Hakimullah Mehsud, Pakistan Taliban chief, killed in US drone attack: Report

[Agnostic Muslim]

Key word in there is former. So what are the ones in charge thinking going forward ?

The two individuals in question were in extremely important positions over a decade - DG ISI, DGMO, COAS, CJCSC etc. As COAS, Kayani nominated the individuals he preferred as DG ISI (Shuja Pasha), and had a key role in higher level promotions and appointments over 6 years. The top military leadership in Pakistan, at the moment, is essentially comprised of 'Kayani's men', and a look at the senior most generals in line for the COAS position (prior to Raheel Sharif taking over) illustrates his line of thinking more than anything:

1. Gen. Haroon-ul_Islam - Led the Swat/Peochar airborne assault (literally - was on the ground with troops during the operation), and was apparently such anathema to the TTP that they welcomed his being passed over for appointment to the COAS position and subsequent resignation, indicating that 'peace talks' would have had no chance had he been appointed given his role in leading the Swat operation

2. Gen. Raheel Sharif - Credited with advancing and implementing doctrinal and training changes to better equip the PA for COIN operations

3. Gen. Tariq Khan - Drastically reformed the paramilitary Frontier Corps and another general who 'led from the front' when it came to operations against the TTP

Between Gen. Ehsan-ul-Haq and Kayani alone, you have over a decade of leadership (in critical positions) in the PA that (in their own words) believed in rooting out extremism and recognized the danger posed to Pakistan from these extremist organizations. Why are you discounting their impact and continuing to maintain the old position of 'PA looks at extremists as strategic assets'?

Not about dismantling anything, its about regaining control of the militants. That is the primary objective.

And with a lack of political will, a weak economy, lack of resources and a divided public, 'regaining control' is going to be a very long term process.

They lost control to a degree due to the war in Afghanistan. They still believe they can ride the tiger. LeT & Haqqanis have been very useful both internally as well as externally.

How exactly have the LeT and Haqqanis been 'very useful' internally, and on the LeT side, externally?

There is no discernable change in how the establishment deals with militants.

The multiple military operations in FATA, the drastic reduction in infiltrations across the LoC and violence in IK over the past decade or so and the recent crackdown on the IJT in Lahore's Punjab University suggest otherwise.

I take that to mean do not expect progress against dismantling militant infrastructure in the near term. As not only is there no change in the strategic thinking of Pakistan, but even if Pakistan did sincerely decide to move against militants then there are perceptual, political & structural barriers that will get in the way.

'Dismantling militant infrastructure' is essentially a 'outright declaration of war' on these groups, which in turn will cause them to turn their guns completely against the State (and likely ally themselves with the TTP/AQ while doing so). The 'gradual process of establishing control' will have to be layered, involving several step, such as:

- Utilize existing contacts to reign in the kinetic operations conducted by these groups (as much as possible, and the record over the last several years indicates a degree of success in this measure)
- Build up public opinion, media and political pressure against the violent activities of these groups (again something we have seen tremendous progress on, given the criticism of the JI, LeJ etc.)
- Improve the capacity of civilian law enforcement and intelligence institutions (they are the ones who can lead a long term sustainable fight, with political support, against domestic extremist organizations)
- Crackdown on criminal activity that is the source of funding for these groups (this can be done without any overt declaration of war against the groups in question)
- Start eliminating/dismantling the easiest targets (Al Qaeda affiliated and sectarian extremists)

As far as an external observer is concerned for the next ten years it will be very difficult to gauge progress (if any) made towards dismantling terrorist infrastructure.

Unfortunately, you are correct. Determining progress, or lack of, will require careful analysis of events and trends in Pakistan.

Can you name some militant orgs that Pakistan has gotten rid of ?

The LeT (militant wing) is a shadow of its former self, in terms of operations outside of Pakistan. The political wing (JuD) has been growing, primarily through charitable works such as free clinics, relief operations for IDP's impacted by military operations and disaster relief - the key here is making sure that the JuD does not redirect their resources into militant/violent activities, and using existing contacts to impact leadership decisions within the JuD in an attempt to sideline the hardliners (Hafiz Saeed will die eventually ...)

LeJ is the only one i can think of in the last ten years that was cracked down upon by Musharraf, yet they are still around today. Because there is a nexus amongst these groups, pro-state or anti-state does not matter.

The LeJ/ASWJ conundrum is similar to that of the JuD/LeT - the ASWJ is the political wing of the LeJ, and has political affiliations with sections of the PMLN, which allow it to have a greater degree of freedom in parts of Punjab. However, since the group is focused on domestic sectarianism, it is easier for its terrorist wing to operate, build contacts with like-minded AQ and TTP affiliates, and continue to carry out sectarian terrorism - domestic terrorist organizations are a much 'tougher nut to crack' than India-focused groups.

[lemontree]

3. Gen. Tariq Khan - Drastically reformed the paramilitary Frontier Corps and another general who 'led from the front' when it came to operations against the TTP

How does a General "lead from the front" in COIN ops? Don't get me wrong, but this term is of no consequence in COIN ops w.r.t staff officers. Their job is totally different and they are not expected or required to be with operating troops.

Between Gen. Ehsan-ul-Haq and Kayani alone, you have over a decade of leadership (in critical positions) in the PA that (in their own words) believed in rooting out extremism and recognized the danger posed to Pakistan from these extremist organizations. Why are you discounting their impact and continuing to maintain the old position of 'PA looks at extremists as strategic assets'?

To root out extremism, the current Generals in PA would have to undo all that Zia-ul-Haq did. The influence of the JI is far too much in a professional organisation like the army, navy and air force. For starters the the zakat ordinance - which funds the jihadi machinary would have to be scrapped.

The official sanction to permit the JI & JUI to raise anti-India jihadi groups will have to be withdrawn along with closing the tap of arms supplies.

How exactly have the LeT and Haqqanis been 'very useful' internally, and on the LeT side, externally?

Internally - The Haqqanis are of no use to Pakistan.
Externally - (a) Carrying out Pak military campaign against NATO/US troops in Afghanistan.
(b) Training of anti-India jihadi groups in the Haqqani camps in Afghanistan pre-2001, and carrying ISI operations against the Indian Embassy in 2007 in Afghanistan.

The multiple military operations in FATA, the drastic reduction in infiltrations across the LoC and violence in IK over the past decade or so and the recent crackdown on the IJT in Lahore's Punjab University suggest otherwise.

Reduction of infiltration is not due to any reduction from Pak military efforts, infact it is IA efforts that have made a strong anti-infilration grid that have reduced infliration to a trickle. It is funny that you give credit to PA for reducted infiltrations in J&K when there is evidence to the contrary.

'Dismantling militant infrastructure' is essentially a 'outright declaration of war' on these groups, which in turn will cause them to turn their guns completely against the State (and likely ally themselves with the TTP/AQ while doing so). The 'gradual process of establishing control' will have to be layered, involving several step, such as:

It is easier than you are willing to agree:
- Cut off official funding to the Haqqanis, JI and JUI.
- Cut off official logistical and military support to the above three.
- Agree to work with India to live in harmony and make a EU sort of economic grid in the sub-continent.
- Ensure peace on the eastern borders so that you can secure Durand line. Continued shelter to the Haqqanis has taken away control of Waziristan from Pak civil authorities.

Confrontation with India has harmed Pakistan more than India, the J&K borders on either side are not changing anytime soon.

[Tronic]

infact it is IA efforts that have made a strong anti-infilration grid that have reduced infliration to a trickle.

That, and the preoccupation of the Jihadis against NATO and ISAF forces in Afghanistan..

[Double Edge]

Reduction of infiltration is not due to any reduction from Pak military efforts, infact it is IA efforts that have made a strong anti-infilration grid that have reduced infliration to a trickle. It is funny that you give credit to PA for reducted infiltrations in J&K when there is evidence to the contrary.

I think he's referring to the reduction in infiltration while the compost dialog was on in 2004 attributed to Musharaf. Since Kashmir was off the table the militants started an all India campaign with numerous domestic bombings. This was mostly through financing and culminated with 26/11.

Although it failed to commit fully to counterinsurgency efforts in FATA or to engage in any meaningful counterterrorism activities in the settled areas during the early to mid-2000s, the Musharraf regime did rein in pro-state groups fighting in Kashmir and took steps to thin their ranks. Following the launch of the peace process with India in early 2004—known as the Composite Dialogue—and accompanying back-channel negotiations, militants were directed to wage a controlled jihad in Kashmir for which support ebbed and flowed thereafter. Kashmir-centric militant groups were curtailed further in response to international pressure the following year, and by 2006–07, militant activity declined signifcantly on that front, thanks in large part to the efforts of the Musharraf regime.

The ISI reportedly paid militant leaders to temper their activities and keep their cadre in line and sought to convince many of those no longer active in Kashmir to their training camps. These men were provided food, board, and in some cases a stipend. In other words, they were paid not to fight. Many were kept in reserve. Some were channeled into their respective group’s above ground organizations, and others were steered toward early retirement and occasionally given assistance in finding a job. Positive inducements were coupled with threats of retribution against those militants who disobeyed the directive to reduce their activities in Indian-administered Kashmir. The aim was to rein in, not dismantle, militant groups and hold their members in reserve, either to be demobilized or reengaged depending on regional developments.

Attempts to rein in historically Kashmir-centric groups were juxtaposed with rising support for Afghan-centric proxies, most notably the Afghan Taliban of Mullah Omar and the Haqqani network. Rather than remain inactive, some militants from Kashmir-centric groups migrated toward the Afghan front via FATA, tapping into the Afghan-centric militant infrastructure that remained relatively untouched despite repeated military incursions. These westward migrating militants linked up with pro-state groups, most notably the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network but also with al-Qaeda members and other foreign fighters, Pashtun militants who had been fighting the Pakistan military since 2002, and many of the men from various Punjabi groups who already had fled there. The destruction of portions of the training infrastructure in Pakistan-administered Kashmir during the 2005 South Asia earthquake and the release of those men jailed in the 2003–04 crackdown following the failed Musharraf assassination attempts increased the militant migration.

In the process, these militants began contributing to attacks against the Pakistani state as well as fighting on the Afghan front. Close observers assert that elements in the army and ISI continued to believe that they could manage militant organizations by working through leaders of extant organizations and local leaders in FATA to control their cadre, eliminating individual “bad apples” when this top-down approach failed. Collectively, these efforts were ad hoc, poorly coordinated, underresourced, often reactive, and suggestive of a laissez-faire approach predicated on the assumption of control over the militant milieu.

It changed with Kayani, a shift back towards Kashmir and slow down the all India campaign, result is domestic bombings reduced to a trickle since 26/11.

Under Musharraf, Pakistan had reined in its India-centric proxies but did so with no intention of dismantling them and nowhere to channel them. In contrast to Musharraf, who pushed to advance the peace process with India, Kayani took a “tough, matter-of-fact line” on Pakistan’s neighbor to the east. In one respect, this stance was deemed a necessary corrective to the policies of the Musharraf regime, which the army leadership believed had conceded too much by reducing support for the Kashmir jihad without securing a political payoff in return. However, it also appears to have been part of a broader attempt to appease pro-state militants previously focused on India, some of who had become involved in attacks at home. The military and ISI also engaged some of these India-centric groups, most notably LeT, to arrest anti-state violence by former members and freelancers in their ranks who began contributing to the insurgency in Pakistan following the deescalation of support for the Kashmir jihad.

Leaders from JeM and LeT’s aboveground wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), claim that they were provided additional resources to keep current members in line and induce former members who might be assisting anti-state militants either purposefully or inadvertently to return to the fold. The aim may have been to gather information from these former members, monitor them, and control their activities to the highest degree possible. ISI officers also reportedly goaded LeT leaders to reindoctrinate former and current members against launching attacks in Pakistan, and local clerics were encouraged to deliver the message that jihad in Pakistan was haram (forbidden).

Similar efforts, according to one of their number, were undertaken with JeM. When forced to rein in LeT further following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the ISI facilitated a pathway for increased presence in Afghanistan, where the group’s fighters began appearing in greater numbers in late 2009 and early 2010. In short, when it appeared that some militants from India-centric pro-state groups were getting out of line, the response was to engage those groups to rectify the problem. Moreover, no evidence in the open source indicates whether these efforts were successful.

The army and ISI have kept LeT from launching any major attacks against India since Mumbai in 2008, but the group is allowed to maintain low-level activities and is unlikely to be dismantled as long as major geopolitical disputes with New Delhi remain.

Today is a gradual stepping up of the Kashmir effort, as there is no progress on dialog so the infiltrations are trying to build up lost momentum since 2004.

[anil]

Many of the problems in J&K could be solved if it were divided into three states:

1) Jammu 2) Kashmir and 3) Ladakh

Kashmir could remain under article 370 while jammu and ladakh could be fully connected with the rest of the country



Ladakh already operates in autonomous district councils besides they are asking for a separate state, sometimes alone and sometimes along with the region of jammu.

[lemontree]

I think he's referring to the reduction in infiltration while the compost dialog was on in 2004 attributed to Musharaf. Since Kashmir was off the table the militants started an all India campaign with numerous domestic bombings. This was mostly through financing and culminated with 26/11.

Only the shelling and firing on the LOC stopped. The infiltrations remained the same.

Post Gujarat 2002 - the ISI-LeT combine targeted rest of India especially Gujarat and Mahrashtra.

It changed with Kayani, a shift back towards Kashmir and slow down the all India campaign, result is domestic bombings reduced to a trickle since 26/11.

The reason why Pakistan had to put a stop to the bomb attacks was that they were crossing a threshold, where after every attack they ended up pleading to the US to hold back India.

The US has played a big role in holding back India, mainly due to the presence and vulnerability of NATO/US troops in Afghanistan.

[Double Edge]

Only the shelling and firing on the LOC stopped. The infiltrations remained the same.

Do you know of any site or data that tracks infiltrations, would be interesting to see how the figures tally.

The reason why Pakistan had to put a stop to the bomb attacks was that they were crossing a threshold, where after every attack they ended up pleading to the US to hold back India.

The US has played a big role in holding back India, mainly due to the presence and vulnerability of NATO/US troops in Afghanistan.

This implies that Pakistan has had some degree of success in reining in their anti-india groups. A few freelancers got through but there is a definite drop in momentum compared to say 2005-2008.

The assumption that it is possible to control a militant is something i've yet to buy into.The results are mixed.

[lemontree]

Do you know of any site or data that tracks infiltrations, would be interesting to see how the figures tally.

Jammu and Kashmir Data Sheet - List
This is one site where you get a lot of data.
Try seeing the "Assessment" pages for year wise details.

This implies that Pakistan has had some degree of success in reining in their anti-india groups.

Pakistan has complete control over them.

A few freelancers got through but there is a definite drop in momentum compared to say 2005-2008.

There are no freelance anti-India jihadi groups.

The assumption that it is possible to control a militant is something i've yet to buy into.The results are mixed.

Depends what you are implying and in what context. Is you question in general or is it Pakistan related?

[Double Edge]

Jammu and Kashmir Data Sheet - List
This is one site where you get a lot of data.
Try seeing the "Assessment" pages for year wise details.

ok, lets examine this claim that Musharraf reined in the anti-india orgs post 2004.

Estimated Infiltration since 2001

We see a 70% decrease in infiltrations from 2004. but home ministry's data does not go beyond 2006. Still its enough to make the point.

The assesment pages paint a better picture.

Jammu and Kashmir Assessment - Year 2010
Jammu and Kashmir Assessment - Year 2013

The fatalities trend is consistently downward. Due to a combination of factors though. better COIN, fatigue, afghan war, interlocutors engagement from 2011 etc.

Pakistan has complete control over them.

Depends on the group, LeT i'd imagine they have better control over than others as LeT politics is closer to Pak ideology.

But we still have leakage despite what Musharaf said. However the reduction is significant. What we see here is the best or close to what the paks can do ie ~70% reduction. This is what 'reining in' means. The assessment figures show a decline in fatalities through the last decade. I'm not able to tell to what extent Pakistan played in this post Mushrraf. Did they increase infiltrations but were stopped more effectively or did the trend in infiltrations continue to stay low. Given kayani's stance i'd think infiltrations would increase.

There are no freelance anti-India jihadi groups.

Splinters exist, disgruntled members who think the Pak state is going soft on India or worse, the Pak state has 'sinned' and deserves retribution. Militants are free to come & go or join other groups. Anyone with an axe to grind against Afghanistan/India/Pakistan can do so. Proscribed orgs continue to exist despite being legally banned.

Depends what you are implying and in what context. Is you question in general or is it Pakistan related?

How well can Pakistan ride the tiger. How well have they done it so far and how much longer can they continue to do so. So as not to have to dismantle militant groups but just get them to not kill their own and use them as strategic assets against Afghanistan or India. Whether this idea is viable. As to continue to do so delays action against anti-pak groups.

The biggest problem with decommisionning militants is what to do with them. These people became militants because they have a 'taste for violence'. When infilitrations dropped against india in the 2004-2007 time frame, these militants went over to the western border to fight over there, some retired. Without a way to re-integrate them back into society any progress Pakistan makes against militants, regain control or reining in is going to be ephemeral. Militants get restless and will join any group so long as there is pay & action. pro pak or anti-pak does not matter.

Kayani took over Nov '07, changed things around so infiltration numbers will creep up. Reason we are given is there was no political payoff from India. What if he had to appease the militants to prevent them from attacking Pakistan. So the question of how sustainable is this 'control' comes up. They can be controlled so long as they get to do what they want and nobody stops them.

How successful has Pakistan has been in controlling militancy and holding on to that control. There are three examples
- going after SSP/LeJ in the 90s-2000 (mixed results despite being determined)
- holding back India centric militants 2004-2007 (lasted about 3 years that too only against Kashmir, terrorist financing increased but has reduced since 26/11)
- holding territory since the 2008-2009 COIN operations in FATA (not found any literature that speaks about how enduring the success of those operations has been but the problem from what i can tell is follow up has not been good, PA performed a sweep and once the army pulled out the militants return)

[Double Edge]

The LeT (militant wing) is a shadow of its former self, in terms of operations outside of Pakistan. The political wing (JuD) has been growing, primarily through charitable works such as free clinics, relief operations for IDP's impacted by military operations and disaster relief - the key here is making sure that the JuD does not redirect their resources into militant/violent activities, and using existing contacts to impact leadership decisions within the JuD in an attempt to sideline the hardliners (Hafiz Saeed will die eventually ...)

JuD is mainstream now. JuD has not renounced violence. Hafiz Saeed leads Difa-e-Pakistan (Defence of Pakistan Council).

DFP ia a coalition of more than forty political-religious parties, some of whose leaders either have ties to or head militant groups, the DPC quickly came to be seen after its formation as a stalking horse for the security establishment.

Hafiz Saeed—leader of LeT and its aboveground JuD—and Maulana Samiul Haq—leader of JUI-S and often referred to as the Father of the Taliban—co-chair the DPC. Other leaders include Ahmed Ludhianvi, head of SSP; Abdur Rehman Makki and Amir Hamza, both of LeT/JuD though the latter has launched his own front group; and Hamid Gul, the former DG ISI and outspoken supporter of Pakistani jihadism. Ahmed Ludhianvi’s presence on the DPC and public posture vis-à-vis the army is notable. He is on record asserting that “the army is the largest institution of this country, so it holds a lot of importance for us and we are willing to fight for them.” Yet he heads the latest incarnation of the SSP, now known as Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat, which has fed insurgency against the state.

The LeJ/ASWJ conundrum is similar to that of the JuD/LeT - the ASWJ is the political wing of the LeJ, and has political affiliations with sections of the PMLN, which allow it to have a greater degree of freedom in parts of Punjab. However, since the group is focused on domestic sectarianism, it is easier for its terrorist wing to operate, build contacts with like-minded AQ and TTP affiliates, and continue to carry out sectarian terrorism - domestic terrorist organizations are a much 'tougher nut to crack' than India-focused groups.

Yes but did you know that it was PMLN itself that started the crack down on SSP & LeJ in the 90s. So this is one example of how Pakistan has tried to deal with a militant group and couldn't do it. The militants prevailed and still do.

The Case of SSP and LeJ

As sectarian violence escalated during the 1990s, the PML-N government cracked down on SSP and its militant offshoot LeJ, seriously degrading their networks. Although the Musharraf regime escalated support for Kashmir-centric groups after taking power in 1999, it continued the PML-N government’s assault on LeJ, banning it in August 2001. Pakistan protected most of its militant groups after 9/11 but did crack down hard on LeJ, driving many of the group’s members to turn against the state. However, for domestic political reasons, SSP was allowed to continue operating, enabling LeJ to tap into its infrastructure to regenerate. Its members rebuilt their networks across Pakistan, with strongholds in North Waziristan, Karachi, and Balochistan, as well as parts of Punjab. They are now at the forefront of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, especially against members of the Shia community.

Some speak of a controlled versus an uncontrolled LeJ, the former headed by Malik Ishaq in Punjab and the latter operating from North Waziristan and known as LeJ al-Alami (International). However, experts familiar with the group perceive this to be a false dichotomy.

Malik Ishaq was accused of thirty-fi ve cases of murder, including the assassination of an Iranian diplomat in 1997. An antiterrorism court (ATC) sentenced him to death, but the Supreme Court overturned that sentence and closed the case in 2011. By that time, the ATC judge who issued the initial sentence had escaped the country, and many of the witnesses to the crime, including a senior police officer, had been murdered.Ishaq was acquitted of murder charges in the other cases as well because of lack of evidence, in many cases because witnesses either died or refused to testify.

While still in prison, Ishaq was twice employed by the military to negotiate with militants—once during the Lal Masjid incident and once when anti-state elements attacked the military’s general headquarters and took hostages. This has fueled speculation that the security establishment might have helped to engineer his release. However, reports also circulated that Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, the current chief of SSP, met Ishaq at the request of Shahbaz Sharif, the younger brother of Nawaz Sharif and chief minister of Punjab province, to offer him a conditional release provided he refrain from militant activities.

Whether military or political offi cials interceded on his behalf or Ishaq’s release was a simple result of witness intimidation and inadequacies in the judicial system is unclear. It is clear, however, that his release and subsequent sectarian sermons coincided with another escalation in the terrorist campaign by LeJ against the Shia.

LeJ executed a spate of attacks against members of Pakistan’s Hazara community, especially in Balochistan, in the wake of Ishaq’s release. The group claimed credit for these attacks and even circulated an open letter stating that “our successful jihad against the Hazaras in Pakistan and, in particular, in Quetta, is ongoing and will continue in the future.” Much of this is driven by sectarian enmity, though it is notable that in Afghanistan the Hazaras are historically an enemy of the Taliban.

Rumors persist about Pakistani military support for LeJ militants in Balochistan to degrade the separatist insurgency in that province. There is no evidence of an institutionalized policy, however, and the military has denied these charges vociferously. It is possible some officers overlook or abet LeJ activities because they are seen as targeting enemies of the state.

Rumors also persist that external powers, including Saudi Arabia, are helping fund a sectarian proxy war along the lines of what occurred during the 1990s. This too is impossible to confirm, but even if it were true, the actors involved are endogenous to Pakistan.

Amid speculation about tacit support from some individuals in the military for LeJ’s activities in Balochistan, civilian politicians are also accused of culpability. The SSP, which is part of the DPC, reportedly engaged in seat adjustments with the PML-N in Punjab for the elections, meaning that in some cases the two parties agreed to not fi eld candidates against one another. This agreement is in addition to courting SSP leaders, such as Ahmed Ludhianvi, for endorsements and assistance delivering vote banks.

Once again, the PML-N is not the only mainstream political party to engage in such activities, but it is viewed as one of the bigger offenders in this regard.

Beyond vote-bank politics, the PML-N was reluctant to crack down on the Punjab-based leadership for fear of triggering a wave of terrorist attacks in a province where it needed to (and did) win big in the elections. In short, the same PML-N that led the charge against the SSP and LeJ in the 1990s courted, and in some cases cooperated, with the same entities.

Unfortunately, you are correct. Determining progress, or lack of, will require careful analysis of events and trends in Pakistan.

Then how will the GOP convince the people that progress against militancy is being made ?

There is a draft policy in the works which is very ambitious. Could not find a copy of it. Reportedly it aims to dismantle, contain, prevent, educate & re-integrate militants. All the buzz words.

India tried to do something less ambitious in 2009 but could not get it done. Law & order is a state subject and the majority of states opposed it. So to get this done in Pakistan where law & order is also a state subject will require the provinces to agree, tricky.

How exactly have the LeT and Haqqanis been 'very useful' internally, and on the LeT side, externally?

Internally:
- LeT is used to counter the TTP's ideology as well as to gather intelligence on anti-state groups.

LeT has carried out a propaganda campaign against al-Qaeda and the TTP—despite cooperating with both at the operational level in Afghanistan—demonizing them for launching attacks in Pakistan.

LeT has published books and produced a number of audio cassettes criticizing al-Qaeda and the TTP and labeling their members apostates, a message that its leaders also deliver during sermons. Its leaders assert that accusing another Muslim of apostasy, as al-Qaeda and the TTP have done to the Pakistani authorities, is a dangerous practice and that if there is any reason to doubt the accusation than the accuser has sinned gravely. To defend the Pakistani state’s cooperation with America, LeT leaders and clerics argue that cooperating with non-Muslims for worldly profit (in this case foreign aid) makes a Muslim misguided, but not an apostate. Indeed, Muslims are only apostates if they actively fight against other Muslims, and LeT leaders argue that operations in the Tribal Areas do not count because this is done to protect the Pakistani population. Further, they aver that those who murder Muslims instead of fighting the true enemy—that is, Christians, Jews, and Hindus—are apostates.

The Pakistani security services also use pro-state groups, such as LeT, to gather intelligence on these actors and, at times, to neutralize them. There is speculation that Punjab provincial authorities have financed JeM for security purposes, though whether this amounted to countering anti-state militants, helping keeping law and order, serving political interests, or simply paying off the group to remain quiescent is unclear.

Similarly, during Operation Zalzala, the Taliban commander Mullah Nazir was given covert support to attack Uzbek militants who enjoyed the protection of his rival Baitullah Mehsud.

These efforts are part of a broader bid to regain control over the militant infrastructure rather than to dismantle it, and they inform Pakistan’s ongoing support for certain pro-state actors.

- Afghan Taliban & Haqqanis were used to temper the TTP to reorient its focus towards Afghanistan.

The Haqqani network and Afghan Taliban act as diplomatic interfaces with the TTP. This includes interceding on specific issues as well as providing private and sometimes public guidance favorable to Pakistan’s interests. The network’s ability to play this role stems in part from the fact that it is an important conduit for many TTP fighters to the jihad in Afghanistan. Ironically, the same group Pakistan relies on to influence the landscape in FATA is also responsible for enabling al-Qaeda, the TTP, and a host of other anti-state militants operating from North Waziristan.

The Haqqani network, in particular, has played this diplomatic liaison role by helping the military to “manage hostilities, gain access to TTP leaders, and try to shape the direction and priorities of militant groups in the FATA, especially those waging jihad against Islamabad.”

Its leaders reportedly helped mediate a number of the cease-fire agreements and peace deals between the military and TTP commanders in North and South Waziristan. They were also instrumental in securing the release of Pakistan’s former ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Azizuddin, whom TTP militants kidnapped in 2008. To do so, Pakistan paid a $2.5 million ransom to Baitullah Mehsud and released a number of TTP militants as well as two high-ranking members of the Afghan Taliban. Mullah Obaidullah Akhund was one of the Afghan Taliban members released and was third in command behind Mullah Omar and his deputy. He was also the most senior Afghan Taliban leader the Pakistani authorities had captured after 9/11.

Such exchanges benefit not only the military and the TTP but also the Haqqani network, whose commanders leverage their ties to both sides to maintain their influence.

For example, in February 2009, leaders from the Haqqani network helped create the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen (SIM). This umbrella group consisted of Afghan and Pakistani militants, including those involved in anti-state violence. Mullah Omar publicly reiterated his instructions that SIM, like all militant entities, focus on fighting in Afghanistan rather than attacking Pakistan. It is generally believed that initiatives such as these were undertaken at the ISI’s behest. The Pakistani military also made efforts to prevail on other FATA-based militants to withhold support from those actors attacking Pakistan and remain focused on Afghanistan. In exchange, these entities were not targeted during military campaigns in FATA.

Alleged calls by Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Afghan Taliban amir, to stop attacks in Pakistan at a time when his movement was exploring confidence-building negotiations with the U.S. exacerbated disagreements over whether to reduce violence. After months of relative calm, however, attacks began increasing once again in Pakistan’s northwest in spring 2012

during Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009–10), Pakistan brokered deals with Mullah Nazir’s group in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan in which both were asked to refuse sanctuary or safe passage to TTP militants in exchange for aid and a cease-fire agreement

- PMLN as well as PTI benefited and yet were silent about TTP attacking secular political parties like ANP, PPP & MQM who were blamed by the TTP for supporting incursions into FATA. During the PPP's time in office both opposition parties did nothing calculating they could benefit by turning a blind eye to militancy.

Pakistan’s major parties are all guilty of seeking support from Islamist organizations tied to militant groups to secure seats in parliament, but the PML-N in particular has been criticized for courting extremist organizations such as the SSP and JuD in order to make electoral gains. According to several JuD officials with whom the author spoke, politicians from the PPP and PML-N have sought their organization’s support. The central secretary general of SSP averred that during the 2008 elections almost all the major political parties, including the PPP, PML-N, ANP, PMLQ, and the JUI, had sought his party’s support in the four provinces of the country.

Externally:
LT answered this one.