Did pakistan ever even develop nuclear weapons?

[Adux]

I assume you meant to write you don't like pakistanis NOR pakistan as a country. Yes, I suspected that but thanks for confirming it.

I have no special interest in the destruction or greatness of Pakistan as a country. I rather have them live happily. It doesnt matter to me what you conjure up my thoughts are. Frankly I am not above biasesness, and I dont need you to tell me that. I am very much disappointed in Pakistani mentality and their sense of morality and justice. Which I may add is far different and medival compared to the rest of the world. A country which is the harbour of all known terrorist of the world, The country which is being used by Oil Shiekhs of the Gulf to run their war, but all the while keeping their own countries all very western friendly, Because of which I cant travel properly around the world, unfortuantly for me my skin colour resembles that of the people who creates the most troubles and death

[Neo]

I don't see a mushroom cloud though. Shouldn't a shroom cloud come up or were the nukes too deep for that?

Myshroom cloud only appears in atmospheric testing, IIRC last atmospheric test was conducted by China on 16 October 1980.

Nukes detonated by India and Pakistan in 1998 were underground.

[Neo]

Its an underground test. Pakistani Bombs were of very low yield. Pakistani bombs are definitly made in China, One reason. Khan and all were doing Uranium based nuclear bomb while those exploded is Plutoniom based.

Don't claim unless you can prove it!

[Neo]

1) How do we know that the bombs exploded were plutonium based only and not Uranium as well as Plutonium based? Who analyzed the fallout and is the result public? Acknowledged by whom?

May 28-30, 1998: Pakistan conducted a series of low yield nuclear tests, Six were sucessfull and the seventh reportedly failed.
Atleast one of the nukes was Pu-based.

According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding.

2) How do we know that the bombs were actually made in china, what if the blueprints were from China but the bombs were manufactured in Pakistan

We don't! We used Chinese designs, the bombs were produced in Pakistan.
We had them ready for testing since 1987!

3) How do we know that the bombs were low yield thermonuclear bombs rather than conventional explosives? I remember reading somewhere that the bombs were actually low yield enough to be non nuclear.

I'm not an expert in this field but conventional explosives don't measure up against nuclear bombs. The first and most powerful test measured a yield of 12 kiloton (official claim 25-36 kiloton).
Do you know how many comventional explosives you need to measure that up??

We tested atleast 3 sub-kiloton nukes since PA has a requirement to have low yield nukes, powerful enough to wipe out complete batallions of intruding armies.

[Neo]

Americans assesd that both Indian and Pakistan based Nuclear Explosions were not upto the Yield they said it were, and were lower. They also assesd that both of the Pokran and Changi Test were plutonium based, WHile it is well known that India had a plutonium based Program, and Pakistan is Uranium. Heck, Pakistan doesnt even have a source to produce Plutonium just Uranium.

Wrong! We have a very expensive and diverse nuclear programme using both HEU and Pu.

2)

Because Pakistan doesnt have any materials, namely Plutonium

We do! Pu based Khushab reactor built in early nineties. :)

3)

Only India exploded a Thermo Nuclear Bomb. Outsiders can asses through Satallites and Ritcher measurements. You have to understand that Western Powers have conducted 1000's of Tests.

Chaghai tests measured 4.5 at Richter scale, equivalent of approx. 12 kiloton.

[Neo]

So then you are saying that firstly nobody accepted that pakistan had a plutonium enriching program and secondly that the pakistanis themselves said the explosions were from a uranium based bomb...but that the pakistani govt was not telling the truth?

And this is confirmed by the Pakistani govt? That there is no plutonium program in Pakistan and never was?

Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A. Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.

In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile.

Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.

[Neo]

Khushab Nuclear Reactor

The heavy water research reactor at Khushab is a central element of Pakistan's program for production of plutonium and tritium for advanced compact warheads. The Khushab facility, like that at Kahuta, is not subject to IAEA inspections. Khushab, with a capacity variously reported at between 40 MWT to 50 MWT [and as high as 70 MWT], was "commissioned" in March 1996, and had been under construction with Chinese assistance since the mid-1980s. According to a Pakistani press report ["Pakistan's Indigenous Nuclear Reactor Starts Up," Islamabad The Nation, April 13, 1998], the Khushab plutonium production reactor had gone critical and began operating in early 1998.

Plutonium is the preferred material for building light, sophisticated warheads, since highly enriched uranium (HEU) generally results in bulkier weapons. Prior to the start-up of Khushab, Pakistan was dependent on the production of highly enriched uranium at Kahuta. The Khushab reactor provides Pakistan the ability to produce enough plutonium each year to fabricate at least one bomb, and perhaps as many as three to five bombs [depending on the efficiency of the bomb design and the reactor's actual output].

The actual plutonium output of Khushab is dependent on both the thermal power level, as well as the actual operating time. Pakistan's prior history of operating the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), for many years Pakistan's only working nuclear power plant, suggests that the Khushab reactor may have a rather low operating availability. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the KANUPP lifetime energy availability factor (as of the end of 1997) was 28.6%, one of the worst performing nuclear power plants in the world. For the period 1989-1996 KANUPP’s capacity factor (the ratio of actual electrical production versus designed power) was only 34%. Although the CANDU reactor at KANUPP is of different design than Khushab, this history suggests that Khushab may produce substantially less plutonium than its theoretical capacity.

Pakistan initially sought to produce plutonium weapons, but these plans were frustrated with the 1977 cancellation by France of the planned sale of a reprocessing plant at Chasma. As of 1995 the US Government had no indication that Pakistan had the capability to reprocess plutonium.

According to a 14 September 1996 CIA report, the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation sold a special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment. It was subsequently reported that the equipment was intended for the Khushab facility. High temperature furnaces are used to mold uranium or plutonium.

Pakistan succeeded in illicitly acquiring a tritium purification and storage plant, and tritium precursor materials from two German firms.

The United States apparently obtained a commitment from China not to supply the heavy water necessary to start up this unsafeguarded plutonium production reactor. But in March 1998 it was reported that China had supplied Pakistan with far more heavy water than needed to operate the safeguarded Kanupp nuclear power reactor, suggesting that Pakistan would be able to divert heavy water from the civilian plant to the Khushab military plant. Although these concerns received considerable political attention in the late 1990s, it is evident from IKONOS satellite imagery that the Khushab complex includes a heavy water production facility.

Institute for Science and International Security
Analysis of the plutonium production reactor
Analysis of the newly-identified heavy water plant

Khushab - Pakistan Special Weapons Facilities

[Neo]

Latest stallite pictures confirm that atleast two more reactors are under construction in Khushab. :)

[maqsad]

Myshroom cloud only appears in atmospheric testing, IIRC last atmospheric test was conducted by China on 16 October 1980.

Nukes detonated by India and Pakistan in 1998 were underground.

Yeah I suspected as much but just wanted to have it confirmed and/or denied so threw it out.

[Agnostic Muslim]

Just to add to Neo's comment about Pakistan expanding its Plutonium based Nuclear program:

Pakistan Appears to be Building a Third Plutonium Production Reactor at Khushab Nuclear Site

David Albright and Paul Brannan
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
June 21, 2007

Commercial satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe taken on June 3, 2007 indicates that Pakistan appears to be building a third plutonium production reactor at the Khushab nuclear site (see Figure 1). On July 24, 2006, ISIS published imagery revealing the construction of a second heavy water reactor at Khushab. The second heavy water reactor, which Pakistan began building between 2000 and 2002, is still under construction in the June 3, 2007 imagery. When operational, this reactor could be as large as several hundred megawatts thermal, notwithstanding claims by Pakistan of its intended initial power capacity.
The third reactor appears to be a replica of the second heavy water reactor and is located a few hundred meters to the north, though construction is progressing much more quickly than the second. A GeoEye image of the same area in Khushab taken in August of 2006 shows only a faint dirt foundation and no structures (see Figure 2). Almost all of the third reactor construction visible in the June 3, 2007 image has taken place in the last 10 months.
The similarities between the second and third reactor construction projects indicate that the power of the third plutonium production reactor is likely to be similar to that of the second reactor (see Figures 1, 4, 5 and 6). The first Khushab reactor went critical in 1998 and looks significantly different from the second and third reactors (see Figure 3). The facilities at this site are not safeguarded by the IAEA and support Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
ISIS reported in January 18, 2007 the resumption of construction of what appears to be a plutonium separation facility at Chashma, a facility approximately 80 km west of Khushab. This reprocessing facility, which would be Pakistan’s second and is also unsafeguarded, is likely related to the construction of the two additional reactors at Khushab. When the reactors come on line, Pakistan’s demand for reprocessing capacity would increase significantly. The expanded construction at Khushab, and apparent resumption of activity at the Chashma plutonium separation plant, all occurring within the last six years, imply that Pakistan’s government has made a decision to increase significantly its production of plutonium for nuclear weapons.

http://www.isis-online.org/publicati...habReactor.pdf

[Officer of Engineers]

Let's be clear on this. Western seismic data dispute the claim. success on both sides. Alot of explanations were put forth but some were just ludicrous, ie simultaneous explosions - now why would you do that in a test?

The Pak nukes were not test devices. You can't keep test devices around from 1987. They were part of their arsenals. The tests revealed problems with the arsenal (ie, remember what I stated about the 40% failure rate?). Presumably, these problems have been fixed but there will be other problems that cannot be revealed without further testing.

Only ONE air sample contained Pu, hardly an indication of a Pu device, not when U was so dominating in other samples but perhaps a Pu based trigger. Of course, it doesn't help when the Pu sample was contaminated after detection, allowing for no further examination.

The air samples have confirmed that the materials come from Pak and Indian reactors.

I have strong reservations about claims of sub-kiloton claims. It doesn't make sense tactically and frankly, a single howitzer battery could do the job alot faster and a whole lot better and without the mess. These were duds.

[Kansas Bear]

Heck, Pakistan doesnt even have a source to produce Plutonium just Uranium.

If Pakistan has a nuclear reactor, then it has a source to produce Plutonium. One of the by-products of running a nuclear reactor is Plutonium. Although, to make it weapons grade, you have to use acid to refine it.

BBC NEWS | INDEPTH | THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

BBC NEWS | INDEPTH | THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

[Adux]

Kansas Bear,

I stand corrected. But I have various other proof which states that Chinese, North Korean hand in the development of Pakistani Nukes. The supply of M-11 and NoDong Missile's are gross violations of MTCR. Pakistani Nukes have obivious chinese imprints on them.

Adu

[Agnostic Muslim]

But I have various other proof which states that Chinese, North Korean hand in the development of Pakistani Nukes. The supply of M-11 and NoDong Missile's are gross violations of MTCR. Pakistani Nukes have obivious chinese imprints on them.

Adu

I don't think any country can claim to have a "absolutely indigenous" nuclear program (and it would be silly to reinvent the wheel, unless there is no other choice). Perhaps ours was with Western/Chinese input - whats important is that Pakistan has the capability, though OoE raises good points about doubts over how effective the Pakistani designs tested in Chaghai actually were. Nonetheless, deterrence has been achieved to some extent.

[Vinod2070]

AM, I agree with your point about deterrence having been achieved.

But historically Pakistan used this supposed deterrence to fuel terror in Kashmir and other parts of India and then threatened to have a very low threshold for using NWs if India retaliated across the borders.

Now don't you think, the 2002 Parakram mobilization broke this myth of nuclear deterrence as a shield for continuing the terror game? And there is little other meaning for this deterrent without that IMHO.