Originally posted by calass
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The only actual close source revelation was USN Admiral Mullen's one word reply to the question, is Pakistan expanding her arsenal. Adm Mullen responded yes. That was spring of this year. Hans took his cue from that and did his mumble jumble and came up with 30 more warheads than last year.
Had it not been for Adm Mullen's testimony, I would have dismissed this year's report.
Originally posted by calass
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Pakistans Nuclear Doctrine
‘Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine’
Both points to a role, nuclear warfighting, that I can quite understand but also know that the Pak arsenal is not upto task. What is revealling is that a Pakistani LGen trying to explain Pak nuke doctrine might as well be in la-la land. The author of the 1st article, LGen (Ret'd) Sardar FS Lodi is no K. Sundarji.
From Pakistans Nuclear Doctrine
Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine would therefore essentially revolve around the first-strike option. In other words we will use nuclear weapons if attacked by India even if the attack is with conventional weapons. With his American experience of a graduated nuclear response Professor Stephen P. Cohen feels that Pakistan would use what he calls an 'option-enhancing policy' for a possible use of nuclear weapons. This would entail a stage-by-stage approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step to deter India from attack. The first step could be a public or private warning, the second a demonstration explosion of a small nuclear weapon on its own soil, the third step would be the use of a few nuclear weapons on its own soil against Indian attacking forces. The fourth stage would be used against critical but purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan. Probably in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing least collateral damage. this may prevent Indian retaliation against cities in Pakistan. Some weapon systems would be in reserve for the counter-value role. These weapons would be safe from Indian attack as some would be airborne while the ground based ones are mobile and could be moved around the country.
Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine would therefore essentially revolve around the first-strike option. In other words we will use nuclear weapons if attacked by India even if the attack is with conventional weapons. With his American experience of a graduated nuclear response Professor Stephen P. Cohen feels that Pakistan would use what he calls an 'option-enhancing policy' for a possible use of nuclear weapons. This would entail a stage-by-stage approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step to deter India from attack. The first step could be a public or private warning, the second a demonstration explosion of a small nuclear weapon on its own soil, the third step would be the use of a few nuclear weapons on its own soil against Indian attacking forces. The fourth stage would be used against critical but purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan. Probably in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing least collateral damage. this may prevent Indian retaliation against cities in Pakistan. Some weapon systems would be in reserve for the counter-value role. These weapons would be safe from Indian attack as some would be airborne while the ground based ones are mobile and could be moved around the country.
I don't know if this guy is in la-la land or need a serious course in military axioms of killing the enemy.
The 2nd article, however, is a wealth of information, in Pakistani nuclear diplomatic history with India, attempts at arms control, and lack thereof, the final response to a 1st strike doctrine.
However, both articles made it clear that within the historic context, Pakistan prefers the minimum reprisal. LGen Lodi suggested Pakistan 50 to India's 150. India is nowhere near 150.
So, the question is what changed to prompt this new estimate? Adm Mullen isn't talking.
Originally posted by calass
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