Border face-off: China and India each deploy 3,000 troops

[Oracle]

India produces satellite images to show PLA incursions

[Oracle]

China deploys troops all along 4,000-km LAC

Kill the chicken (Pak) to scare the monkey?

[Double Edge]

So is the border still 'stable and controllable' ?

Jun 11 (She repeats the same answer from the day before)

AFP: You mentioned yesterday that China and India are taking actions to ease the border situation. So could you give more details on what these actions are?

Hua Chunying: I have no more details regarding the situation on the ground. But I can confirm that China and India have conducted effective communication and reached agreement on properly handling the situation in the west section of the China-India boundary. At present, the two sides are taking actions in line with the agreement to ameliorate the border situation.

Jun 10

AFP: Indian media reported that Chinese and Indian border troops are disengaging and moving back from three locations in the west section of China-India boundary. Can you confirm this?

Hua Chunying: Through diplomatic and military channels, China and India have recently had effective communication and reached agreement on properly handling the situation in the west section of the China-India boundary. At present, the two sides are taking actions in line with the agreement to ameliorate the border situation.

Jun 08

PTI: Senior military officials of India and China held talks over the weekend to resolve the border standoff. How does China view the outcome of the talks?

Hua Chunying: On the afternoon of June 6, Chinese and Indian military officials held commander-level talks in the border personnel meeting point at Moldo to discuss ways to resolve matters related to the recent border situation and safeguard peace and stability in the border area.

Recently China and India have been in close communication through diplomatic and military channels regarding the border situation. Both sides agree to implement the important consensus of the two leaders, avoid escalation of differences into disputes, work together to uphold peace and tranquility in the border area, and create favorable atmosphere for the sound and stable development of bilateral relations. Currently the overall situation in the border area is stable and controllable. Both sides have the willingness and capability to properly resolve the related matters through negotiation and consultation.

Jun 05

AFP: Indian media reports say that Chinese and Indian military leaders will meet tomorrow to address the border disputes. Do you have any details on this meeting?

Geng Shuang: At present, the overall situation in the China-India border areas is stable and controllable. There are sound mechanisms for border-related matters between China and India. The two sides maintain close communication through diplomatic and military channels and are working to properly resolve relevant issues.

Jun 03

South China Morning Post: Indian media reported that Prime Minister Modi and President Trump exchanged views on the China-India border situation during a phone call on Tuesday. Does China have a response?

Zhao Lijian: China's position on the boundary issue is consistent and clear. We have been earnestly implementing the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, strictly abiding by the relevant agreements signed by the two countries, and committed to safeguarding China's territorial sovereignty and security as well as peace and stability in the China-India border areas. At present, the overall situation in the China-India border areas is stable and controllable. On border-related issues, there have been sound mechanisms and channels of communication between China and India, and the two sides are capable of properly resolving relevant issues through dialogue and consultation. There is no need for any third party to intervene.

[Double Edge]

The strategic river | Daily Pioneer | Jun 11 2020

Thursday, 11 June 2020 | KK PAUL

The Galwan River in east Ladakh continues to be important, providing direct and convenient access to Shyok and areas beyond

Though just about 80 kilometres in length, the Galwan River in east Ladakh is of immense strategic importance for India. It was at the turn of the 19th century and during the early years of the last one that Ghulam Rasool Galwan, a young man, an adventurer and an explorer who was a frequent traveller to Tibet, along with a few traders, came in contact with Capt (later Col) Reginald Younghusband. Those were the days when the great game was at its peak. At that time, the British Viceroy in India was far more worried about Russia’s rapid expansion towards Tibet rather than any other threat from China.

Capt Younghusband was specially chosen by the Viceroy to explore Tibet, gather intelligence and assess the possibility of any Russian expansion that could pose a threat to British interests in India. Ghulam Rasool remained attached with the British expeditions as a guide. In the later years, he started guiding other expeditions from France and Italy into Tibet, too. It is understood that in order to cross the Kongka La Pass from Shyok, he frequently used a river valley route. Though this is quite unusual, this small torrent of a river was later named after Ghulam Rasool Galwan as the Gallowan River

In order to better appreciate the current scenario, it would be useful to know a bit of contemporary history about this river. Events moved rapidly after the Chinese occupation of Tibet during 1950-51. That the quiet cold of the high Himalayas would get “noisier” and “hotter” was realised for the first time in 1957 with the discovery of the Aksai Chin road, built in record time by China on Indian territory. The presence of this road was not discovered by any of our patrols for there were none. However, the then Indian Ambassador in China had conveyed about this when he read Press reports about the building of this high altitude road in record time to be an “extraordinary feat.” This was just the beginning of the rapid deterioration in India’s relations with China. Subsequent events are all too well known to be recounted here.

The situation took a turn for the worst when a patrolling party of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was fired upon near Kongka La on October 21, 1959. Ever since then, in order to commemorate the sacrifice of the 11 men who were killed during this skirmish, this day is observed as the Police Commemoration Day. As this incident made the aggressive designs of the Chinese clearer, all checkposts in the area were taken over by the Army. In the meantime, frequent Chinese intrusions into our territory as also the building of roads started receiving attention. Post this, it was decided to station posts in the forward areas that had hitherto remained unpatrolled.

It was in response to this policy that on September 26, 1961, the then Deputy Director of Intelligence Bureau (IB), Shri Dave, sent a detailed note to the Ministry of Defence. It was recommended that “...We should reconnoitre the Galwan River valley and open posts as far as eastwards because this valley was connected with the Shyok valley through which River Shyok provided access to Indus and onwards to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. It was further recommended that if the Chinese command the Galwan valley, it would give them easy access towards Skardu and India’s routes to Murgo, Daulat Beg Oldi and Panamic would be cut. Further, the unoccupied area between Pangong and Spanggur lakes was recommended to be covered by new posts.” At the time of implementation of these recommendations, usual differences of opinion erupted among the higher echelons of the administration. This delayed matters.

Finally, a platoon of 4/8 Gurkhas was moved from Hotsprings. After trekking for a month, it came to a point overlooking the Galwan River on July 5, 1962. Our post was established by this platoon close to the Chinese post of Samzungling in such a manner that it cut off their supply route. Not only that, it also briefly detained a small Chinese patrol. The Galwan River, being strategically important for the Chinese, their reaction was almost instantaneous. Their protest note of July 8, 1962, was followed up by a company strength of troops, which surrounded our Galwan post on July 10. Subsequently, more troops joined and ultimately we had a situation where our Galwan post of one platoon was completely surrounded by a battalion of Chinese with loudspeakers blaring all the time.

Among other things, the loudspeakers were exhorting the Gurkhas to side with Tibet and the Chinese. Then came the question of servicing our Galwan post because all land links had got severed. Ultimately, this had to be done by air. Later, an attempt was made to strengthen this post with 5 Jat. When the hostilities broke out in October 1962, this Galwan post was the first one to be attacked in the western sector and was overwhelmed.

But over the decades, the situation has undergone a vast change. Today, we are not only numerically stronger in the area but also have weaponry that would be more than a match for the Chinese. Accessibility to our border posts used to be a serious handicap. We also have airfields at DBO and Chushul, which are capable of handling the heaviest of loads. Besides, minor airfields have come up at Nyoma and Fukche. The most important point is the construction of a road from Dabruk to Shyok and then to the northernmost point of DBO. This road runs almost parallel to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and is of a very high strategic value. It also virtually acts as the lifeline for our border posts.

This road completely cuts off future plans, if any, from the Chinese side to intrude westwards through the Galwan River valley. This situation had been foreseen way back in 1961 when a forward post was located in the Galwan valley but today we have a road. At that time, the Chinese had reacted to the location of the Galwan post; it is understood that now they are reacting to this road, which more or less blocks their westward passage through the River Galwan valley.

The geography of the area has not changed since 1962 but the high Himalayas are no longer impregnable. The Galwan River, which is located centrally, connects to Shyok on the road under construction. Lying in between the Chushul airport and DBO, it continues to be of great strategic importance, providing direct and convenient access to Shyok and areas beyond. It is expected that as earlier and even now, the events around the Galwan River are going to be the main focus of the ongoing talks between India and China.

(The writer is a former Governor and a Senior Advisor at the Pranab Mukherjee Foundation)

[Double Edge]

They're testing us and themselves

So they didn't like our demands and decided to ante up.

Game on : )

Discussion

That's the other side

[Double Edge]

LAC standoff: India eyes 4-pronged plan for Lt-Gen level talks with China

Those are our demands, the open question is what are theirs ?

LAC was a Chinese idea, Nehru refused it in preference for internationally recognised borders. Didn't happen.

Finally, in '93 Narasimha accepts this concept of LAC.

Chinese stop talking about LAC after 2017

So this concept of LAC now is up in the air.

I seem to remember LAC in question with Doklam as well for a bit.

[Double Edge]

China's strategic assessment of India | WOTR | Mar 25 2020

China’s policy toward India in the past two to three years has shifted. It now actively promotes closer ties.

The reason for this move was the drastic rupture from the Doklam standoff between China and India in 2017, in which Chinese and Indian troops faced off along part of their disputed border. In addition, Beijing fears an emerging India-U.S. alliance as part of Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.

In fact, China and India have announced 70 events throughout the year to celebrate the 70th anniversary of their diplomatic relations.

The official rapprochement between these two global giants represents a case of major realignment — a rare case for the Chinese playbook.

They have a funny way of celebrating 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations. Either that or Yun Sun wrote this piece nearly three months ago.

For China, the Doklam standoff raised fundamental questions regarding the nature of India’s threat. Despite the asymmetry of their national power — India’s GDP is 20 percent that of China’s — China is disadvantaged by the asymmetry of threat perceptions. Simply put, India sees China as its primary threat while China sees India as a secondary challenge. Beijing’s national security priorities unequivocally lie in the western Pacific. Such asymmetry of security priorities means that India may not yet rival China in national power or in a conventional or nuclear arms race, but its resolve and focus on China are significantly stronger than those of China.

In other words, our resolve at Doklam impressed them.

Because India is not China’s primary threat and South Asia is not China’s primary theater, China would prefer to save on costs and minimize military and strategic resources on India. In the event that a conflict is unavoidable, China could mobilize to an overwhelming capacity to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield — which is why the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 was constantly mentioned during the Doklam standoff.

However, China doesn’t want to have a conflict with India over either the border or the status of Kashmir.

Even if China could defeat and contain India through a war, the payoff for China would remain minimal because it wouldn’t address China’s key external security challenges in the Pacific. Instead, a breakdown in ties with New Delhi would only further expose Beijing in its primary theater vis-à-vis the United States.

China’s strategic goal is to stabilize relations with India in order to avoid a two-front war with the United States and India — all while minimizing distractions.

But the challenge of this goal lies in how it can be achieved. For China, the Chinese and Indian demands are different and asymmetrical by nature.

Key concessions that India demands from China — such as the border settlement and U.N. terrorist designations for anti-India militant groups based in Pakistan — are hard commitments that cannot be reversed.

What China needs from India — such as neutrality and political alignment — is ephemeral and easily adjustable.

While New Delhi sees addressing these issues as the prerequisite for India to trust China, Beijing doesn’t believe that relinquishing its leverage will in any way stop India from conducting hostile actions down the road — especially given their clashing regional visions.

As such, China’s policy towards India is pulled in two opposite directions — between a perhaps genuine desire for friendly ties with India so it can focus on the United States and the Pacific, and an equally genuine hostility due to conflicting agendas in Asia.

The former points to a positive trajectory with reduced distrust and enhanced ties. The latter explains the lack of substantive progress in achieving such results.

China’s distrust of New Delhi is greater as the result of burgeoning India-U.S. ties. Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, released three months after the Doklam standoff, seeks to anchor India in its larger Asia posture.

The role, assistance, alignment, and power status the United States have offered India contributed to China’s speedy rapprochement with India and its deepening suspicion of India at the same time.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy has sent China into a frenzy of damage control in order to prevent the emergence of an India-U.S. alliance. When China was more or less reassured by Modi’s reiteration of “strategic autonomy” and reluctance to embrace the Indo-Pacific concept in public, China elevated the status of Sino-Indian relations to an unprecedented level, resulting in a rather abrupt positive shift after the Doklam crisis.

Since then, the U.S. factor has become the most important consideration in China’s policy toward India.

For China, the prospect of facing the American military at sea and the Indian military along its southern border and in the Indian Ocean becomes much more real and dangerous with defense cooperation between the United States and India.

Such cooperation will not only damage the security and stability of China’s western borderland while undermining China’s strategic influence in South Asia; it will also hinder China’s power projection capability in the Indian Ocean with the potential to threaten China’s energy supply from the Middle East.

Regionally and globally, the U.S. endorsement of India’s leadership status dilutes and diminishes China’s soft power, and encourages other countries like Japan and Australia to follow suit in seeking closer ties with New Delhi.

China’s elevation of relations with India reveals an inconvenient truth: exogenous factors primarily drive China’s rapprochement with India. Had Washington not adopted the Indo-Pacific Strategy and pursued alignment with India, the trajectory of China’s policy toward India would have looked very different.

China wants to be friends with India because of the US and US wants to be friends with India because of China : )

Before and after the Doklam standoff, nothing endogenous in Sino-Indian relations fundamentally changed, including the unresolved border disputes, the competition between China and India for influence in South Asia, the longstanding Tibet issue, the growing trade imbalance, the Pakistan factor, and the two countries’ vastly different visions for the regional order.

China might have concluded that improved ties with India were in its interests, but the decision to reach out to New Delhi occurred when it did because Beijing saw the United States swaying India’s preference.

While India has no place in China’s vision for the regional order, the United States offers India a significant position in the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s India policy is the biggest factor that has altered China’s calculation about India’s strategic importance and pushed Beijing to appease New Delhi. But, if the assessment is that India has accepted a de facto alliance with United States, China will have to prepare for a very different approach toward India.

The Chinese South Asia policy community is currently debating the nature of the India-U.S. alignment and the malleability of India’s preferences.

The consensus in China seems to be that India wants and needs to rely on the United States to balance China’s growing regional dominance. The disagreement lies in the extent to which India will align and cooperate with Washington for this shared agenda.

A difference between the civilans and the defense analysts

Chinese civilian observers and diplomats — former and current — have rather low expectations about India-U.S. cooperation.

For them, India and the United States appear to be innately incompatible. In terms of strategic culture, India follows a non-alignment tradition while U.S. global strategy is based on alliances. In terms of strategic goals, India does not seek a total confrontation with China though a confrontation appears to be America’s aim. In terms of partners, India seeks diverse partnerships, including with Russia, a U.S. adversary. In terms of technical compatibility, India has no intention to completely abandon Russian weapons systems, which makes America’s proposed interoperability a challenge in the least. For these Chinese experts, the India-U.S. alignment is tactical — out of expediency — and lacks systematic commitment and binding arrangements. When conflicting calculations arise — and they will arise — the India-U.S. alignment will fall apart.

Unlike their counterparts who are more focused on diplomacy and foreign policy, Chinese defense strategists and security experts are concerned about the substance of the growing India-U.S. ties.

In their view, Washington is making India offers that India cannot refuse, including but not limited to defense industry cooperation, arms sales, and information and intelligence sharing.

Even if India thinks it is maintaining its autonomy, Chinese strategists see India enticed, entangled, and potentially enmeshed in institutionalized cooperative frameworks that it later cannot reject despite its aspiration for autonomy.

For hardliners in Beijing, the benefits that the United States has offered in material and diplomatic terms have already emboldened New Delhi to pursue risky policies vis-à-vis Pakistan in addition to a more assertive negotiating posture towards China.

Within the region, China has grown increasingly wary of the destabilizing effect of Modi’s foreign policy. From Beijing’s perspective, the Modi Doctrine is heavily imbued with his Hindu nationalism and was recently strengthened by his victories on Article 370, changing the legal status of Kashmir, and a controversial citizenship law.

Moreover, the Modi Doctrine directly reflects what the Chinese see as a risk-seeking or, at a minimum, a risk-neutral policy toward Pakistan.

The Chinese are innately distrusting of any country’s foreign policy that is linked to radical domestic politics — a bitter lesson China learned from itself during the Cultural Revolution. In the case of India, China is also worried that its domestic ethno-religious conflicts could potentially spill over across the border.

[Double Edge]

Seen some interesting comments on youtube discussion to ponder on.

China's first concern is USA and India's concern is China, India should exploit this.

To which some one asked to elaborate and boy did we get an answer : )

India works on two strategies on China. They are hard balancing and soft balancing.

India should make its hard balancing more aggressive. The infrastructure of lac must be complete on time and to increase power in Indian ocean by navy and having regular pacific drills with Japan, Australia and USA. And also to show aggression at POK which in turn irks China for its CPEC.

As for now India has limitations to this policy coz of its economic, defense expenditure discrepancy with China. So better to get aggressive on our own land and maritime.

And on soft balancing. Where we should focus with all priorities. India has to complete all ongoing projects in west Bengal side and try to make new ports like KMMTT in Myanmar. Best choice can be to build a port in Malacca strait at opening side. And to speed up the five strategies of Indian ocean. Which are building surveillance and naval base. With support of Japan, Australia. And cooperation from small south Asian countries.

The entity which can reduce this strategiy is Gwadar port. So we have Chabhar port to counter it, but its operation is not at the expected level. With consensus of USA we must make it effective. And next is Japan-India African corridor which is good, but must be brought in reality.

PM Modi focuses on cooperation of all countries in Indian ocean. Which brings everyone in the task and shares responsibility. Which is a big advantage compared to the Chinese autocratic approach. And also safe from future change in political equations (congress)

China is now being pulled between two powers. One is big threat in west pacific- USA and the other India at west mountain terrain. This has forced Chinese to change its strategic approach (years of planning). The recent act at Ladakh is nothing but tactical out of confusion and vulnerability of China.

China believes in power. So same should be given. India is now a thorn which is pricking where it hurts. They can't ignore it.

Chanakya niti says "With powerful enemy we should act the same way".

Here is another

India fought Pakistan in our Jammu and Kashmir for 68 years. Since 2016, we have taken the fight to Gilgit-Baltistan. Our side of Kashmir is a done deal.

Similarly, for 67 years, we have fought China in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Since the Doklam stand-off, we have stood up to China and it won't be long before India takes the fight to Tibet.

We may make tactical concessions in the short term but our strategic posture is self evident.

[Double Edge]

Yun links to a Chinese source for the Sumdurong Chu incident. Use google translate.

What surprised me was Sundarji's plan was to push the NE border up to the Yarlung Tsangpo river. That would have put an end to any transgressions in the eastern sector. In other words we'd have gone to war in '86 with China.

Rajiv pulled the plug at the last moment.

[Oracle]

Next time the PLA starts such nonsense, we should start firing, and kill 50-100 of them and shore up our offensive capability immediately, before the PLA can react. Firstest and mostest. I like this idea of the Colonel. Teach the PLA a lesson over their dead bodies.

[Double Edge]

India no longer a weak country, won’t compromise: Rajnath Singh on border row with China | IE | Jun 14 2020

"We will not keep anybody in the dark. We will tell everything at an appropriate time to Parliament and to everybody," Rajnath Singh said while referring to the situation along the Line of Actual Control.

I hope it won't be one of those 'iss rat bara baja may' kind of announcements : O

Modi typically gives the country 4h warning of some momentous decision. SO he comes on around 7pm and this "from tonight onwards so and so will happen...

Example, from midnight notes of this and that denomination will no longer be legal tender.

Or with the lockdown, we got 48h warning for a voluntary 24h lockdown and it got extended by 21 days on the evening of said day so just 4h warning for a 21 day lockdown.

[Double Edge]

Next time the PLA starts such nonsense, we should start firing, and kill 50-100 of them and shore up our offensive capability immediately, before the PLA can react. Firstest and mostest. I like this idea of the Colonel. Teach the PLA a lesson over their dead bodies.

Would have to be a pretty good lesson otherwise we set up a second hot border ?

That helps both adversaries as they will be a stronger incentive for them to coordinate actions.

If as Yun says, China does not want a war with us, you would think a little dustup as you said would suffice.

Chinese can't do MOSTEST because we're a second priority but they can do FIRSTEST.

We can do MOSTEST but not yet FASTEST

In a few years we might be able to do that with more roads and infrastructure which is what the Chinese are trying to prevent presently.

[Officer of Engineers]

Yun links to a Chinese source for the Sumdurong Chu incident. Use google translate.

What surprised me was Sundarji's plan was to push the NE border up to the Yarlung Tsangpo river. That would have put an end to any transgressions in the eastern sector. In other words we'd have gone to war in '86 with China.

Rajiv pulled the plug at the last moment.

It would not have been a good move. I know a retired Chinese Captain who told me about that dust up. The Army didn't like the idea of the war basically because of the logistics involved. The only chance for victory was a 2nd front through Pakistan (surprise). DXP gave the go ahead for the prep work. Pakistan was not notified (more surprising ... and shows just how much the Chinese value their Pakistani allies).

[Double Edge]

I wonder if we can see the Chinese moves as deterrence signals. They constantly remind us not get any ideas.

Going back over the last ten years.

[Officer of Engineers]

I wonder if we can see the Chinese moves as deterrence signals. They constantly remind us not get any ideas.

Going back over the last ten years.

I don't think so. For a deterent to be effective, you have to know about it. No one outside of the CMC and the PLA did, not even Pakistan and it was their territory and more than likely, their army, that were going to be used in this fight.