US Has Plan To Safeguard Pakistan Nuclear Weapons

[Ray]

I wonder what plans the US can have to control the Pak nukes.

I don't think it will be feasible unless someone has tipped them off and then also, how will they secure the installations, if Musharraf falls and there is a possibility that the radical fundamentalists are about to take them over?

[Silent Hunter]

Do the Pakistani nukes have PALs on them?

I've been thinking of a little scenario I might use somewhere that involves Pakistan's nukes. Simply, there's an Islamist coup in Pakistan. The new government (which is also engaged in a civil war against the loyalists) starts attacking India and ISAF forces in Afghanistan, resulting in UN intervention.

Since I need to prevent the war going nuclear, I've got the original government (whether it's Musharraff, Bhutto or someone else is moot) going into exile. They take the launch codes with them and hand them over to a neutral country for safe keeping.

[Cactus]

Do the Pakistani nukes have PALs on them?

No they don't.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/wa...18nuke.html?hp

The American program was created after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when the Bush administration debated whether to share with Pakistan one of the crown jewels of American nuclear protection technology, known as “permissive action links,” or PALS, a system used to keep a weapon from detonating without proper codes and authorizations.

In the end, despite past federal aid to France and Russia on delicate points of nuclear security, the administration decided that it could not share the system with the Pakistanis because of legal restrictions.

In addition, the Pakistanis were suspicious that any American-made technology in their warheads could include a secret “kill switch,” enabling the Americans to turn off their weapons.

While many nuclear experts in the federal government favored offering the PALS system because they considered Pakistan’s arsenal among the world’s most vulnerable to terrorist groups, some administration officials feared that sharing the technology would teach Pakistan too much about American weaponry.

[Cactus]

From:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18kagan.html

Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem

By FREDERICK W. KAGAN and MICHAEL O’HANLON
Published: November 18, 2007

Washington

AS the government of Pakistan totters, we must face a fact: the United States simply could not stand by as a nuclear-armed Pakistan descended into the abyss. Nor would it be strategically prudent to withdraw our forces from an improving situation in Iraq to cope with a deteriorating one in Pakistan. We need to think — now — about our feasible military options in Pakistan, should it really come to that.

We do not intend to be fear mongers. Pakistan’s officer corps and ruling elites remain largely moderate and more interested in building a strong, modern state than in exporting terrorism or nuclear weapons to the highest bidder. But then again, Americans felt similarly about the shah’s regime in Iran until it was too late.

Moreover, Pakistan’s intelligence services contain enough sympathizers and supporters of the Afghan Taliban, and enough nationalists bent on seizing the disputed province of Kashmir from India, that there are grounds for real worries.

The most likely possible dangers are these: a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism.

All possible military initiatives to avoid those possibilities are daunting. With 160 million people, Pakistan is more than five times the size of Iraq. It would take a long time to move large numbers of American forces halfway across the world. And unless we had precise information about the location of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials, we could not rely on bombing or using Special Forces to destroy them.

The task of stabilizing a collapsed Pakistan is beyond the means of the United States and its allies. Rule-of-thumb estimates suggest that a force of more than a million troops would be required for a country of this size. Thus, if we have any hope of success, we would have to act before a complete government collapse, and we would need the cooperation of moderate Pakistani forces.

One possible plan would be a Special Forces operation with the limited goal of preventing Pakistan’s nuclear materials and warheads from getting into the wrong hands. Given the degree to which Pakistani nationalists cherish these assets, it is unlikely the United States would get permission to destroy them. Somehow, American forces would have to team with Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly to move the material to a safer place.

For the United States, the safest bet would be shipping the material to someplace like New Mexico; but even pro-American Pakistanis would be unlikely to cooperate. More likely, we would have to settle for establishing a remote redoubt within Pakistan, with the nuclear technology guarded by elite Pakistani forces backed up (and watched over) by crack international troops. It is realistic to think that such a mission might be undertaken within days of a decision to act. The price for rapid action and secrecy, however, would probably be a very small international coalition.

A second, broader option would involve supporting the core of the Pakistani armed forces as they sought to hold the country together in the face of an ineffective government, seceding border regions and Al Qaeda and Taliban assassination attempts against the leadership. This would require a sizable combat force — not only from the United States, but ideally also other Western powers and moderate Muslim nations.

Even if we were not so committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western powers would need months to get the troops there. Fortunately, given the longstanding effectiveness of Pakistan’s security forces, any process of state decline probably would be gradual, giving us the time to act.

So, if we got a large number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely directive would be to help Pakistan’s military and security forces hold the country’s center — primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad, and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south.

We would also have to be wary of internecine warfare within the Pakistani security forces. Pro-American moderates could well win a fight against extremist sympathizers on their own. But they might need help if splinter forces or radical Islamists took control of parts of the country containing crucial nuclear materials. The task of retaking any such regions and reclaiming custody of any nuclear weapons would be a priority for our troops.

If a holding operation in the nation’s center was successful, we would probably then seek to establish order in the parts of Pakistan where extremists operate. Beyond propping up the state, this would benefit American efforts in Afghanistan by depriving terrorists of the sanctuaries they have long enjoyed in Pakistan’s tribal and frontier regions.

The great paradox of the post-cold war world is that we are both safer, day to day, and in greater peril than before. There was a time when volatility in places like Pakistan was mostly a humanitarian worry; today it is as much a threat to our basic security as Soviet tanks once were. We must be militarily and diplomatically prepared to keep ourselves safe in such a world. Pakistan may be the next big test.

Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

[Silent Hunter]

Thanks Cactus. So how do the Pakistanis stop someone from lobbing a nuke at India without authorisation?

[dilawar]

So how do the Pakistanis stop someone from lobbing a nuke at India without authorisation?

Key issue here is will. While official Pakistani stated policy is not to propagate terrorist activity in it's neighbourhood, facts over years and decades point otherwise. So ultimately the issue boils down to whether those in the Pakistani establishment will have the will to stop someone without authorization lobbing a nuke at India or covertly handing one or two to Jihadi's in India. This makes Pakistan's nukes under these circumstances the most dangerous arsenal in the world.

[Officer of Engineers]

Ok,

several issues here

1) We know alot about Pak nukes ... and Indian nukes for that matter.

2) They're all kept in component form on both sides and away from their delivery vehicles ... meaning that you have to find the parts and then put them together.

3) All these parts are kept under guard, meaning that there's more than one set of people you have to get through to get at the nukes.

4) The Pak military is still highly professional if their leadership is lacking. The terms, lions lead by donkeys come to mind.

5) Of all of Pak allies, one and one only is capable, trusted, and willing to receive Pak nukes, and she does not bow to Mecca nor to Bethlehem nor to Jerusalem.

[Adux]

Ok,

several issues here

1) We know alot about Pak nukes ... and Indian nukes for that matter.

Sir,

How especially for a country which has no alliance and is very independent from outside interference's unlike that of Pakistan?
What kind of Information are you talking about Indian Nukes.
Location?Type's? or Genreal Information!!

[Adux]

4) The Pak military is still highly professional if their leadership is lacking. The terms, lions lead by donkeys come to mind..

Sir,

They have been found lacking carrying out their oath to the nation, they are divided between nationalisma and religion.

5) Of all of Pak allies, one and one only is capable, trusted, and willing to receive Pak nukes, and she does not bow to Mecca nor to Bethlehem nor to Jerusalem

You mean their supplier(China) will keep them safe and return as and when needed.

[Officer of Engineers]

They have been found lacking carrying out their oath to the nation, they are divided between nationalisma and religion.

Like the NLI?

What kind of Information are you talking about Indian Nukes.
Location?Type's? or Genreal Information!!

For military planners, the only ones that matter. We know where the delivery vehicles are - ie, the missile regiments and the air bases.

[Cactus]

Thanks Cactus. So how do the Pakistanis stop someone from lobbing a nuke at India without authorisation?

Compartmentalization, or in OoE's words points 1-4, was in effect the basic safeguard in the early days. To de-compartmentalize, authorities at the highest-levels have to set the ball in motion - in which case it is war anyway. Compartmentalization is still a safeguard between delivery vehicle and the bomb, so it is applicable to "lobbing a nuke India". At component level, compartmentalization-as-a-safeguard is probably no longer true. How that is applicable to terrorists with nukes is open to speculation...

[Adux]

Like the NLI?

They are not fighting India, Nor do they have any impressions as they do now, that their government and army leadership is the stooge of the West.

For military planners, the only ones that matter. We know where the delivery vehicles are - ie, the missile regiments and the air bases.

Sir,

That is as good as compermised, Do you think Indian planners are naive to be that exposed, I doubt the West has much info on Indian Strategic assets. I expect the Americans to know about Pakistani's nuke's in real-time detail, I dont expect the same with a country which has no History of outside-influences.

[Officer of Engineers]

TThat is as good as compermised, Do you think Indian planners are naive to be that exposed, I doubt the West has much info on Indian Strategic assets. I expect the Americans to know about Pakistani's nuke's in real-time detail, I dont expect the same with a country which has no History of outside-influences.

You forget several things.

1) We've been doing this for decades with and against powers with far more sophisticated arsenals and deception techniques, namely the USSR and China. India, by comparison, is a babe.

2) You can hide nukes but at the same time make them not very user friendly. In other words, in order to hide them from glowing green in the dark (and exposed to overhead satellites), you can place them deep inside mountains or underground but then again, the same techniques we used on the Chinese (roads that go nowhere, garbage and sewage treatment where there are no towns) would work again here.

3) The nukes are stored away from the delivery vehicles but not that far away.

4) India does not have hardened silos yet, meaning we can see all the delivery vehicles.

5) What's left unspoken is that neither the Indian nor the Pakistani nuclear arsenals can withstand an American or a Russian 1st nuclear strike.

[HistoricalDavid]

What about the Chinese arsenal's survivability? Cheers.

[Officer of Engineers]

The Chinese are masters of deception in this arena. In strict military terms, the Chinese have around 200 warheads with around 1000-2000 rockets capable of carrying them but only 20 ICBMs. The warheads are under the control of the Central Military Commission, a civilian organization. In theory, target the CMC and you pretty well kill the command codes for the nukes. You can also pretty well eliminate the ICBM threat ... which leaves the SRBM and the IRBM threat.

HOWEVER, the Chinese have played the guessing game to a master stroke. Chinese nukes were never mated to their rockets. However, we've (and the Soviets) always believed that they were. When the Soviets were planning to strike across Northern China to take Lop Nor, they were ready to sacrifice Moscow which was within range of Chinese IRBMs. At some point, they changed their minds thinking the costs were just not worth it ... BUT it was a bluff.

Until recently, we've always believed that the Chinese had between 400-1000 nuclear warheads. This include a whole spectrum of weapons including aircraft delivered and tactical nukes.

So, while our plans might have taken out all of Chinese nukes, we were never sure about that.

In the strictest sense, we could probably guarantee North America won't be hit but I hate to be in Seoul or Okinawa in an exchange with China.