1. "...poor coordination by his commanders." There's that poor staff work again!
2. Scott had no authority to extend the tours of the militia regiments and could not ask for it. The 90 day regiments terms of service started expiring on 1 AUG. That authority did not exist until the passage of the Militia Act of 1862.
3. "..failed to communicate troop dispositions to other commanders and led from the front, all of which contributed his defeat. Lee makes none of these mistakes and win." compare to "He laid out his plan and 'suggested' ways his commanders could carry it out, but he let them do it their way." They both are guilty of the same. And Lee would show that consistently throughout the war. His poor staff work and lack of decisiveness allowed McClellan to esacape on the Peninsula...he essentially leaned on McClellan and McClellan lost his nerve.
In both cases we are talking of both men early in their combat career...and they were both guilty of the same mistakes.
4. Lee's aggressiveness at Malvern Hill coupled with his poor troop handling led to the mauling of Armistead's, Magruder's and DH Hill's forces. He actually was caught off guard by both Ambrose Brunside at Fredericksburg & Chancellorsville. In each case Union dithering allowed him to concentrate forces. He was able to hold the line at Fredericksburg but the cream of his army was gutted at Chancellorsville. And Gettysburg shredded what was left of his operational offensive capabilities.
5. "From what I've read, desperation was the reason he lost Gettysburg, not the reason he fought it. He erred in that final attack, but events that led him to it share some blame for his loss: disobeyed orders, Stuart's late arrival, Longstreet's pouting, Ewell's delays, too little ammo for his artillery..."
He was on a giant raid to gather supplies and try to force the Union to pull pressure off of Vicksburg (the first instance he expressed a startegic view to Davis).
Orders disobeyed...that is arguable, but he had 2 new corps commadners, and did not position himself to provide them the strong guidance they would need on the battlefield.
Stuart's late arrival is well addressed in this article. The blame for that rests as much with Lee as it did with Stuart. http://www.historynet.com/jeb-stuart...-scapegoat.htm
Lee also had almost 3 brigades of cavalry available to him besides Stuart which was ample for a lot of the work which was left undone.
Longstreet's pouting. This has been overly played out in popular history and has more to do with with Jubal Early's Lost Cause Myth than a true grounding in fact.
Ewell's delay...again, Lee should have been there sticking a boot in his ass.
...too little ammo for his artillery...more shoddy staff work. There was ample supplies avaialable in the ammunition trains...but no one had brought them forward.
So, to the overall question...what if Lee had accepted the position which went to others.
I do poorly on alternative history based on too much study of facts. But to me the facts suggest he would not have built as effective an army as McClellan and he may have gone the way of Hooker... very good combat commander who was aggressive and could handle the tactical fight but started to breakdown at the operational level and was sorely lacking at the strategic level. I think Meade was a better operational commander than Lee and would have been a better choice than most others at the start of the war based on the body of work he displayed.
2. Scott had no authority to extend the tours of the militia regiments and could not ask for it. The 90 day regiments terms of service started expiring on 1 AUG. That authority did not exist until the passage of the Militia Act of 1862.
3. "..failed to communicate troop dispositions to other commanders and led from the front, all of which contributed his defeat. Lee makes none of these mistakes and win." compare to "He laid out his plan and 'suggested' ways his commanders could carry it out, but he let them do it their way." They both are guilty of the same. And Lee would show that consistently throughout the war. His poor staff work and lack of decisiveness allowed McClellan to esacape on the Peninsula...he essentially leaned on McClellan and McClellan lost his nerve.
In both cases we are talking of both men early in their combat career...and they were both guilty of the same mistakes.
4. Lee's aggressiveness at Malvern Hill coupled with his poor troop handling led to the mauling of Armistead's, Magruder's and DH Hill's forces. He actually was caught off guard by both Ambrose Brunside at Fredericksburg & Chancellorsville. In each case Union dithering allowed him to concentrate forces. He was able to hold the line at Fredericksburg but the cream of his army was gutted at Chancellorsville. And Gettysburg shredded what was left of his operational offensive capabilities.
5. "From what I've read, desperation was the reason he lost Gettysburg, not the reason he fought it. He erred in that final attack, but events that led him to it share some blame for his loss: disobeyed orders, Stuart's late arrival, Longstreet's pouting, Ewell's delays, too little ammo for his artillery..."
He was on a giant raid to gather supplies and try to force the Union to pull pressure off of Vicksburg (the first instance he expressed a startegic view to Davis).
Orders disobeyed...that is arguable, but he had 2 new corps commadners, and did not position himself to provide them the strong guidance they would need on the battlefield.
Stuart's late arrival is well addressed in this article. The blame for that rests as much with Lee as it did with Stuart. http://www.historynet.com/jeb-stuart...-scapegoat.htm
Lee also had almost 3 brigades of cavalry available to him besides Stuart which was ample for a lot of the work which was left undone.
Longstreet's pouting. This has been overly played out in popular history and has more to do with with Jubal Early's Lost Cause Myth than a true grounding in fact.
Ewell's delay...again, Lee should have been there sticking a boot in his ass.
...too little ammo for his artillery...more shoddy staff work. There was ample supplies avaialable in the ammunition trains...but no one had brought them forward.
So, to the overall question...what if Lee had accepted the position which went to others.
I do poorly on alternative history based on too much study of facts. But to me the facts suggest he would not have built as effective an army as McClellan and he may have gone the way of Hooker... very good combat commander who was aggressive and could handle the tactical fight but started to breakdown at the operational level and was sorely lacking at the strategic level. I think Meade was a better operational commander than Lee and would have been a better choice than most others at the start of the war based on the body of work he displayed.
Comment