Now what?

[Officer of Engineers]

Captain,

May I introduce USAF Master-Sergeant (Ret'd) Bluesman, formerly of CENTCOM, running intel ops to give you guys the best intel he can give you. He's still in that role as a civie working for uniforms, collecting, evaluating, and projecting intel for your echelon.

When he claims to be have been in this op, I don't doubt it for one second.

[astralis]

S-2, mihais,

Item 13. of Pt. I of the AR 15-6 report doesn't indicate that at all-

"The ANA soldiers maintained disciplined firing, did not fire wildly, as had sometimes been observed in other engagements."

I think you're off the mark on this engagement and it's only this engagement that is addressed on this thread.

the ETT stated that ANA did not sprayed and prayed,which might have led some US troops to wrongly believe they did not fought.A performance by ANA standards.

yup, you're right-- i missed that. the spray and pray from foxholes perception must have come from previous performances, though. glad to see they're improving.

[Michael C]

OoE Reply

I don't think I doubted his intelligence, merely the conclusion he drew. He said, "I stand by it: NOT A SINGLE one of them should be allowed on any American facility. NONE should carry weapons around American personnel.
If we find this to be impractical,"

I was commenting that yes this response is impractical. I did not question his role as a retired Master Sergeant nor his role as a civilian working in CENTCOM. I did not question his knowledge related to attacks on COP Keating or COP Kahler. Further I do not doubt his conclusions drawn about the ANP specifically at the battles of Kahler/Keating. However, his extrapolation that ANP should not work with coalition forces is his own opinion not drawn from the facts at hand. Disbanding the ANP or disallowing them from working with US forces would set the NATO mission behind at least ten years. We do not need to do that to succeed.

[Bluesman]

You are absolutely correct. Your answer to the problem of the ANP is completely impractical. The basis of any successful counter-insurgency is a strong Army and a strong police. The police fill a vital important role. Disbanding the entire Afghanistan National police is wholly impractical, unfeasible and tactical suicide.

With thoughts like, "I would tell my men they are to make any and all ANP hors d' combat as soon as the position is threatened." I am not surprised the ANP have run into the arms of the Taliban instead of the GIRoA and the Coalition. I would never want to be in a fox hole with someone willing to shoot me in the back, and neither would they.

That's WHY they should be rendered ineffective as soon as possible. Because THEY are the ones doing the back-shooting.

Look, I absolutely agree that the whole game centers around getting the Afghans (such as that word has any meaning at all) to take the primary security responsibilty on themselves. And I also agree that some kind of constabulary must be a part of that.

But not THIS one; not THESE guys. Start over. And I don't mean picking and choosing, because what we'll end up with is an uneven result going all the way from the treachery we have now to stand-up guys that are loyal to their oaths. But you can't tell who's who, just who is in charge of picking them, and THAT is where the trouble starts.

WRECK IT, and instead of going for big numbers and whole units started up from nothing but local guys, SELECT for loyalty and fidelity and possibly even talent. In other words, make PERFORMANCE the norm, and give the job some sort of prestige, while actually using the code of honor that these people live by to keep 'em on-side.

What we have now makes CORRUPTION the norm, and their value system sees nothing wrong in being part of a system that, while corrupt, allows them to feed their families. They have no loyalty to it; it's just a means to an end. It's EASY to turn your gun around in that situation.

Remember what happened: the ANP have, on multiple occasions and with tragic results, flipped to the enemy, and in the worst possible circumstances: when we thought they were with US during an engagement. None of those cases were brought about by Capt Bluesman's order to not trust an ANP in battle as far as you could throw him.

[Officer of Engineers]

Just to clarify, Capt Bluesman is MSgt Bluesman's wife.

[Michael C]

My solution

I understand your points about corruption and those who flip to the Taliban. I have a slightly different solution.

First, here is how I see the problem. The problem isn't that fifty or sixty percent of the ANP are corrupt, the problem is the ten percent that is corrupt or openly siding with the Taliban. So we have to ask why. In most of cases, for example at both COP Kahler and Keating, the ANP were at remote outposts that did not have frequent contact with either the ANA or coalitio forces. Thus, whenever they were attacked by Taliban, they had no back up. In a force really only equipped with AKs, and not even RPGs, they are destined to lose. The ANP flip to the Taliban because they fear dying by the Taliban without ANA or CF support. The ANA don't flip because they most of the time live with CF so they are safe.

The solution, which isn't unique, is more CF and ANA. The ANA should be the QRF for the ANP, and the CF should be the QRF for the ANA. In my AO this worked and most of the ANP, once they trusted this system, were turning against the Taliban. True it is one small example, but in my opinion it is better than dumping the entire ANP.

[Mihais]

Come from another angle.What % of the ANP in the S,those in direct contact with the Taliban are traitors?Those matter after all,not those at
Mazar-e-Sharif.

[Mihais]

The solution, which isn't unique, is more CF and ANA. The ANA should be the QRF for the ANP, and the CF should be the QRF for the ANA. In my AO this worked and most of the ANP, once they trusted this system, were turning against the Taliban. True it is one small example, but in my opinion it is better than dumping the entire ANP.

More defense.For God's sake,it's your army that has Offense among its principles of war.Isn't a better thing to do to hunt the enemy than allowing them to come close to local communities-hence ANP?

[S2]

Mihais Reply

I'd really like to stay with this battle and not wander off into general tactical/operational doctrine or larger issues about the organizational flaws of the ANP at a macro level. There's little doubt but that some of those trickled into the defense of the Wanat VPB. Still those flaws couldn't be addressed by the officers and men on the ground.

Mihais, you might review some of the articles by C.J. Shivers on the last page of the Valley of Death thread. They detail a night ambush conducted by our guys in the Korengal and then the next day reaction by the taliban.

EDIT: I see that you already have looked at those articles. My apology.

[Mihais]

No need,Sir. I stopped reading what happened to those particular ANP when ANA commandos move in and take the extra weapons,but leave each one of them with an AK.I went away to puke in disgust.Literally a ''smoking gun'' and still keep the AK.

[S2]

Mihais Reply

"Literally a ''smoking gun'' and still keep the AK..."

That was incomprehensible. I wonder who made such a decision?

OTOH, reducing their arsenal to this modest amount means that the ANA will not find them a direct threat should they have to move into the valley in our absence at some later point. In the interim, the ANP in Wanat can fly the Afghan flag as an ostensible government presence...

...for whatever that's worth.