Indian Nuclear Testing

[Cactus]

In many ways, India and Pakistan are still infants to the nuclear weapons states. They're still in awe with nukes without having gone through the experience that it limits far more than it projects.
...

OK, colonel, let us accept it and leave it that. Like all infants they will grow, try to push the boundaries of what can and cannot be done, in somethings they will succeed and in others they will fail; then they will learn to accept those boundaries and live with it (or die, as the case may be). As they say in that part of the world, jo hona hai, so hoga (what is ordained to happen, will happen).

[Officer of Engineers]

OK, colonel, let us accept it and leave it that. Like all infants they will grow, try to push the boundaries of what can and cannot be done, in somethings they will succeed and in others they will fail; then they will learn to accept those boundaries and live with it (or die, as the case may be).

Situation understood though it must be said that you forced me really to think things through about what FM Nie and Gen Sundarji really meant. It was hard enough concept to work through that deterrence is NOT warfighting. I have to thank you for that.

As they say in that part of the world, jo hona hai, so hoga (what is ordained to happen, will happen).

Don't take quantum mechanics, string theory, or M-theory.

[antimony]

Also, there is nothing new in Pakistani actions. I've seen it before. China against the USSR. Having nukes does not stop one power or its nuclear armed opposition from exercising military actions to settle affairs in their favour. It just try to prevent a nuclear war. Nothing more. Nothing less.

Now, ask yourself this. Is there a Pakistani keyholder who would be so willingly to invite 100 nukes onto Pakistani cities? Because that in the end is exactly what you're suggesting. No matter how many nukes the Paks will deliver onto India, the end result would still be 100 Pak cities full of burning babies if they're lucky, eating fecess and drinking urine if they're not.

And that was Stuart Slade's point. Nukes create more barriers than paths. To rid of those barriers, you have to move away from nukes as your primary focus.

In many ways, India and Pakistan are still infants to the nuclear weapons states. They're still in awe with nukes without having gone through the experience that it limits far more than it projects.

Col,

Here's the rub. You as a military man with training and experience of the Cold War understand that the key to a successful nuclear doctrine is to avoid an exchange if possible. Seems like the military planners at both ends understand that too.

The civilian population in either country, and therefore by extension the ordinary political class does not understand this and are either too jubiliant on the Pakistani side or too indignant on the Indian side. This is exacerbated by the Pakistani establishment's frequent threats about either the nukes falling in the wrong hands if they are not helped financially or of instant retribution for any Indian "misadeventure".

At the end of the day I am unsure whether to call Pakistan's stance a resounding success (for averting a full blown exchange) or a colossal failure (for inviting world scorn and inciting calls for nuclear tests by India)

At the

[Officer of Engineers]

Here's the rub. You as a military man with training and experience of the Cold War understand that the key to a successful nuclear doctrine is to avoid an exchange if possible. Seems like the military planners at both ends understand that too.

Well, you are understanding it, aren't you?

The civilian population in either country, and therefore by extension the ordinary political class does not understand this and are either too jubiliant on the Pakistani side or too indignant on the Indian side.

But have you noticed that Indian military planners could not careless nor are Pakistani planners jumping up for joy for the supposed failure of the Indian Pu test?

Has an Indian General or a Pakistani General come out and said the Indian arsenal is useless?

This is exacerbated by the Pakistani establishment's frequent threats about either the nukes falling in the wrong hands if they are not helped financially or of instant retribution for any Indian "misadeventure".

No one buys that arguement. Please take a look at Nuclear Notebook, Pakisanti nuclear forces, 2009. There's a picture of the Pakistani nuclear weapons storage site.

If opened source identify Pak nuke sites ... well, closed source would at least know a bit more.

At the end of the day I am unsure whether to call Pakistan's stance a resounding success (for averting a full blown exchange) or a colossal failure (for inviting world scorn and inciting calls for nuclear tests by India)

It is at best a work in progress. Deterrence is not static. It has to react to the force opposing it. If that force increae, deterrence also has to increae. By the same token, if the opposing force decreases, the deterence also must decrease ... or else, it invites a first strike because it is a tipping of the balance.

Again, I ask, what is an acceptable Pakistani nuclear arsenal?

[middle earth]

Can’t India simulate the bang? How difficult is it?

[Officer of Engineers]

For a new bomb? Maybe and I would say, yes. For an aged arsenal? No.

[middle earth]

Could I understand that other nuclear powers’ old arsenals need to be tested too, or they have passed that phase?

[Officer of Engineers]

Could I understand that other nuclear powers’ old arsenals need to be tested too, or they have passed that phase?

The last series of tests before the CTBT took effect was to create the dataset for an aged arsenal by all N5 members.

[middle earth]

The last series of tests before the CTBT took effect was to create the dataset for an aged arsenal by all N5 members.

Thanks, I never knew that.

[Deltacamelately]

Again, I ask, what is an acceptable Pakistani nuclear arsenal?

Sir,

Take a leaf...
Considering the coldwar and the two poles, only the Russian in the Soviet block were having nukes in their hands against more than 2 nations having 20000+ nukes matching them. They had to make contingencies for more than one adversary, knowing that the Brits had evolved from targeting 100+ Russian cities to targeting Moscow with 100+ nukes. India has to watch its both sides and that explains the Pak arsenal size and type. A TN arsenal could come into play precisely at this juncture, even if 100 12KT fission devices would be perfect to downsize the Pak population to a 3rd and the Chinese population to a 5th.

[Officer of Engineers]

Major,

I concede the point that India has to watch two nuclear armed neighbours and possibly two more external threats (Iran and North Korea) but again, the question is not answered. What is an acceptable Pakistani nuclear arsenal?

A follow up question is how would India get Pakistan to accept such an arsenal?

[greatindian]

Major,

I concede the point that India has to watch two nuclear armed neighbours and possibly two more external threats (Iran and North Korea) but again, the question is not answered. What is an acceptable Pakistani nuclear arsenal?

A follow up question is how would India get Pakistan to accept such an arsenal?

India has to watch two neighbors and should therefore have enough nukes to deter both together instead of one at a time. In such scenario, around 200 seems plausible. 50 for Pakistan and 150 for China.

Regarding what is acceptable deterrence for Pakistan, it is very difficult to tell. If pakistan looks to deter India, may be 50-100 nukes are enough. But if Pakistan looks for parity, then it will be a big trouble. Making more nukes by Pakistan should be made prohibitively costly both economically and by military means. How it will be done is the big question?

[greatindian]

It is at best a work in progress. Deterrence is not static. It has to react to the force opposing it. If that force increae, deterrence also has to increae. By the same token, if the opposing force decreases, the deterence also must decrease ... or else, it invites a first strike because it is a tipping of the balance.

Again, I ask, what is an acceptable Pakistani nuclear arsenal?

Sir, I agree, deterrence is not static. But India's situation in this case is that of a person between a rock and a hard place. Deterrence should be adequate and proportional to the size (number of targets) of the enemy country. Deterrence should only change when there is a possibility of defense against the nukes (for example - ABM defense) or when there is a very weak second strike capability.

[n21]

Major,

I concede the point that India has to watch two nuclear armed neighbours and possibly two more external threats (Iran and North Korea) but again, the question is not answered. What is an acceptable Pakistani nuclear arsenal?

A follow up question is how would India get Pakistan to accept such an arsenal?

If we go by the comments by the IA chief, it may have been already crossed.

[Officer of Engineers]

If we go by the comments by the IA chief, it may have been already crossed.

I'm still trying to figure out what Gen Kapoor is thinking.