tripoli-Tobruk railroad

[Doktor]

My point was, is it easier and less time consuming to unload 1 tank, then the equivalent tonnage of oil or ammo.

Did all the ports had the equipment (cranes, whatever) to unload tanks (30t at once) or locomotives (100t at once)

I doubt that the axis, if needed were unable to expand the capacities of the current ports.

[1979]

Doktor , the ports had enough capacity in theory (peace time conditions ) but that was not achieved in practice due to enemy action .

[1979]

But not all supplies are time critical. 75mm howitzer ammunition is important if your actually engaged, but not so much if the main fighting is far away.

What about them? For most of the campaign the Axis forces consisted of only about 16 divisions 6 German and 10 Italian German divisions. The low level of supplies might have been an issue on the Eastern Front where constant pressure meant daily allotments equaled life itself. But the desert campaign had operations spaced out on both sides where only food and water had to be arriving every day.
23 October 42- 2nd El Alamein
30 Aug 42-5 Sept 42-Alam el Halfa
1-27 July 42- 1st El Alamein
26 May- 14 June 42- Battle of Gazala...

The pauses before this series of battles are even longer. Benghazi traded hands in December 41 and in Jan 42 as the major events preceding the North African Climax. The pauses allowed the Axis to move supplies forward. They also allowed the Allies to receive shipments from the US, Britain, Canada and other centers of production. The Allies got more stuff but it took longer to get it.

Well, the siege of tobruk required more than just food and water for the italian forces involved , but i see what you mean.

However sooner or latter the italian division would have to go over to the ofensive for any chance of capturing Egypt to succed, even if only to pin down and mop up pockets of resistance armor divisions left in their wake.
The way i see it, it took about one month to bring forward enough supplies to last for just one week of offensive fighting.
Had Benghazi harbor operated at full capacity and/or a rail line existed between tobruk and tripoli the build up period would have decreased substantially.

[zraver]

Well, the siege of tobruk required more than just food and water for the italian forces involved , but i see what you mean.

However sooner or latter the italian division would have to go over to the ofensive for any chance of capturing Egypt to succed, even if only to pin down and mop up pockets of resistance armor divisions left in their wake.
The way i see it, it took about one month to bring forward enough supplies to last for just one week of offensive fighting.
Had Benghazi harbor operated at full capacity and/or a rail line existed between tobruk and tripoli the build up period would have decreased substantially.

I agree absoltrely in part.... A rail line would have shortened the trip so long as the Luftwaffe and patrols could have kept it safe from the RAF and LRDF. However the month wait might have been movement, or it might have been waiting until enough supplies got through to Benghazi/Tripoli to be shipped forward.

Also using lighters port capacity can be by-passed in part for non-bulk items like 55 gallon drums and boxes/crates. While fuel was often shipped in drums, it was also shipped in bulk form as well. It was the bulk shipments that took the biggest losses (tankers) and that required the most port capacity and speciaized equipment.

[zraver]

What is more critical to the discussion of North Africa is llok at the size of the force Rommel had when he encircled Tobruk the first time and then what he had at 2nd El Alamein. If he had a full panzer army early on it is proven they could have been supplied even if it meant leaving some units behind (minus trucks) as was done with some Italian units. The British were in dissarray and vulnerable.

[Officer of Engineers]

Jason,

Supporting Rommel to the extent that you are suggesting, what does that do to BARBAROSSA? Or are you suggesting that Hitler would allow Stalin to get the jump on him?

[1979]

I agree absoltrely in part....

A rail line would have shortened the trip so long as the Luftwaffe and patrols could have kept it safe from the RAF and LRDF. However the month wait might have been movement, or it might have been waiting until enough supplies got through to Benghazi/Tripoli to be shipped forward.

in may 41 the fighting was on the lybia egypt border, assuming the construction begins from tripoli , the raf does not have enogh fighter coverage to protect the bombers beyond Benghazi .

Also using lighters port capacity can be by-passed in part for non-bulk items like 55 gallon drums and boxes/crates. While fuel was often shipped in drums, it was also shipped in bulk form as well. It was the bulk shipments that took the biggest losses (tankers) and that required the most port capacity and speciaized equipment.

there were not too much tankers in the RM to begin with.
edit
iirc there were more tankers stranded in mexico and venezuela than in the med when Il Duce declared war.

[zraver]

Jason,

Supporting Rommel to the extent that you are suggesting, what does that do to BARBAROSSA? Or are you suggesting that Hitler would allow Stalin to get the jump on him?

I don't think 2 more panzer divisions in Africa will have much of an impact on Barbarossa. The pause of July/August followed by the Kiev diversion is the reason Hitler failed there and 2 more divisions more of less won't matter.

[zraver]

in may 41 the fighting was on the lybia egypt border, assuming the construction begins from tripoli , the raf does not have enogh fighter coverage to protect the bombers beyond Benghazi .

True but the railhead has to end somewhere and that creates a choke point. In May 41 the weather is clearign and the days are getting longer so the air threat is going up.

there were not too much tankers in the RM to begin with.
edit
iirc there were more tankers stranded in mexico and venezuela than in the med when Il Duce declared war.[/QUOTE]

The other Axis powers had some, Romania;s tanker fleet took a beating supporting the Axis in NA IIRC.

[1979]

The other Axis powers had some, Romania;s tanker fleet took a beating supporting the Axis in NA IIRC.

What tankers ?
Merchant Marine

[clackers]

I would like to stress the fact that , personally i do not think Rommel could reach Iran/Iraq or any other exotic destination in the middle east or link up with the Wehrmacht forces operating in the Caucasus. Capturing Alexandria was however in his grasp , and historically he got really close of doing it.

I don't think anything ambitious was possible, either, 1979. Rommel of course displayed his usual disregard for high strategy.

Germany's highest ranked officer talked to the Desert Fox in March 1941, and as Halder recorded: "Rommel explained that he would soon conquer Egypt and the Suez Canal, and then he talked about German East Africa. I couldn't restrain a somewhat impolite smile, and asked what he would be needing for the purpose. He thought he would need another two Panzer corps. I asked him, "Even if we had them, how are you going to supply them and feed them?" To this, I received the classic reply, "That's quite immaterial to me. That's your pigeon."

For a good article on Rommel's blindness, check this one by a Marine major who clearly knows his Creveld ("The role of Malta—the British-held island in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea—in disrupting Axis lines of communication and thus defeating German designs in North Africa traditionally has been exaggerated"):

Logistics and the Desert Fox

[clackers]

Not a big fan of Creveld, if we assume the the amount of supplies shipped is close to the amount requested based on the port facilities-given the low of rate of German and Italian production during the time period- then port capacity is not an issue.

It's because they limit the number of ships you can send in a convoy. Like the Tokyo Express at Guadalcanal, the others can't be waiting around while some of them are being unloaded. And the threats to a port like Tobruk are from the Desert Air Force and the fleet at Alexandria, not the squadrons based in Malta.

A report by Panzer Army Africa to OKW in August 1942, outlines the reasons for the supply crisis as: "1) Prevention of coastal shipping from Tobruk to the east by the enemy air force and navy ... 2) Inadequate shipping space ... 3) Limited facilities for unloading at Tobruk ... 4) The establishment of regulated railway traffic ... is not in sight ... 5) Lack of transport vehicles ... "

i.e. the volume of shipping making its way across the Med wasn't the major determinant.

[clackers]

The Mareth Line was outflanked, hell the entire German posistion was outflanked by Torch.

It did what Rommel hoped it would do. The 8th Army had to stop in front of it, and build up to assault it ('Pugilist').

This gave time to send his Panzers to deal with the US II Corps at Kasserine Pass.

It wasn't until March 1943 that the Line could be attacked, with the obvious outflanking move by the New Zealand 2nd Division stopped.

It took a second operation to compromise the Line, and the defenders were able to fall back in an orderly fashion, to yet another line.

Rommel, the dashing armour commander, learnt the value of static defences in North Africa, and organized his defence in depth of Normandy on the same principles in 1944.

[clackers]

The German's best hope to secure Egypt which may have been a war winner, was in early 41. After that the drain caused by Barbarossa and gaining British strength make it nigh impossible for Germany to win.

Yes, I do think the best hope was in early '41, but that it was also unlikely. They were too weak in 1941, and the British were too strong in 1942.

You've said that the Germans had six divisions in Africa during the conflict, but in fact they only had one and a half during this time (and only three by the end of the year).

In the first nine months of 1942, 2,500 Allied tanks arrived in the Middle East, and aircraft reinforcements probably outnumbered German arrivals by a ratio of five to one.

That Rommel got as far as he did is, amongst other things, a serious indictment of British generalship.

[clackers]

What is more critical to the discussion of North Africa is llok at the size of the force Rommel had when he encircled Tobruk the first time and then what he had at 2nd El Alamein. If he had a full panzer army early on it is proven they could have been supplied even if it meant leaving some units behind (minus trucks) as was done with some Italian units. The British were in dissarray and vulnerable.

Well, let's hear from the guy who studied such a proposal.

Ludwig von Thoma commanded the DAK at one point, and clearsightedly in October 1940 had reported "it would not be possible to maintain a large German Army [in the Mediterranean] as well as the Italian Army. My conclusion was, that if a force was sent by us, it should be an armoured force. Nothing less than four armoured divisions would suffice to ensure success - and this, I calculated, was also the maximum that could be effectively maintained with supplies in an advance across the desert to the Nile valley ... I said it could only be done by replacing the Italian troops with German. Large numbers could not be supplied."

It also begs the question. The forces left in Libya by Britain were thought sufficient to deal with a one and a half division German task force.

And in fact, the German spearheads were too weak to progress beyond the Halfaya Pass region while Tobruk was besieged, and were attacked repeatedly in Operations Brevity, Battleaxe and Crusader.

In the middle of his Barbarossa planning, Halder received Rommel's pleas for reinforcements, and wrote: " "Now at last he is constrained to state that his forces are not sufficiently strong to allow him to take full advantage of the 'unique opportunities' offered by the overall situation. That is the impression we have had for quite some time over here."