Most critical year of the War

[Albany Rifles]

Over on DR Brooks Simpsson's Crossroads blog (Crossroads ) he poses a question for discussion every Sunday. This last week he posted what do the readers think was the most important year of the ACW.

Below is my response to the question:

I believe the critical year was from early May 1863 to early May 1864. My reasoning:

In the West, Grant is finally on solid land to the south of Vicksburg and begins his cross-state swing. By mid July Vicksburg and Port Hudson are in Union hands and the Mississippi is an open waterway. Grant is elevated to take overall command in the West. While the Union drive towards Atlanta is halted at Chickamauga the Union wins an overwhelming victory at Chattanooga. Burnside takes Knoxville and holds it. These successes lead Lincoln to elevate Grant to overall command of the Army. Sherman is made overall commander in the West.

In the East, Confederate success at Chancellorsville proves to be a pyrrhic victory followed in early July by the disaster at Gettysburg. While Longstreet’s Corps has success at Chickamauga the losses of these three key battles absolutely shreds for once and for all the offensive power of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Both armies go into winter quarters with different views but similar outcomes. Amongst the Confederate forces an almost evangelical fervor sweeps through the armies. If they can just hold on they can win a peace in 1864. Oaths are sworn in many units to fight to the last.

In the Union Army we see a fairly large number of soldiers choosing to reenlist rather than opt out of their 3 year enlistments the following spring. Despite casualties at critical command levels the AOP reorganizes into an effective fighting force; while there are some failings at corps level the division and brigade level commanders are first rate in most units. The addition of Sheridan as corps commander would prove crucial over the next 16 months.

Union units have been refit and secondary arms have been replaced throughout the country.

As the campaign season opens we see the 2 opposing armies with a new determination. The Confederates have an almost religious fervor to their determination to defend the remaining key cities and industries. The Union forces are imbued with a new confidence and equal determination to end the rebellion. Early May 1864 sees the Union armies attacking across the country in a unified way for the first time. There would be set backs and failures, but there would be no backward step.


What are your thoughts?

[JAD_333]

Albany:

My thoughts? I completely agree with your summary. One could add a few more examples. I was a little thrown off that you used a 'fiscal' year rather than a calendar year. So, really it's the most critical 12 month period. Works for me.

It seems to me the cards were clearly not in the favor of the Confederacy as far back as 1862, early 1863, and the only good argument the Confederacy had to continue the fight was to force a negotiated settlement. But once the scales tipped decisively in favor of the Union, say mid-1864, the outcome was a foregone conclusion. The bloodbath should have ended then.

[astralis]

AR,

May 1863 to early May 1864

i would place it earlier-- sep 1862 to sep 1863.

GB and france were within weeks if not days of intervening (IIRC, the british PM palmerston was headed up to scotland to give a policy speech that would have recognized the confederacy when news of antietam reached him, and later declined Nappy III's offer to jointly mediate the ACW).

moreover by sep 63 the confederacy was already clearly in serious trouble. i'm not sure if they could have forced a negotiated settlement after vicksburg, let alone the one-two punch of vicksburg and gettysburg.

[Triple C]

Not to derail the thread but to derail it,

What could happen if Grant was not in charge of the AOP 1864-65?

[Minskaya]

I believe the critical year was from early May 1863 to early May 1864. My reasoning: In the West, Grant is finally on solid land to the south of Vicksburg and begins his cross-state swing. By mid July Vicksburg and Port Hudson are in Union hands and the Mississippi is an open waterway.

Agreed. Union seizure of the waterway was decisive. In conjunction with seizing Confederate ports along the river, Union forces also captured numerous critical rail junctions. Confederate logistics (foodstuffs/materials/troops) were severely degraded. The Union on the other hand, could now transport precious commodities from the heartland breadbasket east/south by both train and barge. IMHO, Grant's seizure of Vicksburg and environs truly heralded the beginning of the end of the CSA.

[astralis]

triple C,

What could happen if Grant was not in charge of the AOP 1864-65?

meade keeps his job and executes a lackluster offensive in spring 64 is my guess. in this scenario lee has more mobility and suffers less casualties in the spring-summer '64 timeframe...but then again, the AOP doesn't go through the massive bleeding, either.

meade is competent enough where i can't see lee massively defeating him, a la chancellorsville; and the only way out for the confederacy by '64 is a massive defeat of AOP and perhaps seizure of washington/capture of lincoln. if lee couldn't do it at gettysburg i really don't see how he can do it again in '64. AOP just needs to hold the ANV while sherman or grant embowels the confederacy from the west. anything more is just a cherry on top.

what would be interesting is if davis decided to not just have longstreet go out west but lee. longstreet holds meade while lee fights against grant/sherman in a far more manuverable western theater. THAT would have been damn interesting.

[Albany Rifles]

Weeelllllllll.....for starters Grant was NOT in charge of the Army of the Potomac....George Gordon Meade took command of the AOP on June 28 1863 and did not relenquish it until the AOP was disbanded after the war.

Grant was general-in-chief of all Union armies who colocated his HQ with Meade. While this did overshadow Meade, GGM was in command. I believe that this actually caused more problems than it was worth because of conflicts between the staffs not the two commanders. The Westerners and Easterners did not blend together well. Also the staff work often conflicted and caused each to assume the other staff had thought/done something. This really had impact during the Overland Campaign (the poorly worded orders for the Cavalry Corps to open the campaign, the lack of staff recon of the road networks around Spotsylvania, full knowledge of what was the topography at North Anna.)

That said Meade did offer to resign when Grant showed up...Grant shrewdly recognized that if he relieved the Hero of Gettysburg he would "lose" the AOP. Meade was never loved by his Army but he was well respected.

While I can't get my head around who would do this other than Grant (unless Grant was killed in Winter 1863) I do not know if we would see too much of a difference than what occurred. Having Grant in command did nothing really to help the AOJ or the AOS in the Spring 64. I believe Meade maybe would have done the opening of the campaign a little differently. I believe who would have totally sidestepped the Wilderness since he knew the land so well. He had already done a good job at Gettysburg, Bristoe and Mine Run. He knew not to go headlong into defenses.

What you would have seen was a more powerful Butler and Hunter since there would not have been someone with the authority, both legal and moral, other than Lincoln who could remove them.

I dont see that the various Confederate armies could have done much more than they did. After all, Lee never did beat Meade.

[astralis]

AR,

Grant was general-in-chief of all Union armies who colocated his HQ with Meade. While this did overshadow Meade, GGM was in command. I believe that this actually caused more problems than it was worth because of conflicts between the staffs not the two commanders. The Westerners and Easterners did not blend together well. Also the staff work often conflicted and caused each to assume the other staff had thought/done something. This really had impact during the Overland Campaign (the poorly worded orders for the Cavalry Corps to open the campaign, the lack of staff recon of the road networks around Spotsylvania, full knowledge of what was the topography at North Anna.)

good catch there. i wonder to what extent meade really had OPCON, though; grant seemed to direct the AoP just as much as meade did, if not rather more.

I dont see that the various Confederate armies could have done much more than they did. After all, Lee never did beat Meade.

yup. wonder how lee would have done against sherman, or longstreet against meade.

[Albany Rifles]

AR, good catch there. i wonder to what extent meade really had OPCON, though; grant seemed to direct the AoP just as much as meade did, if not rather more.

Grant was usually careful send his orders properly to Meade...there were times when he did bypass bu tthat was usually in the heat or the moment or done in manner to encourage some more aggressive behavior i.e., siding with Sheridan instead of Meade in going after Stuart (though Sheridan's leaving stripped the AOP of its eyes and ears during the Spotsylvania Campaign....remember my mentioning the lack of knowledge of the terrain during that campaign?)

That is not to say that Grant never over ruled Meade, he did. Nor is it to imply Grant ever was wrong.

But definitely as things settled at Petersburg Grant truly worked through his subordinate Army commanders...he really had no choice.

[Shek]

good catch there. i wonder to what extent meade really had OPCON, though; grant seemed to direct the AoP just as much as meade did, if not rather more.

Grant was usually careful send his orders properly to Meade...there were times when he did bypass bu tthat was usually in the heat or the moment or done in manner to encourage some more aggressive behavior i.e., siding with Sheridan instead of Meade in going after Stuart (though Sheridan's leaving stripped the AOP of its eyes and ears during the Spotsylvania Campaign....remember my mentioning the lack of knowledge of the terrain during that campaign?)

That is not to say that Grant never over ruled Meade, he did. Nor is it to imply Grant ever was wrong.

But definitely as things settled at Petersburg Grant truly worked through his subordinate Army commanders...he really had no choice.

After the Wilderness, Grant became much more directive to Meade, naming specific Commanders/Corps in his orders to Meade. He did this in response to his angst in seeing potential opportunities slip away. Part of this was due to the different styles of leadership (Mark Grimsley has a great discussion of the "coping" style of leadership that Grant had vs. the more cautious style of Meade and the AoP), and part was due to the bulky command structure (Burnside as a separate corps commander under Grant instead of Meade to assuage the sensitivities to rank necessitate by Burnsides date of rank being earlier than Meade).

The below passages from letters between Meade and his wife demonstrate how Meade soured on the relationship as Grant become more directive (while still ensuring he went through Meade as Buck pointed out) in his orders and as the Overland Campaign failed to be decisive in ending the war. Also, the tone of the letters should also be placed in the context of the nature of continuous operations during the campaign, which depending how you slice when the campaign ended, can be a biblical 40 days and 40 nights of intense fighting, multiple night movements, and nearly continuous contact.

26 March 1864 - . . . The weather has been so unpropitious that no inspection has been practicable by General Grant. I spent several hours with him yesterday. He appears very friendly, and at once adopts all my suggestions. I believe Grant is honest and fair, and I have no doubt he will give me full credit for anything I may do, and if I don't deserve any, I don't desire it.

5-7 May - Wilderness
8-21 May - Spotsylvania
21 May - War Council at Massaponnax Church
22 May - Movement to North Anna
23-26 May - North Anna

23 May 1864 – . . . if there was any honorable way of retiring from my present false position I should understandably adopt it, but there is none & all I can do is to patiently submit and bear with resignation the humiliation which for some good purpose it has pleased God to inflict on me…

31 May - 12 June Cold Harbor

6 June 1864 – …I have written you so much & so often about my position, that I think it almost useless to refer any more to it. Duty & honor require me to remain quiescent for the present. What may or can be done in the future the future alone can develop…

9 June 1864 – …[Grant] has greatly disappointed me and since the campaign I really begin to think I am something of a General, upon which point I have heretofore had my doubts. There is one thing Grant has disappointed me in more than anything else, and that is his lack of delicacy of feeling & sensibility. I know he thinks a great deal of me & is most friendly, and would do anything for my benefit that should be suggested. I feel confident he would not intentionally do me injustice, and yet I don’t suppose he has the slightest appreciation of the position he has placed me in & probably is not conscious, that in all his despatches of the operations of t his army which he knows has been handled by me he has only once and then accidentally mentioned my name & so that the future historian when collecting official documents to compile a truthful read, would absolutely not know from any evidence Grant’s despatches contain that I was even present with the army. Now I feel sure if I was to tell this to Grant he would be amazed himself….[reference to “Libeler of the Press” incident] this malicious falsehood had been circulated all over the country, and that in Washington it was attributed to a Mr. Washburne member of Congress, a great friend of Grant’s who was present at the time of the reported occurrence. This I can hardly believe, but I have friends investigating the matter, and if I can only get evidence to sustain the charge, I shall show Mr. Washburne no quarter, and will make him very uneasy….

[astralis]

excellent stuff, shek. i'd not be too happy either, if i thought i was being micromanaged...all while the boss continues to put on a friendly face.

i have to note, though, that even when writing letters of complaint/disgruntlement, meade's cautious. got nothing on little mac!

----

hope you're doing well, shek, we gotta make more civil war posts so you drop in more often!

[Albany Rifles]

Good points, Shek.

I think what we see in Meade is a natural caution but I would not place him as a nervous nellie type. He was personally courageous and was aggressive as a brigade, division and corps commander. He recognized that as he stepped up to command the primary army of the Republic he would have to tamp down some of his aggressiveness. That is why you see him recognizing the trap that was the line at Mine Run and not forcing that issue.

Simply, the nation could not afford to lose large numbers of the AOP. The blood letting that did occur almost wrecked the election chances for 1864. If they had occurred in 1863 the reenlistment rates would have been dramatically lower than they were....and remember that the reenlistment issue was mostly an AOP issue since the units were almost all 3 year with some 2 years regiments. The western armies, with the exception of a few units in the Army of the Cumberland, were mostly raised in 1862. Meade had to have known that.

I know Meade is often taken to task for his failure to follow Lee after Gettysburg. But what most people do not take into account, to include many in the Lincoln Administration at the time, was that the AOP was in a shambles. Stuart's Ride had been effective in disrupting the supply line between Gettysburg and the AOP's depot.

Here is a good read on that situation by DR Mark Snell out of Sheppard University. His final assessment was the AOP was in no shape logistically to go after the ANV. The AOP cavalry did pursue and they got the priority on supplies.


National Park Service: Gettysburg Seminar Papers — Mr. Lincoln's Army: The Army of the Potomac in the Gettysburg Campaign


__________________

hope you're doing well, shek, we gotta make more civil war posts so you drop in more often!

I double that sentiment! (Though I am currently on my War of 1812 kick!)

[astralis]

so this leads to the question, would things have gone better if meade had uncontested control of the AOP in 1864? would it have been better to sequester grant in DC?

or alternatively, what happens if Lincoln just kicks MEADE upstairs and makes grant AOP commander?

[Albany Rifles]

so this leads to the question, would things have gone better if meade had uncontested control of the AOP in 1864? would it have been better to sequester grant in DC?

or alternatively, what happens if Lincoln just kicks MEADE upstairs and makes grant AOP commander?

Have to think about the first one....Grant in DC would have been a mess. I think the emphasis Grant gave to the AOP was needed but Grant could have been a little more deft.

As to the second....too contentious. No one in Congress would support a LTG commission for Meade....he may have been the Savior of Gettysburg but he did not have any spectacular success through the fall to match the Vicksburg-Chattanooga one two of Grant. I believe the Eastern generals would have bridled under a Westerner coming east to comamnd them. I also don't think Sherman would have worked well with Meade...Thomas perhaps.

The situation in 1864 was such that Grant was the obvious choice.

As I alluded to but Shek made clear this was a situation which cleared up sufficiently by summer.

The two men forged a good working relationship to the overall benefit of the Union. There were ample examples in our history where command conflict occurred but for the good of the mission the leaders worked it out.

[Shek]

Good points, Shek.

I think what we see in Meade is a natural caution but I would not place him as a nervous nellie type. He was personally courageous and was aggressive as a brigade, division and corps commander. He recognized that as he stepped up to command the primary army of the Republic he would have to tamp down some of his aggressiveness. That is why you see him recognizing the trap that was the line at Mine Run and not forcing that issue.
__________________

hope you're doing well, shek, we gotta make more civil war posts so you drop in more often!

I double that sentiment! (Though I am currently on my War of 1812 kick!)

Buck,
Things are well, but as activity on the board indicates, busy! I wasn't trying to dig into Meade. In fact, the contrasting styles should not be surprising. The only time Grant had suffered defeat was in the defense at Shiloh, whereas, the Meade's greatest success had come in the defense. Thus, experience had taught both mean contrasting lessons - Grant saw opportunity in the offense, while Meade saw opportunity in the defense.