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Very interesting. I know there are drones being tested for Infantry but the brigade combat team is the lowest level in the US Army you find drones...in the Engineer battalion MI Company.
Not sure what the Marines are doing.
“Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
Mark Twain
They're currently renewing the fleet of MIKADO drones in the recce units with a new generation (AirRobot AR-100H instead of AR-100B), which probably means they intend to hand primarily the older models completely over to the infantry. Contract for additional 145 AR-100H was just announced last month.
MIKADO / AR-100B is a small quadrocopter carried in a backpack with rather short mission range of around 1 km and maximum flight time of 30 minutes. In infantry use they're intended so the platoon commander can check the area immediately ahead of his own forces or explore suspicious positions (they're small enough to e.g. enter buildings). He can also fly the drone up to an elevated position and set it down there, e.g. on a roof, to just use the camera for observation for up to a few hours.
The newer MIKADO / AR-100H now being bought for recce troops have pretty much the same specs, but are built a bit bigger and modular, can have its radio module switched for longer range, and can be equipped with a variety of sensors including thermal cameras.
The US Army's SRRP programme for a platoon-level drone seems to have about the same intended use as MIKADO, and broadly comparable specs (they focus a bit more on range and skimp on sensors in comparison). The R&D programme for it has been running since 2018...
There are smaller drones both in the Bundeswehr and US Army, such as "Black Hornet" that both have bought and which tend to get a lot more publicity, but that's more the Special Forces stuff, and neither by payload nor by ruggedness is usable enough for infantry in the field. Compared to other small UAVs MIKADO has a surprisingly high survivability rate. In Afghanistan they were effectively deployed similar to how it's proposed for the infantry battalion here (in similar numbers, and similar use), and we lost only 4 of them between 2007 and 2013.
The ALADIN drones for company level in the Bundeswehr are about comparable to RQ-11 Raven, RQ-20 Puma or RQ-14 Dragon Eye in US Army and USMC use. In the USMC i think these have been at company level for a while, in the US Army it's at least planned to have them at that level.
These are small hand-launched aircraft with a range of around 10 km that are intended more to scout ahead of the company forces.
ALADINs are also the default UAV carried by individual reconnaissance vehicles in the Bundeswehr. For the individual infantry company they're carried on the Boxer of the heavy weapons platoon's commander, in the heavy company's reconnaissance platoon each recce squad has one. System consists of two drones, so they can basically launch them alternatingly to provide sustained coverage over a longer time.
At Brigade Combat Team level the reconnaissance battalion has a drone company with "real" UAVs (10 HUSAR and 10 LUNA, catapult-launched) with 100+ km range and up to 12-hour flight times. In real use other than general observation those are mostly used to support artillery with target identification and damage assessment. HUSAR is a newer version of LUNA that has replaced the KZO artillery observation drones. There were nominally plans to replace all LUNA with them too, but then the company went bankrupt.
Equivalent systems for LUNA/HUSAR in the US are RQ-7 Shadow (Army) and RQ-21 Blackjack (Marines).
RABE - two per squad in the battalion's integral reconnaissance platoon - is a small tracked ground vehicle (about 2.5 kg weight) that's primarily intended to scout during urban combat. They're built to be fairly heavy-duty, can be dropped from up to 5m height or thrown e.g. through windows or down stairs. If they land on their back they can self-righten themselves.
Don't think there's a comparable light system in the US Forces, at least widely deployed. There are - significantly larger - "Packbot" UGVs that are deployed at IBCT level by - i think - combat engineers primarily in EOD, but the Bundeswehr has those too (from the same company, in somewhat larger numbers).
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For larger, combat-support ground drones the Bundeswehr is currently testing primarily Milrem THeMIS. They bought one of them in 2019 and have been deploying it on exercises, most recently for cold-weather testing with a mountain infantry battalion in Norway, hot-weather testing was in Mali. The Estonian infantry platoon deployed with the German contingent in Mali in 2019 also brought in a THeMIS and used it more extensively, mostly on behalf of the company building them.
THeMIS is a 1.6-ton tracked vehicle with payload capacity comparable to a jeep. They can automatically follow walking infantry in rough areas, or for road movement can be towed by other vehicles. On their own they can run at up to 25 km/h.
In theory Milrem also offers - and sells - armed versions of THeMIS, equipped with light weapon stations with machine guns or ATGM. That's not being looked at, what the Bundeswehr wants is a cargo vehicle to support infantry platoons.
The intention here is to - in the future - have a few (3-6 per company) that would carry some heavier weapon systems like grenade launchers - and ammunition - into position for dismounted use. Currently these are on regular vehicles and of course have to be carried into position by their crew, which especially over larger distances can be quite complicated.
It's basically comparable to all those "Cargo Mule" UGV programmes that the US has too (e.g. "S-MET" which is planned to be bought in large numbers), but with a - in comparison - larger vehicle.
Their relatively large size allows to use them adhoc for other duties as well, on exercises they've towed 5-ton vehicles around with them or in Norway tested using them to tow up to a squad of infantry on skis. It probably also helps that they're sized just right that one vehicle could also e.g. carry the backpacks of a whole infantry platoon to make it more mobile in the field, or easily a few days supply of water and food for them.
There is also another type of quadrocopter in service in somewhat significant numbers in the Bundeswehr that has rather similar specs to a Mikado. That's the DJI Matrice 200. As in, yes, that DJI as in that Chinese company whose drones are known to "phone back". 60 of them were bought in 2019.
The Bundeswehr uses these DJI COTS drones for testing light anti-drone defense systems. As in destructive tests.
A second DJI model (Phantom 4) is in service with the Navy. They were specifically bought for and are used there to check refugee boats off the coast of Libya for OP Sophia.
And now for your viewing interest. An a one hour plus long YouTube presentation on German Military Procurement by Perun
kato Can you take a look at that video and critique it please?
“He was the most prodigious personification of all human inferiorities. He was an utterly incapable, unadapted, irresponsible, psychopathic personality, full of empty, infantile fantasies, but cursed with the keen intuition of a rat or a guttersnipe. He represented the shadow, the inferior part of everybody’s personality, in an overwhelming degree, and this was another reason why they fell for him.”
He of course picks a couple extreme examples - that are available by being covered in press etc - but in general i agree with him on the overall notion that procurement and short-term funding iterations is at the core of the problem. The key slides for that start at around 36:45.
There are some nitpicks on the cited numbers and projects - for example those 2 million he cites being attributed to TLVS immediately after the above section. TLVS internationally better known as MEADS. He basically uses that number in the notion of "well, if they only assign 2 million, which company's gonna start any production".
That particular project however was effectively zero-funded at that point with no perspective of buying it (near- or medium-term) at all. The 2 million that year were effectively a send-off to the suppliers to at least keep some of the R&D staff, the documentation etc around.
Similar nitpick - the helmets "ten years in testing whether they fit on German heads" that he quotes the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Eva Högl on? Yeah, not regular helmets, not about whether they fit on German heads of course and so on. Not that Perun can get those reasons in public sources that easily, so that's not really on him. Explaining that one in detail would actually have been interesting in the context of the video, since it dealt with the other side - supplier failure and long-term supply.
Basically that one was about paratrooper helmets with a special pressure-sensitive quick-release system that's certified to work in conjunction with automatic chute systems. When those helmets started entering their first maintenance cycle five years later the Bundeswehr found the supplier simply no longer manufactured those parts, and wouldn't restart production either. And had the full IP rights to the system. So they basically had to race against time getting another supplier to manufacture a "not-quite-the-same" system to the exact same standards while more and more of the spare helmets they had in storage came up for maintenance.
Title : Procurement Dimension Sea (Force Branch Navy)
assigned 10 M€ in 2022, 8.806 B€ from 2023 onwards
Projects : K130, F126, U212CD, Future NSM ship-to-ship/shore missile, IDAS submarine-to-air missile, SONIX, multi-purpose combat boats, successor RHIB 1010
"Successor RHIB 1010" will be the first project being realized from the 100 billion fonds due to its small size - immediately.
The project is about buying new 12m fast insertion boats for the Navy Special Forces (KSM). Transports 14 men, has 4 weapon stations for machine guns, 250nm range and 50+ knots speed. Air-transportable in A400M, sea-transportable onboard Berlin class AOR or in stern slip bay on future F126 frigates.
Contract is for 9 units with an option for further 12. Selected type is from Boomeranger in Finland, probably a slightly customized version of their C-1200 IB/OB model.
The up to 21 boats replace four currently used boats in the KSM with significantly lower capabilities. The replacement has been in the works for two years and was basically ready for signing once money became available.
He of course picks a couple extreme examples - that are available by being covered in press etc - but in general i agree with him on the overall notion that procurement and short-term funding iterations is at the core of the problem. The key slides for that start at around 36:45.
There are some nitpicks on the cited numbers and projects - for example those 2 million he cites being attributed to TLVS immediately after the above section. TLVS internationally better known as MEADS. He basically uses that number in the notion of "well, if they only assign 2 million, which company's gonna start any production".
That particular project however was effectively zero-funded at that point with no perspective of buying it (near- or medium-term) at all. The 2 million that year were effectively a send-off to the suppliers to at least keep some of the R&D staff, the documentation etc around.
Similar nitpick - the helmets "ten years in testing whether they fit on German heads" that he quotes the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Eva Högl on? Yeah, not regular helmets, not about whether they fit on German heads of course and so on. Not that Perun can get those reasons in public sources that easily, so that's not really on him. Explaining that one in detail would actually have been interesting in the context of the video, since it dealt with the other side - supplier failure and long-term supply.
Basically that one was about paratrooper helmets with a special pressure-sensitive quick-release system that's certified to work in conjunction with automatic chute systems. When those helmets started entering their first maintenance cycle five years later the Bundeswehr found the supplier simply no longer manufactured those parts, and wouldn't restart production either. And had the full IP rights to the system. So they basically had to race against time getting another supplier to manufacture a "not-quite-the-same" system to the exact same standards while more and more of the spare helmets they had in storage came up for maintenance.
Kato, you should 'reach out' and contact Perun some time and have a nice long chat sometime on all things military procurement! Apparently he's always looking for expert input for his channel (open source information only of course). :)
If you are emotionally invested in 'believing' something is true you have lost the ability to tell if it is true.
In his place i'd probably be kicking myself for not waiting another week or two. Because the German MoD published the 15th annual "Procurement Report" end of June.
The procurement report gives a broad 120-page current layout of where problems with current procurement projects lay to the extent that the Bundeswehr wants to publish those for select projects. And they don't really mince words there. Some examples below:
For K130 2nd batch: "The subcontractor has announced a delivery delay of a certifiable and operatively usable Combat Management System of 21 months."
Further explained as: "Due to insufficiencies and malperformance of the subcontractor for the Combat Management System Boats No. 6 to 8 as well as the Mission Control and Support Centre will be delayed by about two years. Further delays compared to the schedule are possible."
Or for F125: "Furthermore the timely tendering and realization of corrective maintenance is essential to reaching full operating capability. The first corrective maintenance of the class, for Baden-Württemberg, was delayed by a court case at Upper State Court Düsseldorf regarding the tender process for it. In addition the maintenance had to be extended by four months partly due to delays in parts deliveries".
Basically that one was about paratrooper helmets with a special pressure-sensitive quick-release system that's certified to work in conjunction with automatic chute systems. When those helmets started entering their first maintenance cycle five years later the Bundeswehr found the supplier simply no longer manufactured those parts, and wouldn't restart production either. And had the full IP rights to the system. So they basically had to race against time getting another supplier to manufacture a "not-quite-the-same" system to the exact same standards while more and more of the spare helmets they had in storage came up for maintenance.
This is such an issue with older systems we even have a fancy Acquisition term for it...Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS). Sometimes the saving grace is we buy so many of an item that there quite a number of spares sloshing around in warehouses somewhere. It really hit the UH-1 fleet several years ago when there were so few left in the inventory and they had been built so long ago there were no spares left in US stocks for some key components. Had to turn to allies to source some of them. And also had to pay outrageous prices to get some lines reopened. Causes unit price to skyrocket and makes a program look wasteful.
“Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
Mark Twain
This is such an issue with older systems we even have a fancy Acquisition term for it...Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS). Sometimes the saving grace is we buy so many of an item that there quite a number of spares sloshing around in warehouses somewhere.
Which can then lead to complacency of sorts - "just get them from the depot, not like we're gonna run out that soon".
With those helmets the main problem was that the first new supplier they tried offered to basically make replacement units out of plastic like other helmets. With the prototypes promptly failing during stress tests. Took them a bit to find someone with some sort of ceramics or something sufficiently close in material strength to the original metal bits. And since they had 4,000 spare helmets in depots compared to 5,000 active paratroopers (who all had their helmets) they did have some time.
The only reason the case became public was because last year they did in fact run out of these helmets. Not for the actual troops, mind you, but in August last year what was left in depots wasn't sufficient to issue 600 new helmets to the next recruit batch at the paratrooper school. Of course they did find a way to work around it, with the paratrooper school simply forming pools of helmets that they handed out for training jumps only - not like they were gonna jump all 600 recruits at the same time anyway.
At the same time they were already testing the second new prototypes - and just to make sure were exploring whether other helmets could be relatively quickly certified for automatic-chute operation as well. But as they are entitled to someone did file a complaint with the ombudsman, in the form of the parliamentary commissioner for the Bundeswehr, so it did end up in her report and the press.
It really hit the UH-1 fleet several years ago when there were so few left in the inventory and they had been built so long ago there were no spares left in US stocks for some key components. Had to turn to allies to source some of them. And also had to pay outrageous prices to get some lines reopened. Causes unit price to skyrocket and makes a program look wasteful.
About a decade ago it was discovered that some screws used on German CH-53G had developed microfractures after 50 years in service. Since those were in critical parts that did lead to the whole fleet being grounded. They called up Sikorsky for replacement screws. And Sikorsky didn't have any in stock either - of course. Took six months and probably outrageous money to get them remanufactured.
Basically that one was about paratrooper helmets with a special pressure-sensitive quick-release system that's certified to work in conjunction with automatic chute systems. When those helmets started entering their first maintenance cycle five years later the Bundeswehr found the supplier simply no longer manufactured those parts, and wouldn't restart production either. And had the full IP rights to the system. So they basically had to race against time getting another supplier to manufacture a "not-quite-the-same" system to the exact same standards while more and more of the spare helmets they had in storage came up for maintenance.
I had a feeling there was much more to the combat helmet story than what he was saying. It reminded me of the $600 toilet seat "scandal" from the mid-80s.
I knew for certain that his anecdote about the G36 didn't tell the whole story. Ian McCollum did a great job of diving into the nuances of that little controversy.
Thanks for the info, great to get the real scoop!
“He was the most prodigious personification of all human inferiorities. He was an utterly incapable, unadapted, irresponsible, psychopathic personality, full of empty, infantile fantasies, but cursed with the keen intuition of a rat or a guttersnipe. He represented the shadow, the inferior part of everybody’s personality, in an overwhelming degree, and this was another reason why they fell for him.”
I had a feeling there was much more to the combat helmet story than what he was saying. It reminded me of the $600 toilet seat "scandal" from the mid-80s.
It actually got a bit more complicated because there actually is a helmet programme that has been going on for over a decade - the "Combat Helmet Armed Forces", which is supposed to be the usual gold-plated one-solution-for-everything thing the Bundeswehr tends to procure.
However the paratroopers - and that's what the complaint to Högl was about - were never even planned to get that one, and the shortage last year was not related to it at all. The two programmes just got conflated at some point in reporting.
The delays in that programme supposedly - according to a procurement report from 2020 - stemmed from lack of personnel resources in the department handling personal equipment, which led to all helmet projects in the Bundeswehr only being able to be handled sequentially (!). And the prioritization for that was effectively "helmet for special forces" first, "intermediate solution" (helmet for VJTF 2023) second, "combat helmet armed forces" last. Part of the delay was also that the new helmet has to be compatible to a new integrated personal radio headset which was not going to be introduced before 2023 anyway, so they internally sorta timed the helmet project to be ready to be introduced at the same time.
The programme for the "Combat Helmet Armed Forces" was effectively buried this March (before it ever entered the tendering stage), when the government decided they'd just take the "intermediate solution" helmet that had been bought a good number of in the meantime (11,000 i think) - and will now procure that for everyone.
Ian McCollum did a great job of diving into the nuances of that little controversy.
I'm kinda partial on Ian McCollum regarding his factchecking since his gaffe where for his book publishing job he (supposedly "accidentally") promoted a Swedish neonazi on his channel complete with videos of that man's time in the Azov battalion and at the same time Ian in narration casting aside any war crimes accusations against them. For his apology on that and - in the comments - plenty of discussion on that see here.
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