Athenian Democracy and the Peloponnesian War

[Shek]

I'm busy cranking out my final paper, which is exploring how Athenian Democracy affected the outcome of the Peloponnesian War. My basic thesis is that the Athenian democracy produced a sense of Athenian exceptionalism, which created an appetite for empire and resulted in incredible accomplishments both domestically, and in innovation in military strategy, abandoning traditional hoplite battle as the sole means to fight a war. On the other hand, a government of The People also created a string of great men, which caused them to enter the war (Pericles), implement an interruptum bellum (Nicias, who was a great man only through the best of fortune), and then commit to a high stakes expedition to strike an indirect death blow on the Peloponnesus (Alcibiades). However, in the process, Athens failed to properly support a democratic alliance that could have defeated the Spartans at Mantinea in 418 and by succumbing to allowing false accusations by fellow citizens to be prosecuted, what could be termed a fatal flaw in Athenian Democracy, they drove Alcibiades to betray Athens first to the Spartans, and then to the Persians. In a strange twist of fate, it would be the refusal of the Athenians to listen to the "rehabilitated" Alcibiades, who had triangulated himself back into power in Athens, that led to ultimate Spartan victory in the Pelopponesian War.

In any, I'm curious what others thoughts are on the subject . . .

[astralis]

interesting thesis. i personally think the emphasis of weakness should be on athenian exceptionalism. nicias, after all, did wish for a recall of the athenian expedition; had the athenians withdrawn as opposed to reinforce the expedition wouldn't have been the disaster it would become by 413.

[Shek]

interesting thesis. i personally think the emphasis of weakness should be on athenian exceptionalism. nicias, after all, did wish for a recall of the athenian expedition; had the athenians withdrawn as opposed to reinforce the expedition wouldn't have been the disaster it would become by 413.

Or if they had pursued Lamachus' idea of attacking Siracus immediately, then they would have defeated them and then struck fear in the rest of Sicily. Even if they hadn't done that, it was the secret charges against Alcibiades that drove him to Sparta and revealed Athenian weaknesses and allowed Sparta to arrive just in time for the seige of Siracus and to permanently garrison in Attica, leading to the defeat of Athens in Sicily and their decline. However, whether Athens could have kept Sicily in check if they had won, given that they had trouble in their own backyard, is doubtful.

However, I do agree that Athenian exceptionalism was a weakness in the sense that their perceived role and power didn't match.

[Praxus]

Shek, what do you think the effect of Lysander was on the over all direction of the Pelop. War? On a larger level, what do you think the effect of a large Pelop. Navy that could rival the Athenian had on the end result of the war? Would you weigh these as high as the Athenian disaster at Sicily?

[Bulgaroctonus]

Shek,
Will you post the paper when its done?

[Shek]

Shek, what do you think the effect of Lysander was on the over all direction of the Pelop. War? On a larger level, what do you think the effect of a large Pelop. Navy that could rival the Athenian had on the end result of the war? Would you weigh these as high as the Athenian disaster at Sicily?

Praxus,
Since my main reading was based on Thucydides' text, I haven't read much on the latter part of the war. So, I really can't answer your question about Lysander. From what I did read, I'd say that the large Peloponnesian fleet provided it the mass to wear out the Athenian fleet. While Athens was still superior, they no longer had the capital to replace their lost ships. This was critical since Athens power was based on their fleet - it provided trade, allowed Athens to have a tributary alliance, and allowed its economy to flourish. Thus, its ability to project power was eroded over time. So, with the long walls and Spartan weakness at siegecraft, only a complete defeat of the Athenian fleet would allow a Spartan victory.

[Shek]

Shek,
Will you post the paper when its done?

I finished almost two weeks ago, but here it is. I didn't get as much detail into it as I would have liked, but I think it should read well for an audience that may not be as familiar with Thucydides' text since I threw in many excerpts.