1941 - Annihilated

[Officer of Engineers]

And I've had enough - goodbye

[bugs]

south western front 21 june 1941

4th Mech Corps-979 tanks
8th Mech Corps-899 tanks
9th Mech Corps-316
15th Mech Corps-749
16th Mech Corps-478
19th Mech Corps-453
22th Mech Corps-712
24th Mech Corps-222
Total 4808 tanks
Iniatialy the 16th mechanised corps was part of the south front.
however the cavalry divisions and infantry divisions also had tanks,( <=500 tanks)
4000 tanks in just two weeks means 83 % losses. ;)

[Feanor]

I'm confused as to why these lines boldened above would be considered "casualties." "Losses" or "removed from combat" would seem more the case, in my opinion.

The Russian word потери includes PoW and deserters in it. Since I was translating it might not be 100% correct. In any event, the article also mentions that the majority of tank losses were not destroyed by Germans, they were abandoned due to lack of fuel.

[Guest]

No doubt, that the Soviet forces in the far east would have shredded the Kwantung Army into pieces before or after veteran seasoned Japanese soldiers were withdrawn throughout the war for reassaigment elsewhere in the Pacific (ex: 2nd Area Army).

[wabpilot]

By early '43 the u-boat threat was pretty small anyway.
Definately not big enough to make much of an impact on the transport of troops and supplies to Britain.

Guess again. Allied shipping losses to the U-boats peaked in early 1943. It was not until May 1943 when things changed. What happened? The US had reorganized its ASW effort. The navy was given both the surface and airborne portions of the mission. The USN built hundreds of DDs and DEs to provide effective escorts to convoys. The USN built several small carriers and provided them with a tiny air group. That extended air coverage into the middle of the Atlantic ocean. The submarine chaser school at Miami had finally produced enough graduate with training, hard won by our British and Canadian allies, to man the DDs and DEs. The 9th Fleet was activated to coordinate US ASW efforts in the Atlantic. Still, May 1943 was not the end of the U-boat menace. Just the turning point.

[bugs]

Asuming that by 7 dec 1941, Germany would have won the war in the east,
( not likely), what forces could the UK and US deploy against Germany in 1942 ?

[Speedy]

Guess again. Allied shipping losses to the U-boats peaked in early 1943. It was not until May 1943 when things changed. What happened? The US had reorganized its ASW effort. The navy was given both the surface and airborne portions of the mission. The USN built hundreds of DDs and DEs to provide effective escorts to convoys. The USN built several small carriers and provided them with a tiny air group. That extended air coverage into the middle of the Atlantic ocean. The submarine chaser school at Miami had finally produced enough graduate with training, hard won by our British and Canadian allies, to man the DDs and DEs. The 9th Fleet was activated to coordinate US ASW efforts in the Atlantic. Still, May 1943 was not the end of the U-boat menace. Just the turning point.

Ok early/mid '43 :) .
But what you say backs up my original point that even without a Pacific war the uboat threat would not have been negated much if any earlier than it historically was.

[Feanor]

Asuming that by 7 dec 1941, Germany would have won the war in the east,
( not likely), what forces could the UK and US deploy against Germany in 1942 ?

Irrelevant. A''victory'' in the east would not have freed up any troops. You still have to keep control of the occupied territory.

[bugs]

They could use divisions deployed in france, greece, yugoslavia,denmark or norway to do that. Plus the italian, hungarian, romanian allies.
Operation Sledgehammer - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

[cape_royds]

Goes a long way to show how political a thing war really can be.

You'd figure that after taking a beating like that, any country would collapse. But the USSR hung on and regrouped--they maintained their political unity and political will-to-fight.

Hitler had said beforehand, "we have only to kick the door in, and the whole rotten structure will fall down."

Well, you can't kick a door much harder than Germany kicked Russia's. The 1941 summer and fall campaign constitutes the largest defeat (in absolute size, not relative size of course) ever inflicted by one army upon another in all of history. The Battle of Kiev alone probably holds the all-time record.

But the structure of the Soviet state didn't fall down. Maybe it should have, but it didn't. History can be like that sometimes. Hitler's basic political assumption, that one good round of severe military defeats would knock out Russia, was proven false by events.

Hitler's political assumption was mistaken, but was it unreasonable?

[Feanor]

It was absolutely unreasonable for Hitler to hope to WIN then war after June 22. Before then Hitler was already set up to lose. He over ran most of Europe on land, but resistance in Norway (where they eventually sabotaged his nuclear project), Yugoslavia and France was tying down large number of troops. German troops were also tied down in North Africa. Finally the U.S. was practically ready to start the war. Even if Hitler didn't invade the USSR, the US would still enter the war. That would probably have meant defeat for Hitler. He simply did not have the population base and production capacity to compete. After he commited most of his troops to the Eastern Front he simply signed his death warrant. Where as before he might have lost, but retained power and possibly even some of his conquests, after that attack he had no chances.


Anyways my main point in posting the original numbers was that I was surprised by the incredibly high non-combat losses. Is this a result of inherent low morale or the way the Germans fought?

[cape_royds]

The prisoners account for almost half the total lost--that was due to the large encirclement battles. Credit the German tactics for those.

For such serious defeats as the Soviets suffered in 1941, the desertion totals actually aren't as bad as they could have been. It's remarkable that those battered armies didn't break entirely.

[Triple C]

It was lunacy for Hitler to expect the political collapse of the Soviet Union after a sharp military blow. Their reasoning was that the Soviet Union was "a corrupt, tyrannical totalitarian regime," therefor internally vulnerable. It turned out that Soviet citizens, after decades of indoctrination, were fiercely loyal (or loyal enough). There were no shortage of true believers among Red Army men, and the brutal occupation policies created partisans everywhere.

[cape_royds]

But look at some of the data Hitler may have considering:

1. Russians were incredibly patriotic in WWI, but nevertheless heavy losses and a series of defeats led to the collapse of their government.

2. The Bolshevik regime had made many enemies among the people of the USSR, with its political repression, collectivization, and suppression of religion.

3. Stalin had just shortly beforehand purged the leadership cadres of both the Communist Party and of the Red Army.

4. The Red Army had put in an embarrassing performance against a third-rate power in Finland. That was not exactly testimony to a high level of morale or commitment.

So I wouldn't say it was "lunacy" for Hitler to believe a severe defeat in the field could prove politically decisive against the USSR. Mistaken--as events would prove--but not really irrational.

[zraver]

But look at some of the data Hitler may have considering:

1. Russians were incredibly patriotic in WWI, but nevertheless heavy losses and a series of defeats led to the collapse of their government.

2. The Bolshevik regime had made many enemies among the people of the USSR, with its political repression, collectivization, and suppression of religion.

3. Stalin had just shortly beforehand purged the leadership cadres of both the Communist Party and of the Red Army.

4. The Red Army had put in an embarrassing performance against a third-rate power in Finland. That was not exactly testimony to a high level of morale or commitment.

So I wouldn't say it was "lunacy" for Hitler to believe a severe defeat in the field could prove politically decisive against the USSR. Mistaken--as events would prove--but not really irrational.

Plus they only expected to face 200 or so divisions. They literally ran into twice what they expected and still made it to Moscow. They could have taken Moscow if things had gone just a little bit differently. Now whether or not this would have caused the fall of the USSR is debatable, but it would have caused huge headaches for Stavka with the loss of roads and rail lines that centered on the city.