The War

[Ray]

There maybe merits in the various posts so far, but my post is independent of them.

When the ISAF withdraws and let us say there is a Afghan Taliban govt (one can debate if it would be any better than the previous experience), would it not be also problematic for Pakistan?

As I read in another thread, the Taliban is creating mayhem in Pakistan. If that is correct, then they would have tasted blood. Would they quietly fade away or will they made a bid to take over power in Pakistan in equal measures as they would have done, if a Taliban govt is installed in Afghanistan?

Given the sentiments riding high in Pakistan (as was displayed after the assassination of the Governor of Punjab), it does indicate that the fundamentalists do have a major say.

In such an eventuality, even if the Afghan Taliban govt remains a proxy for the Pakistan Taliban/ fundamentalist govt, then both would prove a major problem for all.

Or would it not?

[S2]

Ray Reply

Brigadier,

Perhaps you didn't see this comment by myself concluding my previous post.

"I fear your [Pakistani] government has badly misread the taliban's influence and desirability among any save yourselves."

The TTP as an entity holds no major sway over the Pakistani populace. The ideals of islamic fundamentalism, however, increasingly may. The afghan taliban infected the TTP whilst encamped in sanctuary on Pakistani lands and previously. The biographies of Nek Mohammed and Baitullah Mehsud both included extensive tutelage under the afghan taliban prior to 9/11.

Further, if past evidence is any indication, the afghan taliban won't prove controllable by the Pakistani authorities. Let's remember that attempts by the Pakistani government to negotiate with the Afghan Taliban government a settlement of the Durand Line between 1996-2001 were dead-on-arrival. The afghan taliban are, in the end, AFGHAN, PASHTUN, and TALIBAN.

Nothing in those three words should hearten the souls of any right-thinking strategic analyst within Rawalpindi. Nonetheless, for the interim, the afghan taliban remain favored sons of their sponsors.

To that end, both have played their roles perfectly and with proper manners. As good hosts, the Pakistani military have conducted no combat operations against Omar, Haqqani, Hekmatyar or their Pakistani synchophants-Maulvi Nazir and Hafez Gul Bahadur. In turn, the afghan taliban have kept a measured distance from any formal association with the TTP's activities and have not drawn down upon their sponsors.

Afterall, the afghan taliban clearly know upon which side their bread is buttered.

[Ray]

S2

That was a rather interesting analysis.

Till now, it was never seen by India that Afghanistan could be a second front.

However, with the 'strategic relationship' evolving rapidly, who knows?

It is, after all, the 'co.ckpit' of the world!

[Agnostic Muslim]

"Zraver himself described Pakistani military actions in East Pakistan as 'genocidal'... Since many vilifying Pakistani actions in 1971 choose to bandy about the term 'genocide/genocidal' based on a few accounts, I fail to see why I should do any different when describing the actions of East Pakistani rebels/terrorists."

Had I seen Zraver's comments and disagreed with his supporting evidence, I'd asked the same of him. It doesn't alleviate your responsibility to exercise care regarding your posts unless you prefer rhetorical mayhem to solid discussion. If so, I can recommend a board where that's commonplace.

I don't quite understand what you mean here - are you saying that you did not read zraver's comment calling Pakistani military actions in East Pakistan 'genocidal'? He did not offer any 'supporting evidence', nor can he, beyond providing limited accounts of atrocities by the PA, as I have done in the case of atrocities by the East Pakistani rebels.

So, in the interest of consistency, am I to assume that your demand to drop inflammatory language such as 'genocide or genocidal', with respect to the actions of all sides in East Pakistan, applies to both Zraver and myself, and any others who choose to comment on the issue?

If the above is the case, I have no quarrel with your position and will gladly commit to a course of avoiding inflammatory language such as 'genocide', provided it is reciprocated by the other side as well, and you are willing to address the issue when it is not.

"Despite what you believe, a Taliban onslaught on Afghanistan in the aftermath of a US withdrawal is not a 'Pakistani victory'. It is in fact one of the least preferred options."

An option, then, and one to be considered it would seem from your words.

Any potential end state in Afghanistan is an 'option' S-2 - a complete defeat of the Taliban, on both sides of the border, however unlikely, is also an option.

A return to a civil war in Afghanistan with the Taliban seeking to violently take over the country again, is, hopefully for everyone, among the least preferred options.

Your preferred option? Read below-

"What would constitute a Pakistani 'victory' currently is a power sharing agreement between the current GoA and the Taliban leadership, and perhaps a merging of Taliban foot soldiers and the ANA and ANP, along with a military withdrawal by ISAF."

I'm unsure from where you draw your guidance on the preference of "options" but this is fantasy.

Whether you think this particular endstate feasible or not S-2 is not the point S-2 - I am merely clarifying what Pakistan's preferred end-state in Afghanistan, or 'victory' in other words, would be.

First, there is no reconciliation between various taliban factions. Omar, Haqqani, and Hekmatyar have anywhere from a demonstrated disdain for one another to open dislike. Hekmatyar, in particular, appears to carry some very hard feelings about the past. So a common voice is one of the difficulties faced when "power sharing".

That is obviously one of the issues that has to be addressed in negotiations over 'power sharing'. IMO, Omar and Haqqani are the key here. Hekmetyar will fall in line with the promise of some position in the government if the other two agree to power sharing. On his own, Hekmetyar has neither the influence nor military intellect to lead an insurgency against Pakistan and the GoA.

Secondly, I'd be curous to understand what you know about the afghan taliban suggesting that they've any interest in "powersharing" with the present GIRoA? These are not practiced politicians (Hekmatyar excepting) with any demonstrated concept of rule by anything other than "diktat".

Now that's not to say the taliban wouldn't see such, perhaps, as an interim measure to establishing a beach-head on their way to the wholesale dismantling of the present regime.

If the Taliban see power-sharing as a means to a 'wholesale dismantling of the regime constructed after the US invasion', albeit internally through increased control of the government, I don't see that as completely negative, provided done through whatever political process is agreed to in such a hypothetical power-sharing arrangement.

Finally, I presume you see viability in such because you see the taliban as the legitimate voice of pashtun aspirations in Afghanistan. Is this true? If so, I'm curious as a side note whether you see the same for the TTP in Pakistan? If not, what indication have you that the afghan taliban represent the afghan pashtun vision for Afghanistan that they should be annointed a role within any future government?

I see the Taliban as a powerful and influential party to the conflict in Afghanistan, and as a party to the conflict, it is worthwhile approaching them to enter into power sharing arrangement to end the violent conflict. Pakistan in fact attempted the same with the various TTP factions in Pakistan, and the process failed since the TTP chose to continue on a path of violence and violated conditions of disarmament and disbanding of militias. I would imagine similar demands would be made of the Afghan Taliban, and the process of power sharing would be contingent upon the Taliban meeting those demands.

I can't imagine that you'd foist upon yourselves a similar solution. What's a concern, of course, with your range of options is that nowhere do they call for the elimination of the afghan taliban. This suggests, coupled with your comments about India-

"...It was in Pakistan's interest to have a stable Afghanistan with a government that did not allow India to run anti-Pakistan operations from Afghan soil..."

-that even you hold to the notion of strategic depth and all implied. Doesn't that, then, explain why the afghan taliban have enjoyed such immunity from military actions on your lands? If you see the afghan taliban as players in a range of offered options, then I presume that's only because your own government does as well. Thus they remain in play...from your lands.

Why should Pakistan not seek to see a regime in Afghanistan that does not undermine Pakistan's security, territorial integrity and national interests? You vilify Pakistan for seeking to protect its interests through influencing the government in Afghanistan, yet the US herself has invaded two nations in the last ten years, similarly seeking regime change to better protect its perceived national interests and security. Pakistan is not looking at initiating war and invading Afghanistan, but merely seeking to push for a power-sharing arrangement that also addresses its national security concerns.

I know that many of your fellow citizens and discussion mates presume this is an accomplished reality. I've provided you the quotes already. Unchallenged by their peers.

The quotes provided reflect the opinions of those individuals - the lack of 'challenge' to them', on that particular thread, illustrates nothing. I have followed the public and private comments of many of the senior members on defence.pk. and the only thing that is true is that all of them have their own opinions, many divergent from the views expressed by the members you quoted, about what the end-state in Afghanistan should be.

What this really entails, of course, is that most Pakistanis-including yourself-wish to shape Afghan politics to your bent as a client state of Pakistan. True Afghan self-determination will take a backseat to politics exercised at the barrel of a taliban gun if necessary.

Pakistan will not sit idly by if 'True Afghan self-determination' implies support by Afghanistan for elements and policies that threaten Pakistan's national security. We have dealt with enough Afghan and Indian subterfuge over the last sixty plus years - we would like to ensure it does not happen again.

Personally, I don't believe that most afghan pashtuns subscribe to Omar's vision of Pakistan nor Omar himself. Despite ISAF's declining popularity, the BBC/ABC/ARD polls consistently show the taliban as polling miserably-even worse than foreign insurgents. Those links have been posted many times by me for your reading pleasure already.

I fear your government has badly misread the taliban's influence and desirability among any save yourselves.

I don't believe we have overestimated the Taliban's appeal - a violent insurgent Taliban will be unpopular, though influential. A Taliban as part of the Afghan Government, having given up on violent insurgency, could possibly poll differently.

[DV RULES]

"...Any potential end state in Afghanistan is an 'option' S-2 - a complete defeat of the Taliban, on both sides of the border, however unlikely, is also an option..."

No. Those are outcomes and not necessarily the function of a chosen course of action.

"...A return to a civil war in Afghanistan with the Taliban seeking to violently take over the country again, is, hopefully for everyone, among the least preferred options..."

Hopefully it is the least likely outcome. As to whether it constitutes a possible course of action is a function of nat'l strategic policy for specific key state elements.

"...Whether you think this particular endstate feasible or not S-2 is not the point S-2 - I am merely clarifying what Pakistan's preferred end-state in Afghanistan, or 'victory' in other words, would be..."

I agree. The true value of my observation is the implication that Pakistan has worked to assure "a force in being" that can leverage a seat at any negotiating table.

"...That is obviously one of the issues that has to be addressed in negotiations over 'power sharing'. IMO, Omar and Haqqani are the key here..."

No. That is an issue that must be surmounted BEFORE negotiations. The ability for successful discussions hinges on clear roles and concisely articulated objectives. This is a very real concern. Secondly HQN's relationship with Al Qaeda is an equal concern. Third, you've left unaddressed Pakistani fellow-travellers such as Maulvi Nazir and Hafez Gul Bahadur out of the discussion. They may exert influence among the affected parties that demands inclusion.

"...If the Taliban see power-sharing as a means to a 'wholesale dismantling of the regime constructed after the US invasion', albeit internally through increased control of the government, I don't see that as completely negative, provided done through whatever political process is agreed to in such a hypothetical power-sharing arrangement..."

I do. It makes clear the absence of good-faith negotiation grounded in principles seeking broad accord. To date, the afghan taliban have done everything within their limited power to obstruct processes designed to BUILD nat'l consensus within Afghanistan. They've zero track record of being anything other than thoroughly disingenuous regarding commonly-accepted political practices.

"...I see the Taliban as a powerful and influential party to the conflict in Afghanistan..."

I agree.

"...and as a party to the conflict, it is worthwhile approaching them to enter into power sharing arrangement to end the violent conflict."

I tend not to agree. From what do the taliban draw their power and influence such that they're worthy of power-sharing? The barrel of a gun? That's raw extortion which has no place in good-faith negotiation.

"...Pakistan in fact attempted the same with the various TTP factions in Pakistan, and the process failed since the TTP chose to continue on a path of violence and violated conditions of disarmament and disbanding of militias..."

Indeed. That path was chosen by them because they've no ability to pursue their objectives by any acceptable means. It brought them into direct conflict with the state once their raw ambitions were unambiguously clear.

"...I would imagine similar demands would be made of the Afghan Taliban, and the process of power sharing would be contingent upon the Taliban meeting those demands..."

And should those fail after-the-fact as they did in Pakistan, who will reassert good order in Afghanistan? Neither the institutions of state nor the armed forces/police have the foundation accorded the GoP by virtue of time and tradition.

"...Why should Pakistan not seek to see a regime in Afghanistan that does not undermine Pakistan's security, territorial integrity and national interests...?"

Why should Pakistan's interests exceed those of CAR, Iran, or even Afghanistan?

"...You vilify Pakistan for seeking to protect its interests through influencing the government in Afghanistan, yet the US herself has invaded two nations in the last ten years, similarly seeking regime change to better protect its perceived national interests and security..."

I vilify the methods. My nation did not seek war with Afghanistan nor did we pursue war in anything that was less than straightforwardly transparent. Our intentions were made clear. The choices to the Afghan taliban government were clear. They chose otherwise and accepted war as a consequence.

"...Pakistan is not looking at initiating war and invading Afghanistan, but merely seeking to push for a power-sharing arrangement that also addresses its national security concerns..."

"...Merely..." is an entirely inadequate expression to describe the manner in which the GoP/P.A. pursue their objectives. The P.A. "...push..." in ways that aren't acceptable.

"...The quotes provided reflect the opinions of those individuals - the lack of 'challenge' to them', on that particular thread, illustrates nothing. I have followed the public and private comments of many of the senior members on defence.pk. and the only thing that is true is that all of them have their own opinions, many divergent from the views expressed by the members you quoted, about what the end-state in Afghanistan should be..."

I've done the same. There are exceptions, of course. They represent outliers to the otherwise broad consensus regarding this issue IMV.

"...Pakistan will not sit idly by if 'True Afghan self-determination' implies support by Afghanistan for elements and policies that threaten Pakistan's national security..."

Ahhh...raw (no pun intended) and clear. Finally. Well, the Afghan taliban proved no better solution to the Durand Line than their predecessors. They likely won't again either. There's, therefore, no resolution of that nat'l security issue to be found.

As for India, Pakistan shares a border with Iran too. Do you seek to shape the Iranian government in the same manner pursued with Afghanistan? It seems not although Iran's relations with India are seemingly excellent. I'm sure you recall Christine Fair's comment regarding the Indian consulate in Zahedan.

What's clear from your comments is Pakistan fears openly competing for afghan goodwill on a level playing field-as other nations do. Of course, you could always declare war should issues prove both de-stabilizing and intractable.

"...We have dealt with enough Afghan and Indian subterfuge over the last sixty plus years - we would like to ensure it does not happen again..."

I know. I think Pakistan is on the cusp of achieving her objectives. We'll see if Pakistan has read the tea-leaves correctly. I sense not but that'll be played out down the road.

"...I don't believe we have overestimated the Taliban's appeal - a violent insurgent Taliban will be unpopular, though influential. A Taliban as part of the Afghan Government, having given up on violent insurgency, could possibly poll differently..."

Perhaps. If they ever stand for election. That will prove a circus event I'd love to see. Imagine...Omar on the campaign trail?

Mr. S-2
Would you like to look at the situation from another angle?
I have ever objection over US influence in South Asia. It leads not towards peace but more problems.


Pakistan has to hold or put its interests in the region to stabilize situation , US has not meanings of fight in Afghanistan, while Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran & Russia have to solve this problem not US OR NATO (They have no right to interfere in this region's policies where they can't understand yet the ground realities). US never showed his reaction over this news which reaction he often showed over news or facts from Pakistan and then he complaint that People of Pakistan didn't trust on USA. Funny

[Agnostic Muslim]

"...Any potential end state in Afghanistan is an 'option' S-2 - a complete defeat of the Taliban, on both sides of the border, however unlikely, is also an option..."

No. Those are outcomes and not necessarily the function of a chosen course of action.

Bad choice of words on my part then - my use of 'options' was in the context of 'outcomes'.

"...That is obviously one of the issues that has to be addressed in negotiations over 'power sharing'. IMO, Omar and Haqqani are the key here..."

No. That is an issue that must be surmounted BEFORE negotiations. The ability for successful discussions hinges on clear roles and concisely articulated objectives. This is a very real concern. Secondly HQN's relationship with Al Qaeda is an equal concern. Third, you've left unaddressed Pakistani fellow-travellers such as Maulvi Nazir and Hafez Gul Bahadur out of the discussion. They may exert influence among the affected parties that demands inclusion.

IMO, negotiations and the potential of one or more of the three major groups coming to an arrangement with ISAF/GoA on power sharing will be a catalyst towards reconciliation or some sort of arrangement between the Taliban/insurgent groups as well, as none would like to be left out, and would have support for their cause undermined significantly. Omar carries the political and ideological weight, that would prove detrimental to both Haqqani and Hekmetyar if they insisted on continuing the insurgency despite Omar entering into power sharing arrangement.

Haqqani has the muscle, and his entering into an accomodation with ISAF/GoA significantly weakens Omar's position and potentially induces him to compromise. On Hekmetyar I maintain that he has neither the ideological weight not military acumen to continue waging an insurgency alone - he will compromise when he sees which way the wind is turning.

"...If the Taliban see power-sharing as a means to a 'wholesale dismantling of the regime constructed after the US invasion', albeit internally through increased control of the government, I don't see that as completely negative, provided done through whatever political process is agreed to in such a hypothetical power-sharing arrangement..."

I do. It makes clear the absence of good-faith negotiation grounded in principles seeking broad accord. To date, the afghan taliban have done everything within their limited power to obstruct processes designed to BUILD nat'l consensus within Afghanistan. They've zero track record of being anything other than thoroughly disingenuous regarding commonly-accepted political practices.

I don't think either the Afghan or Pakistani governments, especially the Afghan, function on pure good faith 'democratic principles'. There is a lot of wheeling, dealing and corruption going on as is. So the Taliban use it to their advantage to build up support and stregthen their position in government. That is part of the process. I do think that whether the Taliban are made part of the government or not, Afghanistan has to be highly decentralized to allow for the autonomy that the various feuding ethnic groups and tribes would need to avoid a 'blame game' of repression and discrimination by the 'other'. In such a decentralized government, potential Taliban power gains would be limited to provinces where they have a large degree of appeal.

"...and as a party to the conflict, it is worthwhile approaching them to enter into power sharing arrangement to end the violent conflict."

I tend not to agree. From what do the taliban draw their power and influence such that they're worthy of power-sharing? The barrel of a gun? That's raw extortion which has no place in good-faith negotiation.

The Taliban would argue that the 'power and influence' drawn by the current GoA is at the 'barrel of ISAF's gun'. I think your position is somewhat idealistic - the Taliban are not likely to give up their only 'card', the insurgency' as a precondition to power sharing negotiations.

"...Pakistan in fact attempted the same with the various TTP factions in Pakistan, and the process failed since the TTP chose to continue on a path of violence and violated conditions of disarmament and disbanding of militias..."

Indeed. That path was chosen by them because they've no ability to pursue their objectives by any acceptable means. It brought them into direct conflict with the state once their raw ambitions were unambiguously clear.

And the same would be unacceptable in Afghanistan, and unacceptable to Pakistan as well. We attempted to have Omar share power with Dostum and Massoud, which he refused. Pakistan would not at all be comfortable with continued Taliban aggression and expansion through force in Afghanistan, since it does not address our concern of a stable and neutral Afghanistan.

And should those fail after-the-fact as they did in Pakistan, who will reassert good order in Afghanistan? Neither the institutions of state nor the armed forces/police have the foundation accorded the GoP by virtue of time and tradition.

At the very least, if the process is conducted in good faith and given the right amount of time, Pakistan will recognize that the Taliban cannot be part of any powersharing arrangement on either side of the border.

"...Why should Pakistan not seek to see a regime in Afghanistan that does not undermine Pakistan's security, territorial integrity and national interests...?"

Why should Pakistan's interests exceed those of CAR, Iran, or even Afghanistan?

WRT to CAR and Iran, given the national security threats Afghanistan and India have posed to Pakistan, and Afghan irredentism, CAR and Iran simply do not have the level of interests in Afghanistan that Pakistan does. As for Afghan interests, so long as they do not threaten Pakistan's national security and territorial integrity, Pakistan is not in conflict with them. If Pakistani and Afghan interests clash on the issues of Pakistan's national security concerns, then Pakistan will not allow Afghanistan to exceed Pakistan's interests.

"...You vilify Pakistan for seeking to protect its interests through influencing the government in Afghanistan, yet the US herself has invaded two nations in the last ten years, similarly seeking regime change to better protect its perceived national interests and security..."

I vilify the methods. My nation did not seek war with Afghanistan nor did we pursue war in anything that was less than straightforwardly transparent. Our intentions were made clear. The choices to the Afghan taliban government were clear. They chose otherwise and accepted war as a consequence.

Methods will depend upon a nation's capacities and resources. 'Transparency' is just code for 'clout' to influence events and policies overtly. The US can use her economic and poitical clout to bribe/coerce a 'Coalition of the Willing' to further its nationa interests through force, at the cost of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives. Pakistan cannot do so, and will use whatever means are available to her to protect her national interests.

The choices to Afghanistan are also clear - Pakistan did not seek Afghan hostility and irredentism, and it did not seek Afghan support for terrorists and insurgents in Pakistan. Afghanistan has chosen to undermine Pakistani interests, and has rebuffed Pakistani efforts at confidence building through certain policy changes, and therefore Pakistan must act as it sees fit to protect her national security.

"...Pakistan will not sit idly by if 'True Afghan self-determination' implies support by Afghanistan for elements and policies that threaten Pakistan's national security..."

Ahhh...raw (no pun intended) and clear. Finally. Well, the Afghan taliban proved no better solution to the Durand Line than their predecessors. They likely won't again either. There's, therefore, no resolution of that nat'l security issue to be found.

With respect to the Durand, perhaps not. With respect to preventing support for Indian actions destabilizing Pakistan from Afghanistan, perhaps yes.

As for India, Pakistan shares a border with Iran too. Do you seek to shape the Iranian government in the same manner pursued with Afghanistan? It seems not although Iran's relations with India are seemingly excellent. I'm sure you recall Christine Fair's comment regarding the Indian consulate in Zahedan.

Iran has no territorial claims on Pakistan, nor has it acted in the manner of India and Afghanistan in seeking to break apart the country and claiming its territory.

What's clear from your comments is Pakistan fears openly competing for afghan goodwill on a level playing field-as other nations do. Of course, you could always declare war should issues prove both de-stabilizing and intractable.

It will be a level playing field when all actors, including those fighting an insurgency against ISAF occupation, are at peace and included in the government. It cannot be a level playing field so long as Afghanistan is hostile to Pakistan and claims its territory and supports its enemies.

[S2]

Bing West Shares His Thoughts On A Different and Kinetic Approach To The War

Bing West was recently interviewed at SWJ regarding his latest book and, more importantly, the observations garnered from his recent visit to Afghanistan. West spent considerable time with the troops.

A former CAP (Combined Action Platoon) commander in Vietnam, his perspectives are both valuable and dramatically opposed to the now conventionally-accepted views of a kinder, gentler COIN perspective-

"The new book title is quite provocative. Why is Afghanistan the “Wrong War?”
Afghanistan is the Wrong War for our benevolent strategy of wooing the Pashtuns by offering money. Our senior leaders say the war cannot be won by killing. It will surely be lost if we don't kill more Islamist terrorists and hard-core Taliban. More disturbing, the US is steadily getting out of the arrest and imprisonment business, due to politics in the States. Why aren‟t we the “Strongest Tribe” in Afghanistan?

In Iraq, the Sunni tribes, with an established hierarchy and strong intra-clan ties, came over to our side because, as their leaders told me, they concluded we were the strongest tribe. It was no accident that the Sunni Awakening began in Anbar, where the Marines had hammered the insurgents - al Qaeda and Sunni tribes alike - year after year. In Afghanistan, the Pashtun sub-tribes have no such established hierarchy. Many villages have scant contact with the next. The Pashtuns will remain neutral and standoffish until they decide who is going to win. They are convinced the Taliban will return as we pull out.

In 2009, General Stanley McChrystal implemented a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign for Afghanistan. Early reports from the field suggest that some battlefield commanders misinterpreted the intent and placed restrictive rules of engagement on ISAF security forces limiting their ability to close with and destroy the enemy. Contrastingly, during this same time period, Special Operations Forces conducted numerous direct action raids killing and capturing hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. What effect did these actions have on the grunt Marines and Soldiers in the field and the way the military views war and warfare?

In the past three years, I have embedded with many rifle companies. COIN is a franchise business. The variation among the franchises is enormous. Some companies have five outposts; others have 18. Some companies have permission to track every patrol with mortars and to fire immediately upon request of the patrol leader - no questions asked. Others have difficulty. Our senior generals did go too far in criticizing from the top. As rules of thumb, the ODA and Marine units have more degrees of freedom to call in fire at a lower level. Many of the Army platoon commanders, after Ranger School, have expressed to me disappointment that they could not act more aggressively on their own. I know this is a tough balancing act, but most Taliban shoot and scoot successfully.

General David Petraeus famously said that we should use money as a weapon. Some interpret this guidance as a need to have a free-fire exercise in spending and reconstruction efforts in order to win hearts and minds. Others caution subtle restraint or coercive civil affairs to ensure that spending is measured to ensure increasing returns on investment and mutually beneficial partnerships. How would you describe our monetary investment in Afghanistan given the current strategy?

From Karzai to the villagers, the response has been rational: take or steal every dollar the Americans are foolish enough to give away. In the US, the Great Society and the War on Poverty created a culture of entitlement and undercut individual responsibility. We exported that failed social philosophy to Afghanistan.

Despite the initial sluggishness of the Marjah campaign, the Marines are finding success. COIN is traditionally a long, slow process. Moreover, in RC-East, commanders in the 101st are executing a violent pacification of long held Taliban and al Qaeda strongholds, and we‟re quietly garnering local tribal militias through the Village Stability Operations (VSO). Why should we not give ISAF more time to conduct President Obama‟s counterinsurgency campaign?

True, the Marine companies are spending millions in Marjah, now that the overt, armed Taliban have left. The criterion of success, however, are districts standing on their own without US rifle companies. In ten years, that has not happened, and six American commanding generals have praised their counterinsurgency campaigns. I have not seen one village with a self-defense force that has killed Taliban and stood on its own.

In a recent interview with SWJ, Karl Hack suggested, “You cannot, for instance, go straight to a comprehensive approach for „winning hearts and minds‟ and expect it to work, if you have not first broken up the larger insurgent groups, disrupted their main bases, and achieved a modicum of spatial dominance and of security for the population of the area concerned.” Do you agree that in many small wars security and the suppression of the insurgency must come before construction and investment efforts?

In Vietnam, the mission of our Combined Action Platoons was to patrol so vigorously that the Viet Cong locals and main force would not enter the AO. The second mission then was to bring in police to ferret out the secret cadre. Overarching those two missions was the daily integration with the Popular Forces, who knew they would be left on their own, usually after nine to twelve months. (My CAP took longer - 485 days.) Security and a belief that you will win are the first requisites for a government.

In Afghanistan, our mission is patrol until the overt Taliban pull out. Then, our battalion commanders then move on to projects and economic development (over $10 million for many, if not most battalions) and to governance. Most battalion commanders are the de facto district governor, or the co-equal. The battalion commanders are then expected to assist in the institution of the rule of law. But since US soldiers are not permitted to arrest Afghans, the rule of law has gradually been dropped from the COIN catechism.

In Vietnam, counterinsurgency focused upon the destruction of the Viet Cong insurgency, and was successful by 1970. For ten years, in Afghanistan, our new COIN doctrine has focused upon building a nation, and has not been successful. The COIN doctrine says our troops are expected to be nation-builders as well as warriors. I believe that is deeply flawed. Our military, despite the exhortations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, should not be a Peace Corps. We need another decade or so to succeed at that, and we need about a trillion dollars and a commitment of about a hundred battalions.

The math is staggering. There are more than 7,000 Pashtun villages and fewer than 50 NATO battalions that will go into combat. Americans cannot protect 11 million Pashtuns. The open border is 1500 miles long; the government in Kabul is rotten; President Karzai is serpentine.

What do you propose for a new strategy?

Push the Afghans to fight their own war. Stop fighting for them. Create the Adviser Corps we have needed for the past ten years. Our air surveillance is so extraordinary today that we can deploy about 50 advisers per 400-man Afghan battalion and patrol rigorously without unduly risking our advisers. We do not need 100,000 troops. The average grunt sees a real live Taliban only a few times in a tour. We spend as much time in shuras as on patrols. That has not yielded return on the investment. The Taliban needs to mass in order to threaten to retake government control in the urban areas. Given our air, they cannot mass.

Given a shift to an advisor only strategy, should we turn command of the Afghanistan campaign over to Army Special Forces, the traditional American experts in small wars?

We need a three-star in charge of the advisers, who in turn must become our main effort - focused upon insisting the Afghans fight their own war. The greatest institutional defect is that we have conceded total control over promotions and firings to Karzai. That can and should be changed.

The wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan led to a resurgence and explosion of theory and study into small wars, a field once relegated to minor departments of security studies and defense analysis. Much of this discussion and debate takes place at Small Wars Journal through major stakeholders such as LTC (ret.) John Nagl, LTC (ret.) David Kilcullen, GEN David Petraeus, and LTG William Caldwell as well as numerous junior and field grade officers and NCO‟s returning from the field trying to apply practice to theory. Has this increase in the study of small wars provided the collective community a greater wisdom of war and warfare?
The new religion of benevolent counterinsurgency has been defined by the best writers. Especially in Big Army, attracting attention and prominence is helped enormously by an advanced degree and by the publication of theoretical papers on macro topics at the high level of warfare.

The new COIN, however, remains an unproven theory, with a distinct downside. Since non- kinetics have been advocated as the smart approach to warfare, from the top down the infection of risk-aversion has spread. Most battalions know the sections of their AOs where the troops will be shot at; those areas are avoided until rotary-wing CAS is scheduled; that takes four to seven days. Every casualty is investigated; if a junior officer has strayed from the published regulations, he is in trouble. Every company and battalion commander must give away the money he is given, and must insure his books balance, etc. We have overly entangled and distracted our rifle companies, and we have turned a blind eye to the need to detect, arrest and imprison those in every village who are true Taliban or part-timers.

Some will respond that the new COIN is still kinetic. It's true that in the two doctrinal pubs (COIN and Irregular Warfare) there is ample mention of being aggressive. Combined, the two pubs run over 250,000 words, with appendices. There's a paragraph in the pubs for every taste and position.

For instance, Nate Fick and John Nagl wrote an op-ed in NYT on 21 February, saying, “even in Sangin, ranking among the very worst districts… the Taliban are being driven from their sanctuaries as the coalition focuses on protecting the Afghan people…”

I just returned from Sangin, where I accompanied a platoon on its daily fights. My story is published in the National Review. Interestingly, the editors, without consulting me, decided the title would be: With the Warriors: How our Marines go about the business of destroying the Taliban. Note the editors did not say, “The business of protecting the population”. What I witnessed in Sangin was a straight-up battle. (See the article with the warriors.) The British tried “protecting the population” for four years by doctrinal COIN means and were penned in. The Marines are slugging it out – killing - every day. The aggressive regimental commander has one rule: every firefight will end with Marines “closing to zero”; that is, standing on the ground where the Taliban fired. These grunts are doing what my combined platoon did in Vietnam – killing the enemy. Yes, that in turn brings “protection” to the people --- regardless of what the people want. That’s the nature of war.

Nate and John acknowledge in their op-ed that, “The coalition has been able to capture or kill far more Taliban leaders in nighttime raids… The United States can’t kill its way to victory, as it learned in Vietnam and Iraq, but it can put enough pressure on many Taliban fighters to encourage them to switch their allegiance.”

While Nate and John praise our SOF raids for killing, they add the obligatory new COIN bromide that “we can’t kill its way to victory”. No single phrase has sown more confusion among a generation of riflemen that we have trained to kill. Any war is about killing, first and foremost. That is what distinguishes war from diplomacy. Vide our Revolutionary War, the Civil War, WWI, WWII, Vietnam and Iraq. North Vietnamese killed the South Vietnamese soldiers and seized Saigon with tanks. The Sunni tribes eventually informed upon those affiliated with Al Qaeda, and they became targets to be killed or captured.

Over the course of three years of embeds in the north, east and south of Afghanistan, I did not find one village that fitted the pattern of Vietnam. For instance, in the village of Bing Nghia where I fought, 15 Americans arrived in June of 1966; the large majority of villagers welcomed them; the US squad trained a local platoon by fighting the Viet Cong night after night; no big projects were constructed; no Americans tried to help with governance; 17 months later, the Americans left the village to fend for itself. Before the Americans arrived and after they left, most of the villagers had an anti-Viet Cong ideology.

That is not the case with the Pashtuns. Their Islamic and cultural association with the Talban is different. Their refusal to commit is much deeper and more conflicted than we encountered in Vietnam.

I agree with Nate and John that most Americans are leaving Afghanistan sooner than 2014. However, the cause will not be that we have protected a Pashtun population that has in turn reciprocated by rejecting the Taliban. Undoubtedly that will be the public claim. But the president is not going to run for re-election with a perceived mess in Afghanistan. Hence, we will have achieved our basic objectives by 2012. That is a political given. Regardless of how we leave, our political leaders will declare victory; e.g., Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for “ending” the Vietnam war. How the Afghan narrative is shaped will depend upon the skill of the White House.

Nate and John and I also agree that we must hasten the transfer of responsibility to Afghan soldiers backed by more advisers. However, the cause of the transfer will not be that we have succeeded in protecting a Pashtun population dispersed over a vast countryside ideal for guerrilla tactics. The math is staggering: 7,000 Pashtun villages and about 250 US rifle companies. The Pashtuns are determined to remain neutral until one side or the other wins. The Pashtuns are the prize for winning the war, not the means of winning it.

The new COIN theory is based on the social contract: the US provides protection and money, and the Pashtuns reject and inform on their Taliban relatives in their midst. The Pashtuns have not kept their side of the contract. Their self-interest lies in remaining neutral until they see a clear winner.

We have confused our soldiers and our mission by clinging to one theory – population protection - about counterinsurgency. Galula popularized that view when he was at Harvard. But his earlier and more honest book about how he fought in Algeria is revealing; he employed tactics – execution, threatening to bake people, etc. – that contradicted his latter encomiums. Every war creates its own facts, regardless of theories. In Afghanistan, the population will not determine the outcome. The end will be determined by the tenacity of the Taliban, or by the infusion of a fighting spirit into the Afghan army, or by a messy deal that will cause us all to ask: why did we fight so long and hard for that? All three outcomes are separate from the Americans. The Afghans are perfectly willing to take our money and let us continue to do the heavy lifting.

It is time to subordinate the misplaced rhetorical emphasis upon population protection and insist that the primary mission be partnered training – to include the relief of ANA incompetents - with timelines for the turnover of security responsibility, including Afghan soldiers patrolling in the villages. The US military should explicitly downgrade the effort devoted to nation-building projects, shuras, governance and economic development. Yes, this means the ANA becomes the power behind Karzai's throne. The armies in Turkey and South Korea provided a stabilizing influence.

Our current level of effort is politically unsustainable here at home. Our generals cannot want to give freedom more than the Pashtuns are willing to fight to gain it. If we cut back our spending and our troop levels, we will be able to persuade the Congress and many in the Executive Branch to stay longer in Afghanistan. I did not come to these conclusions quickly or lightly. In The Wrong War, I recount battles that have gone on for years; we are trying to do too much."

Here's Nagl/Fick's Op-ed for the NYT-

The "Long War" May Be Getting Shorter-John Nagl & Nathanial Fick Op-Ed NYT Feb. 20, 2011

West's own commentary for the National Review Online is here-

With The Warriors-Bing West NRO

I'll amend this post to encourage a reading of "With The Warriors". Very solid account of a squad patrol in Sangin District, Helmand. The marines there are fighting, killing and, sometimes, themselves dying. 20% casualties in the platoon covered by West. A worthy read.

[1980s]

Nothing new, but a good summary

APRIL 15, 2011
Review & Outlook: The Pakistan Ultimatum - WSJ.com

Much as after 9/11, Islamabad has to choose whose side it is on.

So Pakistan now demands that the United States withdraw hundreds of American intelligence operatives and special-ops trainers from its soil and stop the CIA drone strikes on al Qaeda, Taliban and affiliated terrorists. Maybe the Obama Administration can inform its friends in Islamabad that, when it comes to this particular fight, the U.S. will continue to pursue its enemies wherever they may be, with or without Pakistan's cooperation.

Relations between Washington and Islamabad historically have never been easy, and now they seem to have reached something of a watershed. The fault is not all one-sided. Congressional potentates have made a habit of criticizing Pakistan publicly even when it was cooperating with the U.S. and deploying thousands of troops to fight elements of the Taliban. And promised American aid has been haltingly disbursed.

Then again, Pakistan's behavior hasn't exactly been exemplary. Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, has longstanding links to terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network. The government and military have made no move against the Quetta Shura, the operational nerve center in Pakistan of Taliban leader Mullah Omar.

Islamabad's U.S. cooperation has also been double-edged. The government of President Asif Ali Zardari allowed the U.S. to increase the number of drone strikes. Yet it has made a point of complaining about them publicly, playing a particularly cheap form of politics to shore up its waning popularity with a domestic constituency smart enough to see through the hypocrisy.

The Pakistani army was also happy to cooperate with the U.S. when the targets of the strikes were members of the Pakistani Taliban who had their sights set on Islamabad. But the army has been less cooperative when the targets were the Afghan Taliban based in Pakistan or the ISI's terrorist partners.

Matters came to a head in January with Pakistan's arrest of CIA contractor Raymond Davis, after he had shot and killed two armed pursuers. Mr. Davis, who carried an official passport, ought to have been released immediately to U.S. custody under the terms of the Vienna Convention. Instead he was held for 47 days, questioned for 14, and released only after the U.S. government agreed to pay a multimillion-dollar indemnity to the families of the pursuers.

The failure to release Mr. Davis was an indication of how easily cowed Pakistan's civilian government has become in the face of an anti-American public. It also suggested a darker turn by Pakistan's military and the ISI, which were infuriated that Mr. Davis was investigating the activities of the Lashkar-e-Taiba now that it has expanded operations to include terrorism in Afghanistan. Pakistan has also complained bitterly about a drone strike in North Waziristan last month that it claims killed tribal leaders meeting with the Taliban.

A more charitable explanation is that Pakistan's military is angry the CIA is sharing less intelligence with the ISI. In this reading, the mass expulsion of U.S. security officials is really a demand for closer cooperation, even if it's a peculiar way of eliciting it. It's also possible that Pakistan army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani is trying to burnish his own public image by way of an anti-American tantrum that will pass in time.

Still, if the CIA doesn't trust the ISI, that's because it has demonstrated repeatedly that it isn't trustworthy. The Pakistani army has yet to reconcile itself to the idea that Afghanistan should be something other than its strategic backyard, preferably under the control of clients such as the Taliban, and it harbors paranoid illusions that India will encroach on Afghanistan to encircle its old enemy.

Pakistan's civilian government has also done itself neither credit nor favor by failing to tell Pakistan's people the truth about drone strikes, which is that they strike with pinpoint accuracy and that claims of civilian casualties are massively inflated for the benefit of Taliban propaganda. The government could also add that insofar as those drones are taking out leaders of the Pakistan Taliban, they are safeguarding Pakistan's beleaguered democracy.

However Islamabad chooses to act, the U.S. has a vital national interest in pursuing Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in their Pakistani sanctuaries, both for the sake of the war in Afghanistan and the security of the American homeland. Pakistan can choose to cooperate in that fight and reap the benefits of an American alliance. Or it can oppose the U.S. and reap the consequences, including the loss of military aid, special-ops and drone incursions into their frontier areas, and in particular a more robust U.S. military alliance with India.

In the wake of 9/11, the Bush Administration famously sent Secretary of State Colin Powell to Islamabad to explain that the U.S. was going to act forcefully to protect itself, and that Pakistan had to choose whose side it was on. It's time to present Pakistan with the same choice again.

[S2]

1980s Reply

Nice op-ed but...pointless. This relationship will continue under the same nebulous terms that have defined it thus far. Really there's little to be, or, can be changed so long as we permit ourselves to be held hostage to a supply line extending back to Karachi.

I've no love whatsoever for the Karzai regime but it's equally clear that there's no love lost between Kabul and Islamabad or, more accurately, Rawalpindi. I do expect civil war in the post-ISAF phase. Equally, I expect India will take on a more active role in that phase should Pakistan continue its current direction and trajectory WRT to LeT, Haqqani, and the taliban. So too, perhaps, Iran.

How those nations shape their involvement with Afghanistan will be interesting. While there's some evidence to suggest Iran has played both sides of the fence it can be fairly surmised to have done so specifically to poke America in the eye. How seriously Iran would continue supporting taliban efforts in western Afghanistan is highly questionable for obvious religious reasons. How deeply, conversely, the Iranians integrate their reach into the Afghan Hazara community will be interesting and doing so shall bring it into conflict with Pakistan's proteges.

A confluence of Indian, Iranian and Afghan national accord in combatting the taliban would seem to be a deep concern for Pakistan. Despite this, Pakistan's approach has been anything but conciliatory for nearly a decade now. They've made no effort to reassure the Afghan government of their good intentions. In pursuing a course laden with proxy warriors aimed at Afghanistan, it would seem they've deliberately created (or accepted the creation) an enemy.

We both understand the old fears held by Pakistan of pashtun conquest of the punjabi heartland and how that plays into Pakistani internal politics. We also understand their paranoia about a two front war with India. Still, it seems Islamabad has gone out of its way to bring closer to reality those fears. All that's really left is the final act to be played out by ISAF, specifically America-leaving.

Then the real struggle begins.

[1980s]

While there's some evidence to suggest Iran has played both sides of the fence it can be fairly surmised to have done so specifically to poke America in the eye. How seriously Iran would continue supporting taliban efforts in western Afghanistan is highly questionable for obvious religious reasons.

On the surface it appears to be so although i think there is another reason that would motivate the Iranian regime to create trouble in western Afghanistan, particularly Nimruz province which is the area that weapons supplied from Iran turn-up in the most if i am not mistaken. Its actually to do with a dispute over water flow from the Hirmand/Helmand river which runs through Afghanistan into lake Hamun in southeastern Iran. If i am not mistaken, the Taliban attempted to divert or even stop the water flowing into Iran during the 1990s and since then there has been some form of dispute between Iran and Afghanistan over water and opposition to dams etc being built on the Afghan side that would restrict the volume of water that flows downstream to Iran or divert it away altogether.

It seems to suit Iran's purpose therefore to see insecurity in Nimruz for the time being since the province has a small population (no major threat of refugees) and insecurity there gives Iran an upper-hand in negotiations with the Afghans over the fair-use of Hirmand/Helmand river water – it has less, or little do, with abetting the Taliban. Until the terms of water usage have finally been settled, i assume that the Iranian regime would be tempted to undermine security there so that no projects on the river that would be detrimental to Iran can go ahead. (Fars News Agency :: Iran, Afghanistan to Hold Talks on Hirmand River).

But i could be dead-wrong, although that is my suspicion. It has less to do with the Americans, at least, in that particular part of Afghanistan. Although there is no doubt that the US presence in Afghanistan overall causes great anxiety for the Iranian regime, particularly the ambiguous time-table for the US presence there. (MehrNews.com - ‘U.S. to trade south Afghanistan to Taliban for a military base’) – Interesting how Turkey is now entering the arena – i am sure that the Iranian regime is deeply unhappy with Turkey being used as a ground for a Taliban ‘diplomatic office’ and is already mobilizing their allies in Afghanistan against it, as reflected in that article.

How deeply, conversely, the Iranians integrate their reach into the Afghan Hazara community will be interesting and doing so shall bring it into conflict with Pakistan's proteges.

The situation in Bahrain over the past month is exacerbating Iranian hostility towards Pakistan, which could be a further impetus to play itself out in Afghanistan through use of the Hazara and other communities (Iran Warns Pakistan to Cut Relations if Not Stop Sending Military Forces to Bahrain). In relation to this developing hostility the Iranian media has reported that efforts to physically seal the border with Pakistan have recently been renewed (construction of barriers first started in 2007) and that work is already underway and making progress (Fars News Agency :: Iran Fortifying Border Entanglements in Southeast). Although what is more interesting are the recent movements of the Iranian army, which is being deployed ‘along the borders’ (read the southeast in particular) apparently, for an indefinite period of time (Fars News Agency :: Commander: Army to Reinvigorate Military Buildup along Iranian Borders). I am not sure why or what they are anticipating (if anything).

We both understand the old fears held by Pakistan of pashtun conquest of the punjabi heartland and how that plays into Pakistani internal politics. We also understand their paranoia about a two front war with India. Still, it seems Islamabad has gone out of its way to bring closer to reality those fears. All that's really left is the final act to be played out by ISAF, specifically America-leaving.

Then the real struggle begins.

I agree completely.

[S2]

1980s Reply

"Its actually to do with a dispute over water flow from the Hirmand/Helmand river..."

Interesting and I'd little idea although, in retrospect I expect the Helmand probably represents the major regional drainage system for that area. Certainly much is diverted within Helmand for Ag reasons (to include opium).

"...The situation in Bahrain over the past month is exacerbating Iranian hostility towards Pakistan..."

A further permutation and manifestation of the age-old shia/sunni hostility at play. The downstream effect has some interesting regional repercussions.

[JCT]

I just returned from Sangin, where I accompanied a platoon on its daily fights. My story is published in the National Review. Interestingly, the editors, without consulting me, decided the title would be: With the Warriors: How our Marines go about the business of destroying the Taliban. Note the editors did not say, “The business of protecting the population”. What I witnessed in Sangin was a straight-up battle. (See the article with the warriors.) The British tried “protecting the population” for four years by doctrinal COIN means and were penned in. The Marines are slugging it out – killing - every day. The aggressive regimental commander has one rule: every firefight will end with Marines “closing to zero”; that is, standing on the ground where the Taliban fired. These grunts are doing what my combined platoon did in Vietnam – killing the enemy. Yes, that in turn brings “protection” to the people --- regardless of what the people want. That’s the nature of war.

Each district is different. While the fight in each has similarities with its neighbors, different tactical situations drive the approach to each. West saw a very kinetic fight in Sangin, but areas south of it have a very different situation. The Helmand provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, is set to transition sometime this summer, it was one of the initial districts targeted by President Karzai. Transition means pulling out the coalition forces from the district and allowing the Afghan forces to carry the fight themselves - of course we'll be in neighboring districts... Heck I was walking around the Marjeh bazaar without any body armor a few weeks ago. Big change from a year ago (or even 6 months).

[S2]

JCT Reply

"...Lashkar Gah, is set to transition sometime this summer..."

Guess we'll see if the ANA can make a transition permanent...or, at least, relatively stable. We won't really know sh!t until we're gone and can look back at what lies behind.

Think 1974/75 in 'Nam. We left some good troops behind. Also some not-so-good troops with a still very corrupt and weak government.

That show collapsed like the house-of-cards it was.

If I were the taliban right now I'd pull my battlefield leaders back to Pakistan, tell my home boys to lay low while ceding the ground to the ANA. Give every appearance of victory to the allies, hasten America's withdrawal while pumping the ANA's egos with a bloated sense of omnipotence.

Afterall, the taliban can enter and leave a district more or less at will. What can fade away now will easily return at a later date. Given the negligence and habitually poor attention to detail displayed by the Kabul government at the far end of the rope, there'll be the usual local graft/corruption to embitter the peasants and pave a taliban re-entry down the road in the near future.

No sense going toe-to-toe with the yanks. For all our faults we do the killing thang pretty well still. Why deal with that?

[Officer of Engineers]

Not the 1973 Vietnam exodos, but the 1987 Soviet leaving of Afghanistan. Kabul became stronger after the Soviets left. The ANA was winning, doing the traditional Afghan warfare. It was only after Yeltsin came to power that money, fuel, and ammo became lacking for the Kabul government to survive. And who won was not the Taliban, but two warlords who did not get paid on time and therefore switched sides.

The ANA is strainging to be unleashed. It is time to unleashed them and the Taliban will wish for the day before we left Afghanistan.

[S2]

OoE Reply

Colonel,

"The ANA is strainging to be unleashed. It is time to unleashed them and the Taliban will wish for the day before we left Afghanistan."

Sir, you may be correct. I remember a story of a Tajik-dominated ANP unit working in Kandahar with the Canadians that was purportedly rather good. They garnered no love lost among the pashtuns and, evidently, didn't care but the Canadians had no complaint and felt they pursued their work robustly.