Look back with Angst

[Officer of Engineers]

As for the topic itself, I doubt that there will really be a war. The early 20th century didn't have the ability to literally destroy the world ten times over.

I held that view once. Never was the case and certainly not today. We have gotten rid of 55,000+ nukes.

[SouthKorean]

I held that view once. Never was the case and certainly not today. We have gotten rid of 55,000+ nukes.

The world still has tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, still enough to destroy the world. As for my view, let me fix it to be more specific:
There will be no MAJOR war. There will and may be smaller ones and border conflicts (ex. Sino-Indian and Sino-Vietnamese wars which prove that even in the nuclear age, war is possible) but there will be no major wars. Also due to the increasing globalization and intertwined nature of the global economy, I believe that the possibility of wars is ever-more decreasing. I wonder how you think.

[SouthKorean]

Uh, what about the Cultural Revolution and, in close conjecture, the turn to Manchester Capitalism after Mao's death that has resulted in China's massive economic growth mirroring and actually outpacing Germany's run a century earlier? That one was a rather dramatic change and upheaving moment for China. We're not in 1962, you know?

Hegemony? We're talking a comparison of China and pre-WW1 Germany. Pre-WW1 Germany had never been a hegemon. They were an upstart newcomer to the Grand Game at the time, operating in it seriously for perhaps a quarter century, and in the past ten years beginning to challenge the established interregional powers on an entirely new scale. No longer an underdog, but far from dominating. An economic edge? Germany had just barely overtaken the British Empire in 1914, on an economic bubble that was mostly built on selective protectionism. As for a military edge? On both fronts 133 German and Austrian divisions faced 192 Entente divisions in August 1914, the Entente prewar had a mobilization strength of ca 160% of the Central Powers.

Perhaps my knowledge of WWI history and the relevant statistics is lacking and I admit it. I'll get back to that after I do a little research.
As for your first point, I don't actually get what you're saying. Are you saying that the change already happened? I must also clarify-a state needs several levels of change and history shows it. The US began to become a serious power after the end of its civil war. WWI established its presence as an international power, and the Great Depression and WWII cemented its position as a superpower. Russia saw its expansion as a Eurasian empire while the Russian civil war dramatically changed its politics and economy. Stalin's industrialization provided the base of its economy while WWII led to its domination of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and to its status of superpower. I could go on and on, but I think these two examples suffice to show my point. If you're saying that China could become the superpower it aspires to be without change, then I'll have to disagree with you. Under the current political landscape it would never will, and I understand that China has some bubbling economic problems.

[Double Edge]

The world still has tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, still enough to destroy the world. As for my view, let me fix it to be more specific:

Not tens of thousands, the US & Soviets are around 5k a piece. The rest are in the hundreds. 10k nukes plus change.

There will be no MAJOR war. There will and may be smaller ones and border conflicts (ex. Sino-Indian and Sino-Vietnamese wars which prove that even in the nuclear age, war is possible) but there will be no major wars. Also due to the increasing globalization and intertwined nature of the global economy, I believe that the possibility of wars is ever-more decreasing. I wonder how you think.

The underlined bit is what the economist article charges as complacency.

The intertwined nature acts a constraint but its not an insurmountable barrier. But I heard that China is the biggest trading partner of about 120 countries. So that's lots of constraints.

Two precautions would help prevent any of these flashpoints sparking a conflagration. One is a system for minimising the threat from potential dangers. Nobody is quite clear what will happen when North Korea implodes, but America and China need to plan ahead if they are to safeguard its nuclear programme without antagonising each other. China is playing an elaborately dangerous game of “chicken” around its littoral with its neighbours. Eventually, somebody is bound to crash into somebody else—and there is as yet no system for dealing with it. A code of maritime conduct for the area is needed.

The US has Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) with China for over a decade, yet there still were a couple of incidents in 2001 & 2009.

The problem is China does not want to follow international maritime norms, they want to rewrite them. In such a case the only response is deterrence, hence the Japanese moving to fill the gaps by themselves.

The second precaution that would make the world safer is a more active American foreign policy. Despite forging an interim nuclear agreement with Iran, Barack Obama has pulled back in the Middle East—witness his unwillingness to use force in Syria. He has also done little to bring the new emerging giants—India, Indonesia, Brazil and, above all, China—into the global system. This betrays both a lack of ambition and an ignorance of history. Thanks to its military, economic and soft power, America is still indispensable, particularly in dealing with threats like climate change and terror, which cross borders. But unless America behaves as a leader and the guarantor of the world order, it will be inviting regional powers to test their strength by bullying neighbouring countries.

Rebalance is a step in this direction.

[SouthKorean]

Not tens of thousands, the US & Soviets are around 5k a piece. The rest are in the hundreds. 10k nukes plus change.


The underlined bit is what the economist article charges as complacency.

The intertwined nature acts a constraint but its not an insurmountable barrier. But I heard that China is the biggest trading partner of about 120 countries. So that's lots of constraints.


The US has Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) with China for over a decade, yet there still were a couple of incidents in 2001 & 2009.

The problem is China does not want to follow international maritime norms, they want to rewrite them. In such a case the only response is deterrence, hence the Japanese moving to fill the gaps by themselves.


Rebalance is a step in this direction.

You're right, a quick search revealed that there's around 17k. Perhaps I have been misinformed by the wrong set of statistics.
As for complacency, I admit that it certainly is possible. Complacency has caused many nations their downfall. However such complacency was based on irrational and subjective perceptions. Economic relations are real, and China would have much to lose if they provoke a war both politically, diplomatically, and economically. Sure they'll squabble with surrounding countries and perhaps wring a few concessions, but a war that will affect the world and destroy nations would not erupt.
China has much to win and nothing to lose in trying to rebuild the international order. As a strong adherent to realpolitik, I believe that nations are naturally selfish, and the current international order favors the US and western countries. China will want to upset that, and it will succeed. South Korea may or may not benefit, it's still too early to tell.

[zraver]

To have a real world war you need

1. Large scale global trade
2. System of alliances
3. Emergent power that does not respect established lawful norms while nursing a grudge.
4. Long standing and bitter border disputes
5. A failing hegemon that used to police disputes

[Doktor]

The intertwined nature acts a constraint but its not an insurmountable barrier. But I heard that China is the biggest trading partner of about 120 countries. So that's lots of constraints.

How many of those 120 countries are actually happy with this situation?
I mean if they buy something cheap from China and then sell it to let's say us, they might be OK with the deal, but if such deal drains their reserves I doubt it will lead to a long-lasting trade.

USA seems to (still) be comfort to absorb whatever other nations produce and pay for it with Ctrl+P command. That practice seems to end. No country can stand huge deficits.

The US has Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) with China for over a decade, yet there still were a couple of incidents in 2001 & 2009.

If you look them as a pattern then the trend is worrisome. Next incident in 2 years?

The problem is China does not want to follow international maritime norms, they want to rewrite them. In such a case the only response is deterrence, hence the Japanese moving to fill the gaps by themselves.

China seems not to be deterred by USN, what can Japanese do as an extra?

Rebalance is a step in this direction.

What rebalance?

[Double Edge]

How many of those 120 countries are actually happy with this situation?
I mean if they buy something cheap from China and then sell it to let's say us, they might be OK with the deal, but if such deal drains their reserves I doubt it will lead to a long-lasting trade.

USA seems to (still) be comfort to absorb whatever other nations produce and pay for it with Ctrl+P command. That practice seems to end. No country can stand huge deficits.

Happy does not have anything to do with it. Domestic business interests are defacto china lobbies in the countries concerned. The threshold for conflict is higher as a result of the trade. At the same time it imposes costs on both parties. Some countries might sanction China but there are many others left. To counter China requires many countries to act in concert to have the desired effect. At the same time China can also push more. Issuing tests.

If you look them as a pattern then the trend is worrisome. Next incident in 2 years?

or longer. There is always the chance of miscalculation, accident or escalation. Cooler heads have to prevail. As China's intent right now is to find openings.

The flip side about these agreements at sea is they are usually done between foes. To have such an agreement means what ? that the countries making the agreement regard the other as foes. I don't think anybody wants to say that as yet.

China seems not to be deterred by USN, what can Japanese do as an extra?

US-Japan alliance does not show any signs of cracking. This means Japan will not concede
- that there is a dispute
- that they can put off whatever for later.

Right now Japanese have the quality, Chinese have the quantity. The quantity is what the Japanese want to build up. They can be swamped by larger numbers of vessels. This is not military but Chinese civilian boats working as proxies that are dual purpose, surveillance, ocean mapping etc. Japanese need more boats.

East China sea does not have many islands so China wants to increase surveillance and in doing so needs to deny others from doing the same. They need more numbers as their tech isn't upto the mark for this yet. But ten years form now the picture will be different, China will have better tech or is expected to.

Notice the trend over the last ten years. it used to be about Taiwan, it slowly stretched to Vietnam & Philipines and now its with Japan. They're mapping the area out and if openings or any weakness is present they will exploit them in the future.

Japan & US will act in concert to keep those openings small and continue to do so. China builds up, other countries are brought in to rebalance. This will play out over the next decade. At which point if the balance is kept then it tempers China's behaviour in the future.

What rebalance?

US pivot to the east.