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Colonel,
You open the floor on this matter so let's explore it. America, without question, conveyed our determination and stark perspective post 9/11 to Pakistan.
Still, however much Musharraf would like to caricaturize America as a raving bully by insinuating "stone age" we left how matters would proceed to them. So what we have is Pakistan wishing to have their cake and eat it too.
We MIGHT have made war upon Pakistan had they chosen to openly obstruct our post 9/11 immediate plans in Afghanistan. We, however, didn't say as much nor remotely suggest "stone age".
OTOH, how much was Pakistan presuming immediately post 9/11 regarding America? Did their own threat analysis suggest the possibility that we might make war upon them? If so, then were they likely to perceive any hint at our determination to take action in Afghanistan as a suggestion that Pakistan couldn't be far behind should they choose an open rejection?
Sir, this is conjecture. We don't actually KNOW what the ISI's independant analysis following 9/11 might have been. We can, however, presume that there'd been intensive meetings in Islamabad/Rawalpindi almost immediately following the attacks.
I can't speak for the actual level of fear and trepidation existing among them at the time but if we leveraged that obliquely then that certainly shouldn't be surprising to anybody.
Colonel,
You open the floor on this matter so let's explore it. America, without question, conveyed our determination and stark perspective post 9/11 to Pakistan.
Still, however much Musharraf would like to caricaturize America as a raving bully by insinuating "stone age" we left how matters would proceed to them. So what we have is Pakistan wishing to have their cake and eat it too.
We MIGHT have made war upon Pakistan had they chosen to openly obstruct our post 9/11 immediate plans in Afghanistan. We, however, didn't say as much nor remotely suggest "stone age".
OTOH, how much was Pakistan presuming immediately post 9/11 regarding America? Did their own threat analysis suggest the possibility that we might make war upon them? If so, then were they likely to perceive any hint at our determination to take action in Afghanistan as a suggestion that Pakistan couldn't be far behind should they choose an open rejection?
Sir, this is conjecture. We don't actually KNOW what the ISI's independant analysis following 9/11 might have been. We can, however, presume that there'd been intensive meetings in Islamabad/Rawalpindi almost immediately following the attacks.
I can't speak for the actual level of fear and trepidation existing among them at the time but if we leveraged that obliquely then that certainly shouldn't be surprising to anybody.
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