Ukraine: After the May 25 Election

[JAD_333]

Extensive set of graphic and maps...

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2...ns-crimea.html

[Officer of Engineers]

Ukraine has to press its attack while preparing for the worst.

They can't press the attack while preparing for the worst. If the Russians come over, the Ukrainians are outnumbered 2 to 1 and if Russian SPETNEZ has been operating (and you would be a fool to assume that they haven't), then the Russians already have a clear idea where the brigades are and would more than likely present a local superiority greater than 3 to 1.

The jump off points ain't fully manned yet but they will be within days, if not hours.

[Blademaster]

They can't press the attack while preparing for the worst. If the Russians come over, the Ukrainians are outnumbered 2 to 1 and if Russian SPETNEZ has been operating (and you would be a fool to assume that they haven't), then the Russians already have a clear idea where the brigades are and would more than likely present a local superiority greater than 3 to 1.

The jump off points ain't fully manned yet but they will be within days, if not hours.

Why can't the Ukrainians do vice versa? If they know the manning points, the Ukrainians can throw a spanner in the works and interrupt the Russian timetables and delay them to the point where US and other NATO has enough time to be galvanized into action into western Ukraine.

[chanjyj]

Why can't the Ukrainians do vice versa? If they know the manning points, the Ukrainians can throw a spanner in the works and interrupt the Russian timetables and delay them to the point where US and other NATO has enough time to be galvanized into action into western Ukraine.

NATO and US in Ukraine?

[Blademaster]

NATO and US in Ukraine?

It would be a strategic imperative for NATO to keep the western part of Ukraine strong so I would not be surprised if there were some ancillary support such as air support and military aid but no ground troops.

[citanon]

They can't press the attack while preparing for the worst. If the Russians come over, the Ukrainians are outnumbered 2 to 1 and if Russian SPETNEZ has been operating (and you would be a fool to assume that they haven't), then the Russians already have a clear idea where the brigades are and would more than likely present a local superiority greater than 3 to 1.

The jump off points ain't fully manned yet but they will be within days, if not hours.

So Putin basically just has to man the jump off points to stop the Ukrainian offensive cold? Can he maintain the posture indefinitely?

[Officer of Engineers]

Why can't the Ukrainians do vice versa? If they know the manning points, the Ukrainians can throw a spanner in the works and interrupt the Russian timetables and delay them to the point where US and other NATO has enough time to be galvanized into action into western Ukraine.

They're pyschologically and physically oriented the wrong way. They're still pressing their attacks against the rebels. To turn around means that they have give up the fight, refuse a flank (so the rebels can't take advantage) and then move off against the Russians ... meanwhile the Russians are already half way there.

[Officer of Engineers]

So Putin basically just has to man the jump off points to stop the Ukrainian offensive cold?

I don't know. It may or may not be a bluff on Putin's part and the Ukrainians may or may not decide risk calling that bluff. The economic strangling that is happening is not making any Russian happy.

Can he maintain the posture indefinitely?

No. At some point, one side or the other has to decide to shit or get off the pot. The Ukrainians halting their advance does not mean abandoning their gains.

[JAD_333]

Putin miscalculated from the start, but now, as the saying goes, 'in for a penny, in for a pound".

From the article below, a novel observation...

Given Mr Putin’s view of what is at stake in his showdown with the West, further escalation would be unsurprising. Mr Putin believes that his own political future depends on the defence of Russia’s regional influence—that is the lesson he draws from the Soviet Union’s collapse. His nightmare would be to see the rebels defeated without Russia getting anything in return. He would rather be a global pariah than Mikhail Gorbachev.

Sanctions on Russia
This is going to hurt
The cost of Vladimir Putin’s gamble in Ukraine is going up, but he shows no sign of changing course
Aug 2nd 2014 | LONDON AND MOSCOW | From the print edition


IT MAY not be, as leaders in Washington and Brussels insist, the start of a new cold war. But the punitive sanctions against Russia announced by the European Union and America on July 29th bring to an end a 25-year-long quest to make Moscow a partner of the West. How long the rupture will last and whether it intensifies will depend upon the response of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin—and above all on whether he steps back from escalating the bloody insurrection in eastern Ukraine that he has encouraged. He shows not the slightest sign of doing so. If anything, his belligerence towards the West and his preference for surly isolation are growing.

After months of disjointed action, America and Europe finally put together a tough and co-ordinated package of sanctions targeting state-owned banks and forbidding the export of technologies needed by Russia’s oil and defence industries. On their own, the sanctions will not bring Russia to its knees. But they could do real damage to its already ailing economy.
In this section

The downing of a Malaysia Airlines jet last month, apparently by Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine, hardened attitudes towards Mr Putin. His refusal to accept any responsibility, and his stepping up of military support for the rebels after the tragedy, convinced European leaders, some of whom had opposed sanctions that might harm their own economies, that they had no choice but to punish his regime. “It didn’t have to be this way,” Barack Obama said in announcing the new American sanctions. “This is a choice that Russia and President Putin in particular made.”

The sanctions against state-controlled banks present the biggest and most immediate threat to Russia’s economy. According to Bloomberg, a news agency, VTB, Sberbank, Gazprombank and Vnesheconombank have around $15 billion in bonds denominated in dollars, euros and Swiss francs maturing in the next three years. The new sanctions make it harder for lenders such as these to raise equity and debt on Western capital markets. Without access to long-term external financing, their debts will be harder to pay.

The flow of international capital into Russia has already fallen. Dollar loans from foreign banks dropped to $7.9 billion in the first half of 2014, from $25 billion a year earlier; local firms have become more reliant on state-controlled Russian banks as a result. Although state banks can draw on domestic savings, and perhaps other sources of financing in places like China, less money will be available to finance investment. And if China does offer money, it would only be in exchange for preferential access to Russia’s natural resources.

The sanctions do not target Russia’s energy exports. But an embargo on Western technology will limit Russia’s ability to tap new and hard-to-get-at fields in the Arctic and elsewhere, setting in motion a possible decline in hydrocarbon revenue in years to come.

Yet Russia’s economic ties to the West have not been severed. The Americans have kept Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank and the financial heart of its economy, off its sanctions list for the moment; as The Economist went to press, it was unclear whether the European Union had done the same. The restrictions on technology exports to the oil sector left the gas industry conspicuously untouched, an obvious concession to Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. Moreover, the EU has barred future, not existing, defence deals. France’s €1.2 billion ($1.6 billion) sale of Mistral-class warships can proceed as planned.

By coincidence, the day before the new sanctions were announced, a Dutch court ordered Russia to pay $50 billion to compensate former shareholders of Yukos, a now-defunct oil producer, for the expropriation of the company by the Kremlin more than ten years ago. Russian commentators see the award and the sanctions as part of the same Western plot.

War at any price

Mr Putin counted on the West’s dithering and short attention span to let him do as he pleased in Ukraine without much danger or cost. Diplomatic relations might suffer, but real pain would be absent—whatever the damage to Russia’s economy or to Mr Putin’s image abroad, the prize of regaining Crimea and keeping Ukraine beholden to Moscow would be worth it.

It is now clear that the costs will be higher than he reckoned. But perhaps not high enough to make him relent. Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, a think-tank, argues that Mr Putin is now fighting for political survival. The president thinks he faces a choice between galvanising support at home by remaining defiant or yielding to international pressure and possibly losing everything. In the days after the shooting down of Flight MH17, it became clear he was preparing his political supporters for a long, painful fight.

The mood in Moscow is now almost one of embracing isolation. Deputies in the Duma, Russia’s parliament, are talking up the benefits to Russian industry of consumers having to switch to domestic products. Vladislav Inozemstev, an economist, points out that Mr Putin’s grip on power depends less on economic growth than on wages. As a result of energy exports and a bloated state sector, those may remain stable for a while, even as the economy contracts. When problems do arise, they can be blamed on the plotting of a hostile West. The Russian propaganda machine remains powerful. A poll by the Levada Centre shows that 82% of Russians think Ukrainian forces were responsible for the crash of MH17.

Some in the business and political elite have doubts about the course Russia has set. But they depend too much on the Kremlin’s favour to say so publicly. Managers of state-run banks, for example, will be unhappy to lose sources of long-term financing in the West, but know they will need financial support from the government to make it through any bumps ahead.

Given Mr Putin’s view of what is at stake in his showdown with the West, further escalation would be unsurprising. Mr Putin believes that his own political future depends on the defence of Russia’s regional influence—that is the lesson he draws from the Soviet Union’s collapse. His nightmare would be to see the rebels defeated without Russia getting anything in return. He would rather be a global pariah than Mikhail Gorbachev.

Sanctions on Russia: This is going to hurt | The Economist

[JAD_333]

"Join Strelkov's Army"...

Ukrainian rebels set up recruiting office in Moscow

[JAD_333]

Finnish foreign minister says Russia won't invade...

EU sanctions on Russia could be gradually eased - Finland Foreign Minister | Reuters

He added that he saw little risk of Russia occupying more Ukrainian territory, pointing out that it could have already done so had it wanted to.

[Mithridates]

Finnish foreign minister says Russia won't invade...

EU sanctions on Russia could be gradually eased - Finland Foreign Minister | Reuters

Economists surprised by Tuomioja's views on Russia The EU's urge to declare victory and go home rears its ugly head. What's amusing is that they don't even have troops on the front.

[Bigfella]

Economists surprised by Tuomioja's views on Russia The EU's urge to declare victory and go home rears its ugly head. What's amusing is that they don't even have troops on the front.

Finland does, however, have troops on a vast & sparsely defended border with Russia, no NATO treaty to cover its arse and a good appreciation of what Russia is capable of. Its easy to make snide remarks at a distance, for Finland this is already pretty real.

[gf0012-aust]

Finland does, however, have troops on a vast & sparsely defended border with Russia, no NATO treaty to cover its arse and a good appreciation of what Russia is capable of. Its easy to make snide remarks at a distance, for Finland this is already pretty real.

and the Finns now have a PM who is very pro NATO - pro EU and is interested in kicking off the Skanidinavian/Baltic alliance (as an adjunct to whatever NATO model exists in their future)

The russians have been ramping up their threats to the finns as well - and there are quite a few opposition party members who are scared $chittless that the russians will roll over the border on any pretext - even if it means that the reindeer migrate from russia and deserve russian protection from the evil Sami .... :)

[JAD_333]

Economists surprised by Tuomioja's views on Russia The EU's urge to declare victory and go home rears its ugly head. What's amusing is that they don't even have troops on the front.

that doesn't come out in the reading of the article, and apart from a few dissident voices, the EU countries in this seem to appreciate that it will take time for the sanctions to be fully felt, certainly through the winter.