Iran, Nukes, War Casualties and Assorted Accusations

[Double Edge]

Will today's negotiations work ?

Iran talks: Why time is ripe for compromise | CS Monitor Op-Ed | April 13, 2012

Iran talks: Why time is ripe for compromise

Positive signals from Iran and the United States are encouraging as talks on Tehran's nuclear program get underway, writes a political expert from Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

By Mansour Salsabili
posted April 13, 2012 at 11:00 am EDT
Cambridge, Mass.

The opportunity for a compromise on nuclear and other regional issues between Iran and the United States has never been so ripe as now, when talks resume between Iran and international negotiators in Istanbul this weekend.

The desire for progress on both sides of the table is observable. What can ensure a tangible result?

The answer is an active effort to keep this new engagement continuous and irreversible. Just as nonproliferation is vital to the US, the peaceful use of nuclear technology is valued in Iran as an inalienable right. Hence, an agenda for an ongoing negotiation that balances these two interests must be proposed at the very first meeting to capture the momentum.

The failure of past negotiations is often associated with domestic political rivalry in both Iran and the US. It seems today, however, that both sides have overcome internal divisions.

That Iran agreed to take part in talks without further delay, in spite of sharp critics ranging from military and political officials to the Tehran Friday prayers leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, is a good sign and a momentous decision.

At the same time, the US administration is in an election year. The Obama administration must make a courageous decision considering the criticism that anti-Iranian hardliners will use to foil any credible political deal with Iran. Thus, this is a promising start.

Another encouraging sign is the reappointment of Hashemi Rafsanjani, the symbol of pragmatism in the Iranian body politic, as the head of Expediency Council, the body that advises Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It was the supreme leader who reappointed Mr. Rafsanjani, despite overt enmity against him expressed by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the last seven years.

The leader’s hailing of Rafsanjani for all his endeavors came at a time when Rafsanjani recalled a sensitive letter he drafted to the leader of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a couple of years before his demise. The letter spoke of the need to resolve relations between Iran and the US and also improve relations with Saudi Arabia, not only for mutual oil policies but also for regional peace and tranquility.

These are important signals from the Iranian side, sent at the highest level.

In the US, President Obama asserts that Iran has the right to peaceful nuclear technology. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton affirmatively reflects on the religious decree of Ayatollah Khamenei against the production and use of nuclear weapons. Mrs. Clinton has urged Iran to translate its religious belief into active government policy – including allowing inspections and exchanging some of Iran's enriched uranium for fuel for its research reactor.

Both signals show a softening of the US position backing the 2006 UN Security Council resolution that demanded Iran “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.” The American softening also indicates a readiness for respectful engagement.
At a time when neither suspension of Iranian nuclear activity nor international collaboration with Iran on nuclear technology seems feasible, the one possible step is either a temporary cap on the number of centrifuges or a demonstration of restraint in the level of enrichment – or both – as confidence building measures by Iran.

According to the Iranian News Agency, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran considers the idea of a temporary cap on the level of enrichment a likely path Iran could take. That would allow for the 20 percent enriched uranium required for producing medical isotopes. This leaves the door open for a fuel swap. The idea of a fuel cap was repeatedly affirmed by Mr. Ahmadinajad last summer. Such a position matches the US request for sustainable transparency and meticulous verification, supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

To make these talks a success, the parties must first aim for a win-win negotiation. Each side at the end of each round must have something tangible to show to the public back home.

Second, reciprocity is crucial. Word for word, and action for action, mutual concessions will secure the result, limit expectations, and warrant a continuation of the process.

Third, the promulgation of an initial agreement or statement, expressing the principal positions of each side, can shut the door on those who might be interested in prolonging the crisis. An initial agreement could be in the form of a joint communiqué, to limit disparate interpretations and also to promote the commitment to getting real results from each round.

Finally, as the incoming president of the Non-Aligned Movement, Iran wishes to be treated as a reliable member of the international community. Therefore, a respectful and cooperative atmosphere free from blame and recrimination is necessary for a constructive, problem-solving approach to resolving the nuclear issue as well as other regional issues.

By approaching with compromise, maybe we will be able to see the US high-level delegation as a guest to the nonaligned summit in Tehran this summer.

Mansour Salsabili is a research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. A senior political expert on leave from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, he participated in a number of efforts ranging from UN reforms to the Non-Aligned Movement. The views expressed here are entirely his own.

[RoccoR]

S2, et al,

As I said, I know that I hold the minority opinion.

"...Maybe now is not the right time for Iran to be given the responsibility of the Persian Gulf..."

Ya think?

"...Maybe..." leaves some room for doubt though, eh?

"...that does not mean that - given the right influences through demonstrated leadership, it cannot be in the future..."

Oh wow. NOW I've read everything. Why would you even expend the energy to suggest such?

(COMMENT)

I'm a forward thinker - and look to the future that brings us progress in international relations. I also know that the nature and character of countries change. Iran will not always be as it is today. And there is a growing population within Iran that wants to become more involved and connected with the rest of the world. Just as, when I was younger, the North Vietnamese were the evil threat of the day - and could not be envisioned as a positive regional influence, I was shock to learn how wrong I was. And so now - I believe that Iran will (someday) improve and become a benefit and advantage to the region. I haven't written them off yet.

You do appreciate the insidious role Iran has played in Syria? How about its own adventures in Iraq, where the streets have been littered by the bodies of those unfortunate enough to intersect with an Iranian-manufactured EFP? Lebanon and the gentle guiding spirit of Ayaltollah Nasrallah and his merry band of Hezbollans?

(COMMENT)

Even anti-government and anti-occupation forces evolve. You are only looking at one side of the coin with Hezbollah. They are more than a irregular military force of an asymmetric strategy.

The list goes on but, here-at WAB, you promote a kinder, gentler, thousand-points-of-light Iranian beacon of hope for all.

It COULD happen.;)

Yeah, and my aunt could grow balls and become my uncle.

So...tell me, oh wise one-how do those sheep-in-wolves-clothing Iranians get there from here.

Oh! Before answering, you still haven't suggested your preference. Should we unambiguously declare that U.S. forces stationed in the gulf shall never use force in the defense of American interests or simply...withdraw?

Lot of groovy words about "courage" and "honor" and "fair" that you tossed about but I sensed you tap-dancing around my question. I'd love an answer.

Here's hoping that's not asking too much.:)

(COMMENT)

As "Parihaka" points out (from the thread: Iran Reiterates Threat To Close Strait of Hormuz If Attacked) , I have discussed this before, and you have expressed your counter-opinion to the concept. I essentially believe that if the Regional Neighbors to Iran believe that Iran has become a security problem, then they (the Middle East/Persian Gulf States) should collectively solve the problem; not the US. They need to stand on their own two feet.

Yes, I agree that Iran is not the ideal partner for peace today, as it could be. And yes, they (Iran) are probably not the right choice today to be the Protector of the Persian Gulf. But really, that is not our (the US) decision to make. It should be the decision of the Persian Gulf States. And the Persian Gulf States should determine who supervises the protection of the Gulf Region, and what the political-military policies should be region-wide.

This brings us back to the discussion on the reputation of the US among the people in the Middle East and Persian Gulf Regions.

Most Respectfully,
R

PS: I understand that you have some objection to improving the nature and character of the US Leadership with the Governments and the People of the Middle East and Persian Gulf States. But "right through might" is (IMO) the wrong approach. Leadership, and the characteristics of leadership, are (much) more than just demonstrated strength. Yes, it does contain the concepts described in the "groovy words about "courage" and "honor" and "fair."

[RoccoR]

Parihaka, S2, et al,

To be fair to S2, there are a number of authorities that believe as he does; although none quite so elegantly. I put them right up there with the "Whiz Kids" and the "PNAC."

he's already stated his preference


His comments in the rest of that thread are equally interesting

We have no choice when faced by threats that, if permitted to go unmet, could result in sacrificing interests on which the nation's economic well-being and the integrity of basic institutions depend. (1) More likely, a threat to access will arise primarily from developments indigenous to the Gulf. (2)

(COMMENT)

The excerpt, supra, states the foundation in a nutshell. The US "Ruling Elite" is essentially afraid to let the Regional Neighborhood of the Persian Gulf make its own decisions. It doesn't have the courage to allow the Regional Parties to come to a solution through democratic processes; for fear the outcomes will not be amicable to US business interests; a position the US holds as paramount above all others.

America acts, almost entirely, in its own self interest. This is the basis for the political-military engagement talks with Iran now. After nearly a year and a half, the P5+1 and Iran have finally broken the ice jam and have begun a positive dialog under a favorable atmosphere. But notice, that the Persian Gulf States don't have a representation in the talks. I am not sure if The Baroness (Catherine Ashton), the EU Foreign Policy Chief, broke the ice herself, but she went a long way to renewing confidence in the talks which is something the US was unable to accomplish. The Baroness has established a rapport with the Iranian Chief Negotiator (Saeed Jalili) which, for now - opened in a favorable climate. No one in the talks, really wants a war. It would be counterproductive for everyone, even those not directly involved in the talks (particularly the Persian Gulf States).

But it still remains somewhat of an enigma that the Persian Gulf States have so little visibility in the talks. What does this mean? Well, some speculate that the Six Powers (US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany) consider there interests as being above those of the Seven other Persian Gulf States (Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq).

This is not the only example of the Persian Gulf States being left out of the critical decision making processes pertaining to the region; but it is a current example of it being done. And in the decision making processes, who looks out and acts in the best interest of the Seven other Persian Gulf States? I suppose they are asking those questions themselves?

Most Respectfully,
R

[S2]

RoccoR Reply

"I'm a forward thinker - and look to the future that brings us progress in international relations...".

No. You are hopeful for Iran's progress (a charitable description). That's a significant difference.

"...I also know that the nature and character of countries change...".

Some would reasonably suggest "the more things change, the more they stay the same...".

There is more than a grain of truth in such.

"...Iran will not always be as it is today..."

True. However, you make no allowance for it possibly becoming worse before matters improve where the Iran envisioned by you emerges. The trend has been decidedly for the worse with no overt indication of it becoming reversed, much less attaining the stature you foretell.

"...And there is a growing population within Iran that wants to become more involved and connected with the rest of the world..."

And there is an internal security presence making the SAVAK look like indulgent grandparents. Were that irresistable force to meet such an immovable object, hell shall be paid between here and there in Iran.

"...Just as, when I was younger, the North Vietnamese were the evil threat of the day - and could not be envisioned as a positive regional influence, I was shock to learn how wrong I was..."

Positive? I'm not much younger than you and remember that entire war rather clearly. N. Vietnam WASN'T "...the evil threat of the day...". They were, instead, a minion of the evil empire as I recall. A (considerably) "lesser Satan", if you will. To that extent, you distort your analogy.

While Vietnam and America have bridged a considerable gap since that war's end, the communists in Hanoi have a considerable distance to yet travel to achieve a regional status similar to what you've envisioned someday (soon?) for Iran.

"...Even anti-government and anti-occupation forces evolve. You are only looking at one side of the coin with Hezbollah..."

I'm not "...only..." viewing Hezbollah from one perspective. The social contributions made by Hezbollah to the shia community of Lebanon isn't the issue. The disdain displayed by Iran towards HAMAS in Syria should have revealed to you the manner in which these organizations are viewed by Teheran.

Hezbollah is a tool of Iranian foreign policy and has a specific role expected of it. So long as that role is fulfilled, so too shall be their financial coffers. Hezbollah can go its own way, but only at risk of crossing Iran irrevocably. To that end, forcibly dominating the internal political milieu of Lebanon while acting as a front-line proxy against Israel is Hezbollah's raison d'être. Some even might reasonably suggest Hezbollah's raison d'état.

"...I essentially believe that if the Regional Neighbors to Iran believe that Iran has become a security problem, then they (the Middle East/Persian Gulf States) should collectively solve the problem; not the US. They need to stand on their own two feet..."

Of course you believe such. It is the fastest and easiest pathway to Iranian regional hegemony. The practical facts of the matter make clear, in the absence of America, that no combination of regional forces can stand in the way of Iran's objective for gulf hegemony.

The true issue, however, reaches beyond regional security and affects nearly every nation on earth-energy security. Only America, right now, can assure the unfettered access of every nation to market-priced energy from the gulf. Were Iran to assume control of that energy we've no reason to believe that pricing would remain based upon market-demand nor access would remain unfettered.

America's presence assures otherwise. That, btw, is decidedly in our interest as a mercantile nation with two oceans on each shore. We (and others) are inextricably linked in the global economy. Their growth is OUR growth. Without such, we wither and diminish.

"...Yes, I agree that Iran is not the ideal partner for peace today, as it could be. And yes, they (Iran) are probably not the right choice today to be the Protector of the Persian Gulf. But really, that is not our (the US) decision to make..."

Ummm...yes, fortunately, it is. Jurisprudence, I'd like to introduce you to Realpolitik. Here is where the paved, smooth-surfaced road becomes dirt, rocks and ruts.

"...This brings us back to the discussion on the reputation of the US among the people in the Middle East and Persian Gulf Regions..."

While thoroughly ignoring the discussion of the wider implications affecting us all. Good cops neither expect nor need cookies left out at doorsteps. When they say "JUMP", they do expect you to ask "HOW HIGH". That analogy is adequate for our purposes here.

[Double Edge]

The US "Ruling Elite" is essentially afraid to let the Regional Neighborhood of the Persian Gulf make its own decisions. It doesn't have the courage to allow the Regional Parties to come to a solution through democratic processes; for fear the outcomes will not be amicable to US business interests; a position the US holds as paramount above all others.

An inter country dispute like this isn't democratic its about power. Always been like that.

Intra-country is different. US has displayed itself to be non-intervening if one considers how the Arab spring came and went. And in the particular case of Libya acting in a way to preserve the regional momentum.

But notice, that the Persian Gulf States don't have a representation in the talks.

In what capacity should the GCC present themselves ?

But it still remains somewhat of an enigma that the Persian Gulf States have so little visibility in the talks. What does this mean?

Don't understand why they should be present. This is about Iran vs the P5+1.

Well, some speculate that the Six Powers (US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany) consider there interests as being above those of the Seven other Persian Gulf States (Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq).

You could spin it that way. But i would say what the P5+1 have in mind isn't necessarily against the interests of the GCC. Not one of the GCC wants a nuclear armed neighbour.

This is not the only example of the Persian Gulf States being left out of the critical decision making processes pertaining to the region; but it is a current example of it being done. And in the decision making processes, who looks out and acts in the best interest of the Seven other Persian Gulf States? I suppose they are asking those questions themselves?

Most recently, the Saudis were upset that their counsel on Iraq wasn't heeded by the US. They are not happy that there is a Shia govt in charge there. Nothing about Iraq has been to their liking as far back as the invasion itself. They fear a militant Shia govt might take over Iraq and in alliance with Iran challenge their interests. Its a big fear.

But here is an even earlier example of the US letting democratic forces come to the fore. Bush was not going to install another strongman to look after Iraq.

[RoccoR]

et al,

The theory that the US (through the P5+1) is acting in the capacity as the World Police. And while it might be, it is the could be the wrong position to take.

GCC leaders are distressed that we ignored their advice about going into Iraq. I have heard that in Saudi Arabia; I've heard it in the UAE; others have heard it in Qatar. These countries are going to resent the United States even more than they do now if we leave disorder and Iranian influence behind, as it seems we are going to do.

These GCC states have also been concerned about Iran's increasing influence in Syria and Lebanon and Palestine; its perceived influence with the Shia Arab communities in the GCC states; its alleged intervention in Yemen in 2009; its obvious influence in Afghanistan; its conventional military forces and potential nuclear weapons. As to influence with Shia populations in the GCC states, this year Kuwait arrested several Shia who were allegedly working with Iranian agents to photograph American military bases, and they were sentenced recently.

GCC states have had a series of generally unsuccessful diplomatic contacts with Iran, even though on occasion Iran has been invited to come over and talk; Qatar invited them to a GCC summit a few years ago. But the GCC states don't have a lot of hope for improvement as long as Ahmadinejad is in the government. We've heard that they could get along with Rafsanjani, they could work with Khatami, but not Ahmadinejad.

The GCC states have criticized U.S. and Israeli military threats against Iran. They criticize economic sanctions. They criticize our diplomatic strategy regarding Iran's nuclear programs. But they're ambivalent about all these tactics. They're uncertain about what the alternatives are, and they are concerned, as Tom said, about military action against Iran. Not only does Saudi Arabia have infrastructure that would be vulnerable, but Qatar has the liquefied-natural-gas trains, and Abu Dhabi has infrastructure. They support sanctions and diplomacy up to a point. And Qatar even voted in favor of two UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program. But they are concerned about the military option.

So containing or defending against Iran can rest in part upon what the GCC states continue to see as their essential defense relations with the United States. They have defense cooperation agreements with us; they purchase our military technology. This remains the case, even though they are distressed about our policy and see China and India as more important oil customers and rising world powers. There is concern among some defense analysts in the West that these states may ask China and India to undertake some of the defense responsibilities that the United States has been carrying out. China, however, does not want to do that. It's not capable of doing that; it likes to be a free rider. And India, I think, would rather cooperate with the U.S. military than replace it.

GCC leaders also argue that persuading Iran to forgo nuclear weapons means addressing Israeli, Pakistani and Indian nuclear weapons. They argue that the Middle East should be a nuclear-weapons-free zone, which means Israeli nuclear disarmament.

GCC leaders are concerned to varying degrees that Iran poses a serious offensive conventional military threat, and they all take note of Iran's regular military exercises in and around the Gulf. UAE officials, in particular, regularly put a spotlight on Iran's occupation and militarization of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, which are three small islands lying along the strategic shipping lanes to the west of the Strait of Hormuz. They have the support of the other GCC states in their claim to those islands; Prince Turki al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia just mentioned that issue in a piece he wrote last week.

These states recognize that deniable, covert, asymmetric aggression is more likely than attributable, overt, conventional offensive action by Iran unless Iran is responding to an attack. They all note that they have vulnerabilities. Mohammad bin Zayed, Abu Dhabi's crown prince and deputy supreme commander of their armed forces, has noted that the UAE would be a target of Iranian retaliation.

SOURCE's (The video and transcript of our 66th Capitol Hill Conference)
a. Middle East Policy Council | A Reawakened Rivalry: The GCC v. Iran
b. Middle East Policy Council | A Reawakened Rivalry: The GCC v. Iran

It's become a cliche of presidential debates: Facing any question about Afghanistan or other national security issues, the candidates declare that they would heed the advice of their "commanders in the field." It is striking, then, how willing they are to dismiss outright the opinions of America's national security professionals when it comes to Iran.

At a recent conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the Republican candidates played a game of rhetorical one-upmanship in expressing their willingness to take America to war in Iran. By contrast, virtually all of America's most experienced national security leaders have advised caution.

While our best intelligence shows that Iran is developing the capacity to make nuclear weapons, military professionals report that it has not decided to actually do so. They warn that an attack will at best delay Iran's nuclear program, and at worst will encourage it to acquire nuclear weapons to deter further attacks.

The candidates' willingness to ignore the Pentagon's strategic advice is surprising. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta recently said that while intelligence shows Iran is "developing a nuclear capability," it also "makes clear that they haven't made the decision to develop a nuclear weapon." But Christian Whiton, a senior adviser to Newt Gingrich, accused Panetta of not "telling the truth" about Iran's nuclear program.

Yet Panetta's views are echoed by his immediate predecessor, Robert Gates, who cautioned that simplistic talk of military strikes is counterproductive: "This is, I think, one of the toughest foreign-policy problems I have ever seen since entering the government 45 years ago, and I think to talk about it loosely or as though these are easy choices ... is irresponsible."

In congressional testimony in January, James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence and a retired lieutenant general, said that while U.S. officials believe Iran is preserving its options, there is no evidence that it's making a concerted push to build a nuclear weapon. Former Gen. David Petraeus, the CIA director, concurred.

But Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.) proved as willing as the presidential aspirants to contradict the security professionals. He told Clapper in a subsequent hearing, "I'm very convinced that they're going down the road of developing a nuclear weapon." Is Graham ignoring the best intelligence of the U.S. government?

Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said recently that because the Iranian regime is a "rational actor," the current U.S. approach "is the most prudent." But Gingrich, Mitt Romney, and Rick Santorum all dismissed his view.

The current policy of careful diplomacy and steady expansion of international sanctions against Iran's nuclear program has its roots in the Bush administration and in long-term assessments of the best way forward. Gen. Michael Hayden, who was CIA director under George W. Bush, summarized the view of that administration's intelligence team by saying "the consensus was that would guarantee that which we are trying to prevent: an Iran that will spare nothing to build a nuclear weapon and that would build it in secret."

We can agree that the Iranian nuclear program represents a major challenge. But overheated rhetoric and glib threats of military action aren't likely to help us address it. Before we launch another major Middle Eastern war, we'd better listen to the advice of our commanders and intelligence professionals.

SOURCE:
Middle East Policy Council | Heeding the Experts on Iran

I thought this might be of some interest.

v/r
R

[RoccoR]

S2, et al.

Yeh, it is the old Shia (Hezbollah) 'vs' Sunni (Hamas) rivalry.

[B]"...Even anti-government and anti-occupation forces evolve. You are only looking at one side of the coin with Hezbollah..."

I'm not "...only..." viewing Hezbollah from one perspective. The social contributions made by Hezbollah to the shia community of Lebanon isn't the issue. The disdain displayed by Iran towards HAMAS in Syria should have revealed to you the manner in which these organizations are viewed by Teheran.

Hezbollah is a tool of Iranian foreign policy and has a specific role expected of it. So long as that role is fulfilled, so too shall be their financial coffers. Hezbollah can go its own way, but only at risk of crossing Iran irrevocably. To that end, forcibly dominating the internal political milieu of Lebanon while acting as a front-line proxy against Israel is Hezbollah's raison d'être. Some even might reasonably suggest Hezbollah's raison d'état.

(COMMENT)

Yes, Hezbollah receives funding from Iran; no question. Iran is the "a" source of funding, but not the only source of funding. It is not even the largest block of funding. But its contribution is a significant chunk of the budget use to support anti-Israeli Operations in Southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah's was born out of the need to continue operations even after the PLO was pushed out of Lebanon and regrouped in Tunisia. Hezbollah splintered off from the PLO after Yasir Arafat recognized the right of Israel to exist (with the PLO receiving US funding (significant $'s) in return).

Hezbollah is not a controlled proxy of Iran. Iran does have some considerable influence over Middle East Operations; but, only because that is where the Iranian contribution (approx $100M/yr) is focused. Technically, it is a pro-Iranian militant group; with regional and international assets and operations.

Hezbollah receives fund through contributors from Central and Southern Africa expat contributors, counterfiting activities, drug operations, weapons smuggling, private charities, and royal stipends.

Some unique funding operations have seen unusual successes. For instance, Hezbollah, during the mid 2000's, established an economic financing center in Ciudad del-Este, Paraguay, and a companion station in Argentina.

The IRGC-QF also sponsors training and specialized equipment to the PIJ, PFLP-GC, Hamas, and of course, Hezbollah. The annual training budget in the last decade was $50k-$60K; not including equipment and logistics; this is over and above the annual contribution to operations. It is largely through these training opportunities that the QF maintains rapport with the various asymmetric, non-state actors operating throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Some aspects, for a considerable time, were separately funded through cash streams controlled by Syria. This would include Force-17, a regimented, special operations unit within Hezbollah.

In addition to the array of generalized criminal activity, Hezbollah is believed to derive independent funding from localized operations around the world. One such is call the Tri-Border Area (TBA-H) in South America. It contributes about $10M/yr mainly through the sale of pirated software.

Hezballah is beholding to Iran, no question, but it is not a controlled surrogate, a proxy warrior on command to the Iranian. It is much more than that; much more complex. And we have not even broached the legitimately funded political and social services/programs under the umbrella of Hezbollah.

So, NO, I disagree that Hezbollah has any such "raison d'état" mission. But it is more than correct that it is a confirmed enemy of the Israelis; with the goal of its change in Regime Change and ethnic disassociation as a Jewish nation.

As a proxy, the Iranians have a great influence on the potential for the initiation of operations; but Hezbollah is very independent in the way it pursues tactical goals.

Most Respectfully,
R

[JAD_333]

The US "Ruling Elite"...doesn't have the courage to allow the Regional Parties to come to a solution through democratic processes; for fear the outcomes will not be amicable to US business interests; a position the US holds as paramount above all others.

The extremes of courage are cowardliness and rashness. The appropriate word to describe submission to the democratic process you seem to favor is rashness. That would be casting all doubts to the wind and trusting in goodness of others nations, e.g. Iran.

America acts, almost entirely, in its own self interest.

'Almost' and 'entirely' are mismatched. When push comes to shove, the US acts entirely in its best interest. That is an accepted principle within the community of nations. They would be surprised if the US acted otherwise.

But notice, that the Persian Gulf States don't have a representation in the talks.

Do you have any evidence that any Gulf nation has asked for a seat at the table? In any case, it would be political folly for them. They have their preferences and no doubt the members of the P5+1 are well aware of them.

I am not sure if The Baroness (Catherine Ashton), the EU Foreign Policy Chief, broke the ice herself, but she went a long way to renewing confidence in the talks which is something the US was unable to accomplish.

Well, I am sure the Baroness was perfectly mannerly as there is nothing to lose in being respectful, but if you don't think the US had anything to do with getting Iran to the table, then you don't think sanctions and threats matter.

But it still remains somewhat of an enigma that the Persian Gulf States have so little visibility in the talks. What does this mean? Well, some speculate that the Six Powers (US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany) consider there interests as being above those of the Seven other Persian Gulf States (Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq).

There is no enigma. Who are these 'some" who speculate the obvious? It seems to me the Gulf states have everything to gain if Iran's hegemony is curbed. They couldn't do it alone, could they? In reality their interests converge with those of the US and the P5.

[Double Edge]

In any case, it would be political folly for them.

Agree, it would indispose them vis-a-vis Iran as well as their own people.

Iran could view their presence as a provocation.

GCC would gladly sit this one out me thinks.

[RoccoR]

JAD_333, et al,

Yes, sometimes, my diplomatic-ese and manners tend to trigger and unintended perception.

... ... ...That would be casting all doubts to the wind and trusting in goodness of others nations, e.g. Iran.

(COMMENT)

Oh, I have no illusion in the potential threat Iran could pose, given the latitude of inattention. I don't think anyone is saying that they should yet be trusted. But they are a rational actor that bares watching. And we should treat them as a rational actor.

'Almost' and 'entirely' are mismatched. When push comes to shove, the US acts entirely in its best interest. That is an accepted principle within the community of nations. They would be surprised if the US acted otherwise.

(COMMENT)

The Nuclear Weapons issue is an "optional" stance; and, not a "push comes to shove" situation. We made it a significant event, not the Iranians. We saw it as a "possible flaunt" of US (self-decreed) authority. We expected the Iranians comply, and when they didn't - we had to exerts our influence. Or, as "S2" says: When they say "JUMP", they do expect you to ask "HOW HIGH".

Do you have any evidence that any Gulf nation has asked for a seat at the table? In any case, it would be political folly for them. They have their preferences and no doubt the members of the P5+1 are well aware of them.

(COMMENT)

The GCC doesn't necessarily want to sit at the table. Like I said, they want someone to lookout for their best interest. And they are not sure the US has their back. As it is mentioned in the MEPC Briefing, supra:

This remains the case, even though they are distressed about our policy and see China and India as more important oil customers and rising world powers. There is concern among some defense analysts in the West that these states may ask China and India to undertake some of the defense responsibilities that the United States has been carrying out. China, however, does not want to do that. It's not capable of doing that; it likes to be a free rider. And India, I think, would rather cooperate with the U.S. military than replace it.

We (the US) are lucky that no one else wants to be the Protector. But that does not mean that if the US botches the negotiations, that other members of the P5+1 will not step-in and takeover at the invitation of the GCC (Persian Gulf States); forced to straighten out the mess.

Well, I am sure the Baroness was perfectly mannerly as there is nothing to lose in being respectful, but if you don't think the US had anything to do with getting Iran to the table, then you don't think sanctions and threats matter.

(COMMENT)

Well, you are partially correct. It was Dr Shawn Strom's (an American) team that put it together under the EU Foreign Policy Office. Iran has constantly turned-down bilateral talks with the US. The US have very little to do with arranging the P5+1 Meeting with Iran. The two nations don't communicate directly. However, by happy coincidence, after a meeting with the Baroness, Iran's Chief Negotiator (Saeed Jalili) accepted a meeting invitation from the US Under Secretary's Team.

There is no enigma. Who are these 'some" who speculate the obvious? It seems to me the Gulf states have everything to gain if Iran's hegemony is curbed. They couldn't do it alone, could they? In reality their interests converge with those of the US and the P5.

(COMMENT)

Yes, in general, the GCC and the P5+1 want to mitigate Iranian attempts at a Gulf Hegemony. Having said that, the GCC is very concerned about how the US gets there. And that has troubled them.

The GCC states think that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is a means of reducing Iranian influence in the region and Iran's ability to challenge their governments. This is an argument that even President Obama has made, so he understands it. Efforts by Saudi Arabia's king, Qatar's emir and other GCC leaders to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict were not supported by the Bush administration. These leaders are disappointed that the Obama administration is so timid in its Arab-Israeli policy, particularly when Obama and other officials have said that solving this conflict is a vital national security interest of the United States. The GCC leaders support Palestine's admission to the United Nations. Saudi Arabia and Qatar reportedly helped the Palestinian Authority write its draft proposal for admission to the United Nations. Khamenei has recently said he opposes Palestine's admission to the United Nations, although in the past he's been open to the idea of a two-state solution. He hinted very, very strongly at that in Iran's grand-bargain proposal of 2003, but he now evidently thinks this would not be good for Iran, and I agree with him. It would diminish their influence.

GCC states are constructing their own policies to contain Iran, including the purchase of F-15 fighter jets, Black Hawk helicopters and Patriot anti-missile systems. They are even considering nuclear options. But there's more. They've tried to forge Hamas-Fatah reconciliation. They've tried to improve relations between Hezbollah and its rivals in Lebanon. They've tried to engineer a thaw with Syria. They've even tried to mediate between the Taliban and the Kabul government; and they've tried to establish better relations with Russia and China, hoping that they will pressure Iran, independently of U.S. policy.

Don't think for a moment that just because the goal is similar, that the solutions are the same. The GCC feels a bit trapped by the US; like being caught in a 1920's style Protection Racket. But they are planning to make an escape route should it be necessary. In the mean time, much like GEN Hoar implies, the GCC doesn't really want the P5+1 to start a war. If Iran goes nuclear, the GCC is prepared to do the same. And if there is a strike by either the US or Israel, you can pretty much bet that Iran will go all out for a Nuclear Weapons capability to protect its sovereignty.

Most Respectfully,
R

[S2]

RoccoR Reply

"...if there is a strike by either the US or Israel, you can pretty much bet that Iran will go all out for a Nuclear Weapons capability to protect its sovereignty."

I can't address Israel's capabilities beyond provocateur to goad an Iranian reaction. They may be able (with Iran's unwitting assistance) to achieve such. Should the U.S. initiate an attack upon Iran, however, it will be long, punative and debilitating with the parallel goals of forcibly dismantling as much infrastructure-nuclear, then more if necessary while coercing the Iranian government to ceding an inspection regime both rigorous and enduring.

There is no other point to becoming militarily engaged than to bring resolution that thoroughly satisfies our interests. An attack initiated by America signals that we're ALREADY convinced of Iran's determination to seek nuclear weapons. There should be no temporal quality to our intent.

This I seek should talks collapse. Iran has no justification for denying full and rigorous inspections. All their purported objectives can be achieved through such. Anything else meets my satisfaction of their intent to acquire nuclear weaponry and the means to deliver them.

That must never happen.

[Double Edge]

The Nuclear Weapons issue is an "optional" stance; and, not a "push comes to shove" situation. We made it a significant event, not the Iranians.

Agree, the allegation of weapons is the stick used to beat Iran back from its desired position.

The earliest DG IAEA report about Iran's non-compliance is in 2003.

IAEA and Iran

Iran stated their intent in 2002 that they wanted to build more plants.

The issue for them right from the 70s was enrichment. They could not get it then so they went to the black market. Things went silent until 2002 when they stated they wanted to expand. This time they had the tech to do it or at least the necessary parts and with this comes their confidence to push back.

This is when the non-compliance comes in because Iran senses the resistance to their position. So they become less than forthcoming with their NPT obligations. This lack of transparency is construed or rather painted as ambitions if not aspirations to go for a nuke. The IAEA reports serve as the basis for a number of UNSC resolutions on Iran. This goes on for ten years.

Israel pipes in about an attack if Iran does not comply.

But the issue AFAICT has always been about enrichment. Iran has consistently held that line. They get no give and so previous negotiations got no where.

From this pov one expects that Iran will comply if they are allowed to enrich (what % is negotiable but abandonment isn't), the west says they must stop enrichment and comply or else. Basically a sort of penance for getting stuff off the black market that the west would not sell them in the first place. It's an attempt to get Iran to rollback its competence. How that be done is anybody's guess.

The west pushes the focus on to nuclear weapons, Iran tries to pull it back to its rights on enrichment. A contractual dispute.

Does Iran have a right or not to enrichment. I still cannot answer that question.

If a suitable compromise can be worked out this issue should be solved. Otherwise we'll get a standoff of might makes right that I suspect neither party wants to enter into.

The GCC doesn't necessarily want to sit at the table. Like I said, they want someone to lookout for their best interest. And they are not sure the US has their back. As it is mentioned in the MEPC Briefing, supra

Give us more, its not clear to me that the US does not have the GCC's back.

We (the US) are lucky that no one else wants to be the Protector. But that does not mean that if the US botches the negotiations, that other members of the P5+1 will not step-in and takeover at the invitation of the GCC (Persian Gulf States); forced to straighten out the mess.

You've not said it but are you implying that the reason no force has been applied as yet is because the GCC are against it.

Don't think for a moment that just because the goal is similar, that the solutions are the same. The GCC feels a bit trapped by the US; like being caught in a 1920's style Protection Racket. But they are planning to make an escape route should it be necessary.

Which is ?

Somehow i cannot see China + India being upto it just yet unless there is more.

In the mean time, much like GEN Hoar implies, the GCC doesn't really want the P5+1 to start a war.

Ah, you did say it. How do you know that ?

If Iran goes nuclear, the GCC is prepared to do the same. And if there is a strike by either the US or Israel, you can pretty much bet that Iran will go all out for a Nuclear Weapons capability to protect its sovereignty.

Bottomline is the GCC sees a US umbrella as a solution to the impasse here ?

[Officer of Engineers]

The issue for them right from the 70s was enrichment. They could not get it then so they went to the black market. Things went silent until 2002 when they stated they wanted to expand. This time they had the tech to do it or at least the necessary parts and with this comes their confidence to push back.

The issue was and is nuclear weapons, or at the very least, the capability of a break out nuke.

[Double Edge]

Thats from the nuke school of thought. The one that goes bomb, bomb, bomb, every five years, iran is going to get the bomb, bomb iran :)

So what about their right to enrichment ?

[Officer of Engineers]

What about their purchase of two warhead blueprints, computer modelling, and the components for a zero yield test?