sustaining enduring punishment wrought by bombs, artillery and missiles. . . . But maneuver by itself has inherent limitations. Depending on the experience of soldiers and their leaders, the unexpected presence of enemy forces in their rear or on their flanks, while disconcerting, rarely leads to total collapse.”7 Maneuver forces must be agile enough to exploit enemy weak points, powerful enough to seize vital political or strategic objectives, and robust enough to hold until follow-on forces can arrive to secure the victory. Decisive warfare confirms the requirement that ground forces at the tip of the spear combine speed, firepower, and endurance.

According to the Army White Paper Concepts for the Objective Force, the future Objective Force is supposed to be able to maneuver “from strategic distances . . . arriving at multiple points of entry, improved and unimproved,” which are attributes of light forces. But its real mission is to “overwhelm aggressor anti-access capabilities, and rapidly impose our will on our opponents.”8 That will require heavy weapons. Too much emphasis on the desire for rapid deployment may compromise the ability to actually accomplish the mission of winning the war, especially a decisive war calling for the complete defeat and conquest of the enemy’s country. Using light forces as the arm of decision is a trade-off of capabilities, not a “trade-on” that combines them. Transformation should concentrate more on improving the means of deploying robust combat units to the theater of conflict and the battlefield than has been the case, studying the proper expansion of fast cargo ships, prepositioned equipment, and heavy lift aircraft to get the job done.

Keeping Our Heavy Advantage

In an interview in Defense News the day Tikrit fell, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard Myers was asked if the tank will survive transformation. After paying his respects to the FCS, Myers replied, “Never was it said that things like the M1 [Abrams] tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles are not required. That’s never been part of the discussion.”9 But in many circles, the replacement of the M1 and M2 by the FCS has been a major part of the discussion. Indeed, the FCS is commonly referred to “as the core building block” of the Objective Force. The latest example of this shift in force structure is in the Army’s 2004 budget, which did not include money to upgrade the M1s and M2s of the 3d Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment so as not to take money away from the FCS program.

It should be remembered that the initial concept of a lighter Army was a product of the 1990s when the focus was more on peacekeeping. Such missions

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assumed operations more in line with police actions than sustained conventional combat (which was one of the reasons armor was not sent to Somalia). The 21st century, however, has started with a bang. The engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have been fundamentally different from those in Bosnia and Haiti. Major war is back, and due to the greater importance of large-scale conflict to the regional and global balance of power, the Army must be prepared to fight at the high end of the spectrum.

The dominant argument for creating a lighter Army has been the need for rapid strategic deployment in response to sudden crises. But the Iraq War demonstrated that it is diplomacy that sets the timetable, not troop movements. President Bush first identified Iraq as part of the “axis of evil” in his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002. Baghdad’s rejection of UN weapons inspections proposals on 5 July 2002 set in motion the events leading to the invasion of Iraq. On 8 November 2002 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 establishing a new inspection regime, which Iraq accepted five days later. Four more months of inspections, propaganda, and coalition-building followed before the United States gave up its attempt to obtain a second UN resolution condemning Iraq on 14 March and issued its own ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq on 16 March. Operation Iraqi Freedom finally commenced on 19 March 2003.

The building of coalitions, the attempt to coerce a favorable outcome without war, and the desire to conform to international norms combine to make the much-discussed “bolt from the blue” a rare occurrence. The most telling example of the superior speed of military deployment compared to diplomatic preparation was the arrival of a fleet of ships carrying the heavy equipment of the 4th Infantry Division off the coast of Turkey well before the process of obtaining Ankara’s permission to unload had reached its disappointing climax.

Both Gulf Wars have shown a two-step process involving military and diplomatic maneuvers. In the early stages, American air-transportable troops, prepositioned equipment, and Marine amphibious units are rapidly deployed to put down political markers. This first wave is not strong enough to fight a decisive campaign, but it does show national resolve and puts muscle behind diplomacy. As the situation deteriorates, diplomacy shifts to building military coalitions and securing local bases for a further deployment of the heavy units

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needed to fight and win a war. Because America’s superior strength is known to its adversaries, Washington is able to maintain the initiative and thus control the time when large-scale military action will commence—which ought not to be until it has the forces deployed to prevail.

The diplomatic environment can also affect operational choices. Operation Desert Storm saw 34 days of air strikes as part of an attrition campaign against Iraqi defenses prior to the US ground offensive in 1991. The United States could not afford a similar wait to launch the decisive stage of the campaign to topple Saddam in 2003. A month of air strikes might have triggered a worldwide political outcry, with demands for renewed negotiations, a cease-fire, and no regime change. American and coalition forces had to advance on Iraq’s capital from the first day and move as quickly as possible to achieve their political objective. This will have to be the model for future campaigns.

Fortunately, the Iraqis fought for Saddam the way the Italians fought for Mussolini in 1943 rather than how the Germans fought for Hitler in 1945 (it cost the Russians 250,000 casualties to take Berlin, a city smaller than Baghdad). American intelligence analysts, covert operatives, and psychological warfare specialists deserve much credit for understanding and exploiting the enemy’s fragile political environment. However, Washington cannot always count on the enemy being so irresolute. In addition to World War II, the Korean and Vietnam wars provide vivid examples of enemy armies that are willing to fight tenaciously for totalitarian regimes. The next adversary may use chemical weapons or pull its main forces into urban areas to fight to the bitter end. To overcome such enemies requires not only sound strategy and dynamic leadership, but the heavy weapons to prevail in the force-on-force battles that will determine the future of entire nations.


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NOTES

1. “If deterrence fails, decisively defeat an adversary. . . . Such a decisive defeat could include changing the regime of an adversary state or occupation of a foreign territory until US strategic objectives are met.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), p. 13. See also US Department of Defense, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Briefing on the Defense Planning Guidance,” 16 August 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2...t0816dsd.html, in which Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz says, “We want to have a major war capability to impose whatever terms—‘win decisively,’ I guess is the terminology. It was called ‘unconditional surrender’ in World War II.”

2. See, for example, Douglas A. MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997).

3. “As Turkey Casts Wary Eye on Kurdish-held Territory,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, 10 April 2003, p. A8.

4. Frank Tiboni, “U.S. Army’s Future Tank Features New Look,” Defense News, 9 June 2003, p. 40. Additional information about the FCS is available at http://www.darpa.mil/fcs/index.html.

5. Frank Tiboni, “Simulation Shows Speed, IT Key to U.S. FCS,” Defense News, 9-15 December 2002, p. 8.

6. See Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2001), in particular pp. 32-36.

7. Robert H. Scales, Jr., “A Sword with Two Edges: Maneuver in 21st Century Warfare,” in Future Warfare Anthology (rev. ed.; Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, 2000), pp. 72-73.

8. US Army White Paper, Concepts for the Objective Force, undated, http://www.objectiveforce.army.mil/p...hitePaper.pdf.

9. Interview with General Richard Myers, Defense News, 14-20 April 2003, p. 46.


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William R. Hawkins is Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the US Business and Industry Council in Washington, D.C. He previously spent five years on the staff of US Representative Duncan Hunter. Before coming to Washington, he taught economics at Radford University and Appalachian State University.


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Reviewed 22 August 2003. Please send comments or corrections to [email protected]

[Officer of Engineers]

From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces
The Hard Choices Facing India and Pakistan

Gregory S. Jones

Introduction
In the aftermath of their May 1998 nuclear tests, the key question remains: Do India and Pakistan intend to develop fully deployed nuclear forces? If they do, then their tests were only the first step. A fully deployed nuclear force must meet many requirements to ensure that it is capable of fulfilling the deterrence function assigned to it without causing other undue risks. These requirements were first delineated by Albert Wohlstetter in his seminal article, "The Delicate Balance of Terror." [1] Although the origins of these requirements were in the context of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, Wohlstetter made it clear that the requirements applied to any nuclear power and not just the two superpowers. [2]
A central requirement is that a nuclear force should be able to survive a first strike designed to prevent the force from striking back. Wohlstetter had seen how difficult it was for the United States to achieve this objective against the relatively small Soviet nuclear force in the 1950s, which was one of the main reasons he considered the balance of terror "delicate." [3] He believed that meeting this requirement would be even harder in an environment of many nuclear powers where the capabilities of these powers would vary greatly. [4]

As will be shown, both India and Pakistan are currently unable to deploy a force that can meet these requirements, a situation that is unlikely to change for some time. In particular, if India and Pakistan do proceed with weapons deployment, their forces will probably not be capable of withstanding a first strike, which could lead to instability in a crisis. Depending on how their forces are deployed, it may be difficult to prevent physical accidents or the theft or unauthorized use of these weapons, which will increase the risk of war in South Asia or the risk that other countries or subnational groups could obtain nuclear weapons.

This issue paper describes the requirements for a nuclear deterrent force in general terms, discusses how the Indian-Pakistani nuclear relationship is affected by China, and then considers the specific decisions that still must be made in India and Pakistan. Our goal is to provide a road map to the directions that India and Pakistan might take with their nuclear deployments. The paper will also make apparent just how far India and Pakistan still have to go and that if they deploy nuclear forces, the period of heightened risk will persist for many years, if not decades. On the positive side, the long road ahead for India and Pakistan allows for opportunities to head off their nuclear deployments. Indeed, it is important for India and Pakistan to recognize that they are much closer to their starting point than to any possible end point (I point out in the conclusions section that there may be no end point) and that they must seriously consider taking no further steps in nuclear weaponization.

Requirements for a Nuclear Deterrent Force
First, as was discussed in the introduction, a fully deployed nuclear force should be able to survive a first strike designed to prevent that force from striking back. This was a major finding of strategic analyses in the 1950s. The great destructive force associated with nuclear weapons means that this is no trivial requirement.
Second, the delivery systems must be able to reach their targets and to penetrate defenses on their way to the target. Being able to reach the target was an obvious problem in the Cold War, when intercontinental distances separated the combatants. This is still an issue, even though the distances in Asia are smaller. When the delivery vehicles are manned aircraft, being able to penetrate defenses is a concern. For the near term, missile defenses are not a factor, but over the long term they cannot be ruled out.

Third, the force should have a low risk of physical accidents, a problem even the United States has encountered. Aircraft carrying nuclear weapons have crashed. In January 1966, a B-52 carrying four B-28 hydrogen bombs crashed at Palomares, Spain. Two of the weapons were recovered intact (although one had to be retrieved from the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea). The other two weapons did not undergo nuclear detonation, but the accident did cause the high explosives in the weapons to explode, scattering the plutonium in their cores over a considerable area. A similar accident occurred in Greenland in 1968. Ballistic missiles similarly have had accidents--in September 1980, a maintenance accident caused a Titan II missile to explode in its silo. Its 9-MT warhead was blown 600 feet into the air and landed some 1500 feet from the silo. Fortunately, the warhead remained intact.

Fourth, the nuclear weapons should be safe against theft or unauthorized use. This threat can originate from either external or internal sources. The external threat could come from agents of other countries or subnational groups. The internal threat could come from unstable individuals or dissident groups. An example of the latter type of threat occurred in Algeria in 1961. A revolt broke out within the French army there as a nuclear weapon was being readied for a test. This weapon was reportedly detonated hastily in order to prevent the possibility of its seizure.

Fifth, the force should have a low risk of mistaken use by authorized persons. Such use might occur as a result of faulty warning of an attack or in response to an attack from a wrongly identified country or from a subnational group.

Sixth, the command authorities must survive any first strike, be able to make the decision to retaliate, and be able to communicate this decision to the surviving nuclear forces. U.S. law has specified 17 office holders as presidential successors [5] to ensure that there will always be someone authorized and available to make the decision to use nuclear weapons. Communication with dispersed nuclear forces may not be easy, especially if the command authority must specify targets instead of just giving a "go/no-go" signal.

Seventh, the nuclear forces should be capable of a number of response options. Otherwise, the political authorities may not have an option available that they are willing to carry out. For example, a small minimum-deterrence force capable of striking a few of the enemy's cities would not provide a reasonable option in the face of an attack on military forces. To respond in such circumstances would invite a response on one's own cities, which could be suicidal.

Finally, the force must be procured and operated at a reasonable cost. What is "reasonable" is relative, depending on the defense spending in any particular country.

There is a tension between some of these requirements. Dispersing a nuclear force to improve its ability to withstand a first strike makes it harder to protect against theft and also makes it harder for the political authorities to communicate with it. The solution to many of the problems will involve increased spending (for example, buying additional delivery systems to increase the odds that some will survive a first strike), which may make it hard to control costs.

In August 1999, India's National Security Advisory Board released its draft "Indian Nuclear Doctrine." The doctrine conformed closely with the above requirements. In particular, it stated that "the survivability of our arsenal is critical"; it recognized the importance of weapons "safety and security" and "the continuity of nuclear command and control"; and it noted that release authority for Indian nuclear weapons would reside "in the person of the Prime Minister of India or the designated successor(s)." However, the document does not explain how these objectives will be achieved, nor is it clear that the Board recognized the difficulty of meeting all of the requirements. [6]

The Effect of China on the Indian-Pakistani Nuclear Relationship
Discussions of the recent events in South Asia have tended to focus on the interaction between India and Pakistan--but China is also a player in South Asia. India and China fought a border conflict in 1962 and outstanding border disputes remain. Furthermore, China has been a long-time supporter of Pakistan, and India sees any major conflict with Pakistan as having a Chinese dimension--especially now that India believes China has provided considerable support to Pakistan's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In May 1998, India's Defense Minister, George Fernandes, declared that China was "potential threat No. 1." India's nuclear tests only eight days after this statement seem to be intended as a direct challenge to China.
Compared with India, China has formidable nuclear forces. China is believed to have deployed some 125 long-range (1700 km or greater) nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. [7] The missile warheads are thought to have yields of between 200 kT and 5 MT. In addition, China is believed to have some 150 bomber-deliverable nuclear weapons and 120 tactical nuclear weapons deliverable by short-range missiles or artillery. An attack using just a small part of this force could have a devastating effect on an Indian nuclear force.

China's a major modernization program for its nuclear forces is being driven by its concerns related to the United States and Russia. It is developing several new long-range solid-fueled ballistic missiles including the DF-31 that was tested in August 1999. This land-based mobile missile has a range of 8000 km. Changes to China's modernization effort in light of the Indian nuclear tests should not be anticipated because the developing systems would be quite capable against India. For example, the DF-31 could hit any part of India from any part of China.

China professes to adhere to no-first-use and minimum deterrence policies. China's deployed nuclear forces, however, can achieve more than minimum deterrence. Nuclear weapons of a minimum deterrence force would need only to reach the homelands of the four other declared nuclear powers. Such a force would consist only of CSS-3s and CSS-4s. But China also has the shorter-range CSS-2s and CSS-5s. The CSS-5 is particularly telling because the missile was developed after the CSS-3 and CSS-4. These missiles have a range of only 1700 km, which makes it clear that they are intended to hit targets near China. These targets could be the conventional forces of the major nuclear powers or China's neighboring countries. Neither is consistent with a minimum deterrence policy. Clearly, China has a more complex nuclear policy that does not rule out nuclear attacks on its neighbors. It is not clear what China's real nuclear policy is, but it might under some circumstances include the first use of nuclear weapons, such as a disarming first strike against India. The risk of such an attack is currently quite low. Nevertheless, Indian planners will have to consider such an attack seriously if they start to deploy nuclear forces.

There are many reports of China having provided Pakistan with substantial aid to both its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. An alternative to a direct Chinese nuclear confrontation with India is for China to continue or even increase its aid to Pakistan. China's goal would be to make it harder for India to use its superior resources to gain an advantage over Pakistan in a nuclear arms race.

Decisions Facing India
What choices does India face if it is intent on developing a fully deployed nuclear force? Probably the biggest decision relates to delivery systems. In the near term, aircraft are the only available delivery systems. Fighter-bomber aircraft would be the most likely type used, with India's Jaguar as a good example. It can carry a 1000-kg nuclear weapon to a radius of 900--1400 km depending on the flight profile. [8] From the base at Ambala (200 km north of New Delhi), the Jaguar could cover most of Pakistan. This base, however, is only 300 km from Pakistan and might be vulnerable to attack. Using the Jaguar base at Gorakpur might make more sense. This base is about 1000 km from Pakistan, which makes it less vulnerable to air attack. To attack Pakistan, aircraft from this base could stage through a base close to Pakistan and thereby cover the entire country. In the near future, the newly acquired Su-30 might be the preferred option. It would not have a much greater range than the Jaguar, but its higher performance and better radar might make it more capable of penetrating defenses.
Fighter-bomber-type aircraft can cover Pakistan, but they do not cover China well. Even if they were to stage through bases in Assam (northeastern India), they can only reach southwestern China. Although India possesses the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) variant of Russia's strategic TU-95 bomber, which can carry a heavy nuclear weapon (or several lighter ones) 5000-6000 km, India has only eight of these aircraft, and their ability to penetrate Chinese air defenses is probably not good. In addition, because these aircraft are navy assets, using them for strategic bombing might be organizationally difficult.

Any aircraft-based Indian delivery system with dependence on fixed airfields would have a problem surviving a first strike, especially from China. China could easily strike Indian military facilities and nuclear weapon production sites with 20 or so nuclear-armed ballistic missiles (mainly CSS-2s and CSS-5s, with a few CSS-3s) and have over 100 nuclear-armed missiles in reserve. India has no way of detecting ballistic missiles in flight. Its first hint that a nuclear attack was under way would come only when Chinese nuclear weapons began exploding over its airfields. China could then mop up with bomber-delivered nuclear attacks. An Indian nuclear force based solely on aircraft delivery would be hard pressed to survive such an attack. (A multimegaton warhead exploded over an airfield would destroy all of the aircraft on the ground even if they were in hardened shelters.) Furthermore, Pakistan's two tests (in April 1998 and April 1999) of its 1500-km-range Ghauri missile, which can reach many of India's deep airfields such as Gorakpur, show that this is a growing problem with respect to Pakistan as well. Combined with the problems associated with penetrating air defenses (again, China is more of a problem than is Pakistan), an aircraft-based delivery system appears doubtful, leading one to consider ballistic missiles.

India is currently developing two medium-range ballistic missiles, the Agni-1 and the Agni-2. The Agni-1 uses a first stage derived from India's SLV-3 space launcher and a second stage derived from India's Prithvi short-range ballistic missile. It was tested three times between 1989 and 1994 and has a range of about 1500 km. India tested the Agni-2 in April 1999. This missile is similar to the Agni-1 but uses a new solid-fuel second stage. Indian sources suggest 2500 km as the intended range of this missile, but it is more likely to be only 2000-2200 km. [9] This range is sufficient to cover all of Pakistan from well inside India, but it cannot cover much of China. Even if the Agni-2 were based in extreme northeast India it could not reach northeastern China (including Beijing) or many of the east coast cities. However, operating in such a geographically restricted area would increase the missile's vulnerability to a Chinese first strike. In addition, the state of Assam has been the site of an internal insurrection and is connected to the rest of India by only a narrow corridor.

For these reasons, India might want to base its missile force to the west of Bangladesh. One of the closest viable sites to China would be near the city of Bhagalpur, which is some 3000 km from Beijing. To provide flexibility for basing or for operating a land-based mobile system, a missile range of 3500 km would be required. A missile with a range of 5000 km would be ideal because it could be based almost anywhere in India and still hit Beijing. However, no upgrade of the Agni-2 is likely to produce a missile with a 3500-5000 km range. Thus, India would have to produce a whole new missile. The Polar Space Launch Vehicle (PSLV) shows that India has the technology to produce the required missile, but the new missile cannot be directly derived from the PSLV because it is too big (it would be big even for an ICBM). The 3500-5000 km ballistic missile would have to be a new development, not derived from any existing Indian missile system, so it would be neither quick nor inexpensive. Ultimately, such a missile would probably weigh 25-30 metric tons and look something like the French S-3 or M-20 or the Soviet SS-20 ballistic missiles.

If India procures a 3500-5000 km range missile, what would be its basing options? The easiest option would be to deploy the missile to soft fixed sites, although such a deployment mode would make it vulnerable to a first strike. Silo basing would be quite effective given the large CEPs of Pakistan's and China's current missiles. However, India does not currently have the technology to build hardened silos. In the ten or more years it would take for India to develop such technology, China's missile accuracy could improve enough (perhaps using satellite systems) that silo-based missiles would also be vulnerable.

Another alternative might be some form of mobile basing. A 30-metric-ton missile is light enough to be made road-mobile, but the poor state of India's roads makes this a dangerous proposition. Special roads could be built to transport the missile but would be expensive, and it is not clear that a road long enough to ensure the missile force's survival could be built. India's railroads are in fairly good shape, which makes a rail-mobile system a possibility. The identity of trains carrying nuclear weapons would need to be obscured, and the trains would have to move often enough so that China and Pakistan could not learn their locations. As with any mobile system, there are the problems of physical accidents, theft and physical security, and communication with civilian authorities. To minimize some of these problems, various garrisons could be connected by rail. The trains would normally be at one of the protected garrisons and only occasionally moved between them. This would be a compromise between a constantly mobile system and a fixed one. There would have to be enough garrison locations to ensure sufficient locational uncertainty so that some of the force would survive a first strike. This would increase costs.

Mobility on a submarine seems well beyond India's capability for at least ten, and probably 20, years. To build such a submarine, India would have to develop a light water reactor using enriched uranium, which would require India to obtain a source of enriched uranium. Foreign suppliers are not likely to be willing to help India, and in any case India may well not want to be dependent on foreign supplies, with the result that India would have to expand its centrifuge enrichment program to supply the needed material.

India's National Security Advisory Board's draft Nuclear Doctrine calls for "a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets." The phrase "sea-based assets" implies that India may be considering a surface ship system for delivering nuclear weapons. Such a system would not be as desirable as a submarine; unlike a submarine, which is difficult to find when it is submerged, a surface ship can be readily located.

Another important decision for India is to determine the readiness level of its nuclear force. In the past, India has had an unready force. Presumably, the weapons were kept in pieces at one well-guarded site. South Africa's nuclear force was kept this way. [10] Such an arrangement can be protected against physical accidents, theft, and unauthorized use, and the site is inexpensive and easy to communicate with. However, it is vulnerable to a first strike. South Africa did not need to worry about a first strike but India certainly does. A further complication is that India does not possess any means of detecting ballistic missiles in flight and therefore is forced to adopt a strategy of riding out any nuclear missile attack. The more ready India's force is and the more it takes other steps (such as using mobile delivery systems) to reduce its first-strike vulnerability, the better it will be able to survive a ballistic missile attack. But it will have to worry more about physical accidents, theft and unauthorized use, and maintaining reliable and secure communications.

One possible option would be to have a mobile system kept safely guarded in garrison during "normal" peacetime. Only in a crisis or on receipt of strategic warning would the force be sent into mobile operation. This raises the issue of whether strategic warning can be the principal means to protect a nuclear force. Some have argued that Wohlstetter's "delicate balance" assumed a "bolt from the blue" attack and that such attacks are unlikely. [11] This argument, however, ignores the fact that some of the most serious instances of surprise attacks were not "bolts from the blue" but rather "bolts from the gray," and indeed sometimes the gray has been very dark indeed. [12] For example, the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred only ten days after a war warning had been sent to its commander from the Chief of Naval Operations. [13] The Israelis depend on strategic warning to mobilize their military forces, but failed to mobilize until just before the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur war despite a situation that could hardly be characterized as "blue skies." [14] The combat in Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani forces in the spring of 1999 once again illustrates that it is often hard to find "blue skies" in the relations between these two countries.

A nuclear force that depended on its survival by dispersing on the receipt of strategic warning would be vulnerable to a first strike if the warning were not received or recognized. Furthermore, the dispersal of the nuclear force during a crisis could be considered an escalatory step. Despite the serious risks associated with this option, India may de facto adopt this or some similar system. Indeed, India's National Security Advisory Board's draft Nuclear Doctrine calls for its nuclear forces to have the "capability to shift from peace-time deployment to fully employable forces," which suggests that this option is being seriously considered. Not only will this option have the first-strike vulnerability problems described, but a hastily dispersed force will be particularly prone to the problems of physical accidents, theft, unauthorized use, and difficulty communicating with its command authorities. For example, the fear that an attack was imminent could lead one to skip certain safety or security procedures in the effort to disperse the force quickly. These problems underline the dangers that would be created should India try to deploy nuclear forces without spending the time and money needed to make them more robust.

Another important decision for India is how to design a command structure that is resistant to an attack aimed at decapitating India's civilian leadership. One option is to delegate nuclear-use authority to subordinate commanders so that nuclear response is still possible even if the civilian leadership is disabled. This, however, exacerbates the problem of unauthorized use because nothing would prevent a subordinate commander from proclaiming the civilian leadership disabled and using the weapons as he sees fit. In fact, the Indian government seems unlikely to want to delegate authority. [15] If this is so, and if the Indian government wants to always maintain "top-down" control, then there are two things it must clarify. First, India must, like the United States, codify civilian succession through a large enough number of governmental officers so that one or more is likely to survive a decapitating attack. At the present time, the ruling party in India would have to convene to elect a successor--something that would be difficult in a nuclear war. Second, India must develop the mechanism to enforce the civilian control of its nuclear weapons. There are two ways to do this. One way is to use a mechanical device, which prevents the arming of the weapon unless the proper code is entered. In the United States, such devices, used extensively on U.S. weapons, are called Permissive Action Links (PALs). The other way is to use specially selected personnel in an organization separate from the military to maintain weapons control. This method was used in the old Soviet Union and is still used by Russia. India must decide on the combination of these two methods that it wants to use.

India must also decide on a targeting and use doctrine. Open Indian sources (including the National Security Advisory Board's draft Nuclear Doctrine) call for a minimum or proportional deterrence doctrine. Such a doctrine would require only a small number of delivery vehicles and would target only the opponent's cities. This doctrine might be sufficient for deterring Pakistan, especially if India's main goal were to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used in any conflict. Against China this doctrine might not be enough. A first strike by China against India using approximately 20 nuclear weapons could devastate India's nuclear and air forces, yet China would still have over one hundred nuclear weapons to hit Indian cities should India strike Chinese cities in response. India must determine how it would respond to such an attack. Such a response would probably involve attacking Chinese military targets, which would require a larger and more discriminate nuclear force than would be required by a minimum deterrence doctrine.

Ironically, a leading proponent of the proportional deterrence variant of minimum deterrence, Pierre Gallois, came to recognize the flaw in this strategy. When he had originally formulated his views on proportional deterrence, he had done so in the context of an attack that jeopardized national survival. [16] However, in the 1980s Gallois realized that discriminate attacks on military targets would require a different kind of response. "For a medium-size power victim of such an attack, retaliation would pose a difficult political and strategic problem. Hence, for this medium power, the necessity of adding to the minimum deterrence weapons, the instruments of a selective nuclear reaction against the aggressor's military installations with accurate and low yield atomic weapons." [17]

An issue that will be dictated by the choice of doctrine is whether India will require a prompt response (in less than an hour) to any nuclear attack. Presumably, a quick response would be required to strike military targets (not necessarily only nuclear ones). A rapid response would require India to maintain a very ready nuclear force and would have implications for command, control, and intelligence. Rapid reaction would require not only that the top Indian leadership survive and decide to retaliate, but also that the command links to the nuclear forces survive, so that a message to respond could be received quickly. Rapid response would place heavy demands on Indian intelligence to provide targeting information related to enemy military forces. Having a force that can respond rapidly raises the problems of not only unauthorized use and theft but also of mistaken authorized use. In particular, India would have to quickly decide that an attack had occurred and ascertain where it had come from.

A final issue that India must address is whether to further develop its nuclear weapons. There are two parts to this question. The first is whether India needs to conduct additional nuclear weapons tests. India says that it tested five devices on May 11 and 13, 1998, and that four of them were fission devices with yields of 0.2 kT, 0.2 kT, 0.6 kT and 12 kT. [18] The three subkiloton tests are unusual, and have led some to speculate that these low-yield devices are intended for battlefield use. But even if these devices had the yield reported by India, there is no reason to assume that the intended yield is the same as the test yield. When the British were testing in Australia, they deliberately tested reduced-yield versions of their weapons to limit the test's environmental effects. [19] India's three subkiloton tests, along with the 12-kT test and its May 1974 test might have provided enough information for India to produce a reliable weapon with a 10-20 kT yield that would be light enough (1000 kg or less) to be deliverable by tactical aircraft or ballistic missile.

India has said that its other nuclear test was of a thermonuclear device with a yield of 42 kT. [20] This again is somewhat unusual, since the whole point of India producing a thermonuclear weapon would be to have a weapon with a yield in the 100-kT to 1-MT range. India has specifically said that the weapon yield was deliberately reduced to minimize environmental damage. This might include not only seismic damage to nearby villages but also containment of radioactivity. But how confident can India be that its scaled-up thermonuclear weapon will produce the desired yield? All five nuclear powers undertook many tests not only to perfect their thermonuclear weapons but also to produce relatively lightweight versions of this type of weapon. China's first deployed thermonuclear missile warhead weighed over 2000 kg, yet India's Agni-2 missile has only a 1000-kg payload. [21]

Nor can India easily forgo the possession of thermonuclear weapons if it wants to maintain any sort of balance with China. Despite the common belief that one atomic weapon is enough to destroy a city, in actuality a 10-kT weapon will destroy about 9 sq km of an urban area. [22] While this yield would be quite enough for a medium-sized city like Hiroshima with a population of about one-quarter million and a built-up area of about 18 sq km, large modern cities typically have populations of 5 to 10 million and built-up areas of 500 to 1,000 sq km or more. A small Indian retaliatory force of, say, ten 10-kT weapons would barely be enough to disable even one large Chinese city (bearing in mind that not every square kilometer of a city must be destroyed before it stops functioning). However, a 1-MT weapon will destroy an area at least 20 times larger than that of a 10-kT one. Approximately 20 Chinese multimegaton weapons would be enough to disable every Indian city with a population of more than 1 million.

These considerations lead one to conclude that India might want to conduct additional thermonuclear tests. India has currently proclaimed a test moratorium and has said that it will enter negotiations on signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--but it is hard to tell how serious India is. Whether India conducts additional nuclear tests will ultimately depend upon political considerations, not just technical ones.

Our discussion thus far has taken India's test claims at face value. However, the seismic data do not totally agree with India's statements. India said its three tests on May 11, 1998 had yields of 42 kT, 12 kT and 0.2 kT. The tests, however, registered a body-wave magnitude of 5.0, which corresponds to a total yield of only 9-16 kT. [23] India said that its two tests on May 13, 1998 had yields of 0.6 kT and 0.2 kT. However, no seismic signals were detected, though at these yields, some should have been. Clearly (at least on May 11), some type of nuclear explosion took place, so it is not hard to credit India with a simple fission weapon capability. The yield discrepancies throw doubt on India's thermonuclear claims--a doubt that must undercut any deterrent effect India's supposed possession of thermonuclear weapons might have. The need to remove this doubt is yet another reason why India may well want to conduct more nuclear tests.

The second part of the question of further Indian nuclear weapons development concerns stockpile size and how it affects fissile nuclear material requirements. India currently has about 450 kg of separated weapons-grade plutonium, [24] which would allow the manufacture of about 90 simple fission weapons. [25] India is currently producing about 25 kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year, which could be increased to about 100 kg per year if India felt it to be necessary. This stockpile of plutonium and its current production rate are probably enough to supply India with an adequate supply of fission weapons. India's fissile material requirements for its thermonuclear weapons are less clear; there is no unclassified estimate of the amount of plutonium required per weapon. Furthermore, all of the five established nuclear-weapon states have produced both plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). The usual reason given is that thermonuclear weapons require highly enriched uranium. India has only a very small uranium enrichment capacity. It could currently produce at most only 10 kg of HEU per year. It also has produced kilogram quantities of U-233 by irradiating thorium in its power reactors. It is unclear whether it used some of its limited supplies of HEU or U-233 in its thermonuclear test or whether it has found a way to make thermonuclear weapons without HEU. Either way, India might have to increase its fissile material production if it wants to make tens of thermonuclear weapons. If it makes plutonium-only thermonuclear weapons, then these weapons might well use more plutonium than a standard fission weapon. If India uses HEU or U-233, then it will have to undertake a major expansion in its ability to produce these materials.

Decisions Facing Pakistan
Much of the discussion on India applies to Pakistan as well, for if Pakistan is to deploy a fully weaponized force, many of the choices it must make are similar to those facing India. I will highlight some of the significant differences. Just as the potential of a first strike from Pakistan or, especially, China places difficult requirements on India, so India, with its relatively large size and resources, generates difficult decisions for Pakistan.
Pakistan, like India, must make decisions about a nuclear delivery system. Pakistan has fighter-bombers, such as the F-16, suitable for nuclear delivery. The F-16 can carry a 1000-kg nuclear weapon to a range of 1400 km, [26] which would allow for fairly deep strikes into India. But, like India, Pakistan's aircraft are vulnerable to a first strike. Its handful of tactical fighter bases are nearly all within 200 km of India (less than 10 minutes flying time). The problem of first-strike vulnerability, combined with the need to penetrate deeply into Indian air defenses, leads to the consideration of ballistic missiles for nuclear delivery.

Thanks to foreign assistance, Pakistan's missile programs are further along than are India's. The M-11 missiles Pakistan is reported to have received from China are highly capable mobile missiles that would make excellent nuclear delivery vehicles. Their main drawback is that their range is only 300 km, which means that they cannot cover most of India. Pakistan's two tests of its Ghauri missile may have solved this problem. The Ghauri is believed to be derived from the North Korean No Dong missile and to have a range of 1500 km. The videos of its tests showed that it was launched from a road-mobile launcher. If Pakistan is able to acquire or build enough of these missiles, they could be quite a satisfactory delivery system. The 750-km-range Shaheen-1 that Pakistan tested in April 1999 could also be a nuclear-delivery vehicle, although its shorter range would limit the targets in India that it could reach.

Even if Pakistan decides to place its nuclear weapons on a mobile ballistic missile, it, like India, must then decide how ready this force will be. If it is deployed in the field, moving frequently from site to site, and is armed with its nuclear warheads, then a missile force will be more likely to survive a first strike but will at the same time be more vulnerable to physical accidents, theft and unauthorized use, and problems communicating with its command authorities. If it is deployed at a few secure garrisons, perhaps without the nuclear warheads attached, then it will have far fewer problems with physical accidents and the like but will be much more vulnerable to a first strike. Like India, there is a serious risk that Pakistan will keep its forces in unready garrison mode and try to rely on strategic warning to disperse its force. Such a strategy is vulnerable to warning failure and a hasty dispersal can increase the physical accident and other problems, and could be considered an escalatory action.

Like India, Pakistan must make important decisions regarding its command arrangements and must develop a targeting and use doctrine. These include devising an arrangement to maintain "top-down" control of its nuclear forces even in the face of an attack designed to decapitate the leadership, and deciding under what circumstances and against which targets it might actually use nuclear weapons.

Pakistan must also decide on any further development of its nuclear stockpile. There has been no official Pakistani statement regarding the types of weapons and the yields for its six claimed tests. The first five tests on May 28, 1998 produced a single seismic signal with a body-wave magnitude of 4.9. [27] This is equivalent to a total yield of 6-13 kT. The sixth test on May 30, 1998 had a body-wave magnitude of 4.3, which is equivalent to a yield of 2-8 kT. It seems likely that all of Pakistan's tests involved simple fission weapons, with the most powerful one having a yield no greater than 15 kT. As a result of these tests, Pakistan may have a reliable weapon with a 10-15 kT yield that is light enough (1000 kg or less) to be carried on its F-16s or its M-11s and Ghauris. If this is true, then in the short term Pakistan will have no need to conduct further tests for weapons development, although for political reasons, it might still test if India does.

In the long term, the situation is less clear. If India has really tested a thermonuclear weapon and if it conducts additional tests (especially with large yields of 100 kT- 1 MT), then Pakistan will likely try to develop its own thermonuclear weapon--not only for political reasons but for technical ones as well. As was discussed earlier, it takes at least twenty times as many 10-kT warheads to cause urban damage similar to that of a 1-MT warhead. A small Pakistani force equipped with 10-kT weapons would have difficulty disabling even one large Indian city, whereas an Indian force equipped with megaton-yield weapons would probably be able to disable every major city in Pakistan.

Pakistan has already made the decision to expand its stockpile of fissile material. From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s (when production stopped as a result of U.S. pressure) Pakistan produced some 200 kg of HEU at its enrichment plant at Kahuta. [28] Assuming 15 kg of HEU per weapon, this would have given Pakistan enough HEU for approximately 13 fission nuclear weapons. If Pakistan really did test six nuclear weapons in May 1998, afterwards it would have had only enough HEU for seven more weapons. Given this fact, it is not surprising that there are reports that Pakistan restarted production of HEU at Kahuta in the spring of 1998. [29] Although HEU may not have been produced at Kahuta during the 1991-1998 period, Kahuta was in operation during this time and the Pakistanis stockpiled medium enriched uranium product. Using this intermediate product to produce HEU would have given Pakistan some 200 kg of additional HEU by the end of 1998. [30] Pakistan would then have had enough total HEU to produce approximately 20 nuclear weapons. At this point, the intermediate product stockpile would be exhausted and Kahuta would have gone back to producing HEU from natural uranium. When Kahuta last operated, it produced some 25 kg of HEU per year (starting from natural uranium), which is enough for about 1.7 weapons per year. Pakistan may have already expanded the production rate at this facility or it may expand it in the future.

In addition, Pakistan is reported to have started the operation of its 50-MW heavy-water plutonium production reactor at Khushab. [31] Significantly, this reactor is reported to have started operation in April 1998, before the Indian tests. Where Pakistan obtained the heavy water needed to start this reactor has not been publicly stated. It probably took about a year for the reactor to reach full-power operation and the plutonium production in the fuel to achieve equilibrium. At this point, the reactor would start discharging about 11 kg of plutonium per year. Assuming 5 kg of plutonium per weapon, this will be enough for some 2.2 weapons per year. The number of plutonium weapons is additive with whatever HEU weapons are produced by Kahuta's output.

Conclusions
Each of the five major nuclear powers has had to create deployed nuclear forces that meet the requirements for a deterrent force. It has been a long and expensive process. When the British, French, and Chinese first deployed their nuclear forces, they could not survive a Soviet first strike. These countries wanted (and needed) such forces anyway. As soon as they had the capability, both Britain and France deployed nuclear ballistic missile submarines. China has moved toward survivable forces somewhat more slowly, but even it has developed nuclear ballistic missile submarines and land-mobile missiles.
Because no nuclear disasters occurred while these three powers had vulnerable nuclear forces, there may be some in India and Pakistan who think that this paper has overstated the risks that they face. But the British and French were always protected by U.S. nuclear forces. In the Chinese case, it is well known that the Soviets were seriously considering a preventive nuclear war against China in the late 1960s, which clearly illustrates the magnitude of the risks. [32]

These three powers eventually managed to minimize some of the risks discussed in this paper by deploying large diverse arsenals. An important element in their arsenals was the deployment of mobile missiles on submarines. The submarine's mobility and its invisibility under water not only protect it from a first strike but also from theft. In the case of a physical accident (as has happened to two Soviet ballistic missile submarines), the vessel simply sinks into deep water, with minimal environmental effects.[33]

However, it will be a long time before there are Indian ballistic missile submarines cruising the Indian Ocean and even longer before there are Pakistani ones. In the interim, if India and Pakistan go ahead with their nuclear deployments, their forces could be vulnerable to a first strike (which could lead to crisis instability), to physical accidents, to theft, and to unauthorized use. As such, Indian and Pakistani nuclear deployments are a threat to the whole world.

Even if some day India and Pakistan were able to make all of the decisions, take all of the actions, and afford all of the expenditures needed to bring them to where the major nuclear powers are today, neither country should think that this would be the end of it. Maintaining a nuclear deterrent force is a dynamic process,[34] a point that was illustrated to some extent above. For example, Pakistan's two tests of its Ghauri ballistic missile has forced India to consider the vulnerability of many more of its air bases. India's claim to have tested a thermonuclear weapon has forced Pakistan to consider the development of similar weapons. Additional events should be expected in the future. It was considerations such as these that forced the five nuclear powers to maintain significant expenditures on their nuclear forces. One of the more extreme cases was France, which for many years spent around 30 percent of its defense budget on its nuclear forces. India and Pakistan may face expenditures of a similar magnitude.

Some Indians will argue that the possibility of conflict with China requires India to deploy nuclear weapons. But as this paper has shown, the mere possession of nuclear forces does not necessarily mean that one can deter one's enemies. The key issue is, does the deployment of nuclear forces increase or decrease Indian security? Because Indian nuclear forces will be unlikely to be able to withstand a Chinese first strike, an Indian deployment of nuclear weapons will actually make a Chinese nuclear strike more likely. This, combined with the risks of physical accidents, theft, and unauthorized use, and the drain of resources away from conventional military forces, makes it clear that by deploying nuclear forces India will be decreasing its security.

Given all of these problems, the U.S. policy to try to stop nuclear weaponization in India and Pakistan is eminently sensible. The risks to the rest of the world are undeniable. And as this paper has shown, weaponization would present India and Pakistan not only with substantial risks but also with major expenditures should they try to reduce these risks. The United States needs to be frank with India and Pakistan about the problems they are getting into and how complex those problems can be. It is one thing to say, "Have safe nuclear weapons." The Indians and Pakistanis will surely respond, "Of course we will." It is another to say, "A small, unsophisticated nuclear force may have to choose whether it can survive a first strike or whether it can avoid physical accidents and have weapons that are safe from theft and unauthorized use."

At the same time, the United States should see what can be done to lessen the underlying tensions in the region. For example, resolution of India's border disputes with China would help to build on the force reductions that have already taken place in the last few years on the Sino-Indian border. It is steps like these, rather than India and Pakistan's deployment of vulnerable nuclear forces, that hold the key to stability in South Asia.

[Officer of Engineers]

1] Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2, January 1959. A slightly different version was published as P-1472, RAND, December 1958.
[2]Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3, April 1961.

[3]See A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R. J. Lutz, and H. S. Rowen, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, RAND, R-266, April 2, 1954; A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, and H. S. Rowen, Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s, RAND, R-290, September 1, 1956; and Albert Wohlstetter and Fred Hoffman, Defending a Strategic Force After 1960, RAND, D-2270, February 1, 1954. This work first enunciated the importance of the first strike/second strike distinction, developed "fail-safe" procedures for strategic bomber operations, and formulated the concept and rationale for missile silos.

[4]In "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country" (p. 370), he wrote,


The view that widespread diffusion [of nuclear weapons] will be stabilizing assumes that the prototype relation among the many powers will be mutual deterrence. But it would in fact be a miracle if every pair of countries out of a large number of nuclear powers stood in this relationship. These countries are at different stages of development and in different relative strategic positions. It would be remarkable if there were not strong asymmetries and sometimes symmetrical "preclusive" capabilities.
Not all analysts share Wohlstetter's concerns about Nth country nuclear forces. Kenneth N. Waltz takes a benign view of the proliferation of nuclear forces. "Nuclear forces are seldom delicate because no state wants delicate forces, and nuclear forces can easily be made sturdy." (Kenneth N. Waltz, "More May Be Better," The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1995, p. 19.) Given Wohlstetter's extensive real-world analysis of this issue (see footnote 3), his concerns have far more weight than do Waltz's assurances. Furthermore, by his use of the word "seldom," even Waltz concedes that under some circumstances vulnerable forces may exist.

[5]3 U.S. Code Annotated, Section 19.

[6]Note that Waltz's requirements for deterrent forces, "whether big or small ones," are similar to those laid out in this section. See Waltz, 1995, p. 20.

[7]SIPRI Yearbook 1997, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p. 401.

[8]The 900-km radius is with external fuel and a lo-lo-lo flight profile. The 1400-km radius is with external fuel and a hi-lo-hi flight profile. See Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1994-1995, Jane's Information Group, Alexandria, Virginia, p. 121.

[9]The 2000-km range is given by a U.S. Defense Department source; the 2200-km range is given by an Indian one. See Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April 1996, p. 39; and Vivek Raghuvanshi and Barbara Opall-Rome, "India's New Agni Raises Missile Race Stakes," Defense News, May 11-17, 1998, p. 4.

[10]David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, p. 44.

[11]See for example, Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4, Spring 1978. To be fair to Brodie, he was making this argument in the context of the United States and Soviet Union. It is not clear that he would make this same argument in the current South Asian context.

[12]For more on this issue, see Richard Brody, "The Limits of Warning," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer 1983.

[13]In part this message said: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." This did not necessarily mean that an attack on Hawaii would take place. In Hawaii, this message was interpreted as referring to a possible Japanese attack in Southeast Asia. As it turned out, both Hawaii and Southeast Asia were attacked. See Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, Stanford University Press, 1962, p. 45.

[14]Israel had already fought three wars with its neighbors. At the end of the Six Day War in 1967, there was a long period of low-level conflict known as the War of Attrition that did not end until August 1970. Only four months before the Yom Kippur war, Israel had partially mobilized its forces in anticipation of an attack. See Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, Random House, New York, 1982.

[15]India's National Security Advisory Board's draft Nuclear Doctrine says: "The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s)."

[16]Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1961, p. 119.

[17]Pierre Gallois, "Precision, The Fourth Age of Strategy," paper presented at "Disarmament and Peace Seminar," Istanbul, November 25-26, 1983, p. 5.

[18]John F. Burns, "Indian Scientists Confirm They Detonated a Hydrogen Bomb," The New York Times, May 18, 1998, p. 1.

[19]During the "Buffalo" test series in 1956, the second and third tests were of the "Blue Danube" bomb. The full yield of this bomb was 40 kT, yet the yields of the two tests were 1.5 kT and 3 kT. As the official history of these tests states: "The yield of a test warhead or device bore no necessary relation to that of a production bomb, since the yield of a given device could be varied at will." See Lorna Arnold, A Very Special Relationship--British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1987, pp. 63-64, 70.

[20]Burns, 1998.

[21]This was on the DF-3 (CSS-2). See Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1994, p. 380.

[22]About 12 sq km were destroyed at Hiroshima. I used two-thirds power scaling to reduce this area from the 15-kT weapon used at Hiroshima to that for a 10-kT one. See The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, U.S. Government Printing Office, June 30, 1946. Note that this area is not the same as the lethal area, which at Hiroshima was about 8 sq km.

[23]Brian Barker et al., "Monitoring Nuclear Tests," Science, Vol. 281, September 25, 1998, p. 1967.

[24]This is an update of a previous estimate. See Brian G. Chow, Richard H. Speier, and Gregory S. Jones, The Proposed Fissile Material Production Cutoff--Next Steps, RAND, MR-586-1-OSD, 1995, pp. 43-45.

[25]India also has about 200 kg of separated reactor-grade plutonium. Although this material is less desirable for weapons, it could be used to make about 30 additional weapons (assuming 7 kg of plutonium per weapon). India's stocks of weapons-grade plutonium are large enough that it probably would not use its stock of reactor-grade plutonium to make weapons.

[26]Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1994-1995, p. 572.

[27]Barker et al., 1998.

[28]Brian G. Chow, Richard H. Speier, and Gregory S. Jones, 1995,
p. 46.

[29]Mark Hibbs, Shahid-Ur-Rehman, and Abdul Rauf Siddiqi, "Pakistan's Prime Minister Will Not Order a Hasty Test," Nucleonics Week, May 21, 1998, p. 14.

[30]Pakistan's total stockpile of HEU will be the same as if it had never stopped producing HEU at Kahuta. In other words, the moratorium on HEU production at Kahuta during these seven years will have had no effect on Pakistan's long-term HEU production.

[31]Testimony of Paul Leventhal, President, Nuclear Control Institute, to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, May 14, 1998.

[32]Ultimately, even China's security depended on U.S. protection; it was strong U.S. opposition that discouraged the Soviet attack. See Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring 1994, p. 84. New information makes it clear that Brezhnev himself favored truncating China's nuclear weapons development, but that he wanted U.S. concurrence. See William Burr (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts, The New Press, New York, 1998, pp. 131, 142.

[33]Peter Huchthausen, Igor Kurdin, and R. Alan White, Hostile Waters, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1997.

[34]Albert Wohlstetter first pointed out this problem facing small nuclear powers.


The problem of deterring a major power requires a continuing effort because the requirements for deterrence will change with the counter-measures taken by the major power. Therefore, the costs can never be computed with certainty; one can be sure only that the initiation fee is merely a down payment on the expense of membership in the nuclear club.
("Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country," 1961, p. 363.)



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IP-192 (2000)
RAND issue papers explore topics of interest to the policymaking community. Although issue papers are formally reviewed, authors have substantial latitude to express provocative views without doing full justice to other perspectives. The views and conclusions expressed in Issue Papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of RAND of its research sponsors. This issue paper is also available in printed form.

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[Officer of Engineers]

The Evolution and Relative Effectiveness of the Interim Brigade Combat Team

Michael K. Robel, LTC, USAR


Part 1 Brigade Organization and Mission

The brigade's mission is:

The brigade deploys very rapidly, executes early entry, and conducts effective combat operations immediately on arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict through shaping and decisive operations. The brigade participates in major theater war (MTW), with augmentation, as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps, in a variety of possible roles. The brigade also participates with appropriate augmentation in stability and support operations (SASO) as an initial entry force and/or as a guarantor to provide security for stability forces by means of its extensive combat capabilities."

This brigade would likely arrive in theatre after the initial entry forces but before heavy forces arrive via maritime prepositioned ship, thus providing a significant improvement in combat power available to theater commanders in the opening stages of a campaign.

While organization and equipment are still in flux, the IBCT will be organized like current separate brigades as shown in Figure 1. It will have three motorized infantry battalions; carried in a "medium weight infantry-fighting vehicle". This vehicle will be armed with the a gun from 7.62mm to 25mm in a wheeled vehicle similar to the LAV-25 currently used by the Marines, but also comes in other variants including an Anti-tank Vehicle, Air Defense Vehicle, Mortar, command and control, logistics, and recovery variants. The vehicle must fit on a C-130. It also will have a field artillery battalion, possibly based on a wheeled vehicle, and/or a HIMARS battery. However, the significant difference between these brigades and existing ones is the armored cavalry squadron. Normally, brigades only have a cavalry troop. An anti-tank company and a engineer company round out the brigade. Like all US brigades, the IBCT would be capable of accepting other units to command such as tank battalions, additional artillery, or air defense units.

Full Article

[Officer of Engineers]

Some flaws in this article. That's a Qiwi M113, not Aussie and the Aussies are very happy with the LAV III, being deployed to East Timor.

Also of note, Aussies think coy, not bn, let alone bde. Their idea of a battle group (actually a battalion group) is two coys(+). Thus, there are very few other examples to based the Stryker Bdes on.

-----------------------------------------------------

Medium Brigade Flaws, and the Cure: The IBCT Revisited

LTC Michael K. Robel, USAR

Since our original study of the IBCT was published, there have been some developments.

The Light Armored Vehicle III (LAVIII) family of vehicles was selected as the interim vehicle to equip the IBCT.
The LAVIII weapons systems will primarily be the M2 caliber .50 heavy machine gun and the MK19 40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher.
An appeal was lost that sought to have the M113A3 be the interim vehicle instead of the LAVIII.
The first six brigades targeted for conversion to IBCTs have been identified and the process has begun. They are:
2nd Brigade/25th ID (L)
3rd Brigade/25th ID (L)
2nd Brigade/2nd ID (M)
172nd SIB (L)
2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
An unidentified National Guard Brigade
These decisions, have ignited some additional debate about the IBCT and so we have decided to present some additional analysis. This paper will:

Compare the physical characteristics of the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) / M8 Armored Gun System (AGS) with the LAV III variants.
Discuss the ability to move the IBCT equipment via C-130
Determine the ability to strategically deploy the IBCT by air in 96 hours or less.
Determine the sustainability of the IBCT via air, and
Contrast the simulated performance of an M113/M8 IBCT with a LAVIII IBCT against an Opposing Force (OPFOR) Motorized Rifle Regiment using Shrapnel Game's Brigade Combat Team.


Full Article

[Bill]

Tropic Lightning is going Mech???

OMG....say it aint so!

[Officer of Engineers]

Canadian Forces College
War, Peace, and Security
Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) papers

Asymmetrical Warfare and the Transnational Threat: Relearning the Lessons from Vietnam
Captain(N) D.W. Craig

Ballistic Missile Proliferation: What Goes up Must Come Down
Colonel J.D.R. Bourque

The Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship of the 21st Century: a Divorce of Convenience or a Renewal of the Vows?
Colonel Daniel P. Gosselin

A Case for a Balanced Approach to Future Operational-Level Command and Control Systems: When a Butterfly Flaps Its Wings Over the Battlefield...
Colonel M.J. Dumais

The Character of Manoeuvre at the Operational Level
Colonel D.-Holger Mueller

Command and Control Systems: A Challenge to the Leadership
Capt (N) P. Guindon

Communications and Information Systems: a Requirement for the Canadian Forces
Col P.J. McCabe

Ethics and Non-Commissioned Officers: a Critical Link!
Colonel R.R. Romses

Fencing the Global Commons
Lieutenant-Colonel F.M. Boomer

A Few Good Visions: Time for Wartime Leadership
Col P.J. McCabe

General Slim's Failure and Success in Generalship at the Operational Level
Colonel Dennis C. Tabbernor

The Impact of the Evolution of the Operational Level of War on the Structure of the Canadian Forces: a Sailor's Perspective
Captain(N) J.S. Dewar

Information Operations for Canada
Colonel J.D.R. Bourque

Joint or Combined Doctrine?: the Right Choice for Canada
Lieutenant-Colonel F.M. Boomer

Jus ad Bellumand the 1983 Grenada Invasion: the Limits of International Law
Colonel Daniel P. Gosselin

Jus In Bello and Military Necessity
Colonel J.G. Fleury

The Key to Logistics Interoperability in a US-Led Coalition
Colonel John Patrick Leake

Leading a Multinational Force Without Leaving Anyone Behind: the Human Dimensions of Marginalisation
Colonel E.D.J. Plante

NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces and the Canadian Forces Logistics Support at the Operational Level
Colonel J.C.S.M. Jones

The Nature of the Operational Level Environment and the Requirement to Focus on Operational Level Leadership Development
Lieutenant-Colonel M.W. Haché

Operational Art and the Gulf War: Masterpiece or Forgery?
Colonel M.J. Dumais

Operational Leadership in the Gulf War: Lessons from the Schwarzkopf-Franks Controversy
Colonel John Patrick Leake

Operational Commanders, Orders and the Right to Choose
Colonel Dennis C. Tabbernor

Operational Level Failures and Successes: Generalship
Colonel J.C.S.M. Jones

Our Peacekeeping Dilemma: Knowing When to Say No
Captain(N) D.W. Craig

Peace Support Operations: Time Now for the Canadian Forces to Address a Force Continuum Gap
Colonel R.R. Romses

"The Plea of Ignorance"
Colonel J.G. Fleury

Predicting the Next Stage of a Conflict: Conflict Resolution in Peacekeeping Operations
Colonel E.D.J. Plante

The Professional Military Obligation of Relieving an Incompetent Subordinate Commander: an Ethical Complexity
Commander J.A. Denis Rouleau

The Revolution in Military Affairs: All That Glitters Is Not Gold
Colonel W. Semiamaw

Revolution in Military Affairs: the Divergence between the Most Dangerous and the Most Likely
Captain(N) J.S. Dewar

Rules of Engagement
Capt (N) P. Guindon

Space Policy
Colonel T.J. Grant

Stressors and Stresses on Peacekeeping Operations: Implications for Operational-Level Commanders
Colonel Richard A. Hatton

The Success of ONUC and Dag Hammarskjold's Vision
Commander J.A. Denis Rouleau

Training on Rules of Engagement in Domestic Operations
Colonel T.J. Grant

The Understanding of Command from the Canadian and German Perspective
Colonel D.-Holger Mueller

US Joint Doctrine: Services Influence and "Disjointness"
Colonel J.J. Morneau

Western Operational Theory: Breaking the Industrial Paradigm
Colonel W. Semianiw

What are the Key Attributes Required by an Operational Level Commander to be Successful?
Colonel J.J. Morneau

Army logistics beyond repair : can contracting out save the day?
Colonel Robert Maynard
(355.005 A5 1999 no.01 / IRC-CIS)

Asymmetrical warfare: the counterrevolution in military affairs
Commander Thomas Francis Manning
(355.005 A5 1999 no.02 / IRC-CIS)

Attacking our cohesion : who needs enemies?
Colonel C.J. Corrigan

Averting operational paralysis : a logistician's perspective
Colonel L.G. Gillis
(355.005 A5 1999 no.03 / IRC-CIS)

Canadian Forces information operations : a newborn concept in danger of disintegration
Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.G. Champagne
(355.005 A5 1999 no.04 / IRC-CIS)

Canadian Forces transformational leadership against the 21st century environment and its neutralizers : the battle of our future operational commander
Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.G. Champagne
(355.005 A5 1999 no.05 / IRC-CIS)

Coalitions and peace support operations continuum : reading the peace-field : an unbalancing experience
Colonel J.G.J.C. Barabé
(355.005 A5 1999 no.06 / IRC-CIS)

Command, control and the information age of military operations
Captain(N) Richard P. Harrison
(355.005 A5 1999 no.07 / IRC-CIS)

Le développement des chefs pour faire face aux défis du niveau opérationnel
Colonel Daniel Benjamin
(355.005 A5 1999 no.08 / IRC-CIS)

The effect on sustainment of stress in operations
Captain(N) Richard R. Town
(355.005 A5 1999 no.09 / IRC-CIS)

Ethical and legal dilemmas in decision-making : Rwanda : 'lest we forget'.
Colonel L.G. Gillis
(355.005 A5 1999 no.10 / IRC-CIS)

Ethical issues in operations : the importance of military ethics in the conduct of military operations other than war
Colonel William H. McFarland, Jr.

An exploration of just war and just means in the Kosovo campaign
Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Gagnon

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz : the right man for the times
Captain(N) Richard P. Harrison
(355.005 A5 1999 no.11 / IRC-CIS)

Guerre conventionnelle et soutien des opérations de maintien de la paix, opérations domestiques et opérations de secours humanitaire : à la recherche d'un juste milieu
Colonel Berthier Desjardins
(355.005 A5 1999 no.12 / IRC-CIS)

In search of a learning culture : developing operational level leaders in the CF
Colonel Patricia L. Brennan
(355.005 A5 1999 no.13 / IRC-CIS)

Information operations : the vanguard of the revolution
Captain (N) Kevin D.W. Laing
(355.005 A5 1999 no.14 / IRC-CIS)

The invisible scars of the peace-field : the operational commander's perspectiveColonel J.G.J.C. Barabé
(355.005 A5 1999 no.15 / IRC-CIS)

Joint doctrine and the Canadian Forces : ready for the next decade?
Colonel J.D.A. Hincke
(355.005 A5 1999 no.16 / IRC-CIS)

Joint doctrine for the Canadian Forces : vital concern or hindrance?
Colonel Berthier Desjardins
(355.005 A5 1999 no.28 / IRC-CIS)

Kosovo and NATO : morality and the law
Colonel Andrew Leslie
(355.005 A5 1999 no.27 / IRC-CIS)

Mediation or intervention? the UN operation in the Congo 1960-64?
Colonel C.J. Corrigan

Protection of civilian populations and air warfare in the 1990s
Colonel J.D.A. Hincke
(355.005 A5 1999 no.18 / IRC-CIS)

Ready, aye, ready, but not permitted : Canada's navy and the maritime pollution conundrum
Captain (N) Kevin D.W. Laing
(355.005 A5 1999 no.26/ IRC-CIS)

Rules of engagement in ground operations : a legal or training problem?
Colonel Robert Maynard
(355.005 A5 1999 no.19 / IRC-CIS)

The sanctions era : an ethical perspective on sanctions and just war theory
Colonel Patricia L. Brennan
(355.005 A5 1999 no.20 / IRC-CIS)

Ships are not just jeeps with shower facilities : the use of Canadian maritime forces in conflict resolution situations
Captain(N) Richard R. Town
(355.005 A5 1999 no.21 / IRC-CIS)

Theatre level warfare : the missing link?
Colonel Andrew Leslie
(355.005 A5 1999 no.22 / IRC-CIS)

The theory of conflict resolution meets the Dayton Accords
Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Gagnon
(355.005 A5 1999 no.23 / IRC-CIS)

L'unité de commandement, un rêve ou une réalité?
Colonel Daniel Benjamin
(355.005 A5 1999 no.25 / IRC-CIS)

Warfare in the 21st century and technology impacts on U.S. Army military intelligence
Colonel William H. McFarland, Jr.
(355.005 A5 1999 no.24 / IRC-CIS)

Adaptive failure at the operational level : attrition in Vietnam
Lieutenant-Colonel R.G. Davis
(355.005 A5 2000 no.22 / IRC-CIS)

Asymmetry : levelling the playing field
Lieutenant-Colonel Sadanand Varma
(355.005 A5 2000 no.21 / IRC-CIS)

Bomber Harris : a dangerous commander?
Colonel Carla Coulson
(355.005 A5 2000 no.09 / IRC-CIS)

Canada's joint sustainment co-ordination capabilities
Captain (N) Bryn M. Weadon
(355.005 A5 2000 no.08 / IRC-CIS)

Canadian Forces option development process : "enabler to future military coalition operations"
Capt (N) J.R. MacIsaac

Canadian Forces operational doctrine : 2020 vision
Commander R.K. Taylor
(355.005 A5 2000 no.07 / IRC-CIS)

The Canadian Forces operational planning process : a maturing process or continued improvisation?
Colonel Robert Clark
(355.005 A5 2000 no.06 / IRC-CIS)

Coalitions redefined?
Colonel Michael McLean
(355.005 A5 2000 no.05 / IRC-CIS)

Command and control in coalition operations
Colonel C.J.R. Davis

Command in a network-centric war
Colonel Pierre Forgues
(355.005 A5 2000 no.04 / IRC-CIS)

Command : positions for citizen-soldiers?
Lieutenant-Colonel Marie-Claire Ouellette
(355.005 A5 2000 no.03 / IRC-CIS)

Conflict resolution : a wider application of campaign planning
Lieutenant-Colonel D.B. Baker
(355.005 A5 2000 no.02 / IRC-CIS)

Conflict resolution in the Congo, 1960-1964
Colonel C.J.R. Davis
(355.005 A5 2000 no.32 / IRC-CIS)

Desert Storm : maneuver warfare or campaign of attrition?
Lieutenant-Colonel D.A. Maclean
(355.005 A5 2000 no. 01 / IRC-CIS)

Establishing "trust" in peace support leadership
Lieutenant-Colonel R.G. Davis
(355.005 A5 2000 no.31 / IRC-CIS)

An ethical dilemma for United Nations Force commanders : protection of enclaves
Capt(N) Bryn M. Weadon
(355.005 A5 2000 no.29 / IRC-CIS)

Human competencies for command at the operational level : future requirements
Lieutenant-Colonel D.B. Baker
(355.005 A5 2000 no.11 / IRC-CIS)

Joint fires : in search of optimization
Colonel Pierre Forgues
355.005 A5 2000 no.30 / IRC-CIS)

Law of armed conflict at the operational level : Rwanda and an unlawful order
Colonel B.W. MacLeod
(355.005 A5 2000 no.20 / IRC-CIS)

Leadership during peace support operations : "mission impossible"
Capt (N) J.R. MacIsaac

Legitimacy : a center of gravity for the information age
Lieutenant-Colonel J.M. Petryk
(355.005 A5 2000 no.25 / IRC-CIS)

Lessons applied from Grenada lead to success in the Gulf
Colonel Barry MacLeod
(355.005 A5 2000 no.12 / IRC-CIS)

The military ethos and force protection
Lieutenant-Colonel J.M. Petryk
(355.005 A5 2000 no.10 / IRC-CIS)

Operational command and the future battlefield : new demands, new skills, new methods
Lieutenant-Colonel Sadanand Varma
(355.005 A5 2000 no.24 / IRC-CIS)

Operational leadership : experience in officer professional development : a pillar in peril
Colonel Stuart A. Beare
(355.005 A5 2000 no.18 / IRC-CIS)

Powerlessness in the face of responsibility : LtGen Romeo Dallaire's military leadership during UNAMIR
Colonel Dr. Klaus Buschmann
(355.005 A5 2000 no.14 / IRC-CIS)

The principles of war in the 21st century : operational considerations
Colonel Randy Brooks
(355.005 A5 2000 no.23 / IRC-CIS)

Rape as a tool of war
Lieutenant-Colonel Marie-Claire Ouellette
(355.005 A5 2000 no.17 / IRC-CIS)

ROE : their impact on combat stress in peace support operations
Lieutenant-Colonel Mike McLean
(355.005 A5 2000 no.13 / IRC-CIS)

Rules of engagement and the peacekeeper's dilemma
Lieutenant-Colonel D.A. MacLean
(355.005 A5 2000 no.19 / IRC-CIS)

Rules of engagement : key operational level responsibility in peace support operations
Commander R.K. Taylor
(355.005 A5 2000 no.28 / IRC-CIS)

Sustaining joint and combined operations : reflections on the adequacy of doctrine
Colonel Carla Coulson
(355.005 A5 2000 no.27 / IRC-CIS)

Symmetrical warfare and lessons for future war : the case of the Iran-Iraq conflict
Colonel Robert Clark
(355.005 A5 2000 no.15 / IRC-CIS)

Understanding the enemy : time to tune up the planning process
Colonel Stuart A. Beare

Woodward's war : a lesson in leadership at the operational level
Colonel Randy Brooks

21st century technology : Achilles heel of military commanders!
Colonel Gordon D. Ward

Assassination is justifiable under the law of armed conflict
Colonel Robert A. Rowlette, Jr. , United States Army

Coalition and alliance operations in the 21st century : a continuing need for the NATO alliance
Commander G.D. Switzer

Command and control : operational effectiveness versus technical efficiency
Commander M.R. Bellows

Un command en peril, la campagne aérienne du Kosovo : une application du modèle McCann et Pigeau
Colonel Alain Boyer

Command versus control in the age of information technology
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Christiner

Contractors on the battlefield : have we done our homework
Commander T.H. Addison

Conflict resolution : Canadian senior officers meeting the challenge
Colonel J.P.P.J. Lacroix

Les entrepreneurs en theater opérationnel : les reservists en agents de changement
Colonel Richard V. Blanchette

The future of warfare : clueless coalitions?
Colonel Robert Chekan

Generalship at the operational level : the challenges of a rationalistic world
Lieutenant-Colonel Peter J. Davies

Jointness : it's a matter of attitude
Colonel J.G.G. Simard

Preparing military leadership for warfare in the 21st century
Colonel Kelvin Chng

La Réserve au soutien des opérations de maintien de la paix : maintenant ou jamais !
Colonel Camil Giguère

Towards creating operational commanders in the Canadian Forces : is Auftragstaktik the model?
Lieutenant-Colonel Clive Caton

The UN intervention in Cambodia : a glass half empty or a glass half full
Lieutenant-Colonel P.F. Wynnyk

Warfare in the 21st century
Lieutenant-Colonel Charalampos Avramopoulos, Greece

Was NATO an effective third party intervening in the Bosnian conflict?
Colonel P.J. Devlin

Asymmetric warfare : new networks against network terrorism
Lieutenant-Colonel Eric D. Stevens

The Canadian Forces Joint Support Group : logistics salvation or a commitment unfulfilled?
Commander Alan J. Kerr

A clash of service doctrines : integration versus synchronization in joint operations
Lieutenant-Colonel Gerald M. Pratt

Command structure for coalition operations : a template for future force commanders
Colonel Sylvain R. Lescoutre

Commanders, complexity and the limits of modern battlespace visualization
Colonel Christian Rousseau

The complexity of operations demands a new officer corps
Lieutenant-Colonel Warren J. Spaan

Coping with uncertainty : command at the operational level
Colonel Alan J. Howard

Culture : the key to coalition operations
Colonel G.L. Gillispie

Effects based operations : not simple, but necessary
Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas A. Neill

The humanitarian yardstick within the law of armed conflict
Lieutenant-Colonel M.G. Archer

Information age command and control : the weakest link?
Colonel Manfred H.H. Arndt

Joint processes in the conduct of a campaign plan
Colonel Salem Alkaabi, United Arab Emirates

Levels of war : a new Canadian model to begin the 21st century
Commander Gordon R. Peskett

Mason-Crabbe : worth another look?
Colonel Chris L. Little

North American homeland defence coalition
Colonel C.S. Sullivan

The perception of war versus the reality of law
Colonel David Fraser

Prime vendor support : the wave of the future
Colonel Darryl Bradley

Principles of war at the operational level : a comparison of the doctrines "Canadian Forces Operations" (AF-000), US "Doctrine for Joint Operations" (JP 3-0) and Austria's Regulation "Operational Command" (Draft)
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Weiner, Austria

The threat of asymmetrical warfare and Canada's readiness
Lieutenant-Colonel C.M. Hazelton

Using HFSW radar into 21st century Mexico's navy operations
Captain (N) Cornelio Espinoza Hernandez, Mexico

Whither the field ambulance? role 2 land health service support in the 21st century battlespace
Lieutenant-Colonel James C. Taylor

Warfare in the 21st century
Colonel Marian Dumitrescu, Romania

Winning the nations hearts and minds : combating asymmetric warfare
Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Whitecross

The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Knowing and Finding the Adversary in the "Three Block War"
Commander Martin Adamson

Network Centric Warfare: Just Another dot.com?
Colonel Larry Aitken, CD

Future Command and Control (C2) in Joint Operations: New Potential Concept to be developed in the UAE
Colonel Salim M. AlAli

International Maritime Law & Blockades: Is the 1995 San Remo Manual Dead In the Water?
Jean Yves Bastien, MVO, CD

Threats to Operational Force Health Protection
LCol Jean-Robert Bernier

Canadian Military Domestic Response to Terrorist Networks
Colonel Bob Bertrand

Le Groupe de Soutien Interarmées (GSI), prélude à un Commandement de Soutien Interarmées (CSI) et un chef d'état-major soutien interarmées (CEM J4)
Col Denis Bouchard

New Law for a New Type of War: The United States and Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention
Colonel Mike Bumgarner

Sustainment Transformation: If You Don't Know Where You're Going, Any Road Will Get You There
Colonel Charles Davies

Canadian Forces Transformation: Kicking the Trend - Interoperability Trumps 'Jointness'
Colonel C.M. Fletcher, CD

Canadian Maritime Security: A Requirement for a National Intelligence and Surveillance Fusion Centre
Commander Paul A. Hendry

On 21st Century Operational Art
LCol C.R. Kilford

Leçons algériennes de la guerre asymétrique et perspectives d'avenir
Capitaine de frégate Hugues Létourneau

An Analysis of the Operational Art in the Korean Air War (1950-1953) - Lessons Re-Learned and Forgotten
Colonel T.F.J. Leversedge

Myth or Reality: Network-centric Warfare and Integrated Command and Control in the Information Age?
LTC Seng Hock Lim

Why the Laws of Armed Conflict are no longer the Ties that Bind
Capt(N) P. Dean McFadden

Leading the Willing: Canadian Command and Control in International Operations
Colonel Matthew K Overton

A Canadian Perspective of the Operational Art
Colonel Alex C. Patch

Canadian Coalition Contributions: Proposing a Planning Paradigm
LCol B.N. Pennington

Command and Control of the Canadian Forces Supply Chain
LCol Neville Russell

Keeping Operational Art Relevant for Canada: A Functional Approach
LCol James Simms

Winning the War but Losing the Peace: Systems Theory Approach to Intervention Warfare
Lieutenant-Colonel Denis W. Thompson, The RCR

Blurring of the Lines: The Call for an Integral Surgical Capability in Canadian Field Ambulances
LCol David R. Weger

We Fight As One? The Future of the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group
Colonel C.J. Weicker

"Plans are nothing, but planning is everything": did Moltke go far enough? A critical reflection on requirements for plans and planning processes at the operational level
LCol A. Wessely

The Importance of Vision for Command at the Operational Level
Cdr. William F. Wood

[Ray]

Thanks Colonel.

The above post and the links are like a multi layered gigantic wedding cake.

Very awesome, but welcoming and delicious.:yum

[Officer of Engineers]

Speaking about Wedding Cakes, I really do have to apologize to your wife for keeping you in front of the computer screen instead of doing her bidding.

[Officer of Engineers]

Combined Arms Center
Military Review
Home | English Edition | Spanish Edition | Portuguese Edition | Past Editions

September-October 2002 English Edition
30 The Battle for Objective Area Alpha
by Lieutenant Colonel Scott R. McMichael, U.S. Army, Retired; Colonel Peter J. Zielinski, U.S. Army; and Colonel Brian Zahn, U.S. Army



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Using the story of a battle as a device for illuminating important themes and lessons regarding the art of war is a time-honored practice. In the example here, the battle is in the future. The theme is tactical operations. The goal is to present a picture of how the future Objective Force will fight at the tactical level.

The scenario is simple and familiar. A U.S. ally is attacked by a regional aggressor and is in danger of being overrun. Time is of the essence. The aggressor hopes for a quick victory that would make external intervention more difficult. The United States understands that the longer it delays, the more advantages accrue to the adversary to achieve its strategic objectives and to prepare more fully to defeat intervention.

Faithful to its commitments, the United States responds immediately to counter the aggressor while building a coalition of like-minded states. The first phase of the joint campaign—initial entry operations—has been completed, and the joint task force (JTF) is preparing to seize the initiative.

Entry Operations

After returning from face-to-face meetings with local police authorities, Colonel Ralph Donnelly, commander of the 1st Combined Arms Brigade (CAB), focused on the displays in his command vehicle. He reviewed the courses of action (COA) the staff had just completed in response to the digitized operation order (OPORD) and operational graphic received earlier from division headquarters. The brigade had been in country for just 10 days, and already, the joint force was transitioning from an initial defensive posture to offensive operations.

The JTF commander directed the brigade—the initial maneuver formation in the joint force flow—to deploy as rapidly as possible to defend the ground approaches to the host-nation (HN) capital. The brigade, with joint air support, was to prevent the seizure of the capital.

Deploying by multiple means, the brigade surprised the enemy with the speed, location, and power of its projection into the HN capital region. Three of its six combat battalions, with the brigade headquarters, deployed by air to unimproved airstrips and unprepared landing areas near the capital. They bypassed the main commercial airport and military air base that the enemy had targeted effectively with improved, long-range precision munitions. The other three battalions deployed via shallow-draft, high-speed sealift under the deputy commander's control, coming ashore near several small fishing towns about 200 kilometers from the capital. They also avoided the main seaport, which had been subject to long-range enemy interdiction.

Deploying in combined arms unit configurations with integrated sustainment packages eliminated the requirement for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) within an assembly area and enabled all six battalions to move quickly from debarkation into pre-planned defensive positions near the capital. In doing so, they surprised and destroyed the enemy's advanced elements in the near approaches to the city. Nearly simultaneously, an infantry regiment from the Marine expeditionary brigade sea base deployed to block enemy advances along the littoral.

Donnelly's command group included the temporary attachment of two observers from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth. The commander wanted to capture all of the significant operational lessons during the campaign. He and the CALL team had discussed the extraordinary level of strategic responsiveness and versatility the new strategic-lift platforms provided. Those capabilities, plus the streamlined force structure of the Objective Force, its lighter platforms, and reduced logistic infrastructure, with substantial elements of the overall force remaining outside the joint operations area (JOA), enabled the brigade to complete its multi-modal deployment within 96 hours. The brigade then moved immediately off the ramp to fight its way into initial defensive operations.

The commander stressed the importance of improvements in joint interoperability with respect to command, control, and communications and intelligence (C3I) systems. These systems, with en route planning and rehearsal, permitted the commander to do several tasks. He could see the deployment status of each element of the brigade; receive and automatically distribute frequent updates of the enemy and friendly situation in the JOA; and war game several initial-entry COAs while en route. In fact, en route situational awareness across the joint force allowed the JTF commander to redirect one of the air-delivered battalions into a fall-back air strip when it became clear that the enemy advance would place one of the planned aerial ports of debarkation within enemy artillery range.

US paratrooper with Saudi national guardsmen during the early days of Operation Desert Shield, August 1990.

Joint air and maritime power was critical to the success of entry operations. These forces, including the integrated air/missile defense network, were largely responsible for overcoming enemy anti-access measures and for setting the conditions for early entry ground forces through attrition of the enemy's air and maritime power, long-range precision engagement capabilities, and forward immediate-action drill systems. Information operations—focused on reducing the enemy's ability to maintain actionable visibility of U.S. force flow, timing, and intent—blinded, confused, and deceived the enemy. Information operations included denial of air space to the enemy's forward reconnaissance aircraft, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); interruption of satellite feeds; computer network attack aimed at reducing the enemy's ability to collect and process information and exercise battle command; and deception regarding entry points and timing.

Overall, these shaping operations allowed the rapid introduction of the 1st CAB, which immediately expanded the lodgment area and moved to close off ap-proach routes to the capital city. Organic joint linkages through interoperable battle command and intelligence networks permitted the brigade to coordinate directly for joint fires and to receive near-
continuous information updates in the short interim before the arrival of the division early entry command post. Coordination with local HN military and police forces and previously deployed U.S. special operations forces (SOF) elements strengthened the brigade's ability to guard against unconventional threats detected through human intelligence (HUMINT) sources.

The result of this integrated joint entry operation was remarkable. Despite the absence of strategic surprise—the enemy clearly had visibility of U.S. deployment preparations via HUMINT and the news media—the speed of entry operations allowed the joint task force to achieve operational surprise, beating the enemy to one of the key initial objectives. Although the enemy had occupied a significant portion of the HN territory, the denial of capture of its political center as a result of the Objective Force's deployment compelled the enemy to reconsider his campaign goals. Moreover, as the joint task force rapidly built joint combat power, the enemy found that his vulnerability to air- and ground-based precision strike forced him to abandon large-scale maneuver, which restricted his offensive operations to periods of limited visibility.

Within a short time, these disadvantages forced the enemy to shift his focus to consolidating current gains and to assume the defense, first locally near the capital, then more broadly across the entire force. Although he might have made a major effort to invest the capital and push through the brigade, the cost would have been great, with no assurance of success, given the rapid closure of the additional brigades comprising the initial Objective Force division's air-ground task force.

The enemy adopted a defensive strategy, hoping to draw out the conflict and make the United States pay a high price in time, casualties, and resources. In essence, the high level of strategic responsiveness and the synchronized introduction of the U.S. joint contingency force precluded the enemy from achieving a critical early objective and forced him to fall back to a less certain strategy.

Donnelly reminded the CALL team of the difference between this entry operation and that of Operation Desert Storm: "The world has really changed since the Gulf War. I was the executive officer (XO) of a Bradley infantry company that was part of the first heavy division to deploy. We waited weeks for strategic transport and logistic structure to fall into place, followed by more delay when we finally arrived because of our time-consuming RSOI and then our forward movement into initial defensive positions. During that time, the only maneuver forces on the ground were 82d Airborne units holding a thin line in the desert. Frankly, we were fortunate that Saddam Hussein was not a more aggressive military commander because it would have been near impossible to hold that line against a mechanized advance."

Seizing the Initiative

With the first division's task force of four brigades fully closed, the second division's task force closing fast, and the remainder of the Marine force en route, the JTF commander intended to seize the initiative from the enemy. He studied the enemy dispositions displayed on the joint common operating picture (COP) and thought about the updates he had received during alert and deployment.

The enemy force was largely a 1990s-vintage mechanized army with small air and naval forces, but it possessed some advanced niche capabilities with respect to long-range fires, communications, target acquisition, and first-generation UAVs. U.S. intelligence reports assessed enemy training readiness and leadership as above average compared to other regional forces, but still short of U.S. standards.

The enemy fought best in conventional mounted scenarios, employing mass and momentum against his overmatched neighbors. However, the enemy had been observed over the past several years to have developed increasing competence in decentralized maneuver by avoiding patterns and templates coupled with coordinated indirect-fire strikes that massed effects from dispersed units. Every indicator pointed to an increasingly sophisticated operational style, balancing offense and defense, with investment in the C3 and ISR systems necessary to support complex operations. However, the authoritarian nature of the regime with its endemic barriers to initiative and independent thought naturally stifled and limited the pace of progress.

Although hoping to avoid U.S. intervention in the conflict, the enemy had nevertheless prepared for confrontation. He had a good sense of his own strengths and weaknesses, vis-à-vis U.S. forces, and he knew that he had little chance of sustaining offensive operations in the face of U.S. joint precision strikes. Assuming the defense, he had dispersed his forces and occupied mutually supporting, networked defensive positions anchored by combined arms strongpoints. Many were based within the sanctuary of built-up areas and complex terrain. He was actively fortifying and stockpiling, with special effort toward building redundant, resilient communications networks. He employed deception widely and was husbanding his indirect-fire capability for focused fire strikes against lucrative U.S. targets. His disposition was organized to deny the best air and ground avenues of approach. His defense of these approaches was further strengthened by the dispersal of dismounted infantry, antiarmor, and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). By and large, his fighting platforms and fire units matched U.S. capabilities in range. This parity gave advantage, in general, to the side that shot first.

Overall, the enemy presented a tough nut to crack—a complex systemology with no single point of failure within the defensive scheme. Fortunately, the rapid deployment of Objective Force units limited the time available to the enemy to strengthen defenses. Long-range precision fires would generate some significant attrition against the enemy but would fall far short of decisive effects and would likely produce excessive collateral damage, a result that the host nation desperately hoped to avoid. Ultimately, this enemy would have to be destroyed in detail by ground combined arms battalions, or he would have to be flushed into the open and destroyed by all-source precision fires.



Instead of a 20th-century campaign of attrition and deliberately sequenced operations, however, the JTF commander intended to pursue a campaign of dislocation and disintegration through joint simultaneous engagement focused against key capabilities and forces within the enemy systemology. The combination of joint precision strike, to keep the enemy dispersed and relatively immobile, and the all-arms capabilities of the Objective Force, to root out and destroy those forces, would afford the enemy no rest or relief and no means of responding effectively to a relentless, multidimensional assault.

After extensive supporting analysis, the joint commander concluded that at this point in the campaign, he could directly attack several elements of the enemy's military center of gravity. This would include key enemy forces to the east of the capital, the lines of communications (LOC) that supported those forces, and two operating bases located within enemy territory (shielded within urban areas) that anchored enemy LOCs. The JTF commander's ground campaign called for two Objective Force divisions to conduct simultaneous, noncontiguous major operations against enemy forces disposed within the host nation to split those forces into progressively smaller fragments. Simultaneously, joint fires would continue deep interdiction, support to ground operations, and targeting of key enemy capabilities such as battle command and ISR nodes; long-range artillery and missile forces; and logistic elements. Also, Marine Corps amphibious forces would complete deployment ashore to secure the littoral and the right flank of the land area of operations (AO), presenting a parallel threat to the enemy's littoral. Subsequently, advancing Objective Force formations would maneuver laterally to cut LOCs and dislocate enemy forces, with operational maneuver by air of one or more brigades directly against the enemy operating bases just across the international boundary. As these operations succeeded, enemy forces occupying territory north and west of the capital would become increasingly dislocated, irrelevant, exposed, and in danger of encirclement.

The Brigade Order

The abbreviated OPORD and operational graphic that the brigade had received laid out a brigade AO extending over a 75- by 100-kilometer area east of the capital—a large area to cover even with six combat battalions assigned. The mission required the brigade to destroy two brigades of the enemy's 12th Infantry Division (ID) (Mechanized (M)) and other supporting forces and prepare to conduct a second battle without pause in a major reorientation to the north to cut LOCs and isolate the remainder of the enemy's 15th Corps. Two sister brigades would be conducting simultaneous attacks against the enemy's 10th and 11th ID (M) (15th Corps) farther to the northeast, with similar follow-on missions. Host-nation forces would follow and deal with bypassed and remnant enemy elements.

Per brigade battle rhythm, Donnelly used the afternoon secure video-teleconference to issue his attack order to his six subordinate battalion commanders and to the brigade staff.

"Gentlemen, as you know, our mission is to destroy the 34th and 35th mechanized brigades within the enemy 12th ID (M) and continue the attack north to cut enemy LOCs, thereby isolating the 15th Corps while the 2d and 3d Brigades conduct simultaneous, noncontiguous attacks. You have collaborated directly with the staff and with me during the planning process, so it will come as no surprise that I have selected COA 3 for execution.

"As you can see on your command displays, this COA designates four battalion objective areas (OA), designated A through D, within the brigade AO. Each OA incorporates one or more enemy battalions dispersed within integrated strongpoints. Because the battalion OAs also include key enemy C3 nodes, critical ISR, and supporting fire units, my assessment is that their seizure will render both enemy brigades largely ineffective, negating any requirement to engage all enemy division elements in the brigade area.

"As the 1st through the 4th Future Combat System (FCS) battalions attack the four primary objectives, I intend to vault the 5th Battalion by air into temporary defensive positions in the rear of the enemy division to block withdrawal or reinforcing elements, secure key ground transportation nodes, and pre-position the battalion for the follow-on engagements. The 6th Battalion, uncommitted at the beginning of the battle, will support the rest of you with non-line of sight (NLOS) fires and simultaneously maneuver in depth. Brigade reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition elements will lead, to initiate the follow-on battle to the north without pause (in coordination with the 5th Battalion) and maintain pressure on the enemy. I will move with the 6th Battalion.

"I estimate that the initial battle will be completed within 36 to 48 hours, but we are going to continue to advance and to transition immediately into the subsequent set of engagements. Therefore, I want you to conserve on-board munitions, consistent, of course, with the way the battle unfolds and without compromising freedom of action, effectiveness, or survivability. Shoot for a goal of 50 percent with respect to both line of sight (LOS) and NLOS rounds. Fuel should not be a problem, considering the distances we have to traverse and the speed with which we expect to break down the enemy's defenses and shatter his coherence.

"You can see from the task organization that the division has allocated considerable support to the brigade battle. In just a moment, the fires/effects coordinator will run through how the division will cover the counterfire mission, support attacks with planned fires, and shape the battle in terms of isolating and neutralizing other enemy elements within the brigade AO. We will discuss using planned and on-call joint fires for the air assault and deep maneuver, as well as aviation and armed UAV assets. This support will enhance freedom of action, support rapid movement to the objective areas, and help conserve on-board munitions for the next fight.

"Of course, the enemy could prove tenacious. We might run into a few surprises although I think our situational understanding at this time is top drawer. We know how tough it can be to clear and secure urban areas, even small ones. I have directed the deputy commander to conduct preliminary planning in case we have to cycle battalions through mission staging during transition. The 1st Battalion will have the toughest engagement. I want to have at least one fully replenished combat battalion for the turn to the north, so I want the 1st Battalion, as an exception, to plan from the start for replenishment before its follow-on engagement. Division will configure sustainment pulses for on-call replenishment if anyone else is delayed or exceeds consumption goals when coming out of initial engagements.

"You all understand how important it is to maintain and update situational awareness during combat operations. I want you to remain cognizant of how the entire brigade battle is proceeding in case we have to make in-stride adjustments, either to respond to a challenge or to exploit an opportunity. This is going to be a fluid battle. I am counting on the XO, as my chief information officer, to maneuver the brigade C3 and ISR network to ensure continuous support. We must keep our eyes on everything in the brigade AO and be prepared to respond to any unforeseen development, even though our focus is the battalion OAs. Each battalion must use its organic RSTA to fill in the gaps that remote sensors cannot see and to fight for information when required. As stated earlier, brigade RSTA will focus on the deep maneuver and develop the situation for subsequent engagements.

"Let's run the animation to show how I see the flow of the battle, particularly the synchronization of air and ground maneuver and the fire plan. Then we will answer questions on the overall concept and commander's intent before we move on through the rest of the order. I want to finish this in the next 20 minutes, then get graphics and collaborative briefbacks from the battalions within another hour. Our attack begins 8 hours from now."

The division allocated considerable support to the brigade battle, including a two-battalion fires/effects task force, sufficient aviation lift for the air assault, two Comanche reconnaissance/attack companies, an armed UAV platoon, plus bridging and breaching assets. Given the light enemy air threat and the division's responsibility for the local air and missile defense (AMD) umbrella, division retained control of its AMD assets, particularly to ensure support for tactical air assaults and the deeper operational maneuver. The combination of joint (airborne laser), division (ground-based laser and missile), and organic battalion assets (FCS-mounted, short-range missiles) would be employed to deal with the enemy's low-level UAV and rotary-wing threats through the Integrated Airspace Control Network.

FCS Battalion Operations

Lieutenant Colonel Rick Reagan, 1st Battalion commander, switched off the video link and studied the battalion objective area—OA Alpha—more closely. The center of mass was approximately 30 kilometers from his current dispositions. The OA represented the heart of the enemy brigade's webbed defense. Irregularly shaped, it included the better part of two enemy mechanized battalions, three cannon batteries, and a short-range air defense missile battery organized into six company-size strongpoints and distributed over three small towns and the partially forested, hilly area surrounding them. If Reagan could destroy the strongpoints and the associated C3 network and control the key terrain, the brigade defense would largely collapse. A string of ground reconnaissance elements maintained a number of forward outposts and four other enemy strongpoints. An enemy reserve company was outside the OA, but it was close enough to affect the attack. The brigade would act to isolate the nearby strongpoints and fix the reserve company from responding, while division fires conducted preemptive counterfire to destroy the cannon batteries. The battalion would have the responsibility of avoiding or sweeping away the enemy covering force and responding to the enemy's mortars with its own organic target acquisition and indirect-fire systems.

As Reagan collaborated on options with his staff, subordinate commanders monitored their discussion on the command "electronic whiteboard." Noticing the XO's and S3's smiles as they exchanged glances, Reagan asked, "OK, what's the inside joke?"

"Well sir," replied the S3, "It does not seem quite fair to the enemy. This is the first major battle in an AO where we have never deployed before, but it is not really new. The battalion has trained against similar dispersed, strongpoint-based, defensive dispositions at the National Training Center and at the new Joint Urban Warfare Training Center. Plus, all of our training scenarios incorporated some mix of unconventional and asymmetric threats. In addition, during sea deployment, our en route mission planning and rehearsal system applications permitted us to run virtual exercises against this very enemy division on real-world digitized terrain in the same general area as our current objective. Virtual exercises are not the same as fighting, of course, but there is no question we have already acquired a high level of knowledge and familiarity with the enemy, the terrain, and the overall operating environment before we have to fight."

"Those are good points and good reasons for all of us to feel confident, but not overconfident," Reagan cautioned. "That certainly bears out how important it is to train as we fight. But, as long as I am reviewing fundamentals, I want to reinforce three essential operational themes that have been critical to our training and exercise program and that will be critical to this attack."

Artist's conception of Theater Support Vessels and helicopters utilizing stream-lined external-load technology conducting landings at a remote location.

As a former tactics instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Reagan never passed up a chance to teach his team. "First point, gentleman: knowledge is paramount. The battalion has to maintain a high level of situational understanding, with frequent updates to the COP during execution. Information superiority is the key to optimizing every other battalion capability. Remember that. Timely situation updates will help the 1st Battalion to avoid surprise and to exploit the quality of firsts—the ability to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. Being first in these areas because of what we know gives us a home-court advantage.

"Second, freedom of action. The battalion must retain freedom of action during its attack. We must force the enemy to react to our actions and to the supporting actions of the brigade and the division. We must control the tempo of this engagement, and we must adapt rapidly to changing battlefield conditions, adjusting our plan in-stride, if necessary. The enemy will try to slow us down then tie us down. We must anticipate his actions. Will he use dismounted infantry, obstacles, reconnaissance elements, antiarmor ambushes, and precision-fire strikes? We must avoid, blind, neutralize, or destroy threats from stand-off distances. Higher echelon fires will also help us avoid being bogged down and will support maneuver.

"Third: speed, mobility, and power equals momentum plus protection. Our task forces will capitalize on the speed and mobility of the FCS system of systems to move rapidly on multiple axes, exploiting the inevitable seams between the enemy's strongpoints. As seen many times during training exercises, speed combined with stealth provides inherent protection against enemy fires and often serves to overwhelm and paralyze his forces. Combining speed, mobility, and the power of organic direct and indirect fires will generate the momentum needed for rapid decision and will place the enemy at a disadvantage during final close combat assault against his strongpoint positions."

The Tactical Infosphere

The tactical infosphere is the layered, integrated network of information and communications capabilities required to support effective tactical operations, as well as the information it provides. To ensure "decision dominance," tactical commanders need fully networked communications that have access to the global information grid (GIG) that provides real-time situational awareness and targeting information. Furthermore, the networks need connectivity with joint, theater, and national sources, and have reachback assets on the GIG. The tactical infosphere requires wider bandwidth; robust, self-organizing, self-healing communication architecture; and an integrated, distributed, virtual database that is computer intensive, with smart routers and multilevel security protocols.2

Reagan and his subordinate leaders had confidence in their current level of situational understanding without, however, assuming that their knowledge was either perfect or complete. The JTF had begun building the infosphere required to support contingency operations even before deployment began. Intelligence from a variety of complementary sources from national- to theater-level satellites; manned aerial reconnaissance; UAVs; in-country SOF; HN sources; all forms of electronic and signals intelligence; and information from nongovernment and private volunteer organizations that remained in country had been integrated to rapidly develop the required knowledge base.

Once deployed, the brigade employed its own considerable sensor networks, HUMINT, and air-ground RSTA assets to thicken the brigade COP. Reagan's scouts and organic UAVs had also been busy, focusing on discriminating between decoy and actual enemy dispositions; locating enemy dismounted infantry, reconnaissance, MANPADS, and antiarmor; and establishing information exchanges with local police and U.S. SOF. As the commander, Reagan keenly felt the responsibility for managing his organic ISR assets as effectively as possible to ensure no significant gaps in information occurred to stall the attack.

Reagan continued to stress the importance of situational understanding: "Team, take a moment and see if we have any major information shortfalls. S2?"

"Sir, we have been focused on the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), expecting to go on the offensive. Between our feeds to brigade and higher, our local sources, and employment of our own assets, I believe we have reliably identified primary danger areas; movement chokepoints; new and old obstacles; best routes to specific subunit objectives; protected positions for tactical standoff fires; and likely assailable flanks of enemy strongpoints. Daily all-source updates have helped us discern small patterns in the enemy's activities and changes in his dispositions and strengths. We have good visibility on conditions within the three villages, including blocked streets and many hardened fighting positions, with much of the information coming from SOF and HN sources. Our enemy COP also depicts the reconnaissance outposts that we will have to blind or take down. I have to say, however, that there are dismounted elements and some dispersed antiarmor teams in the battalion AO that we have not located. Plus, the enemy has concealed his mortars well. We probably will not locate those assets until he uses them."

"All right, commanders, staff, the S2 just told you what else we need to know." Reagan's battle staff captains were well trained in keeping the COP updated and in adjusting ISR assets to respond to changes in CCIR.

Once the battle began, Reagan intended to push his organic UAVs aloft and seed key areas and routes with remotely delivered sensors, re-seeding as the attack progressed. He also had a string on brigade-controlled Comanche and armed UAV systems for both reconnaissance and attack of a number of suspected enemy reverse-slope positions and hard-to-strike urban targets. He could also employ the Comanche as an ISR and joint fires integrator against any attempts by the enemy to reinforce his defense or to conduct countermaneuver.

Given this analysis, Reagan decided to organize his battalion into four combined arms teams, each maneuvering independently on separate axes to designated unit objectives within OA Alpha, with a single platoon in battalion reserve. Mainly employing secondary and off-road approaches, the four axes could get close enough for the separate columns to provide mutual support while presenting no large lucrative target to invite an enemy fire strike. Reagan surmised that the multiple axes would also serve to confuse the enemy regarding the battalion's specific objectives and to complicate enemy acquisition and engagement.

With the brigade fires/effects coordination center, Reagan's fires/effects team planned to use a mix of suppression and obscuration fires along each route against covering forces and danger areas to protect and facilitate movement. The automated fire planning system, with its configurable horizontal and vertical linkages, provided real-time visibility on the entire brigade fires/effects system and linked them to joint systems. Scouts and UAVs would precede each task force as additional eyes forward to provide early warning of new threats and to pass new targeting data through direct sensor-shooter linkages to battalion long-range shooters, as well as to the uncommitted 6th Battalion for supporting fires.

"What about obstacles?" Reagan asked.

The S3 quickly answered, "Most of the known obstacles can be bypassed given the superior mobility of the Future Combat System. However, these two minefields [he points them out], which cannot be avoided, will be neutralized from standoff with overpressure or nonlethal munitions. We have balanced organic mobility support across the combined arms team to deal with unforeseen obstacles. We can also call on brigade bridging and breaching assets although those elements are currently allocated in direct support of the 3d and 6th Battalions. Also, we need to remind all elements to scan the bypass routes for new obstacles before using them. Offensively, the division will emplace artillery-delivered minefields, with 8-hour active sensors, to support our maneuver and to canalize the enemy, as shown on the overlay. Plus, we have sufficient NETFIRES remote munitions to put in two temporary nonlethal obstacles—nonlethal because of the urban population in the OA—on call, if we need to."

Reagan had confidence that each combined arms team commander was well versed in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of combining standoff fires from protected positions en route with rapid closure against assigned final objectives from positions of advantage. In many cases, the fast-moving elements were likely to pass other small, decentralized enemy teams before they could respond effectively. On-board dazzlers and the FCS active-protection system had proven in the past to reduce the threat from LOS antiarmor that they might encounter.

Given the enemy's dispositions in depth, Reagan expected that each team would have to deploy from march formation several times en route to and within the objective area in order to overcome enemy forward elements and outposts. In addition, per Don-nelly's direction, Reagan specifically instructed his commanders to engage and destroy any C2 or signal nodes and air defense capabilities discovered en route. Doing so would systematically strip the enemy of his capabilities for battle command and would reduce the surface-to-air threat to air assault and to aerial supply movements in support of the brigade overall. As Reagan completed his order, he stressed that it was key to avoid becoming bogged down or decisively engaged in advance of final objectives.

"Gentlemen, the toughest part of the engagement will be the destruction of the enemy strongpoints anchored in the three villages. Your fighting teams must still be fresh for that part of the fight. Consistent with the brigade order and beginning the movement several hours before dawn, the battalion attack will be syn-chronized. The task forces should close on unit objec-tives more or less simultaneously and initiate the close combat battle for the three villages and adjacent complex terrain a couple of hours before night falls.

"Clearing the enemy from his positions in built-up areas is going to be time-consuming and complex. I want each team commander to brief back on how you see your piece unfolding. Where are the seams and entry points to create positional advantage? How are you going to sequence this part of the fight to break down the strongpoints? In particular, review with me how you plan to combine mounted and dismounted modes and how you will employ organic direct and indirect fires for reinforcing and complementary effects.

"Action of networked teams will be centrally important. Their effectiveness will depend largely on how well you maintain responsive linkages with supporting fire systems and make effective use of sensors, robotic scouts, urban micro-UAVs, and soldier knowledge systems. Maximize use of nonlethal engagement systems where you have any doubts about noncombatants; the enemy will try to shield himself with civilians and civilian structures. Make sure platoon leaders are prepared to call for the armed UAVs and Comanches for flanking and rear fires within the towns and in complex terrain. There will be some delay there, but not much. Finally, driving the enemy outside the city and finishing him there will reduce collateral damage and save civilian lives.

"We are only going to hold the towns for a few hours. Host-nation units will follow up in a stability role, but be sure to avoid friendly-fire mishaps or give any enemy remnants opportunities to hurt us during the hand-off."

Reagan was more than satisfied with his selected COA, which optimized his battalion's strengths. Brigade and higher shaping actions would help set conditions for attack by destroying or neutralizing high-value enemy capabilities and high-payoff targets, particularly elements that comprised his precision-engagement and mobile-strike capabilities—aviation, artillery, target acquisition, and C3 capabilities. Also, supporting fires would fix reserve forces in place; isolate battalion objective areas; strip away enemy reconnaissance and intelligence assets; and protect battalion maneuver. All of the enemy forces that might affect his attack would be effectively suppressed, blinded, or destroyed. Moreover, any effort by the enemy to withdraw from defensive positions to disengage or conduct countermaneuver would expose those forces to observation and withering precision fires.

Undoubtedly, during the engagement, circumstances would force alteration of the attack plan. That was routine and expected. No plan survives contact. Reagan's task force commanders all understood his intent, had the capability to synchronize their activities in stride, and would exercise initiative, according to the principles of mission command, to adjust without orders to new information and changing battlefield conditions.

The Outcome

To describe a decisive rout of the enemy as the end of the story would be too easy and ultimately self-serving. More useful and instructive is to take note of several enduring factors likely to influence the outcome of the battle for OA Alpha.

The enemy has a vote in every battle. A thinking, creative, adaptive enemy has an even larger vote, even when it faces a technologically superior foe. In our scenario, any number of enemy counters might slow or compromise U.S. success: the use by the enemy of nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities on any scale; the successful degradation of U.S. situational understanding; the exposure of significant numbers of civilians to injury or death; the introduction of technical surprise; or the use of other unanticipated asymmetric responses. In short, although the advanced capabilities envisioned for the Objective Force would certainly introduce significant changes to ground operations, the enemy's own innovation and reactions must be anticipated and accounted for.

The tactical concept described here is highly complex and significantly more complex than existing doctrine. Achieving it would place demands on future leaders and soldiers that substantially exceed today's demands. Clearly, the Army's training and leader development systems must evolve at the same pace as the Objective Force so to produce leaders and units that can—

Direct organic combined arms capabilities at levels below battalion.
Operate autonomously and noncontiguously over expanded distances.
Manage and exploit a much larger flow of information.
Meet the challenges of urban warfare as a routine operating environment.
Transition from one engagement to the next without a significant pause.
Transition smoothly between the four primary forms of operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and support.
The application of joint fires and resources is descending the echelons. If in the past it has been rare to employ joint assets at battalion level, it might well become more routine in the future. Collectively, these developments constitute important new challenges. Ultimately, the quality of leaders of soldiers and the excellence of small units will determine the rise in effectiveness of the Objective Force.
Overemphasizing the significance of information and knowledge to the Objective Force tactical concept would be difficult. Maintaining information superiority and situational understanding shared through a COP and updated by a variety of means during the course of the operation are essential elements of the tactical concept. Superior, reliable, timely, actionable information enhances the effectiveness of all capabilities embedded within the FCS combat battalion and Objective Force combined arms brigade. Rather than guessing about the enemy forces' (and one's own) having knowledge, albeit imperfect, is critical to more efficient use of battle resources and capabilities; to the conduct of precision maneuver; to the ability to conduct simultaneous and subsequent engagements; and of course, to the survivability of the force. Knowledge permits the commander to pursue the most profitable fights, which in turn, will lead to achieving accelerated decision in battle and to dislocating, destroying, and disintegrating the enemy force.

The Army's effort to develop the Objective Force unreservedly highlights the continuing need to close with and destroy enemy forces. Although the definition of close combat is changing to include a broader geographic scope and the continuous combination of LOS and NLOS engagements by mounted and dismounted forces, the future Army must always be prepared for the "short sword" fight in situations where the enemy chooses to stand and fight to the end. MR



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Lieutenant Colonel Scott R. McMichael, U.S. Army, Retired, is a senior concept developer at U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). He received a B.A. from Davidson College, an M.A. from the University of Chicago, and he is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the U.S. Army Russian Institute. His articles have appeared in Army, Parameters, and Jane's Intelligence Review, and he is the author of Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan (New York: Brassey's, 1991). He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS) and Germany.

Colonel Peter J. Zielinski is the director of the Joint and Army Concepts Directorate, DSCDOC. He received a B.S. from the University of Notre Dame, an M.A. from the University of Akron, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has served in various command and staff positions, including chief, Training and Doctrine, WIDD, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill; commander, 3/174 (FA) Training Support Battalion, Fort Drum; and he was an instructor for the Center for Army Tactics, CGSC.

Colonel Brian Zahn is Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Headquarters, TRADOC, Fort Monroe. He received a B.A. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.B.A. from the University of Georgia, Athens, and he is a U.S. Army War College Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Hawaii, and Germany.



Huba Wass de Czege
US Army

[Officer of Engineers]

Combined Arms Center
Military Review
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September-October 2002 English Edition
22 Operational Art for the Objective Force
by Colonel James K. Greer, U.S. Army



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As the U.S. Army's Transformation to an Objective Force begins, a host of questions have emerged. What might the Army of the future be called on to do, where, against what opponents, and under what conditions? How will the Army operate in the future joint, multinational, and interagency context? What technological innovations will affect the future conduct of Army operations? How will the Army fight tactically? How will the Army conduct those campaigns and operations that are predominantly land in character; that is, what will be the operational art of the future?

During a series of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) seminar war games and annual Army Transformation war games, observations began to emerge to suggest that warfare was not changing only at the tactical level; the conduct of the campaigns of the 21st century would be significantly different from those of the 20th century.

Operational Art's Development

Before considering the operational art of the future, it is necessary to understand the operational art of the present. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Army added the operational level of war and operational art to its doctrine, which became the AirLand Battle Doctrine of the 1986 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations.1 The logic and necessity of the argument for operational art was so compelling that the joint community incorporated virtually intact the Army's doctrine into Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.2 The operational design construct of 1986 grew out of a sustained, detailed TRADOC study of military theory, history, and practice. The combination of insights and conclusions drawn from those three areas of study resulted in the doctrine that enabled the successes of Operations Just Cause in 1989 and Operation Desert Storm in 1990.

Among the key theoreticians examined were Carl von Clausewitz, with his contribution of centers of gravity, fog, friction, and culmination; Henri Jomini, with his derivation of lines of operation and decisive points; and the Russians Triandifilov and Tucha-chevsky, with their development of deep battle and the operational level of war. And, because it was the lens through which all activity was viewed at the time, the entire theoretical approach was grounded in Newtonian logic and linear determinism.3

The analysis of history that went into developing the operational-design construct for AirLand Battle was equally exhaustive. Study of Napoleon's campaigns reveals the concept of large-formation operations, and the development of all-arms corps that could fight and win a battle on their own, independent from the main army. Helmuth von Moltke's 1866 and 1870 campaigns demonstrated the importance of maneuver. Ulysses S. Grant's campaigns in the American Civil War provided insight into the dynamics of operations distributed in time and space but united in purpose. The German Army blitzkrieg and the Russian Army deep operations in World War II contributed further insight into arrangement of battles and military action in time, space, and purpose.

In the area of practical application, the experiences of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 were coupled with Cold War preparations for the expected large-scale, high-intensity combat defending the Central Region of Europe against attack by the Soviet Union. Experiences such as repeated multicorps REFORGER exercises, deliberate war planning, and senior-leader war games provided a forum for understanding the challenges of operational maneuver of large formations.

Soldiers in an M1 Abrams and an M113 experiment with AirLand Battle techniques prior to the deployment of all envisioned equipment during REFORGER 82.

The lessons of theory, history, and practice were molded into the first U.S. doctrinal understanding of the operational level of war and operational art. The close cooperation, both doctrinal and practical, between the United States and other NATO nations quickly resulted in NATO-wide acceptance of the revised Western approach to operational art. The design of the military operation to remove Manuel Noriega from power in Panama in December 1989 and the coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1990 were based on the elements of operational design that formed the centerpiece of AirLand Battle Doctrine.

But times change, and so does the world and its most violent form of human interaction—warfare. The dramatic series of events that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall and that have continued through the current campaign against terrorism resulted in the Army performing a wide range of military operations across the full spectrum of conflict. Peace-support operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai; humanitarian assistance in East Timor, Haiti, andv Rwanda; and domestic support for counterdrug and flood and hurricane disaster response are samples of the many missions the Army performs.

Unfortunately, the current operational-design construct is often incapable of providing planners and commanders the means of designing campaigns and major operations these full-spectrum operations require. Despite the concept of logical, in the place of physical, lines of operations in the 2001 version of FM 3-0, planners of the ongoing counterterrorism campaign face the same challenge as planners of peace-support operations in the Balkans. Today's doctrinal concepts for operational design hamstring planners' and commanders' abilities to design and conduct effective, coherent campaigns for operations across the spectrum of conflict in today's security environment.

Future Operating Environment

The changing dynamics of the security environment are even more ominous. The future operational environment will be far more challenging for the U.S. Armed Forces than that of today. Freed of the Cold War strategic environment, potential opponents will be more numerous, adaptive, creative, and willing to employ force to achieve strategic goals. Rather than facing opponents trained and equipped to fight along the lines of the old Soviet model, the Armed Forces will face opponents who will combine conventional, unconventional, and information operations in a variety of new and effective ways. Those opponents will take advantage of the global proliferation of cheap, high-technology weapons systems to modernize selected portions of their armed forces, while seeking to take advantage of low-technology asymmetrical approaches to offset the United States' high-end warfighting dominance.

The use of cell phones for tactical and operational control in Somalia and the Balkans; the shooting down by Serbia of an F-117 Stealth Fighter; the attack on the U.S. Cole, and the attacks of 11 September 2001 are indicative of the variety and effectiveness of potential threats the Army will face in future operations and campaigns. Yet, not everything will change for planners and commanders of future campaigns and major operations; operational art will remain and—

Will be about translating strategic purpose into tactical action.
Will always be joint, multinational, and interagency.
Will be about campaigns and major operations.
Will be about the sequencing of battles, engagements, and military activities.
Will always be integrated with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.
Will be about focusing power at decisive times and places.
Despite anticipated changes in the operational environment, the nature of war remains the same. Even with high technology and the promise of information operations, war remains a nasty, brutal business in which people are killed, and things are destroyed.

Clausewitz's construct of the physical and moral domains of war—domains dominated by danger, ex-ertion, uncertainty, and chance—remains as valid today as it was in 1830. Furthermore, any future war-fighting doctrine must retain Clausewitz's focus on commanders and their ability to maneuver forces to bring about battle. Still, how the Army thinks about warfare and military operations will continue to change.

James J. Schneider's construct of the crucible of war is a case in point.4 During the 1980s, as the Army refined its understanding of operational art, Schneider offered a metaphor that would assist in understanding how the application of military force brought about the defeat of the enemy. His construct was that of a crucible in which military force (heat) was applied against a unit (lead). The transformation of the lead from solid to liquid to gas was a metaphor for the application of physical force resulting in the successive destruction of forces (physical), followed by disorganization of command and control (C2) (cybernetic), and finally disintegration of unit cohesion (morale). Schneider's construct focused more on the unit than on the commander and more on the application of physical force than maneuver. The primary means for applying force in Schneider's metaphor was physical destruction.

The Army continues to see different ways of achieving opponents' destruction, disorganization, and disintegration. Theories of warfare in the information age, such as that expressed in Alvin and Heidi Toffler's book, War and Anti-War, offer different opportunities than those of the Industrial Age.5 Information-age sciences, such as the science of chaos and the theory of complexity, focus on the system and information as the keys to military success. Repeated examples of precise application of combat power over the last decade begin to confirm the validity of these new theories of warfare.

These soldiers of the 99th Infantry Division reached their state of "equilibrium" when they had no alternative to enemy action and surrendered during the Battle of the Bulge, December 1945.

Since the emergence of the 1986 version of operational art, the Army has continued to study the theory, history, and practice of war. Analyses of these three areas, along with an understanding of the future operating environment and the difficulties of designing campaigns over the last decade, suggests a need for a new construct of operational design. That is, the current elements of operational design might no longer be sufficient to enable the effective planning and execution of campaigns and major operations across the full spectrum of operations.

The science of chaos and the theory of complexity lead to accepting systems theory to replace Newtonian linear determinism as the primary means of explaining how the world, societies, and warfare work. Doing so has profound implications for theories of war because key theories such as those of Clausewitz and Jomini are based on Newtonian approaches. Perhaps more important, systems theory provides significant opportunities to assist in the design and conduct of campaigns and major operations not centered on high-intensity combat, such as peace-support operations, counterterrorism, or unconventional warfare.

Another set of emerging theories is those of the information age, such as found in the Tofflers' treatise. The Tofflers suggest that waves in which all human society changes drive true revolutions. They posit that the Third Wave—the information age—is upon us.6 Over the past decade, such theories of information operations have grown exponentially, but incoherently. While theories of information operations promise significant changes in the conduct of war, unlike Joimini, it is difficult to translate information theories into practical operational concepts.

A detailed review of historical campaigns and major operations was critical to the early development of operational art. Historical study focused on campaigns that led to an operational design for large-scale, high-intensity combat against former Warsaw Pact forces. The nature of more recent U.S. military operations and the anticipated future operating environment leads historical study in a different direction. While large-scale, conventional campaigns such as Operation Desert Storm must be studied, historical studies must branch out to encompass the full spectrum of military operations, including expeditionary campaigns and crisis-action operations. Relevant campaigns include, but are not limited to, Vietnam (1945-1975), Somalia (1992-1993), Falkland Islands (1982), Norway (1940), China-Burma-India (1941-1945), Panama (1989), and Kosovo (1999).

To gain insight from current military operations, further study is required in the areas of homeland security (post-11 September 2001), counterdrug operations, counterterrorism operations worldwide, and ongoing operations in Afghanistan and the Philippines. Review of the planning and execution of these campaigns and major operations reveals the difficulty of trying to apply current operational-design doctrine. Centers of gravity, lines of operations, and decisive points are difficult to discern in a complex mix of political, economic, and military peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans or when attacking a worldwide, web-like, self-organizing, transnational terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda.

Five Operational Design Alternatives

A new operational-design construct is needed for the effective planning and execution of future campaigns and major operations. The important question is, what form should that design take? At least five alternatives are currently being examined as operational-design approaches. The five alternatives have grown out of attempts to grapple with the difficulties in applying current doctrine. They include the following:

1.Current doctrine. The current design of centers of gravity, lines of operations (both physical and logical), and decisive points might be sufficient if refined based on current practice.

2.Systems. The systems approach views all military organizations as complex systems and would apply emerging systems and the science of chaos and the theory of complexity to developing an operational-design construct with which to execute the military equivalent of forcing opposing systems into either chaos or equilibrium.

3.Effects-based. Developed initially from U.S. Air Force (USAF) Colonel John Warden's work, The Air Campaign, the effects-based approach describes what effects are required to secure strategic objectives and then conduct military actions that would bring about the required effects.7 The USAF champions the effects-based approach and has developed it as a concept nested in a broader "Rapid Decisive Operations" concept by Joint Forces Command.

4.Destroy-dislocate-disintegrate. This approach, largely theoretical, seeks as rapidly as possible to conduct military operations and apply combat power to successively (ideally simultaneously) destroy, dislocate, and disintegrate opposing military forces. During the 1990s, TRADOC gained an appreciation for this approach during its series of mobile strike force experiments.

5.Center of gravity (COG) to critical vulnerabilities. The U.S. Marine Corps is examining an innovative doctrinal approach that seeks to translate the theoretical construct of the center of gravity into a practical approach to applying combat power. This approach is to find the critical vulnerabilities of an opposing force—those that will cause its center of gravity to fail—then attack and defeat critical vulnerabilities.

Because development of the current operational art and Schneider's destroy-dislocate-disintegrate model have already been discussed, the next three paragraphs discuss only the remaining approaches to changes in operational art: the systems approach, effects-based operations, and critical vulnerabilities. From an understanding of all five approaches, it might be possible to determine the direction further exploration should take.

The systems approach. There is no doubt that the systems approach must be integrated into any new operational-design construct. The new sciences, which simply did not exist 20 years ago, are forcing the Army to realize that all military organizations, in fact all organizations in the world, are systems and that their behavior as they interact with each other can be described and affected using systems theory. A radical departure from traditional thinking is to understand that an armored division is a system in the same manner that a terrorist group is a system—as are carrier battle groups, fighter squadrons, and maintenance detachments.

Understanding military organizations and opponents as systems enables us to describe, predict, and counter their actions in ways that are not possible using Newtonian logic. For example, in a Battle Command Training Program warfighter exercise, we can model fairly well, using Lanchester Equations based on linear mathematics, the movement and combat of units and formations.8 We can evaluate the results of combat between two opposing forces, but we could never model the effect of reduced C2 capabilities or morale. However, application of systems and complexity theories enables entity-based modeling that, in turn, can demonstrate the impact of the loss of communications or the moral impact of a successful turning movement.

Systems theory shows that most systems exist in a state of complex interaction with their environment and other systems. Systems that are unable to cope with or adapt to changes in their environment or that are the result of interactions with other systems are forced out of complexity and into one of two other states. Those two states are equilibrium and chaos. Equilibrium is a state in which the system is incapable of any productive activity. Chaos is a state in which there is a great deal of activity but no purpose or direction.

An army unit is in a state of complexity if it is conducting an operation successfully, has positive command and control, and is adapting to changes in the environment or enemy action. If the same army unit was placed in a situation in which it had no alternative to enemy action and its soldiers had surrendered, that unit would be in equilibrium. Take the same unit, destroy its cohesiveness and command and control so activities are uncoordinated, and some elements will break ranks and retreat. The unit would be in chaos.

Some examples of systems in equilibrium are the French Strategic Command during the German Blitzkrieg of 1940; the Iraqi Air Defense System after the initial strikes of Operation Desert Storm; and the Soviet Union in 1989 when the Warsaw Pact disintegrated. Some examples of chaos are the French tactical forces opposing the German Blitzkrieg of 1940; the Iraqi Army during the Desert Storm ground operation; and the United States during the later stages of the Vietnam war (1967-1971).

Applying systems theory to military operations is simple in some respects, difficult in others. Military organizations have always been systems, we just did not know it for the first 5,000 years or so. On the other hand, understanding and applying the science of chaos and theory of complexity requires education in new terms and patterns of thinking. For example, system theory states there are seven attributes to any system. These seven attributes are powerful tools to describe a system and actions that can defeat that system, but those attributes must be learned, understood, and applied. Below are the attributes commonly used to describe a system and to understand how it functions:

Aggregation is the attribute of a system that enables adaptation when encountering more complex problems by combining (aggregating) smaller agents or subsystems into larger subsystems to perform critical tasks. A military example of aggregation is organization into successively larger formations or echelons (battalion_brigade_division_corps or squadron_group_wing_air expeditionary force).

Building blocks are the components of the system that are aggregated to provide new capabilities and can be existing agents, meta-agents, subsystems, or new components the system creates to adapt to new challenges. The military equivalents are units or weapons systems.

Tagging is the means by which the system identifies its component parts as it functions or adapts. Military examples are unit guidons, designations (11th Cavalry), or e-mail addresses.

Flows are the movement of agents, resources, or information through the system. Military examples are the movement of units through the air or over land or sea; the distribution of ammunition or fuel throughout a unit; or the passing of orders through the C2 system.

Tnternal models are coping mechanisms that a system has employed or will employ to successfully adapt to or overcome challenges to its functioning and existence. A military example might be battle drills or evasive maneuvers to avoid antiaircraft missiles.

Diversity is the attribute of a system wherein it uses a variety of agents, models, and building blocks to create multiple ways of adapting and surviving. A military example is the use of a variety of combined arms in battle.

Nonlinearity is the means by which systems avoid predictable and deterministic behavior in order to have the versatility and adaptability required to remain viable and productive in complex situations. The military example in this case is innovation, out-of-the-box thinking, and asymmetrical operations.

The practical application of systems relates to the variety of systems potential that opponents might employ. Such systems are found at all echelons—strategic, operational, and tactical—and range from national electric power distribution grids to long-range reconnaissance-strike to tactical maneuver systems. Many systems are not internal to a single unit or echelon but span multiple echelons and military units either in part or in whole. Some systems are even civilian in composition; many combine civil and military components. Future operational commanders will have to determine which enemy systems must be disintegrated, which can be simply disorganized, which need only have specific capabilities destroyed, and which can be ignored.

Effects-based operations. The effects-based approach to operations that grew out of Warden's book has considerable merit from the standpoint that it focuses on what effects are desired rather than simply applying force aimed at destruction.9 In Warden's model, airpower should always be applied to gain strategic objectives. The primary target of airpower has been the opposing strategic leadership, with supporting targets of organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and the Armed Forces. Joint Forces Command is examining the USAF effects-based operations (EBO) cycle as a concept within the broader rapid decisive operations concept.

Over time, the Mujahideen became fairly proficient baiting and conducting ambushes of Soviet helicopters which were often struck from above. Understanding that all military organizations from armored divisions to guerrilla bands—are systems enables us to describe, predict, and counter their actions in ways that are not possible using Newtonian logic.

The EBO cycle provides a strong strategy-to-task linkage, but it provides no methodology for the integration of the desired effects into a broader campaign or major operation. Instead, the EBO cycle is optimized for deciding if and how to "take down the enemy power grid," but it provides no framework for deciding if the Army should. Given that strategic attack has almost never brought about the desired end state, the EBO cycle can be used in execution of a campaign, but it contributes little to the design of that campaign. Yet, effects-based thinking is absolutely critical to a systems approach to campaign design.

Critical vulnerabilities. Joe Strange, of the U.S. Marine Corps University, proposes a practical approach to operational thinking that seeks to take the theoretical construct of Clausewitz's center of gravity and derive from that construct military tasks that can accomplish strategic objectives.10 Strange's approach is to identify the enemy COG, then identify the critical capabilities (CC) of which it is made. Having identified the critical capabilities, Strange derives the critical requirements (CR) that the CC must have to accomplish the enemy's purpose. From the CR he derives the requirements that have specific vulnerabilities that can be attacked and defeated. The concept is that attacking and defeating critical vulnerabilities removes CR, without which the CC cannot enable the enemy COG. The importance of Strange's concept is that he provides a systematic method for translating the often-nebulous concept of the COG into meaningful military tasks. Yet, in a way, this is a high-value/high-payoff target approach to operational planning. As such, it treats the opposing force as a house of cards, with hope that removing a few key cards will cause the entire enemy structure to fall. From a historical viewpoint, this has almost never been the case, and one of the prime reasons for developing operational art was that, by the 20th century, armies (as well as navies and air forces) had grown so large and resilient that no single blow could defeat them.

Bringing It All Together

As U.S. Armed Forces carry out the global war on terrorism, while also looking toward future security requirements, some key insights are apparent. All future campaigns will be combinations of conventional, unconventional, and information operations. Opponents will employ these three types of conflict in different combinations for each scenario. The United States and its allies must be prepared to counter and defeat all three. This is a fundamental change from the U.S. military establishment's focus on conventional warfare to the exclusion (except in Special Forces) of unconventional and information warfare.

The current conventional campaign-planning construct must be retained, which means there will still be campaigns against state opponents with primarily conventional military forces. Defeat of those forces will require the military to design portions of future campaigns around centers of gravity, decisive points, and lines of operations leading to conventional battles and engagements.

The destruction, disorganization, and disintegration of selected enemy strategic, operational, and tactical systems will enable rapid, decisive defeat of enemy forces. The military has used precision-strike to negate enemy strategic systems, such as electric power grids. In future campaigns, land forces will have to lead efforts to defeat opposing operational systems, such as reconnaissance-strike and distribution of petroleum oils and lubricants. Land forces will use combinations of fires, electronic warfare, information operations, and special forces, supported by air, space, and naval capabilities. Successful campaigns will require a moral component to gain support of neutrals, reinforce the support of friendlies, and break the morale of opponents.

These insights suggest a broad outline of a new construct of operational design for the Armed Forces in the 21st century. This construct is one that has significant implications for the design of the Army's Objective Force. Future Army forces must be designed with the qualities of campaign durability required to fight combinations of battles and engagements over increased space and time. At the same time, Army forces must have new capabilities that enable identification and understanding of opponents' systems and possess the requisite attack capabilities to defeat those systems.

Future Army forces must be truly full spectrum. That means leaving behind the almost total focus on physical force and developing balanced capabilities to attack the physical, mental, and moral aspects of opponents while retaining the core ability to take, hold, and control the ground. Such a transformation of U.S. Armed Forces must be accomplished in the full meaning of design—doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers—to enable operational commanders to plan, prepare, and execute campaigns and major operations incorporating the elements of operational design. MR



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1.Field Manual (FM) 100-1, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1986).

2.Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001).

3.For a discussion of Newtonian approaches, see <www.newdream.org/conversation-arc/msg01811.html>.

4.James J. Schneider, "A New Form of Warfare," Military Review (January-February 2000), 57-58.

5.Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (NY: Time Warner Books, 1995).

6.Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (NY: Bantam Books, 1991).

7.John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign (toExcel, Incorporated, 1 October 1998).

8.For a discussion of Lanchester Equations, see <archives.his.com/intelforum/msg01873.html>.

9.Warden.

10.Joseph Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps University, 1996).



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Colonel James K. Greer is the director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.S. from Long Island University, an M.M.A.S. from the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, and an M.M.A.S. from the National War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Germany, and Bosnia.




US Army
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[Ironduke]

5.Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (NY: Time Warner Books, 1995).

6.Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (NY: Bantam Books, 1991).

I love Alvin Toffler.

Speaking of which, tw-acs still hasn't returned my copy of The Third Wave..... it's been almost 5 years already.

[Officer of Engineers]

Combined Arms Center
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September-October 2002 English Edition
10 Battle Command
by Major General Russel L. Honoré, U.S. Army



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Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total.

Sun Tzu1
Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, says, "The art of command lies in the conscious and skillful exercise of command authority through visualization, decisionmaking, and leadership."2 These characteristics are the hallmarks of great leaders within the military profession. Great leaders are able to visualize an operation from its current state to an end state; to make qualitatively better decisions than can an enemy; and to lead soldiers in peace and in combat. Perfecting professional skills improves the organization by helping develop future leaders and build future teams. Strong teams enable the Army to operate as a learning organization capable of adapting to meet any challenge.

The complexity of the military profession requires leaders who can make the most of physical, intellectual, and moral resources. The professional challenge of battle command involves applying the art and science of war to specific conditions. Doctrine assists, but doctrine is descriptive, not prescriptive, and requires commanders to get personally involved and make decisions.3 This article focuses on the thoughtful application of doctrine in specific conditions. I endeavor to show how to apply doctrine, using METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available, time, and civil considerations).

Battle command is developed and practiced based on two integrated leadership models that guide operations in garrison and in the field—the Model of Excellence and the Battle Command Model. The models provide the foundations for effective leadership and battle command in the wide range of conditions encountered by deployed units.

The Model of Excellence

The Model of Excellence depicts the relationship between competence, confidence, discipline, and esprit de corps that complements Army values and enables units to perform effectively under a variety of conditions. The Model of Excellence focuses on standards, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are keepers of the standards. The model's three principal components—competence, confidence, and discipline—are mutually reinforcing. Balance among competence, confidence, and discipline creates strong units with high esprit de corps.

Competence. Competence means that soldiers have the skill, knowledge, and ability to do their jobs—and to do them right. Competence is the mastery of four domains: values, attributes, skills, and actions.4 The Army values—loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage (LDRSHIP)—reflect individual character and represent the heart of our soldier-centered profession.

The three types of attributes from the Army leadership framework—mental, physical, and emotional—contribute to individual competence by providing the ability to learn and apply skills to solve Army problems.5 These values and attributes clearly describe what a leader should BE.

Skill, the ability to apply knowledge to solve a problem, is essential to developing competence. All service members learn technical and tactical skills as part of their transformation from civilians to soldiers. Technical skills give soldiers the know-how to operate equipment. Tactical skills provide leaders with the knowledge to make the right decisions at the appropriate leader level concerning the employment of units in combat. Also, leaders develop interpersonal skills to gain knowledge of their people and how to work with them. Since leadership begins with influencing people, these skills are critical for operations and for improving the organization by developing future leaders. Finally, conceptual skills allow leaders to understand and apply doctrine and other ideas required to do the job. Developing skills in these four knowledge domains (technical, tactical, interpersonal, and conceptual) leads to competence in what leaders should KNOW.

The actions a leader must DO derive from the Army definition of leadership. Without action, one suffers from a syndrome known as "a whole lotta HOOAH and not enough DO-AH." Leader actions are categorized as influencing, operating, and improving. The "influencing actions" (communicating, decisionmaking, and motivating) stem from interpersonal and conceptual skills and are grounded in institutional values and character. The "operating actions" describe how Army forces conduct missions in a continuous cycle of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. Battle command powers this operations process, which draws on commander and staff skills to address all aspects of the art and science of warfare. "Improving actions" focus on the organization and the institution by developing subordinates into future leaders and building teams and systems that endure beyond a leader's tenure. As soldier and leader competence grows, individual confidence inevitably follows.

The reverse BOS analysis of the enemy is not limited to tactical forces but includes such factors as road congestion.

Confidence. Confidence expands through repetition, which leads to an automatic response. Soldiers who know how to use equipment properly (technical skills) gain confidence that they can contribute to the mission. Mastery of the art of tactics at the appropriate level and competence in tactical skills give leaders the confidence to make sound decisions and give subordinates the confidence to make recommendations.

Soldiers and leaders must have the opportunity to develop interpersonal and conceptual skills. Knowing fellow leaders and soldiers and how to work with them offers the double benefit of developing confidence in one's own interpersonal skills and confidence in one's battle buddy. Developing confidence based on competence in conceptual skills means more than knowing doctrine, standing operating procedures, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Confidence comes from developing the ability to understand and apply knowledge—first in thought, then in action.

Discipline. With competence and confidence achieved, discipline is required to achieve and maintain excellence. Individual soldier discipline is consistent with living up to Army values. Discipline means doing what needs to be done without being told to do it and doing what is right when no one is watching. Soldiers demonstrate self-discipline by mastering required skills, maintaining proficiency in those skills, and seeking opportunities to learn or develop new skills.

Unit discipline is the collective discipline of organizations of all sizes. Units train individual and collective skills, provide opportunities for ongoing training to maintain proficiency (competence), and provide training opportunities to develop new skills and to build confidence. Unit discipline also provides the expectation of accountability—not to be confused with a lack of trust. Accountability provides an impetus for increased discipline and provides structure for doing the "harder right."

Leader discipline is perhaps the most important form of discipline in a warfighting organization. "However compassionate we may be with others, we dare not be soft or indulgent with ourselves. Excellence comes at a price, and one of the major prices is that of inner control."6 NCOs are keepers of the standards. Organizational leaders develop individual and unit collective skills, and they also ensure discipline through policies, systems, and programs that promote competence, confidence, and discipline (for individuals, units, and leaders). Solid individual, unit, and leader discipline makes excellence possible at all levels.

Esprit de corps. The by-products of competence, confidence, and discipline are esprit de corps and high morale. Esprit de corps is an indispensable commodity in military organizations, but one cannot buy it, sell it (or trade it in for something else), or demand its presence. Esprit de corps grows spontaneously when soldiers, leaders, and units operate with competence, confidence, and discipline. Find a unit with high morale and esprit de corps, and one can rest assured that disciplined, confident, competent soldiers fill its ranks, and disciplined, confident, competent leaders stand in front, behind, and within.

The Battle Command Model

The Battle Command Model of leadership supports decisionmaking in both tactical and garrison operations.7 The Battle Command Model, grounded in Army decisionmaking and leadership doctrine, provides leaders with a useful framework within which to solve Army problems. The Battle Command Model depicts the essential elements of military decisionmaking including the five-paragraph field order and METT-TC. Perhaps most important, the Battle Command Model portrays the importance of understanding the relationships between each of the individual considerations; the lines that connect the model's components represent the interdependence of several factors to assemble a coherent and holistic decisionmaking aid.

Visualize. The commander must visualize each operation from the current state along a line of operations to the end state. Through the application of the art of war, the commander gets a picture of the operation in his mind. Intuition, based on experience and education, feeds the art of this process. But, just as a painter must know the primary colors and the combinations that produce complementary colors in order to create a masterpiece, the commander must know the science of war and demonstrate mastery of it. The science of war provides the basis for logic and understanding of his visualization.

The commander uses the battlefield framework to form the visualization. The assigned area of operations delineates the physical volume of space in which the formation will operate. The battlespace is conceptual and includes such things as the area of influence, the area of interest, the information sphere, the flow of reinforcements, institutional capabilities, and so on. Another aid in forming the visualization is METT-TC, the factors of which aid in understanding how the mission relates to the situation in time, space, resources, and purpose.

Resources available vary based on the level of the organization, but they can be described by the elements of combat power (leadership, maneuver, firepower, protection, and information) and the battlefield operating systems (BOS). For the purpose of visualization, the specific tasks to the formation might not be fully developed, but the overall aim and the purpose of the operation must become clear. In the lexicon of operations doctrine, purpose-based operations facilitate the visualization by establishing early on what is decisive, which shaping operations support the decisive operation, and which sustaining operations facilitate the decisive and shaping operations. These purpose-based operations communicate purpose in spite of physical geometry.

See the enemy. "Battle command is the exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking opponent."8 This is a critical consideration for, as Carl von Clausewitz says, "War is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass, but always the collision of two living forces."9 As a living, thinking adversary, the opponent has a center of gravity (primary sources of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance), capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities.10 From analyses of these, commanders determine decisive points, which they connect to form a line of operations. They conduct a reverse-BOS analysis of the enemy to better understand how he will fight. By doing so, commanders can remain enemy-focused, to fight the enemy (in multiple domains) wherever he is (in spite of geography).

This analysis is not limited to tactical employment against an armed force on a traditional battlefield. As commanders face everyday challenges in garrison and the field, the "enemy" is whatever stands in the way of excellence. Two principal examples are fighting the tyrannies (distance, dispersion, congestion, terrain and weather, and so on) and facing asymmetric threats against our vulnerabilities, such as terrorism. The value comes from seeing the enemy, not in isolation, but in relation to the other factors of the Battle Command Model.

See yourself. The initial step for seeing yourself goes back to the Model of Excellence—competence, confidence, discipline, and esprit de corps. Commanders must understand their own centers of gravity, capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. Again, this analysis cannot be completed in isolation; it must take into account the current situation with respect to the other components of the Battle Command Model.

The status of physical forces is only one piece of combat readiness. The aim of warfare is to impose one's will on the enemy. Will is energy and emotion, a passion balanced by judgment and principle.11 Seeing yourself involves other moral forces, such as personality, esprit de corps, health (physical, emotional, and spiritual), and courage.

See the terrain and weather. The factors of OCOKA (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach) still serve for terrain analysis, and operational weather forecasts serve well. The weather is the first enemy. Summer heat waves contrast sharply with bitter cold winters, and ever-changing weather conditions challenge operations. The Battle Command Model enables seeing the terrain and weather in relation to the other factors of the model. The effect of terrain and weather is what is important. Knowing there are narrow routes with poor trafficability is useful, but knowing their effect on the enemy, friendly forces, and the military operation is more so.

Describe

Once the commander has assembled his visualization, he must share his vision for it to become actionable. He must articulate his visualization to subordinate commanders and the staff and describe his visualization of the operation from the current state to the end state, using the terminology and language of the profession to clearly accomplish a shared visualization.

The formal means of articulating the visualization to the entire formation is through commander's intent and commander's guidance. The commander describes how he sees the operation unfolding in time, space, resources (combat power), purpose (decisive, shaping, or sustaining), and action. The uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity that accompany the fog of war should be mitigated by clear, concise commander's intent and guidance.

Embedded intent. The Battle Command Model addresses commander's intent as "embedded intent" to demonstrate the importance of integration and interdependence throughout the model. The aim of any operation in combat is to impose one's will on the enemy. Based on the strategy employed, the ends, ways, and means for accomplishing that aim differ. The commander's intent clearly establishes the purpose of the operation and the key tasks that must be accomplished in relation to the visualized end state. The intent itself should be actionable and understood two levels down. Since most Army operations are part of a larger unified action, it is important that the intent be nested with the higher commander's mission and intent two levels up.12

A rifle squad onducting a situational training exercise.

Time, space, resources, and purpose. The shared visualization that comes from the commander describes the operation in terms of time, space, resources, and purpose. Actions are described in time as simultaneous or sequential. Tempo, frequency, and duration of the operation describe the flow of the action. The timing of the operation, relative to the enemy and conditions, describes time relationships. The relation in space includes mutual supportability based on distances and line of sight, vertical airspace, and the effects of distance on lines of communication and the line of operations. If applicable, the commander should describe the opportunities to pursue an indirect approach to the end state.

A critical part of military action is the commander's decisionmaking. The goal is to enable commanders to make qualitatively better decisions relative to those made by an enemy. Qualitatively better means a right decision, at the appropriate level, at the right time. Being better is not as simple as making decisions faster and more often than can an enemy. For example, making a faster decision to transition to the defense might cause a commander to miss an opportunity for exploitation if the enemy commander decides at the same time to retrograde). Commanders should do everything possible to exploit or deny the enemy's ability to make quality decisions.

Direct

Armed with the commander's intent, subordinate commanders and staffs work to apply resources to achieve the desired end state, adjusting tasks of units in space and time to achieve the described purpose. Commanders communicate the specific task and purpose to each subordinate in the "direct" function. The doctrinal process that drives this military decisionmaking is the operations process.

Operations process. Battle command drives the operations process of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment, and the process cannot be accomplished effectively without everything discussed so far. The operations process begins with confident leader actions based on solid skills (technical, tactical, interpersonal, and conceptual) by those with the character and attributes to command effectively. The commander visualizes the operation, describes it in terms of intent and guidance, and makes decisions to direct tasks to fulfill the purpose of the operation in planning and preparation. The commander continues to make execution decisions (to adjust to the situation, allocate resources to restore the plan, or adapt completely and change the plan). Assessment is continuous. The entire process is not linear, but cyclical. So a crucial part of the Battle Command Model is its continued application before, during, and after operations.

Concept of the operation. The concept of the operation describes how the commander sees the actions of each of his units fitting together to accomplish the mission. The concept of the operation is the integration of the elements of combat power and BOS into the purpose-based operations the commander visualizes, based on the anticipated conditions of METT-TC. The simultaneous or sequential timing of the operation is described from the current state to the end state and includes the decisive operation, the several shaping operations that ensure its success, and the sustaining operations that support them all. Once again, the integration of the blocks in the Battle Command Model enable the concept of the operation to address time, space, task, and purpose in relation to the conditions and is always tied to the embedded intent, which is the result of the visualization.

Running estimate. The concept of the operation establishes common understanding up to execution time. Since the anticipated conditions of METT-TC never survive first contact, the running estimate provides the medium for continual situational understanding. The running estimate begins with mere situational awareness, becomes knowledge with confirmation, and finally becomes understanding when the commander realizes the effects of changing conditions and adapts. The value of the running estimate is the continual integration of Battle Command Model components, including aspects of safety and managing risk. According to Clausewitz, "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult."13 Maintaining situational understanding gives commanders a better chance of overcoming friction. The running estimate must be continuously updated, and striving for situational understanding must become habit.

Leader habit and discipline. The final component of the Battle Command Model brings us back to the Model of Excellence (confidence, competence, and discipline for soldiers, units, and leaders, which breed esprit de corps for deployed units). Leaders of character and competence act to achieve excellence by developing confidence through repeated actions, which become habit. Leveraging competence, nourishing confidence, and instilling discipline and accountability throughout the formation, leaders demonstrate the relevance and power of the Model of Excellence and its integration with the Battle Command Model.

A Pattern of Thinking

Battle command is a pattern of thinking for the entire formation. The Model of Excellence serves as a simple aid for training and development to achieve excellence, and it reflects leadership doctrine. The Battle Command Model incorporates the doctrinal model of visualize-describe-direct, encompasses the unique challenges of serving in deployed locations, and helps develop future leaders—planting the seeds that will germinate and grow throughout thousands of careers.

The enduring benefit of these comprehensive models is that they facilitate an ongoing, holistic view of all operations instead of "stovepipe," BOS-specific views from the staff. As new soldiers and leaders arrive, rapid integration of new personnel is critical to the continual preparation to "fight tonight." Deployed units do not have the luxury of relying merely on the collective experience of thousands of soldiers from dozens of other warfighting headquarters. Deployed units have unique challenges, with unique organizations. They are usually task organized and employed differently from how they were trained in garrison. Deployed units must have soldiers and leaders who think, train, work, and fight using consistent models rooted in Army doctrine.

As a commander seeks a shared visualization of the challenges he faces, he must integrate all of the elements of the five-paragraph field order, address all factors of METT-TC, and conduct running estimates to adapt to ever-changing situations. He must see himself and develop competence, confidence, discipline, and esprit de corps. He must see the enemy, weather, and terrain to discern their effect on the operation. The embedded intent and concept of the operation establish the actions he must accomplish in time and space to achieve a common purpose—victory.

With situational understanding, commanders can "initiate combat on our terms, gain and maintain contact, and seize and hold the initiative. We win on the offense [and through the exercise of battle command, we can] build momentum quickly and win decisively (one hundred to nothing on the score-board)."14 This comprehensive, holistic focus, helps commanders integrate BOS in planning, execution, and during transitions. The devil is in the details, and the art and science of war enable the orchestration of the details into an integrated operation. Commanders give back to the institution by developing future leaders who understand the connections between all of the above: This is battle command. MR



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1.Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed., Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 129.

2.U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 14 June 2001), 5-1.

3.Doctrine is defined as "the fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application" (FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics [Washington, DC: GPO, 30 September 1997], 1-55).

4.For further discussion of Army leadership doctrine and the Army Leadership Framework, see FM 22-100 (renumbered FM 6-22), Army Leadership (Washington DC: GPO, June 1999).

5.Mental attributes include will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, self-confidence, intelligence, and cultural awareness. Physical attributes include health, fitness, and professional bearing. Emotional attributes include self-control, balance, and stability.

6.Elton Trueblood, The New Man for Our Time (Nashville, TN: The Upper Room Press, 1983), 227.

7.The Battle Command Model is derived from the work presented in Battle Command Battle Lab (BCBL) Publication 2.1, Battle Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: BCBL, 1994), 57.

8.FM 3-0, 5-1.

9.Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 77.

10.For more discussion of centers of gravity, critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities, see Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Foundation Press, 1996).

11.For a discussion of moral forces, see Clausewitz, 104-107.

12.Unified action includes joint, multinational, and interagency operations aimed at accomplishing a single mission.

13.Clausewitz, 119.

14.Eric Shinseki, remarks from final after-action review, Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter Exercise, 17 December 2001.



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Major General Russel L. Honoré is commanding general, 2d Infantry Division, Korea. He received a B.S. from Southern University, A&M College; an M.S. from Troy State University; and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Air War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, and Korea.

US Army




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September-October 2002 English Edition


16 Battle Command and Visualization
by Lieutenant Colonel Marc LeGare, U.S. Army, Retired



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Despite the best efforts of the staff, the plan was unraveling. The scouts reported the enemy moving forward into the security zone instead of staying where the situational template said they would defend from. This invalidated the projected direct and indirect fire plan. The task force commander would have to rely on his lead team commander to find the enemy then develop and issue verbal orders at that point. He felt helpless and unable to provide any other guidance to his lead commander. He was unable to visualize the changes that needed to occur to influence the battle later.

Battlefield visualization, a key component of battle command, is the process of visualizing the unit's current state and a future state (of mission success), formulating concepts of operations to get from one to the other at least cost, and articulating this sequence in intent and guidance.1 The Army's current attempt at digital command and control (C2) systems will allow better visualization of the battlefield than in the past.

As commander of the 1-22 Infantry Battalion, 4th Infantry Division (ID) (Mechanized (M)), I had the opportunity to test and field Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), which is a digital Battle Command Brigade and Below Control System. FBCB2 uses information-age technology to enable soldiers to receive, compare, and transmit situational awareness (SA) information more quickly than was previously possible and to send and receive C2 messages.

FBCB2 transmits and receives data across the wireless Fixed Tactical Internet (FTI) via the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLARS) data radio and Single Channel Ground Air Radio System. Each FBCB2 derives its own location via the precision lightweight global positioning system receiver. Through these interfaces, the FBCB2 automatically updates and broadcasts its current location to all other FBCB2-equipped platforms. These radios also transmit and receive C2 messages such as orders, overlays, and reports. The FBCB2 computer is the heart of the system and comes with a keyboard, touch-sensitive screen, and removable hard-disk drive. The system is located inside the vehicle next to the platform commander.

To describe the power of visualization that FBC-B2 brings to battalion- and company-level units, a framework is needed to place its importance in perspective. Combat power and its elements provide this framework.

Combat Power and Visualization

Combat power is a commonly used term that describes the resource that commanders use to accomplish the mission. Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, defines combat power as "the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time—a combination of the effects of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership."2 Field Manual 3-0, Operations, adds information as an element of combat power.3

Maneuver. Field Manual 3-0 describes maneuver as "the employment of forces, through movement combined with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Maneuver is the means by which commanders concentrate combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dom-inance."4 FBCB2 allows the commander to visualize the effects of terrain, to plan for distributed movement and maneuver, and to monitor execution.

The value of FBCB2 is particularly apparent in two instances of maneuver: the transition from movement to maneuver and the rapid concentration of forces. Using the FBCB2 enemy situational template and the circular line-of-sight tool, leaders can visualize the enemy's maximum engagement line and determine the location of the phase line that triggers the change in movement techniques from traveling or traveling overwatch to bounding overwatch.

The commander can monitor the progress and formation of subordinate elements and view the transition as units make the appropriate changes. This trigger, which can be rapidly modified via a transmitted overlay or radio call, meets a long-known Combat Training Center (CTC) shortfall of units failing to transition from movement to maneuver.5 Dismounted infantry units call in enemy spot reports, and the company commander can use a phase line as a trigger to transition from movement to maneuver. Thus, the company commander will have a high probability of gaining visual contact with a small element first, before the enemy gains direct-fire contact on a larger friendly element.

FBCB2 can help maneuver rapidly concentrate forces by generating a geo-referenced icon on all FBCB2 screens. Once the report is posted, units that have been moving or maneuvering dispersed can rapidly move or maneuver to the location and pass through the obstacle breach, choke point, or passage point, or they can link up with another unit. This capability is especially important in limited visibility.

A seamless transition from a digital C2 system screen to gaining contact with the enemy—with no surprises in between—is the truest indicator of situational dominance.

As leaders begin to understand the capabilities of the system, they can develop their own techniques. During field testing, one task force engineer company commander proposed using the bridge report for a breach or bypass. He wanted to speed recognition of the friendly entrance point. Instead of sending out the location as an overlay, which takes time to address, transmit, and bring up, he researched the types of geo-referenced symbols. The bridge report met the need.

The bridge report automatically populates all brigade FBCB2 screens with a bridge symbol at the designated location. A radio call alerts the unit to identify the displayed location and move to its location.6 As vehicles approach the location, they pick up the far-recognition panel or limited visibility marker and the markings for the entrance to the breach or bypass. This technique cut out the overlay transmission time, populated all brigade screens without having any operator work performed, maintained the common operating picture, and allowed rapid concentration and redispersal of forces.

Firepower. Firepower provides the second element of combat power. Firepower is "the destructive force essential to overcoming the enemy's ability and will to fight."7 FBCB2 provides a head start on direct and indirect fires that make up firepower. Through spot reports on Red or enemy forces, commanders and crews can make timely decisions on how to control friendly contact with the enemy. Contact with the enemy can be best visualized in terms of time, location, array, and action. At the lowest level of combat, commanders strive to gain visual contact with the enemy before the enemy initiates direct fire. The SA capability allows direct-fire platforms and commanders to picture and construct the engagement so visual contact occurs effectively. The truest indicator of situational dominance is the occurrence of a seamless transition from a digital C2 system screen to gaining contact with the enemy, using direct-fire optics, with no surprises in between.8

Using combinations of enemy template overlay, circular, and direct line-of-sight tools, the commander can visualize the best location, array, and action with which to gain visual and direct-fire contact with the enemy. The picture can be portrayed in an overlay and transmitted to subordinate elements as part of the tactical plan. The commander can apply this capability to both offensive and defensive operations.

Once the operation begins, the commander must still control the unit and understand when and how to make adjustments. With the rapid position updates from EPLRS and spot reports from the brigade's complement of reconnaissance assets, the common operating picture gives the commander a large visualization capability. This capability can also have a positive effect on changing the well-known deficiency of company or team fire planning. This deficiency is noted in trend newsletters in terms of mass, leader control, understanding the plan, focused fires, fires distribution, and shifting fires.9

The commander can speed reconnaissance by using the Digital Topographic Support System (currently at brigade level), TerraBase (at battalion level), and the FBCB2 line-of-sight tool (at company level) for tentative positions, with subordinate units confirming positions in traditional fashion. FBCB2 range sketches can be consolidated at platoon level into a platoon overlay, sent to the company commander and consolidated, then forwarded to battalion or task-force level. This process can also be extended to observation plans for reconnaissance-based units and for support-area defense plans.

Protection. Protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place.10 FBCB2 has functions that significantly add to force-protection capabilities that units already practice.

Each platform equipped with FBCB2 can set the system for audible warnings when approaching danger zones. These zones are related to enemy direct fire (tied to the last FBCB2 spot-reported location and system administrative settings); reported nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination areas; and reported enemy obstacles.

FBCB2 also affords the commander a capability to reduce fratricide risk. The automatic platform-generated location provides a significant tool for commanders (and all FBCB2 users) to understand spatial relationships and to identify potential fratricide situations before they occur. However, all the friendly units on the battlefield are not necessarily digitized. The commander is still responsible for clearing indirect fires, and each leader or platform commander is responsible for proper target identification.

Leadership. Combat power's leadership component provides purpose, direction, and motivation.11 The ability to visualize the battlefield is essential in leadership. For the commander to exercise effective, decisive battle command, many different aspects of battlefield visualization must come together accurately.

The primary aspects of visualization that positively affect leadership are the projected and evolving interactions between enemy forces, friendly forces, and the terrain. Inside the tactical operations centers of digitized units, the commander, battle captain, and staff have the means of rapidly visualizing these variables. The commander must formulate his concept to move his unit from the current state to the end state of mission accomplishment. His visualization must include projected enemy capabilities, the area of influence or interest and effects, and the current or projected state of friendly forces.

FBCB2 allows this to happen more effectively. Inside the platform, commanders will have FBCB2. Depending on the unit's training level and application of standing operating procedures, commanders can rapidly see the battlefield plan unfolding and gain an appreciation of evolving risk and opportunity. This picture is also shared with subordinate and higher command elements.

The common operating picture provides leadership-related assistance in two ways: through application of senior experience and through commander-to-commander dialogue. As the senior commander observes the evolving engagement, he can rapidly view the situation and ask a well-timed question to prompt a subordinate commander to take appropriate action. One or two results can occur. The subordinate commander, who is probably in name-tag defilade observing his unit, will take corrective action, or he will inform his senior that the appropriate action is in fact taking place.12 As commanders talk to each other, the common operating picture provides the means for shared visualization. This results in more accurate dialogue and common understanding of intent.

Just understanding that a particular system has a screen, map, and blue positions is not necessarily enough to signal a qualitative improvement over past battle-command systems. By discussing the application of FBCB2 in terms of combat power, the battlefield visualization's utility and value become apparent, even to commanders who have not yet worked with the system. However, the value that digital C2 brings to leadership warrants a closer discussion.

Information. According to FM 3-0, information enhances leadership and the effects of the other elements of combat power.13 Using the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership allows one to easily see the benefits FBCB2 brings to battlefield visualization. However, using the element of information requires focusing the discussion.

The best way to understand the battlefield visualization utility of digital C2 systems is through the commanders' eyes as they discern risk and opportunity. According to FM 101-5-1, risk is the chance of hazard or bad consequences.14 The Army concept of battle command is to minimize known or projected battlefield risk or at least make an informed decision to take or assume risk.15 Clearly, any process or system that enables the commander to rapidly identify risk or battlefield opportunity is beneficial.

In the past, commanders relied on staffs and voice transmissions to articulate portions of the battlefield picture. The staff used charts, push pins, maps, and operational graphics, while radio reports provided location and status. Clearly, the FBCB2 display, constantly updated with positions (for FBCB2-equipped platforms); the latest enemy reports, operational graphics; and intelligence from higher echelon assets provide a better venue for identifying risk and opportunity.

Risk and opportunity have always been on the battlefield. Given a correct assessment, however, there are many reasons that relate to the combat power of information that might prevent the commander from making the appropriate decision. These reasons might be incomplete understanding, cost or benefit of a possible new decision, and higher headquarters approval.

Despite the best efforts of the staff and subordinate commanders, the commander inevitably asks questions about the current situation, especially when the unit is in contact with the enemy. Unanswered questions or information gaps cause the commander to have an incomplete visualization of the battlefield, which results in delayed or discounted decisions.

Another impediment to visualization is the challenge of weighing the benefit of the change against the cost of changing the plan. This is the typical CTC observer/controller (O/C) battle command comment of "fight the enemy, not the plan." This comment revolves around the commander's unwillingness to change the plan because doing so might result in an unraveling of planned battlefield synchronization. The commander is faced with a decision that will in some perceived aspect cause combat power to become unfocused, affect other elements of the unit, or cause other unintended consequences.

The perceived problem of articulating the rationale and decision to the next echelon commander is also an obstacle. In analog units, commanders rely on common maps or graphics to create a verbal picture to justify their decisions. Granted, the next higher commander does not have to approve all changes, but this type of significant decision is the least performed in units and also the type that can now be much more easily justified with FBCB2.

Clearly, commanders of FBCB2-equipped units can be bold and make changes to their decisions with greater confidence, based on better battlefield visualization.16 If information gaps are present, commanders can discount them, fill them faster, or take them into account. The commander can also better visualize the cost of changing the plan. The mental "what if" and action-reaction-counteraction process can occur more quickly. In some cases, the commander can rapidly synchronize combat-power effects. The common operating picture provides a collaborative environment for dialogue about these significant decisions. Common understanding and better informed decisions can now occur.

Does FBCB2 make bolder commanders? It is hard to say. However, in the Army's current state of transformation, commanders operating with a greater degree of confidence and making better informed decisions might be the result.

Measuring Visualization Effects

Since FBCB2 exists in more than one division and will soon be fielded across III Corps, why are the benefits of battlefield visualization not more apparent? The answer is complex and often lost to the casual observer.17 Three main issues significantly affect the system's ability to measure or perceive the value or benefit of digital C2 system-supported decisions. The first issue is the inability to measure the quality of the outcome. The second is how to measure combat power in digital units.18 The third is incomplete training systems.

Engagements are replicated to near reality and repeated over and over at the National Training Center (NTC)(or any other CTC once digital units become the norm). However, the O/Cs there are not yet prepared well enough to assess the unit's use of digital C2 systems. Although the NTC is "instrumented," valuable battle command assessments still remain focused on analog methods. To remedy this problem, O/Cs should be outfitted with at least the same type of digital C2 system with which the unit comes equipped. Some mechanism for capturing digital C2 data should also be available so O/Cs can coach commanders on how to use information to better picture the battlefield and to make appropriate adjustments.

Combat Training Center O/Cs bring tremendous insight and perspective to training events, yet they are only now able to contribute in a limited fashion to the Army's transformation effort. The Army should take advantage also of data from the numerous training battles. These data would give senior leaders some insight into the progress of the combat unit transformation and identify potential doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, and soldier solutions.

Measuring combat power in digital units is complex. All digitized armor and mechanized infantry battalions were reduced from four maneuver companies to three as they picked up modernized platforms and digital C2 systems. Some subunits were reduced also. The mortar platoon was reduced from six tubes to four, and the scout platoon from 10 vehicles to six. The logistics element of combat battalions also changed. These reductions were necessary for many reasons, but for the most part, they were made to recapitalize portions of the Army.

One can readily see that battalions with three companies, digital C2, and more-capable platforms can fight at least as well as a four-company battalion. At the brigade level, the reduction is more telling. The overall reduction amounts to a battalion (minus) of combat power. The theory behind units that have reduced combat power but enhanced C2 platforms is that they allow battalion or brigade commanders to fight more efficiently. On the other hand, these same units also field the latest model tanks and infantry or cavalry fighting vehicles. Any operational-test officer should be able to see problems arising from any attempt to single out one contributing variable. What is lost in the effort of transformation is the attempt to observe performance differences between smaller digital units and larger analog units.19

My own experience, based on two NTC rotations, one with a four-company mechanized infantry battalion and one with a three-company battalion equipped with FBCB2/Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS), provided two unit-level insights: in general, the smaller battalion did not conclude the fight any faster than the larger one did, but in some instances, FBCB2 allowed the smaller battalion to transition faster between missions, especially when finishing a fight at night.20

Incomplete Training Systems

The final problem is that of the variables relating to digital C2 training. Training variables can significantly affect a commander's overall ability to visualize the battlefield and make adjustments. Obviously, system operators are the soldiers who receive the training, but some systems also require leader training; however, the pace with which leaders rotate in and out can often marginalize their training.

Under current rules of engagement for equipment fielding, the Army Program Manager is responsible for new-equipment training. When the equipment is upgraded, the program manager is also responsible for "delta" training required to train operators in the latest added capabilities or changes. This can occur quite frequently in an environment of spiral development. Sustainment training to maintain critical skills is most often articulated as a unit responsibility. Most often, the solution is periodic classroom training. Scheduling a classroom, especially at large installations, is an obstacle, however. What commanders need but do not have is an inexpensive solution that will enable the unit to train on its own systems as part of normal garrison training events.

Even in the best circumstances, operator-training skills can degrade over two to three months. My personal experience indicates that my operators needed routine training on FBCB2 at least once a month while in garrison. Also, they needed to train on incorporating specific digital C2 tasks into each field event. Fort Hood's III Corps took a tremendous step forward to support digital C2 sustainment training when it fielded the FTI, which allows FBCB2-equipped units to train with FBCB2 without having elements of the brigade or division's signal elements present. In short, the FTI acted as a surrogate headquarters element for connectivity purposes, which allowed units to use FBCB2 routinely in the field and in creative digital C2 sustainment-training events. However, commanders must still make tough decisions to leverage limited training opportunities. Digital C2 system training is a prime area for "Sergeants' Time" as described by Command Sergeant Major (CSM) James DePriest, a former CSM for the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th ID, who had three years experience with FBCB2.21

The current group of commanders of FBCB2-equipped units is voicing an insight with which most commanders will agree. Once units become digital, sustainment training should not entail going back to a centralized classroom. Units need to conduct sustainment training as part of routine business inside their own footprint.22 The lack of a resourced Armywide digital training strategy compounds this specific training problem. However, there are units and installations that are moving to implement unique solutions.23

FBCB2 can provide battalion, company, platoon, and vehicle commanders the ability to maneuver better, apply firepower more effectively, assume better protective postures, and take advantage of a chaotic battlefield. However, these benefits are not clearly measurable in most instances because of inadequate measuring processes, force reductions, other equipment fieldings, and inadequate sustainment-training support. In an age of fiscal competition, the Army will have to confront these issues to justify digital C2 systems and to continue to set the conditions for a successful Transformation. MR



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1.U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 30 September 1997), 1-18; FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company/Team (Washington, DC: GPO, 26 January 1998), chapter 2; see also FM 71-100, Division Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 28 August 1996) and FM 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Washington, DC: GPO, 11 May 1988).

2.FM 101-5-1, 1-31.

3.FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001), 4-3.

4.Ibid., 4-4.

5.U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), "NTC Trends and TTPs" (01-12), (Fort Leavenworth, KS), Maneuver Trend 7_Movement to the Objective.

6.This point is important because units in contact should be focused on gaining visual contact with the enemy, not necessarily looking at a screen.

7.FM 3-0.

8.The timing of observing the FBCB2 screen depends on the activity of the platform commander. Before the line of departure, the commander might be viewing the screen frequently. After crossing the line of departure, platform commanders should attempt to gain visual contact with the enemy. Under no normal circumstances should a platform commander visually contact the enemy by looking at a screen.

9.See CALL, "CTC Newsletter" (4Qtr FY94), and CALL "Special Study, Mar 98: Closing with the Enemy: Company Team Maneuver."

10.FM 3-0, 4-8.

11.Ibid., 4-7.

12.Two personal examples come to mind. I once asked a company commander why a section was moving out of the support-by-fire position. The company commander said the templated position was not, in fact, the best place to be, and he was moving a section forward to the next intervisibility line. At another time, I observed a company's movement stray from the planned axis of advance. Once cued, the commander was able to get his unit back under control.

13.FM 3-0, 4-10.

14.FM 101-5-1.

15.Ibid., 1-134; FM 3-90, Tactics (Washington, DC: GPO, 4 July 2001), 1-12.

16.A commander could identify risk by looking at the spatial relationship with the enemy and between Blue forces and graphic control measures; between Blue elements or units; Blue forces and terrain; and so on. Familiarity with the plan, knowledge of the current situation, and a quick glance at the screen is sometimes all a commander needs to make a quick assessment. This does not relieve any commander from performing the necessary risk assessment before the operation begins.

17.See U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO)/National Security and International Affairs Department (NSIAD)-99-150, Battlefield Automation: Performance Uncertainties are Likely When Army Fields Its First Digitized Division (Washington, DC: GAO, July 1999).

18.The terms "digital" unit and "analog" unit oversimplify the strengths and weaknesses of both types of units.

19.LTC John Hadjis, "Making Art Out of Digits," Armor (January_February 2002), 24. During NTC Rotation 00-10, Hadjis commanded a small tank battalion that was FBCB2-equipped. His opposing force (OPFOR) kill ratio was almost twice that of larger units.

20.I was S3, 1-16th ID (M), for NTC Rotation 95-05. Task Force 1-16 ID was organized with two mechanized infantry companies, two tank companies, one antitank company, and one engineer company. During NTC 00-10, I was battalion commander, 1-22 ID (M), organized with two mechanized infantry companies, one tank company, and one engineer company. Rapid transitions were not caused by less equipment, but by an application of FBCB2 to speed the process. In one isolated mission, my smaller unit exceeded the performance of the larger unit. To my knowledge, the only OPFOR difference between these two rotations was the OPFOR's change from the Soviet-based model to a more flexible operational concept. In other words, the size of the OPFOR was not reduced.

21.CSM James L. DePriest, "Sergeants' Time XXI," Armor (January_February 2002), 22. DePriest's task list is especially prescient in that he emphasizes conducting pre-contact inspections and troubleshooting equipment for which the soldier or unit is responsible.

22.An example is the training technique for command maintenance. As part of command maintenance, the unit can power up digital systems and establish connectivity. Some systems have an embedded tutorial that operators can use as the basis for the training event. Missing, however, is the training-sustainment solution to support the higher level leader skills needed to fully leverage these new systems. A unit-owned, low-cost, scenario-driven system that would allow interaction between platforms and leaders would be a welcome addition.

23.The best example is the U.S. Armor Center, 16th Cavalry Regiment, whose Digital Battle Command Suite is a unique, low-cost, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command-exportable training system that will yield terrific results for units that receive these particular career-course graduates.



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Lieutenant Colonel Marc LeGare, U.S. Army, Retired, is a senior consultant for FBCB2 Training and Integrated Logistics, Killeen, Texas. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.S. from the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology, an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions.



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September-October 2002 English Edition

41 Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly

by Major Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army



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I will be damned if I will permit the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.1

Organizational structures that encourage the presentation of innovative proposals and their careful reviews make innovation less likely.2

These quotes engender two truisms about the military organizations of great powers: they embrace the big-war paradigm, and because they are large, hierarchical institutions, they generally innovate incrementally. This means that great-power militaries do not innovate well, particularly when the required innovations and adaptations lie outside the scope of conventional war. In other words, great powers do not win small wars because they are great powers: their militaries must maintain a central competence in symmetric warfare to preserve their great-power status vis-à-vis other great powers; and their militaries must be large organizations. These two characteristics combine to create a formidable competence on the plains of Europe or the deserts of Iraq. However, these two traits do not produce institutions and cultures that exhibit a propensity for counterguerrilla warfare.3

In addition to a big-war culture, there are some contradictions that derive from the logic that exists when a superior industrial or postindustrial power faces an inferior, semifeudal, semicolonial, or preindustrial adversary. On one hand, the great power intrinsically brings overwhelmingly superior resources and technology to this type of conflict. On the other hand, the seemingly inferior opponent generally exhibits superior will, demonstrated by a willingness to accept higher costs and to persevere against many odds. "Victory or Death" is not simply a statement on a bumper sticker; it is a dilemma that embodies asymmetric conflicts. The qualitatively or quantitatively inferior opponent fights with limited means for a strategic objective—independence. Conversely, the qualitatively or quantitatively superior opponent fights with potentially unlimited means for limited ends—maintaining some peripheral territory or outpost. Seemingly weaker military forces often prevail over those with superior firepower and technology because they are fighting for survival.4

History offers many examples of big-power failures in the context of asymmetric conflict: the Romans in the Teutoburg Forest, the British in the American Revolution, the French in the Peninsular War, the French in Indochina and Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam, the Russians in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and the Americans in Somalia. This list is not entirely homogeneous, and it is important to clarify that the American Revolution, the Peninsular War, and the Vietnam war are examples of great powers failing to win against strategies that combined asymmetric approaches with symmetric approaches.

A Russian tank sits on a forward-slope firing position overlooking Grozny's urban sprawl, January 2000.

However, two qualifications are necessary when generalizing great powers' failures in small wars. First, big powers do not necessarily lose small wars; they simply fail to win them. In fact, they often win many tactical victories on the battlefield. However, in the absence of a threat to survival, the big powers' failure to quickly and decisively attain their strategic aim causes them to lose domestic support. Second, weaker opponents must be strategically circumspect enough to avoid confronting the great powers symmetrically in conventional wars.

History also recounts many examples wherein big powers achieved crushing victories over small powers when the inferior sides were injudicious enough to fight battles or wars according to the big-power paradigm. The Battle of the Pyramids and the Battle of Omdurman provide the most conspicuous examples of primitive militaries facing advanced militaries symmetrically. The Persian Gulf war is the most recent example of an outmatched military force fighting according to it opponent's preferred paradigm. The same was true for the Italians' victory in Abyssinia, about which Mao Tse-tung observed that defeat is the inevitable result when semifeudal forces fight positional warfare and pitched battles against modernized forces.5

Asymmetric conflict is the most probable form of conflict that the United States may face. Four factors support this probability:

The Western Powers have the world's most advanced militaries in technology and firepower.
The economic and political homogenization among the Western Powers precludes a war among them.
Most rational adversaries in the non-Western world should have learned from the Gulf war not to confront the West on its terms.
As a result, the United States and its European allies will employ their firepower and technology in the less-developed world against ostensibly inferior adversaries employing asymmetric approaches.
Asymmetric conflict will therefore be the norm, not the exception. Even though the war in Afghanistan departs from the model of asymmetric conflict presented in this article, the asymmetric nature of the war there only underscores the salience of asymmetric conflicts.6
The term "asymmetric conflict" first appeared in a paper as early as 1974, and it has become the strategic term de jour. 7 However, the term "asymmetric" has come to include so many approaches that it has lost its utility and clarity. For example, one article described Japan's World War II direct attack on Pearl Harbor as conventional but its indirect attack against British conventional forces in Singapore as asymmetric. So encompassing a definition diminishes the term's utility. If every type of asymmetry or indirect approach is subsumed within this definition, then what approaches are excluded?

This article circumscribes the scope of asymmetric conflict to analyze conflicts in which either national or multinational superior external military forces confront inferior states or indigenous groups in the latter's territory. Insurgencies and small wars lie within this category, and this article uses both terms interchangeably. Small wars are not big, force-on-force, state-on-state, conventional, orthodox, unambiguous wars in which success is measured by phase lines crossed or hills seized. Small wars are counterinsurgencies and low-intensity conflicts in which ambiguity rules and superior firepower does not necessarily guarantee success.

Asymmetry in Strategy

The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.8

Symmetric wars are total wars wherein there is a zero-sum struggle for survival by both sides—World Wars I and II are the most obvious examples. An asymmetric struggle implies that the war for the indigenous insurgents is total but that it is inherently limited for the great power. This is because the insurgents pose no direct threat to the great power's survival. Moreover, for the great power in an asymmetric situation, full military mobilization is neither politically prudent nor militarily necessary. The disparity in military capabilities is so great and the confidence that military power will predominate is so acute that the great power expects victory. However, although the inferior side possesses limited means, its aim is nonetheless the expulsion of the great power. The choice for the underdog is literally victory or death.

After the Continental Army unsuccessfully defended New York in 1776 and Brandywine Creek, Philadelphia, in 1777, Washington was compelled to adopt a Fabian strategy. Fabius Maximus was a Roman consul charged with defending Rome against Hannibal. According to B. H. Liddell Hart, Fabius' strategy "was not merely an evasion of battle to gain time, but calculated for its effect on the morale of the enemy." 9 Fabius knew his enemy's military superiority too well to risk a decision in direct battle. Thus, Fabius sought to avoid direct battle against superior Carthaginian-led concentrations and instead protracted the war by "military pin-pricks to wear down the invaders' endurance." 10

Like Fabius against Hannibal, Washington generally avoided head-on collisions with the British Army. Since Washington's army was limited in personnel, resources, and training, he soon realized that committing his troops to open battle against the British would be disastrous. Washington adopted an indirect strategy of attrition by avoiding general actions against the British main body and concentrating what forces he had against weak enemy outposts and isolated detachments. Washington's plan for victory was to keep the revolution alive by preserving the Continental Army and by exhausting the British will to sustain the fight with raids against peripheral detachments. Washington's political objective was to remove the British from the American colonies, but his military means were so weak that "Washington's hopes had to lie mainly not in military victory but in the possibility that the political opposition in Great Britain might in time force the British Ministry to abandon the conflict."11

The American Revolution witnessed some of the best unconventional and guerrilla fighting in the history of American warfare. In the Northern Department, irregulars helped bring about the surrender of British Major General John Burgoyne's army at Saratoga by conducting unconventional hit-and-run attacks on Burgoyne's flanks and lines of communication. In the Southern Department, General Nathanael Greene combined conventional with unconventional tactics to wear down Major General Lord Charles Cornwallis. Greene "developed a capacity to weave together guerrilla operations and those of his regular forces with a skill that makes him not unworthy of comparison with Mao Tse-tung or Vo Nguyen Giap."12 In part, Greene's strategy stemmed from the shortage of provisions for his regulars and from the presence of partisan bands in the Southern Department.

Asymmetry in Technology

For the Chechens an outright military victory was unlikely, so their goal was to inflict as many casualties as possible on the Russian people and erode their will to fight. The Chechens used an `asymmetric' strategy that avoided battle in the open against Russian armor, artillery, and air power. They sought to even the fight by fighting an infantry war. Time and again, the Chechens forced their Russian counterparts to meet them on the urban battlefield where a Russian infantryman could die just as easily.13

Asymmetry in technology stems from a huge disparity in technological and industrial capacities between adversaries in asymmetric conflicts. The disparity inheres in the structure of any conflict that witnesses a peripheral power facing a core power. Not only does conventional military and technological superiority not ensure victory, it may even undermine victory in an asymmetric context. One need only ask a veteran of the 1995 Battle of Grozny how superior numbers and technology fare against a guileful opponent using an asymmetric approach.14

The Russian forces that assaulted Grozny on 31 December 1994 were technologically and quantitatively superior to their Chechen defenders. Perhaps the Russian military's perception of its own invulnerability, stemming from a numerical and technological superiority, contributed to the haphazard manner by which it ambled into a beehive of Chechen antiarmor ambushes. In raw numbers, the Russians employed 230 tanks, 454 armored infantry vehicles, and 388 artillery guns. The Chechens, on the other hand, had 50 tanks, 100 armored infantry vehicles, and 60 artillery guns. Despite Russia's superior weapon systems, the Russians were unable to maneuver the Chechens into a disadvantageous position. Despite former Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's claim that he could topple the Dudayev regime in a couple of hours with one parachute regiment, the Chechen forces' skillful resistance in Grozny compelled the Russian forces to fall back from the city's center to regroup. Firing from all sides and from all floors, from city block to city block, Chechen antiarmor teams systematically destroyed a large number of Russian tanks with RPG-7s. In fact, during the New Year's Eve assault, one Russian regiment lost 102 out of 120 vehicles as well as most of its officers.15

The 1994-1996 conflict in Chechnya witnessed the massive use of Russian technology and firepower—carpet bombings and massive artillery strikes—the application of which exhibited little concern for civilian casualties or collateral damage. On the other hand, for the rest of the war, the Chechen forces avoided direct battles and isolated Russian forces into smaller detachments that could be ambushed and destroyed piecemeal. For the Russians, unskilled in counterinsurgency techniques and nuances, massed artillery became the substitute for infantry maneuver, and the conventional principle of the offensive "came to be interpreted as the tons of ordnance dropped on target."16 It seems, then, that instead of adopting the preferred counterinsurgent approach of separating the guerrillas from the people, the Russians in Chechnya tried to destroy the population, guerrillas and all.

The fact that the Russians' technological and numerical superiority did not enable them to achieve their objectives only highlights technology's chimerical nature. One author writes: "Technology offers little decisive advantage in guerrilla warfare, urban combat, peace operations, and combat in rugged terrain. The weapon of choice in these conditions remains copious quantities of well-trained infantrymen."17 Guerrilla war is more a test of national will and endurance than it is a military contest.

Asymmetry of Will

As far back as two millennia, the professional, salaried, pensioned, and career-minded citizen-soldiers of the Roman legions routinely had to fight against warriors eager to die gloriously for tribe or religion. Already then, their superiors were far from indifferent to the casualties of combat, if only because trained troops were very costly and citizen manpower was very scarce.18

This quotation highlights a profound disparity that characterizes differences between imperial powers and nonimperial powers. Imperial powers are unable or unwilling to accept high casualties indefinitely in peripheral wars. The weaker side's will is sometimes manifested by a high threshold of pain that enables small powers to succeed against big powers. Samuel B. Griffith II explains: "Guerrilla war is not dependent for success on the efficient operation of complex mechanical devices, highly organized logistical systems, or the accuracy of electronic computers. Its basic element is man, and man is more complex than any of his machines. He is endowed with intelligence, emotion, and will (author's italics)."19

All asymmetric conflicts exhibit this same disparity of will. No single phrase better captures this disparity than this question posed in "Gardens of Stone," a movie about the Vietnam war: "How do you beat an enemy who is willing to fight helicopters with bows and arrows?"20 In Vietnam, enemy tactics seemed "to be motivated by a desire to impose casualties on Americans regardless of the cost to themselves."21 According to one RAND analysis of Vietnam, the enemy was "willing to suffer losses at a far greater rate than our own, but he has not accepted these losses as decisive and refuses to sue for peace."22 In Somalia, the enemy used slingshots against helicopters and used women and children as human shields during firefights.

A Marine attached to a Combined Action Platoon helps a Vietnamese man with his rice harvest, 26 February 1969.

Asymmetric conflict is not limited to military operations on the battlefield. The weak opponent looks to affect the great power's domestic cohesion, imposing a continual aggregation of costs on its adversaries.23 From a strategic perspective, the rebels' aim must be to provoke the great power into escalating the conflict. Escalation produces political and economic costs to the external power—soldiers killed and equipment destroyed—but over time, these may be considered to be too high when the great power's security is not directly threatened.

This problem was particularly acute during the Vietnam war when the Clausewitzian-minded U.S. security establishment incorrectly determined that destroying North Vietnam's means of waging war would affect its will to wage war. Even though the United States dropped more than 7 million tons of bombs on Indochina—more than 300 times the impact of the atomic bombs that fell on Japan—North Vietnam's will was resolute, but the United States' will wavered. Lacking the military means to destroy the United States' ability to wage war, Ho Chi Min and General Vo Nguyen Giap correctly focused on U.S. domestic political resolve to continue to support the war. Mao expressed this as "the destruction of the unity of the enemy," but another author explains it even more lucidly: "If the external power's will to continue the struggle is destroyed, then its military capability—no matter how powerful—is totally irrelevant."24

Big powers are less tolerant of casualties in small wars than their opponents are. This disparity arose again, this time during the U.S. Army's participation in Somalia: "The enthusiasm of the nation to take an active hand in crafting a new International order through the agency of the UN and multilateral operations, never strong to begin with, died along with 18 of America's soldiers on the streets of Mogadishu."25 The Army's operations there culminated with the 3-4 October 1993 battle in Mogadishu that left 18 U.S. soldiers killed and 84 wounded, compared to 312 Somalis killed and 814 wounded. The United States' entire involvement in Somalia witnessed at least 30 U.S. troops killed and more than 100 wounded whereas Somali casualties ranged between 1,000 and 3,000. However, 4 days after the ill-fated raid, President William J. Clinton announced the end of U.S. involvement in Somalia, "ostensibly because of the public's adverse reaction to the casualties."26 Since Somalia, the United States' use of force has appeared to be even more restricted by a zero-deaths syndrome. Another manifestation was Kosovo where an air campaign exacerbated the notion of using force without bleeding. Moreover, the U.S. forces that deployed to Kosovo to conduct peace operations had no friendly casualties as their most important criterion for success.

Embedded Conventionality

Great powers tend to exhibit homogeneity of military thought. Since the Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War, big powers have embraced Carl von Clausewitz as the quintessential oracle of war, and they continue to espouse a German-originated theoretical approach to both conventional and mechanized maneuver warfare. However, one can also discern in great powers' military cultures a singularly Jominian trait to separate the political sphere from the military sphere once the war begins. This creates two problems for great powers in asymmetric conflicts: poor or nonexistent politico-military integration and a go-with-what-you-know approach that translates into the preferred paradigm—mid- or high-intensity conventional war. Add to this the tendency of large organizations to change very slowly, and the result is a military that clings to a conventional approach in situations where a conventional approach is not appropriate or effective such as during asymmetric conflicts.27

Nowhere was this more manifest than in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet army that invaded Afghanistan was not trained to conduct counterguerrilla operations but to conduct conventional high-intensity warfare on European plains. Author Scott McIntosh stated: "[Soviet doctrine placed] a premium on mass, echelonment, rapid maneuver, heavy fire support, high rates of advance and coordinated, combined arms actions at all levels."28 The Soviet army did not have the doctrine or the skill set to fight an unconventional war. There were no conventional fronts or rears to penetrate with massed advances of heavy armored forces; instead, the Soviets faced an unorthodox, tenacious, and elusive enemy in difficult, mountainous terrain. The goal of a quick and decisive victory quickly became unrealistic.

The Soviet army rigidly adhered to a big-war paradigm: "The Soviets invaded Afghanistan using the same military tactics as in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia."29 What's more, the same officer who commanded the Czechoslovakian invasion, General Ivan Pavlovsky, also commanded the initial incursion into Afghanistan. The Soviet army conducted large-scale armor warfare up until 1982. About twice a year, the Soviets conducted huge conventional offensives, using motorized rifle divisions trained for battle against NATO in central Europe rather than using their lighter and better-suited airborne units. The excessive force and indiscriminate destruction that this approach entailed, however, did not win hearts and minds. The Soviets' scorched-earth approach of the mid-1980s stiffened rebel resistance.

Vietnam was also essentially a counterguerrilla war until the United States tried to transform it into something it was not by "Americanizing" it. In fact, in 1961 and 1962, U.S. Army Special Forces initially met with some success using proven counterinsurgency techniques such as aggressive small-unit patrolling, intelligence gathering, and winning hearts and minds. By the end of 1962, the Special Forces had recovered and secured several hundred villages from the Vietcong. Moreover, the U.S. Marines operating in the I Corps area employed similar techniques with their combined actions platoons, achieving local success for most of the war. However, General William C. Westmoreland's team tended to marginalize both the Special Forces' efforts and the Marines' combined actions platoon program because both were inconsistent with his concept of the U.S. Army's way of war: conventional, lots of firepower, and harnessing technology to search and destroy.

Somalia, 1993.

It has been argued that the U.S. Army never seriously attempted counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Its lack of flexibility was summed up in the remark at the beginning of this article: "I will be damned if I will permit the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war."30 The American victory over the Germans and Japanese during World War II "had been so absolute, so brilliantly American, that the notion of losing a war was unthinkable."31 The solution for that war's victory, "superior firepower, superior manpower, superior technology," became the formula for victory for the rest of the century and encouraged commanding generals in Vietnam "willfully to underestimate their enemies and over-estimate their own battlefield prowess."32 The U.S. Army was unable to adapt to the kind of war the North Vietnamese and Vietcong conducted. "By its more conventional response, its strategy of attrition and the unceasing quest for the big set-piece battle, the Army became, in effect, a large French Expeditionary Corps—and met the same frustrations."33 The U.S. Army placed marginal emphasis on unconventional warfare doctrine. With scant interest or recent practice in counterinsurgency on a large scale—and few recognizable payoffs in career promotions or annual budget allocations—the evolving U.S. Army strategy was predictable. "The Army was going to use a sledgehammer to crush a fly, while the practice of unconventional war was left largely to the Special Forces."34

The good news is that after more than a decade of doing things other than war, U.S. military culture is changing—it is becoming more disposed to operations outside its historical paradigm. This is manifest, in particular, by the fact that the Army's core leaders are reflecting and effecting changed attitudes toward peace operations. In a U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) report that interviewed a group of general officers, General Eric K. Shinseki observed that he had to face a cultural bias in Bosnia because "Army doctrine-based training prepared him for war fighting at all levels, but there wasn't a clear doctrine for stability operations."35 However, as the current Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Shinseki is driving change in the Army's mind-set and force structure to make it more strategically relevant. The USIP report also concluded that peace operations are "the new paradigm of conflict that will confront the army in future deployments as more failed states emerge and peace enforcement and nation-building become staples of the senior military leadership diet."36 In another study, the former Implementation Force chief of staff expressed the need to "build a military capable of many things—not just the high end."37

In October 2001, the U.S. military prosecuted an effective and unprecedented strategy against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Combining precision bombing and employing Special Forces in an unconventional warfare role, the U.S. military essentially decapitated the oppressive Taliban rule there. However, the U.S. war in Afghanistan is different from the examples discussed here in one significant way. In the war against terrorism, U.S. military forces are defending the United States' vital interests. In this respect, this war has more in common with World War II than it does with Vietnam or Somalia. It is a war as a crusade against a nonstate actor that attacked and continues to threaten the U.S. homeland.

A B-52 pilot conducts preflight checks before launching on a night mission in response to terrorist attacks on the United States.

Both the United States and al-Qaeda appear to be fighting to achieve unlimited ends: the United States is trying to eradicate the al-Qaeda terror network around the globe, and the enemy wants to get the United States out of the Middle East and East Asia. In this case, the U.S. public will probably continue to tolerate casualties and to support a protracted counterterror war because it is clear that this effort is defending U.S. vital interests. For the same reason, U.S. political leaders agree and have resolved to successfully conclude this war.

The war in Afghanistan is distinct in another important way. The first, and most successful, campaign there was U.S. special operations troops operating in a proinsurgent role—the U.S. military initially was the guerrilla. Being the guerrilla and countering the guerrilla are two very different things. Since the beginning of 2002, however, the U.S. military has conducted counterguerrilla operations in eastern Afghanistan. Although the final outcome is yet to be determined, an approach that combines intelligence, small special-unit actions, and precision bombing has been successful inside Afghanistan.

However, the potential for safe haven for the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters along the porous and sparsely guarded 1,300-mile Pakistani border seems to have been realized since Pakistani national police sources estimate that as many as 10,000 Taliban cadres and 5,000 al-Qaeda fighters are hiding in sanctuaries inside Pakistan. This situation presents a vexing conundrum: whose forces can and will search out the 15,000 enemy soldiers who are being harbored inside a friendly state by and among the 1 percent of the population who are Islamic extremists and the 15 percent of the population who are anti-American?38 If it is at all possible that U.S. forces may enter Pakistan to help that government isolate and eradicate these 10 to 15,000 jihadist guerrillas, there are some lessons from another war in Asia more than a quarter of a century ago that can help show the United States what not to do.

Of all the services, the U.S. Marine Corps seems to be the best incubator for serious thought about small wars. The Marines sponsored two works on small wars that are worthy of dusting off as the U.S. military continues its global fight against al-Qaeda guerrillas. The first is a U.S. Marine Corps primer that was published in 1962, The Guerrilla—and How to Fight Him, and the second is the 1940 U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual.39 The latter offers timeless guidelines and techniques for con-ducting counterguerrilla operations: "In small wars, caution must be exer-cised, and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with the forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population. Small wars involve a wide range of activities including diplomacy, contacts with the civil population and warfare of the most difficult kind."40 MR



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1.This quote, attributed to an anonymous U.S. Army general, is from Brian M. Jenkins, The Unchangeable War, RM-6278-ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970), 3.

2.Harvey M. Sapolsky, "On the Theory of Military Innovation," Breakthroughs (Spring 2000), 35 and 38.

3.To win or to be effective in the context of counterinsurgency or low-intensity conflict (LIC) is subjective and relative. However, although diverse missions comprise the realm of LIC/operations other than war, a general corpus of principles has emerged from a legacy of experiences in operations short of war. To be effective, doctrine in this area should help promote two central aims: to integrate military, political, economic, and social objectives, moving them toward the desired strategic outcome and to gain and maintain support of the indigenous population.

4.Based on Andrew Mack, "Why Big Powers Lose Small Wars: the Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," Power, Strategy, and Security: a World Politics Reader, Klaus Knorr, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 126-51. This implies a qualitative and quantitative superiority by empirical conventional measures of military capabilities only.

5.These battles witnessed European armies handily and brutally defeating their non-European adversaries because the latter chose, imprudently, to fight the former symmetrically. See Winston S. Churchill, The River War (London: Prion, 1997), 191-225 and Daniel P. Bolger, "The Ghosts of Omdurman," Parameters (Autumn 1991), 34, for an analysis of the Battle of Omdurman. Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted Warfare (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 9-10.

6.Once again, inferior connotes a weakness in conventional measures of military might, not necessarily in strategy, tactics, and warrior skills. Asymmetric conflict was also the norm during the Cold War and throughout U.S. history. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear escalation precluded a symmetric conflict between the two superpowers.

7.The term "asymmetric conflict" first appeared in Andrew Mack, "The Concept of Power and Its Uses in Explaining Asymmetric Conflict" (London: Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research, 1974).

8.Henry Kissinger, "The Vietnam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs (January 1969), 214.

9.B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1967), 26. Fabian connotes an indirect strategic use of force and stems from Roman General Quintus Fabius Maximus who protracted the war against Hannibal in the Second Punic War by avoiding decisive battles.

10.Ibid., 27.

11.Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy From its Beginnings Through the First World War," Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 410-12; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (IN: Indiana University Press, 1 September 1977) 5, 15, and 18-19. See Mack, "Why Big Powers Lose Small Wars," 145-46.

12.Ibid., 410-11 and Ibid., 18, 23-24, 26, and 29.

13.Sean J.A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: the Changing Face of Urban Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 28.

14.Mack, "Why Big Powers Lose Small Wars," 128 and 133.

15.Timothy Thomas, "The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya," Part III (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office [FMSO], 1997), 6; Raymond Finch, "Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO, 1997), 4-7; and Gregory J. Celestan, "Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO, 1996), 4.

16.Finch, 5-6 and Celestan, 5. Wiping out the noncombatant population is not the preferred solution in counterinsurgency. To counter Mao's approach in which the people in a guerrilla war are "likened to water" and the guerrillas are likened "to the fish who inhabit it," most counterinsurgency experts would assert the necessity of separating the fish from the water by winning the hearts and minds of the population. For Mao's fish and water simile, see Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, Samuel B. Griffith II, trans. (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 93.

17.Lester W. Grau, "Bashing the Laser Range Finder With a Rock" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO, 1997), 4.

18.Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995), 116.

19.Samuel B. Griffith II, "Introduction" in Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 7.

20.Francis Ford Coppola, "Gardens of Stone," produced by Columbia TriStar Home Video, 111 minutes, 1987, videocassette.

21.Jenkins, 3.

22.Ibid., 4.

23.Mack, "Why Big Powers Lose Small Wars," 128, 130, and 132-33.

24.Ibid., 129-30 and Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 90. For tons of bombs dropped on Vietnam, see John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 5th ed. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), 111-12.

25.Anonymous U.S. senator cited in Edward Foster, NATO's Military in the Age of Crisis Management (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1995), 13.

26.For casualty figures, see Susan Rosegrant and Michael D. Watkins, A Seamless Transition: United States and United Nations Operations in Somalia 1992-1993 (B) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1996), 12-16 and Rick Atkinson, "Night of a Thousand Casualties," Washington Post, 31 January 1994, A01. Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff, Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officers in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 23. This is not necessarily true in Afghanistan, however, where the American public and political elite seem to be more tolerant toward casualties because the war is a crusade against an unambiguous, direct threat to U.S. security.

27.For a discussion of the professionalization and homogenization of Western militaries, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 46-65. Some would argue that A.A. Svechin and V.K. Triandafillov are the true-faith apostles of operational art and maneuver warfare. However, two Germans, Sigismund von Schlichting and Helmuth von Moltke, the elder, were among the first military thinkers to recognize the shift away from the Napoleonic (Clausewitzian) paradigm that the American Civil War had signaled. See James J. Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolution (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), 168-77.

28.Scott E. McIntosh, "Leading With the Chin: Using Svechin to Analyze the Soviet Incursion Into Afghanistan, 1979-1989," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies (June 1995), 420.

29.Olivier Roy, The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War, Adelphi Paper 259 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), 16 and 18. It is hard to miss the similarity and the concomitant irony between the name Pavlovsky and Pavlov. In some manner, the Soviet army in Afghanistan acted like Pavlov's dogs, exhibiting a conditioned response, however inappropriate.

30.Jenkins.

31.Ibid.

32.Ibid. and Rick Atkinson, The Long Gray Line (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1989), 82.

33.Peter M. Dunn, "The American Army: The Vietnam War, 1965-1973," Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency, Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlot, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1985), 84.

34.Ibid., 85.

35.General Eric K. Shinseki, Interview, 14 January 1999, in Howard Olsen and John Davis, "Training U.S. Army Offi-cers for Peace Operations," Special Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999), 2.

36.Ibid., 3.

37.Edith B. Wilkie and Beth C. DeGrasse, A Force for Peace: U.S. Commanders' Views of the Military's Role in Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Peace Through Law Education Fund, 1999), 40.

38.Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Al Qaeda's Privileged Sanctuary," Washington Times, 20 June 2002, 19.

39.Krepinevich, 70-71 and 172-77, and The Guerrilla—And How to Fight Him, T.N. Greene, ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962).

40.U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 31-32.



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Major Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, is the S3, 4th Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas. He holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and is a graduate of the French Joint Defense College, Paris. He previously served as assistant professor of international relations, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.



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Is World Opinion Important?

Edward Bernard Glick



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In the war against terrorism, the United States worries too much about international coalitions, just as it does about world public opinion. There is nothing wrong with building a coalition, whether against the al-Qaeda's Osama bin Laden or against Iraq's Saddam Hussein. But before it crafts a coalition, the United States should first inoculate itself against "coalitionitis," a potentially crippling politico-military disease that lets the most diffident members of an alliance diminish American resolve and results.

In the current phase of the antiterrorist war, when all is said and done, Pakistan and Uzbekistan are the only countries in Central Asia that are cooperating with the United States. Great Britain is its only true ally in Europe. And Turkey and Israel—which have more experience fighting terrorism than any other nation on Earth—are its only reliable partners in the Middle East.

As for international public opinion, nothing delights good people more than seeking solutions that are acceptable to it. Yet, nothing is more difficult for them to grasp than the myths and realities of international public opinion. In the heat of an issue, how many people realize that world public opinion is not based on a universally agreed-upon value system, that it is not always objective, that it is difficult to define, that it is easily manufactured or manipulated, that it is fragmented and ephemeral, that it has a very short memory, and that it can often turn out to be wrong?

Take the matter of definition. How does, or should, one define world public opinion on a given issue? By the level of violence committed in its name? By its loudness? By its repetition? By its media coverage? By the language and number of resolutions the United Nations has adopted on the issue? By the tally of states invoking it on a particular side of an issue? By the total population of those countries?

Or take the fickle and forgetful nature of world public opinion. The Russia that international opinion condemned decades ago for invading Hungary and Czechoslovakia is the same Russia that was hailed for its anti-Israel attitude during those decades. The world public opinion that condemned U.S. intervention in Vietnam is the same public opinion that ignored China when it conquered Tibet. The intellectuals who condemned America's sometime use of nonlethal tear gas during the Vietnam war were the same ones who were silent when Iraq used lethal poison gas during the Iraq-Iran war. In short, world public opinion, to the extent that it exists, is always conditioned by multiple perceptions of democracy, self-determination, wars of national liberation, colonialism, and imperialism.

Clearly, when a democracy such as the United States enters a war, it is obliged to debate, explain, and, if possible, justify its actions. But when Thomas Jefferson admonished his countrymen in the Declaration of Independence to afford "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," he did not mean that the United States should be blindly obedient to mankind's opinions.

Americans should be particularly wary of European public opinion. Europe's elites, particularly on the left, have always been publicly contemptuous, but privately jealous, of the United States. They have mocked its dynamism, openness, diversity, informality, social mobility, and appeal to the world's masses. Despite the fact that America saved Europe in World Wars I and II, leaving thousands of U.S. soldiers buried in its military graveyards, Europe cannot accept that history has forced it to cede to the New World the Old World's cultural, diplomatic, economic, and military dominance in global affairs. When European intellectuals and their U.S. counterparts proclaim that the people of the world hate America, they forget that Americans are not paying money to have someone smuggle them into other countries. Rather, citizens of other countries are paying fortunes, sometimes risking life and limb, to be smuggled into the United States.

As for Arab public opinion and Arab emigration into the United States, Fouad Ajami, professor of Middle Eastern studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, has observed that "something is amiss in an Arab world that besieges American embassies for visas and at the same time celebrates America's calamities."

It will not be true forever, but for the present, America is the only great power the dictionary defines as a state powerful enough to influence events throughout the world. That means, in essence, that whether it is fighting nonstate terrorists or trying to prevent rogue states from using weapons of mass destruction, America should do what it must do, even if from time to time it defies the voices of so-called world public opinion.



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Edward Bernard Glick is professor emeritus of political science at Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He received a B.A. from Brooklyn College and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of Florida, Gainesville. He has published several books on the U.S. military and on Israel and its army.




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