Iraqi Constitution passing ? Place your bets ...

[Guest]

There is actually an Ireland based electronic exchange for politics, current events, financial indicators, weather and other unique contracts just opened a market on the new Iraqi constitution. This site can be seen at www.intrade.com .
From a recent press release from the Intrade.com folk, they note that their exchange traders are actively betting the Iraqi Constitution will pass when it comes to a vote on October 15th.
Apparently, Intrade.com began trading contracts tied to the ratification of the Iraq Constitution with a rush of volume, mostly on the upside. Traders on Intrade.com correctly predicted the outcome of the US general election in 2004, Tony Blair's re-election and Cardinal Ratszinger's appointment to the papacy are also betting on ratification.
From their site, the probability of a YES Vote is now about 70% - up over 30% from last week, with all the rhetoric on rejecting this referendum and the history of correctly predicting political election results, it makes sense to take no other sides of this trade.
Another related Intrade.com trading contract involves betting that Osama bin Laden will be captured by the end of this year. This contract has fallen from $30 in May to only about $13-14 now.

Interesting stuff… makes a lot of sense too…

[Shek]

I think it will pass, but it will face stiff resistance in Sunni majority areas and be defeated in 1-2 provinces. Achieving a 2/3 majority to defeat it in 3 provinces will be tough to do for its opponents.

[Ray]

Call me a sceptic.

[Ray]

COMMENT: Iraq’s constitutional crisis —Tanvir Ahmad Khan


The Sunnis protest that the weakened Centre will not hold and the country will fall apart. They point to the spectre of a three-way split, civil war or, at the very least, chronic instability if the constitution is adopted without changes

The situation in Iraq continues to unfold to one’s worst apprehensions. Diplomats and statesmen of scores of countries struggled hard to avert the impending invasion of that benighted country and millions of people marched all over the globe to support their efforts. But the invasion came like a Biblical curse and laid waste a country already weakened by Saddam Hussein’s wars and a decade of harsh sanctions. Not many people in the world believe that the US and the UK invaded Iraq because of weapons of mass destruction, which they knew did not exist; or, for that matter, because of Iraq’s fictitious role in global terrorism. But many of them were beginning to hope that the revised semantics of war aims — liberty, freedom and democracy — would begin the healing process and set the stage for an honourable disengagement by the occupying powers.

This hope rested on the United States recognising the fact that wars, especially those regarded as illegal and unjust, have great many unintended consequences and that the occupation had gone wrong. Decisions such as the wanton destruction of the entire political and administrative structure of the occupied country were simply misconceived. Above all, Iraq in 2003-2005 presented altogether a different set of problems in the reconstitution of the demolished state than Japan and Germany in 1945.

Four differentiating factors stood out from the very beginning. First, unlike Germany and Japan, the occupation continued to be fiercely resisted. Second, Iraq was not homogenous and had ethnic and sectarian fault lines that had been deliberately sharpened by the invading countries for more than a decade. Third, Iraq was militarily defeated but not emptied of ideological content. Shia Ayatollahs, Sunni patriots and Kurdish nationalists sustained Iraqi people with visions of alternative identities that rejected a single collective identity of being a broken and vanquished people. Fourth, the invasion had unleashed apocalyptic fears in the region that enabled the resistance to draw upon a stream of outside volunteers.

The post-invasion situation produced many narratives poorly understood by the Bush administration. There was the inevitable national resistance. Having dubbed it as terrorism, the occupation knew no strategy to deal with it except — as Fallujah tragically demonstrated — the application of brute force. Then there were Kurdish aspirations that had been supported and betrayed by the West for almost a century and that were now being openly encouraged. An effective air cover provided by the US and the UK for more than a decade had virtually turned Kurdish areas into an autonomous state. Yet again, there were the sufferings of Iraqi Shias who had faced bloody reprisals by Saddam Hussein after the Kuwait war.

Under relentless military pressure from occupation forces, the national resistance did degenerate into terrorism. Asymmetrical warfare by militants more than willing to die for their cause is always a serious challenge to regular armies. Anxious to concentrate its firepower on clearly delimited targets, the occupation chose to identify resistance with the so-called Sunni triangle. Shias and Kurds were promised a high degree of self-determination in the reconstructed state. Admittedly, the situation on the ground militated against Arabs and Kurds returning to the traditional authoritarian unified state but the offer of sectarian federalism in Arab areas was fraught with grave risks as it exacerbated Sunni fears of total marginalisation.

Alienated and harassed, the Sunnis made the mistake of boycotting the elections at a time when any election was better than none. The process produced not only a strong Kurdish presence in the national parliament but also a Kurdistan National Assembly backed by the experienced peshmerga fighters. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and Da’awa, the Shias parties, emerged as a major faction in the new parliament with a clear agenda for regional autonomy and adoption of Islam as the mainspring of law. Evidently, this project found favour also in Tehran as it provided an altogether new matrix for regional alignments in the years to come.

The best-case scenario would have envisaged a broad consensus on the major provisions of the constitution that would replace the transitional administrative law (TAL) decreed by the Occupation. United States did make a belated effort to level out the divisive tendencies it had earlier encouraged. Despite extensions of the deadline for writing the constitution, the parliament failed to allay Sunni fears. The draft document written only by Kurdish and Shia legislators would be put to vote in a national referendum on October 15 this year. It falls if three out of 18 provinces of Iraq reject it with a two-thirds majority. The Sunnis protest that the weakened Centre will not hold and the country will fall apart. They point to the spectre of a three-way split, civil war or, at the very least, chronic instability if the constitution is adopted without changes.

The text recognises the Kurdistan region and empowers one or more provinces to create a region with considerable legislative, executive and judicial autonomy. It gives the federal government revenues of current oil wells while new resources will probably be under regional jurisdiction. There is some hope in the fact that details are to be worked out by a new parliament expected to be elected with full Sunni participation. Shia-Sunni unity was not fractured even by the eight-year war against Iran. It will reassert itself quickly if federalism is made equitable and free of external manipulation. A timetable for the termination of military occupation will probably reduce suspicion of an alien hidden agenda in the new constitution. Clearly, the solution lies in working out a judicious devolution of powers to all the provinces while retaining a viable centre. This task can be accomplished only by including all segments of Iraqi people. The constitution of an Islamic country cannot be based on sectarian grounds.

The writer is a former foreign secretary
COMMENT: Iraq’s constitutional crisis —Tanvir Ahmad Khan

The Sunnis protest that the weakened Centre will not hold and the country will fall apart. They point to the spectre of a three-way split, civil war or, at the very least, chronic instability if the constitution is adopted without changes

The situation in Iraq continues to unfold to one’s worst apprehensions. Diplomats and statesmen of scores of countries struggled hard to avert the impending invasion of that benighted country and millions of people marched all over the globe to support their efforts. But the invasion came like a Biblical curse and laid waste a country already weakened by Saddam Hussein’s wars and a decade of harsh sanctions. Not many people in the world believe that the US and the UK invaded Iraq because of weapons of mass destruction, which they knew did not exist; or, for that matter, because of Iraq’s fictitious role in global terrorism. But many of them were beginning to hope that the revised semantics of war aims — liberty, freedom and democracy — would begin the healing process and set the stage for an honourable disengagement by the occupying powers.

This hope rested on the United States recognising the fact that wars, especially those regarded as illegal and unjust, have great many unintended consequences and that the occupation had gone wrong. Decisions such as the wanton destruction of the entire political and administrative structure of the occupied country were simply misconceived. Above all, Iraq in 2003-2005 presented altogether a different set of problems in the reconstitution of the demolished state than Japan and Germany in 1945.

Four differentiating factors stood out from the very beginning. First, unlike Germany and Japan, the occupation continued to be fiercely resisted. Second, Iraq was not homogenous and had ethnic and sectarian fault lines that had been deliberately sharpened by the invading countries for more than a decade. Third, Iraq was militarily defeated but not emptied of ideological content. Shia Ayatollahs, Sunni patriots and Kurdish nationalists sustained Iraqi people with visions of alternative identities that rejected a single collective identity of being a broken and vanquished people. Fourth, the invasion had unleashed apocalyptic fears in the region that enabled the resistance to draw upon a stream of outside volunteers.

The post-invasion situation produced many narratives poorly understood by the Bush administration. There was the inevitable national resistance. Having dubbed it as terrorism, the occupation knew no strategy to deal with it except — as Fallujah tragically demonstrated — the application of brute force. Then there were Kurdish aspirations that had been supported and betrayed by the West for almost a century and that were now being openly encouraged. An effective air cover provided by the US and the UK for more than a decade had virtually turned Kurdish areas into an autonomous state. Yet again, there were the sufferings of Iraqi Shias who had faced bloody reprisals by Saddam Hussein after the Kuwait war.

Under relentless military pressure from occupation forces, the national resistance did degenerate into terrorism. Asymmetrical warfare by militants more than willing to die for their cause is always a serious challenge to regular armies. Anxious to concentrate its firepower on clearly delimited targets, the occupation chose to identify resistance with the so-called Sunni triangle. Shias and Kurds were promised a high degree of self-determination in the reconstructed state. Admittedly, the situation on the ground militated against Arabs and Kurds returning to the traditional authoritarian unified state but the offer of sectarian federalism in Arab areas was fraught with grave risks as it exacerbated Sunni fears of total marginalisation.

Alienated and harassed, the Sunnis made the mistake of boycotting the elections at a time when any election was better than none. The process produced not only a strong Kurdish presence in the national parliament but also a Kurdistan National Assembly backed by the experienced peshmerga fighters. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and Da’awa, the Shias parties, emerged as a major faction in the new parliament with a clear agenda for regional autonomy and adoption of Islam as the mainspring of law. Evidently, this project found favour also in Tehran as it provided an altogether new matrix for regional alignments in the years to come.

The best-case scenario would have envisaged a broad consensus on the major provisions of the constitution that would replace the transitional administrative law (TAL) decreed by the Occupation. United States did make a belated effort to level out the divisive tendencies it had earlier encouraged. Despite extensions of the deadline for writing the constitution, the parliament failed to allay Sunni fears. The draft document written only by Kurdish and Shia legislators would be put to vote in a national referendum on October 15 this year. It falls if three out of 18 provinces of Iraq reject it with a two-thirds majority. The Sunnis protest that the weakened Centre will not hold and the country will fall apart. They point to the spectre of a three-way split, civil war or, at the very least, chronic instability if the constitution is adopted without changes.

The text recognises the Kurdistan region and empowers one or more provinces to create a region with considerable legislative, executive and judicial autonomy. It gives the federal government revenues of current oil wells while new resources will probably be under regional jurisdiction. There is some hope in the fact that details are to be worked out by a new parliament expected to be elected with full Sunni participation. Shia-Sunni unity was not fractured even by the eight-year war against Iran. It will reassert itself quickly if federalism is made equitable and free of external manipulation. A timetable for the termination of military occupation will probably reduce suspicion of an alien hidden agenda in the new constitution. Clearly, the solution lies in working out a judicious devolution of powers to all the provinces while retaining a viable centre. This task can be accomplished only by including all segments of Iraqi people. The constitution of an Islamic country cannot be based on sectarian grounds.

The writer is a former foreign secretary

A view from an Islamic country (Pakistan) media on the Constitution.

It is to be noted that it is a media report from a Sunni majority country.

Nonetheless, a view that is important in its context.

[csite]

The same thing will happen as the japanese constitution after ww2, it will end up being written by foreign rulers, rather than the actual leaders. They wont agree and it will take for ever. Its just America that has a rush to leave, you cant rush these things.

[Ray]

What is the answer then?

The lawlessness is increasing day by day.

India liberated Bangladesh and the Army was pulled out almost immediately.

Bangladesh managed on their own.

Things were good till those in the Army took over in a coup.

The army men including the General were orginally from the Pakistani army, most of them had deserted the Pakistani army during their war for liberation. They were conversant with organising coups. Still things were even keel.

It was only when they took the help of the rabid Islamic forces and Bangaldesh became an Islamic Republic that things went sour in their international outlook. In a poor country where finance is badly required, the huge money funneled in by rabid Islamic countries and Islamic "charitable' organganisation is too huge a lure to spurn.

It is in a bad shape now, because the Jammaat is in governance with Khaleda Zia's party and are going whole hog in Islamisation of Bangaldesh. US has cautioned them of the negative fallouts.

Therefore, while one may feel that the US should have handed over the reins to the Iraqis after the invasion, handing over immediately also has the negative connotation wherein the rabid Islamic forces takes over and the whole exercise of freedom and democracy comes to nought.

And if one hangs on as the Us is doing, the situation gets tough and an impasse approaches though Islamisation is prevented.

Therefore, it is a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation.

What is the answer?