Market Garden

[dalem]

Horrocks, Adair, and (to a lesser extent) Browning appear to have been unprepared to exploit the opportunity to advance north toward Arnhem despite the perilous condition of British forces there and adequate time to consider the ways and means.

And don't forget that there were other smaller highways and bridges that could have been exploited by the advancing XXX corps, or even the reserve units, if for no other reason than to force the Germans to ease pressure on the main N-S corridor held by the 82nd and 101st.

A bold operation, and a good idea, IMO, destroyed by poor planning, rejection of intel, poor reaction, and insufficient execution and commitment.

-dale

[1979]

Patton, Napoleon or God could have been running that op, I don't think it would have mattered.

Even if Market Garden would have succeeded, how are they going to supply the british army beyond the Rhine ?

[S2]

1979 Reply

"...how are they going to supply the british army beyond the Rhine ?"

If Market-Garden succeeded, that would have meant a secure corridor over the Rhine. In all likelihood, the allied main effort would have been directed here. Assuming allied armies could be supplied at all (and this would prove an accurate assumption), the main effort to secure the corridor north from Grave through Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem would have put allied forces over the Rhine five and one-half months earlier than Remagen (March 7, 1945). Montgomery wouldn't again cross the Rhine until March 23, 1945-a full six months later.

Would the battles of Aachen, Hurtgen Forest, and Metz have been fought? Perhaps. Would the Germans have been able to conduct these battles with the same number of forces ultimately available because Market-Garden had failed? How about the battle of the Bulge?

21st Army Group would have been poised to strike south into the Ruhr and onto the N. German plain. This would have been an unacceptable threat to the German government and, hence, been the primary focus of their defenses. However, the Germans would no longer have the Rhine as a backstop.

The potential effect upon the war's outcome could have been profound IMV.

[Tarek Morgen]

If Market-Garden succeeded, that would have meant a secure corridor over the Rhine

I do ahve somie problems believing that any corridor so narrow could be considered really secure. Correct me if I am wrong but would the allies not have to defend the entire length of the corridor while the Germans could try to cut it off more or less where it suits them? And would not even only tempory cuts of the stream of supplies be extremly dangerous for the troops beyond the Rhine?

Am I completly wrong when I believe that an (inital) succesful market garden could lead to a even bigger failure to the allies?

[S2]

Tarek Morgen Reply

"I do ahve somie problems believing that any corridor so narrow could be considered really secure."

Do you have problems also believing it wouldn't be a primary allied mission to WIDEN that corridor?"

"Correct me if I am wrong but would the allies not have to defend the entire length of the corridor while the Germans could try to cut it off more or less where it suits them?"

The threat you postulate comes from two directions-west from retreating 15th Army soldiers, themselves lacking supplies, strength, and coherance more so than ever with an allied army group interposed between Germany and them and also east from the Reichswald.

Could Germany in late September attack the corridor with effect faster than 21st Army Group could widen it? It would seem that 21st Army Group's implied mission would be to secure Holland, thus securing its advance across the bridge at, first, Arnhem and then other locations up and down the Dutch Rhine river. For how long could the Germans make this a battle and to what degree would doing so have weakened their abilities to defend elsewhere along the western front?

"Am I completly wrong when I believe that an (inital) succesful market garden could lead to a even bigger failure to the allies?"

Depends upon the reasons for success with Market-Garden. The reality is that it was unsuccessful. The larger question is why? I presume more so from allied command ineptitude than German strength. Perhaps you presume otherwise. If successful at Market-Garden and for reasons of Allied command acumen, what can you offer to convince me Germany could sustain/maintain the 15th Army and Student's Parachute Army as a force in being capable of threatening an allied army group interposed between themselves and Germany?

Could Germany sustain attacks out of the Reichswald indefinitely? Could they, if possible, do so and also defend elsewhere along the western front?

[Tarek Morgen]

First let me clarify that in my previous post I did not mean to make claims of any kind whatsoever. The questions I asked where not meant to be any form of passive aggression but simply where actual questions. I.E. I am not saying that those things would have been the case, I am asking because I wonder if there might be anything to it. So when somebody who knows more about military matters tells me that my fears about risks in a post-market-garden situation are too exaggerated i am more then willing to believe it.

Was Germany capable of disrupting the corridior (for a serious period of time) right at the end of Market Garden with the forces at hand? I doubt it. But what if they instead of actually blocking the corridor only have to prevent/slow down the allied attemp to widen it so it stays vulnerable?

Right before the start of Market Garden Hitler ordered the the start of planning for the Ardenne Offensive. While this did not start until December (too late in a succesful-market-garden-scenario I would pressume), it at least shows that Germany had still the power for one last desperate push in the west and its target certainly would have become the corridor. Hitler was willing to sacrifice time and land at all other fronts in the actual scenario to stop the Allies from penetrating west-Germany, I am rather sure he would have done the same, or even more so, had they managed to secure a foothold across the rhine in late 44.

So instead of actually disrupting the corridor they need "only" to keep in a still vulnerable position until a rushed ardenne offensive starts.

[S2]

Tarek Morgen Reply

"The questions I asked where not meant to be any form of passive aggression but simply where actual questions."

Tarek, generally I challenge points-not people. You're very welcome to your views.

"...what if they instead of actually blocking the corridor only have to prevent/slow down the allied attemp to widen it so it stays vulnerable?"

Anything is possible. The permutations seem incalculable of what MIGHT be possible. I argue that it was the obligation of 21st Army Group to seize a bridgehead across the Rhine in mid-late September 1944 instead of March 1945. Doing so seems to mean that the accumulated combat power of that army group (and, indeed, the entire allied force in western Europe) might be then focused on expanding the secured zone. Further IMMEDIATE exploitation wouldn't seem a priority as compared to the securing and expansion of the bridgehead. Offensive operations on both sides of the Rhine to expand that bridgehead would, de facto, also secure it.

Meanwhile, unless all allied forces would be redirected north to this region or, alternatively, all supplies cut off to those forces elsewhere the Germans have a greater problem of defense. I don't know, as indicated earlier, if Metz, Aachen, the Hurtgen forest or even the Bulge become the same large battles if whatever German strength is directed north sufficient to challenge 21st Army Group's grip on its bridgehead.

"...it [the Bulge] at least shows that Germany had still the power for one last desperate push in the west and its target certainly would have become the corridor."

While it's hard to argue with history, the question really seems whether the Germans possessed the combat power to withstand an expansion of the Arnhem bridgehead in late September by 21st Army Group. While Antwerp had been already captured, we know that it was rendered unusable until the Scheldt was opened. That didn't happen until late November. I know little of those battles and am unprepared to hazard speculation about whether the allies could have done so sooner. Somehow, though, allied forces found adequate supplies to conduct battles both in the Aachen/Hurtgen forest area as well as the Lorraine campaign that fall.

There's an interesting mix of factors involving allied supply and the ability of Germany to reconstitute viable forces that needs calculation. While we know how matters proceeded for both sides throughout the fall because of Market-Garden's failure I'm less certain how matters would have unfolded with its success. It seems fair, though, that a success with Market-Garden would have required a different set of priorities to the upcoming fall campaigns for both sides.

[1979]

Assuming allied armies could be supplied at all (and this would prove an accurate assumption), the main effort to secure the corridor north from Grave through Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem would have put allied forces over the Rhine five and one-half months earlier than Remagen (March 7, 1945). Montgomery wouldn't again cross the Rhine until March 23, 1945-a full six months later.

We must also assume that the port of Antwerp was not vital, or that the 15th army would somehow chose to retreat instead of digging in ?

[zraver]

With Antwerp closed until September/November, and then a record cold coming in December and January on one side, and the last big push of German industry and Mainstein's carefully hoarded reserves of armor on the other its doubtful the pace of the war would have been sped up much at all and the Spring of 45 is still going to be the time when the Allies finally race into the heart of Germany.

[Mihais]

What push,what armour,which Manstein?

Antwerp or not,the arrival of the Allies in Germany in Autumn 44 would have created the same effects it created in Spring 45.Raise the white flag in the West and throw everything to stop the Reds.Arnhem was fought by a motley of weakened SS and Heer units.That was all.Behind them was a void.Allied loss gave the Germans 3 months to concentrate whatever was left from both Germany and Polish front.

[1979]

What push,what armour,which Manstein?

Antwerp or not,the arrival of the Allies in Germany in Autumn 44 would have created the same effects it created in Spring 45.Raise the white flag in the West and throw everything to stop the Reds.Arnhem was fought by a motley of weakened SS and Heer units.That was all.Behind them was a void.Allied loss gave the Germans 3 months to concentrate whatever was left from both Germany and Polish front.

The soviets were also at the end of they're logistics in September.

[zraver]

What push,what armour,which Manstein?

By late fall 44 the Germans had assembled a reserve of armor. IN history this reserve was thrown at the allies in the battle of the Bulge. Along with this were several hundred thousand men.

Antwerp or not,the arrival of the Allies in Germany in Autumn 44 would have created the same effects it created in Spring 45.Raise the white flag in the West and throw everything to stop the Reds.Arnhem was fought by a motley of weakened SS and Heer units.That was all.Behind them was a void.Allied loss gave the Germans 3 months to concentrate whatever was left from both Germany and Polish front.

The allies did arrive in Germany in 44 for all the good it did them. In late 44 Germany was battered but not yet broken. The rail transport had not yet totally collapsed and industry was still turning gout weapons in record numbers. With the allies already across the Rhine the carefully built up reserves either get used to attack there, or used to stiffen the defenses during a period the German's were already calling the Miracle in the West.

[Mihais]

Late Fall ain't September.In September there was zilch.All it was required was for Monty to win the darn Arnhem and for the Allies to decide on a concentrated assault.You had enough airplanes to send 2500t in one ride,IIRC.That's 5 divisions worth of supplies,by your standards.The trucks were also plenty for such a move,since only about half of the Allied div's would have been on the move.Daring,but there was nothing facing such a thrust.But Monty blew his chance royally.

[Mihais]

The soviets were also at the end of they're logistics in September.

Yep,in Poland.But there were also other events on the Eastern Front.Arnhem provided a period of respite.Now,choose between N Germany and Hungary(with the last oil reserves of the Reich).Choose between Hamburg or Wien.Tough ones.Choose between stopping the red beast(the whole reason for fighting at that stage)or giving up in the W while facing a force that could not be stopped.That's a bit easier

[1979]

Yep,in Poland.But there were also other events on the Eastern Front.Arnhem provided a period of respite.Now,choose between N Germany and Hungary(with the last oil reserves of the Reich).Choose between Hamburg or Wien.Tough ones.Choose between stopping the red beast(the whole reason for fighting at that stage)or giving up in the W while facing a force that could not be stopped.That's a bit easier

But Mihais , was Arnhem that essential ? They already bridged the Waal at Nijmegen.
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