Israel has 'eight days' to hit Iran nuclear site: US envoy

[Skywatcher]

Actually you'd be surprised, we've got some pretty damn rational ones about the place, though most IIRC are now American resident.

I was referring to them (they have Iranian flags on their profiles), so I'd assume they were speaking to their families and such.

[Blademaster]

Now, whatever would be gained by THAT? We have two types of Iranian poster here: 1) an apologist for the government, usually madder than a rat in a coffee can, and 2) an apologist for all things Persian, possibly a member of the first cohort, possibly not, but an undying belief that if it's Persian, it's better, and feircely nationalistic, and absolutely chauvanistic and anti-Semitic. (Oh, and that applies to the first cohort, as well.)

But what you will NOT get is dispassionate analysis, an objective seeking-out of The Truth. They, like most any Muslim, will seek to make themselves the victims of some powerful but occult force, OR the conquering champion, simply by membership in the triumphalist group (Iran, Persian, Islam, whatever).

So, you're welcome to ask 'em, but may I respectfully recommend a big healthy dose of Don't-Buy-What-They-Sell-You?

So the only one that is rational is somebody who agrees with you and your demonizing of their country, Iran? Fat chance of that happening.

[Bluesman]

So the only one that is rational is somebody who agrees with you and your demonizing of their country, Iran? Fat chance of that happening.

You're a bad analyst. Maybe that's because your reading comprehension is poor, or perhaps personal bias leads you to jump to incorrect conclusions when you read things into something that you read that isn't there.

You should work on that, though. Good analysis requires you to be more objective.

[Blademaster]

You're a bad analyst. Maybe that's because your reading comprehension is poor, or perhaps personal bias leads you to jump to incorrect conclusions when you read things into something that you read that isn't there.

You should work on that, though. Good analysis requires you to be more objective.

Good luck with those ad hominem attacks. That's all you are really good at. Just launch personal attacks on those who disagree with you.

[Zinja]

Bluesman,

An internal revolt is not going to take away the Iranian headache. In fact, perhaps the Obama administration did right this time by staying out of it. The green movement just wanted to use whoever they can lay their hands on to get into power, and once there they would not have been any less a headache than their predecesors. The Iranians (the regime, the green movement and the general populace) is united on the nuke issue. Obama did the right thing last year. The US should not allow itself to be used again and again only to be spite at next time round chanting death to America and sponsoring elements to kill US service man.

In any case in my opinion there will never be a revolt in Iran. The security apparatus, military and the janjaweed(Basiji) are firmly in the control of the regime.

[captain]

Bluesman,

An internal revolt is not going to take away the Iranian headache. In fact, perhaps the Obama administration did right this time by staying out of it. The green movement just wanted to use whoever they can lay their hands on to get into power, and once there they would not have been any less a headache than their predecesors. The Iranians (the regime, the green movement and the general populace) is united on the nuke issue. Obama did the right thing last year. The US should not allow itself to be used again and again only to be spite at next time round chanting death to America and sponsoring elements to kill US service man.

In any case in my opinion there will never be a revolt in Iran. The security apparatus, military and the janjaweed(Basiji) are firmly in the control of the regime.

I think this is about as good an assessment as could be made at this stage.

When the shooting of "NEDA" took place there was a great outpouring of affinity for the Iranian green movement from the world and also on the WAB.
At the time, although I felt sorry for her, I was not convinced the Green movement leadership, had they overthrown the election results and the present regime, would have had that much of a different foriegn policy outlook to the present mob in charge.

I have no doubt that there are many amoung the young Green protesters who, if they could, would be almost perfectly amenable to Israel and the west generally but how big of a percentage of them would feel that way is a corncern.
Specifically, how many of them would be prepared advocate the cutting of all ties with Hamas, Hizbollah, Shia militants in Iraq and the total cessation of any nuclear weapons development.

The following article altough nearly twelve months old, deals with that concern.

Who's Really Running Iran's Green Movement

Despite being lauded as modernizers, opposition front-runner Mousavi and his two green movement colleagues are deeply loyal to the ideals of Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, and advocate a theocratic political system. Had Mousavi come into office following the June 12 presidential election, he would not have challenged the political order. He would have tried to fix the Islamic Republic's internal and external crises through slight policy tweaks. Nor would the West have seen an "opening" of the sort that some suggest. Indeed, Mousavi's rivalry with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has little to do with the current regime's foreign policy and far more to do with internal power struggles, economic policy, and, to some extent, cultural agendas. A new leader would not have fundamentally changed Iran's position on nuclear policy or its regional role. The reason is simple: Everyone who ran for president concedes that foreign-policy decisions should fall to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
..............

If you want to know the unconventional nature of this movement -- and what the people who have bravely taken to the streets really want - don't listen to Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami.

Since the true representatives of reform owe little to them, a successful green movement would likely push them aside anyway.

This is why it is not only the regime in Tehran -- but also the reformist "leaders" who pretend to lead this movement -- that fear the success of the green movement. Democracy in Iran will emerge only through a rupture with the late Ayatollah Khomeini's ideals and Islamic ideology -- concepts to which the accidental leaders of the green movement are still loyal.

Source and aticle in full; Who's Really Running Iran's Green Movement | Foreign Policy

Unfortunately I do not see anything on the horizon except a continual sabre rattling from all sides that must eventually lead to confrontation.

Cheers.

[1980s]

I don't suppose any of the board's Iranian members could chip in on the stability of Padasran control?

The situation in Iran is more complicated than it being a simple question of who wields more tangible power; the clerical establishment or the Revolutionary Guards. Clerics themselves play a role within the IRGC such as regularly consulting with commanders and playing a role in supervising and monitoring the cadre alongside providing ideological ‘training’ if you want to call it that. So the clerical establishment and the IRGC cannot properly be said to be two wholly separate entities.

The Islamic Republic is a highly paranoid regime and this paranoia is largely due to the clerics own insecurity and their uncertainty over how loyal, or committed at least, the population, and their own security forces, really are to the I.R’s ideological linchpin; clerical oversight of the state. So with the fear of a coup and overthrow always having been in their minds since the revolution the clerical establishment has a representative in just about every organ, branch and tool of the state to both watch-over and try to influence things like the parliament, armed-forces etc. The IRGC is no exception. So it cannot be assumed that the cadre are necessarily loyal to their commanders and to their branch of the military rather than to the theocracy and its preservation given that they are not free from its indoctrination and have the presence of clerics among them.

Revolutionary Iran’s politics is complicated to say the least. Anyway, i hope you find this article useful reading on the subject:

Aug 18, 2010
Ahmadinejad feels the heat at home
By Mahan Abedin

In a sure sign that Iran's factionalized politics is making a comeback, the right-wing and conservative forces that last year engineered the marginalization of the reformists, are slowly splintering. At the center of this latest bout of factional in-fighting is the divisive personality of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.

While few people expected the political scene to be dominated by a unified conservative front for long, the speed at which the right-wing factions are dividing between pro- and anti-Ahmadinejad camps has caught many analysts by surprise.

The polarization of the right wing will continue as long as Ahmadinejad is at the helm; the president's provocative and controversial style guarantees that. But the key question is under what conditions (if any) Ahmadinejad's conservative detractors will make a decisive move against him, for instance by trying to have him impeached in parliament. This scenario is far-fetched, at least for the foreseeable future, but it cannot be ruled out altogether, especially if the president's indiscretions reach a point where Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is forced to make a public stand.

A strange relationship
To many conservatives, the most contentious aspect of the Ahmadinejad presidency is his deep and largely inexplicable relationship with Esfandyar Rahim Mashayee, the head of the Presidential Office and Ahmadinejad's effective chief of staff. A natural self-publicist with an eye for controversy and an equally strong proclivity for pseudo-intellectual grandstanding, Mashayee has caused deep upset with a series of controversial remarks over the years.

In August 2008, Mashayee rocked the conservative camp with his assertion that Iran was friendly towards all people in the world, "including Israelis". This was explosive stuff in a regime that believes in the political destruction of the state of Israel and its replacement with a Palestinian state. What made matters worse was Mashayee's refusal to bow under tremendous pressure and retract his apparently pro-Israeli statement. This earned him a direct rebuke from Khamenei, who called his comments "illogical". The supreme leader rarely comments on the sayings of Iranian officials, a clear sign of the seriousness of the situation.

Mashayee has also courted controversy by his lax attitude towards the Islamic hijab (a head-covering scarf) and by at least one speech in which he predicted the demise of "Islamism". The sum effect of these indiscretions was the galvanization of conservative forces against his appointment as first vice president in July 2009, barely a few weeks after the disputed presidential elections.

Ahmadinejad initially resisted calls for Mashayee's immediate resignation, but was forced to relent after the supreme leader issued a written edict to that effect. But in a gesture that was widely perceived as a snub to the supreme leader, Ahmadinejad appointed Mashayee as the head of the Presidential Office.

Mashayee's latest audacious remarks came in a gathering of Iranian expatriates in early August in Tehran, at which he waxed lyrical about the "ideology of Iran" [Maktab-e-Iran]. This drew immediate and fierce criticism from every noteworthy religious, ideological, political and security node of the Islamic Republic. Mashayee appeared to be promoting nationalism (long a taboo subject in the Islamic Republic) at the expense of the state's expressly pan-Islamic ethos and geopolitical objectives. Indeed, Mashayee explicitly stated that the only "Islam" that he recognized was the one found in Iran, thus dealing yet another blow to the Islamic Republic's carefully cultivated image as the standard-bearer of Islamic unity.

The rebukes came thick and fast. Besides an uproar in the conservative media, a number of high-ranking personalities harshly berated Mashayee for his controversial remarks. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, the Friday prayer leader at Tehran University and a rising clerical politician, dismissed Mashayee's remarks as tantamount to "pagan nationalism". A far more significant rebuke came from Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, widely regarded as the spiritual leader of the hardline right-wing faction led by Ahmadinejad, who lamented Mashayee's apparently strange and "inappropriate" comment.

The most blistering attack, however, was delivered by General Hassan Firouzabadi, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who described Mashayee's remarks as a "crime against national security". The involvement of a non-political and non-religious figure, especially one with the stature of Firouzabadi, may indicate the beginning of the end for Mashayee, who characteristically has refused to bow under this tremendous pressure and has even threatened to sue Firouzabadi in court.

While there may be an element of political maneuvering in these attacks, with key conservative figures attempting to undermine or at least constrain Ahmadinejad through the political assassination of his controversial chief of staff, there is doubtless a significant degree of ideological consideration at play too.

Whereas many conservatives eventually let Mashayee off the hook over his apparently pro-Israeli remarks, this time he is unlikely to be as lucky insofar as he has been judged to have violated one of the cardinal taboos of the regime. By championing nationalism, Mashayee has struck at the core identity of the Islamic Republic and inadvertently questioned many of its underlying ideological, political and strategic premises. This helps explain the ferocity of the backlash.

This latest controversy has focused attention on the nature of the relationship between Ahmadinejad and Mashayee. In the past, Ahmadinejad (whose son is married to Mashayee's daughter) has fiercely defended Mashayee and praised him for the clarity and prescience of his ideas. Some analysts believe Mashayee to be Ahmadinejad's secular ideological mentor and thus a man with a strong influence over the running of the government. It has been alleged that both men display at best a lackluster and perfunctory support for Velayat-e-Faqih (Rule of the Jurisprudent), the cornerstone of Iran's unique system of Islamic government.

Whereas Velayat-e-Faqih is supposed to fill in the religious and temporal vacuum in the absence of the twelfth and "hidden" imam (Imam al-Mahdi), it has been alleged that Ahmadinejad and Mashayee believe their government is in effect the "Mahdi's" government, thus rendering Velayat-e-Faqih obsolete.

It is difficult to verify these allegations and while Ahmadinejad has positioned the idea of "Mahdaviyat" (Mahdivism) at the center stage of politics, he has never openly questioned any aspect of Velayat-e-Faqih. It is equally difficult to establish to what extent these esoteric religious and ideological beliefs are driving the clash among the conservatives, but doubtless influential centers are raising serious concerns.

The hardline Keyhan daily, which up to now had been a vocal supporter of Ahmadinejad and played a key role in preparing a strong media backlash against the losing candidates in last year's disputed presidential elections, has dramatically raised the stakes in this intra-conservative squabble by questioning the loyalty of Ahmadinejad to the supreme leader.

The daily's political editor, Mehdi Mohammadi, writing on July 22, went so far as to place key Ahmadinejad supporters alongside the "forces of sedition", a reference to the losing candidates in last year's disputed presidential elections and the reform movement more broadly. Mohammadi does not rule out an open confrontation between this tendency (ie core Ahmadinejad supporters) and the more conventional loyalists of the Islamic revolution.

It is noteworthy that Keyhan is close to Khamenei, but that does not mean that everything it publishes meets the approval of the leader of the Islamic revolution. Equally important, Keyhan is a barometer of hardline conservative thinking and the fact that the lead editorial carries such a damning indictment of Ahmadinejad and his inner circle is a clear indication of massive fissures beneath the surface.

Indeed, in yet another indication of the deep anxieties gripping the conservative camp, the managing director of the centrist conservative paper Resalat, in an interview with the Panjereh weekly, warned of the emergence of a the so-called principlist force (Osoolgerayan) that consciously seeks to exclude the clergy from politics. According to him, the distinguishing feature of this tendency is its claims to be in direct communication with the "Hidden" imam, thus bypassing Velayat-e-Faqih altogether.

Ahmadinejad is also in the midst of a bitter political dispute with the speaker of the Majlis, or National Assembly, the arch-conservative Ali Ardeshir Larijani. The dispute revolves around a long-running row over parliamentary legislation allocating US$2 billion from the oil reserve fund to the expansion of Tehran's metro network. Ahmadinejad's refusal to discharge his legal duties on the basis that his government has secured "25 million votes" is viewed by many conservatives as an indicator of his dictatorial tendencies. It appears unlikely that this political and legal dispute can be resolved without the decisive intervention of the supreme leader.

In addition to all this, Iran's polarizing president has been sharply rebuked for his choice of language, which appears to be getting more colloquial and offensive by the day. In the same expatriates' conference in which Mashayee indulged in nationalistic rhetoric, Ahmadinejad dismissed American-led efforts to isolate and coerce Iran by employing the expression "the boogeyman snatched the boob". (See 'The boogeyman snatched the boob' Asia Times Online, August 13, 2010.)

While this had the audience consumed by laughter, outside the conference hall it was judged to be deeply offensive and inappropriate in a political culture that puts a premium on sophisticated and pious language. A few days later, in an unrelated incident involving a senior journalist - but in an atmosphere no doubt influenced by Ahmadinejad's boogeyman comment - head of the judiciary Ayatollah Sadiq Larijani (Ali Ardeshir Larijani's brother) berated the president for his choice of words and advised him to use language that is "composed, dignified, correct and fair". This was a humiliating dressing-down for a serving president.

Whither Ahmadinejad?
The recent spate of attacks on Ahmadinejad and his key allies by conservatives needs to be balanced by the fact that the majority of right-wing factions still detect more positives than negatives in Ahmadinejad's government. Indeed, the people who have launched strong attacks on Mashayee have been careful to point out that their statements should not be construed as indicating a lack of recognition for the achievements of the Ahmadinejad administration.

Broadly speaking, conservatives and the principlists credit Ahmadinejad with reversing the liberal policies of the previous reformist administration by placing the rhetoric and program of the Islamic Revolution at the center stage of politics. In particular, they praise Ahmadinejad's foreign policy, which they believe has once again revived the authentic discourse of the Islamic Republic in international forums and subsequently enabled Iran to negotiate from a position of strength with its opponents and enemies.

Nonetheless, Ahmadinejad's peculiar leadership style reinforced by his esoteric beliefs, and coupled by the questionable intellectual and ideological heritage of his key supporters, point to further friction with the key nodes of the conservative and principlist front. Whether or not there is an eventual showdown depends on several factors, chief among them the strength of the internal opposition to the regime and the nature and intensity of external threats.

For instance, if the Green movement and the reformists behind it make a comeback, then the conservatives and principlists are likely to close their ranks to meet that challenge, as they did throughout last year. By the same token, should the United States and Israel ratchet up their threats of military action on Iran over its nuclear program, then that is likely to unify (at least superficially) the entire Iranian political elite, conservatives and reformists alike.

In the final analysis, the decisive factor is the role and future decisions of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Hitherto, he has supported Ahmadinejad, even to the point of expending from his own political, ideological and spiritual prestige. The continuation of this support is a sure indicator that as far as the leadership is concerned, Ahmadinejad has not strayed radically from the core ideological parameters of the revolution.

However, the more Ahmadinejad polarizes the conservative and principlist front, the more difficult it will be for the leadership to sustain this support. Even a relatively mild public rebuke by the supreme leader could be enough to embolden Ahmadinejad's enemies to set the stage for his political demise by initiating impeachment proceedings in parliament.

Mahan Abedin is an analyst of Middle East politics.

[1980s]

The Iranians (the regime, the green movement and the general populace) is united on the nuke issue.

That is because it is the right of the Iranian nation to engage in a civilian nuclear program. Big surprise. Altho for the 'general populace', the nuclear issue is not a priority, nor is it an expression of 'Iranian national pride' or whatever other bollocks some outsiders think it is. That is propaganda from the regime. Many Iranians, including myself, do not even know why the regime wants to invest in nuclear power at a time when Iran does not even meet its domestic petroleum refining needs.

[Mihais]

The situation in Iran is more complicated than it being a simple question of who wields more tangible power; the clerical establishment or the Revolutionary Guards. Clerics themselves play a role within the IRGC such as regularly consulting with commanders and playing a role in supervising and monitoring the cadre alongside providing ideological ‘training’ if you want to call it that. So the clerical establishment and the IRGC cannot properly be said to be two wholly separate entities.

Are the clerics involved in planning of operations,in a way analogous to the Soviet Commisars?

p.s Let me guess.There aren't too many Zoroastrians in positions of power.

[Mihais]

That is because it is the right of the Iranian nation to engage in a civilian nuclear program. Big surprise. Altho for the 'general populace', the nuclear issue is not a priority, nor is it an expression of 'Iranian national pride' or whatever other bollocks some outsiders think it is. That is propaganda from the regime. Many Iranians, including myself, do not even know why the regime wants to invest in nuclear power at a time when Iran does not even meet its domestic petroleum refining needs.

Maybe,but oil will eventually run out.In a long term it makes sense.The problem,as you know,is the nuke program.

[S2]

Nobody has a problem with a properly-run civilian nuclear energy program inside Iran. Being a signatory to the NPT allows exactly that and it makes perfect sense for those who've a dependance on fossil-fuels for their energy needs (and bankroll). It's the compliance issues and attendant subterfuge where all the funkiness lies. That funkiness now includes a long history of evasion that's particularly disturbing.

I'm trying to politely soft-peddle my thoughts here, btw.

[Mihais]

Yeah,little details.Maybe our friend can tell us how are these small matters,like evasions, considered by those ordinary Iranians that know those facts.
p.s Politely,just like an Officer and Gentleman,ehh?

[S2]

Mihais Reply

"p.s Politely,just like an Officer and Gentleman,ehh?"

Ahhh..., errr yes. Polite. One of the last, btw, to be commissioned by an act of Congress.

[Albany Rifles]

"p.s Politely,just like an Officer and Gentleman,ehh?"

Ahhh..., errr yes. Polite. One of the last, btw, to be commissioned by an act of Congress.

And as one of my company commanders told me, "Lieutenant, the Army may have made you an officer but its obvious it will take more than an act of Congress to make your ass a gentelman!" CPT Jim O'Donnell, Goeppingen, FRG, DEC 1982.

[Mihais]

Ahhh..., errr yes. Polite.

Ahh,damn it.Yes