What if the Confederates had Gatling guns?

[Albany Rifles]

Those infantry assaults stopped by Gatlings were not against first line industrial society military formations....they were used against tribal and peasant armies...not the same as the Union Army.

But if the Confederates had Gatlings available to them I seriously doubt Grant would have aven attacked at Cold Harbor. He would have used what was his best operational strategy....continuously move against Lee's right flank and pin him against Richmond.

The main failure of Cold Harbor was not the corps commanders....it was a poor plan on bad terrain attempted to be executed by a worn out Army. The staff planning on the part of the AOP and Grant's staff was atrocious. The VIth Corps had to march 14 miles overnight from the extreme right along Totopotomy Creek to just to get into position. Soldiers wer eliterally walking into trees asleep on the march. The 3 days it took get the AOP across the James afforded those men the first rest they had had since the night of 2 May. The same was true of II Corps. As at the leadup to the Bloody Angle fight a few weeks before staffwork did not take into account the poor road network which did not support the type of troop movements needed to succesfully shift forces for the attack.

The failure at Cold Harbor was Grant's decision to conduct the attack once he couldn't get his Army into place in time to be effective and then his refusal to accept the cost of asking for a truce which resulted in more men dying needlessly.

That said, the Gatling would have made it difficult but not impossible.

NOTE: What Shek said!

[Albany Rifles]

Hey Shek...love those new maps on teh Civil War Trust website too!

[astralis]

of course, in any scenario where the ANV has gatlings in any number, you can bet your bottom dollar that the AoP will have them...and in greater numbers, too.

[Albany Rifles]

of course, in any scenario where the ANV has gatlings in any number, you can bet your bottom dollar that the AoP will have them...and in greater numbers, too.

But that would be unfair!


God, I hate Harry Turtledove!

[zraver]

1. Keep in mind the terrain, which provided numerous IV lines to provide cover from the effects for the Gatlings. The general assault proceeded generally until the last covered position and served in the end to close the gap between the two lines.

Granted you won't have regiments wiped out in the communication trenches before they even reach the jump off point but you will still have men mowed down.

2. The general assault was ordered because it was going to be the last opportunity for an assault prior to the seige of Richmond. More importantly, it was made upon the assumption by Grant that the ANV was spent.

If the ANV had unveiled gatlings here that assumption would still hold. I've made mention in this thread that the best way the ANV could have used a few batteries of the weapon was in a surprise unleashing against a massed attack in an election year. I freely concede once the shock wears off the utility of the weapon decreases. Thus the goal is to maximize the shock and thus the political damage to Lincoln.

[quote]The latter half #2 is the most important factor for ordering the general assault. Add in Gatlings, and Grant proceeds more cautiously in his tactics.[/qutoe]

If he knows, he already has one intelligence failure, the ANV is not spent

Add in #1, and any effective fire will spontaneously halt assaulting lines just as effective rifle fire halted them on 3 June 1864.

Dissagree, highly disciplined troops would not break on contact and would be slow to react to the nature of the new threat. Militia would break and suffer fewer losses but regulars and veterans would be mowed down. Adaptation takes time and the unit that develops the counter is rarely the unit to first encounter the new threat- that unit tends to die.

The end result is not a substantial # of casualties. Instead, Grant initiates the sidle around the ANV's right flank earlier. In fact, maybe this earlier movement results in Grant smashing through the Petersburg defenses during the second week of June and owning Richmond that same week. Virginia is lost and with it goes the supplies from the Shenandoah and from Tregedar. While the ANV exists to fight another day, it takes substantial losses in the counterattack against the Union held Richmond. Southern morale collapses and the war is won by Election Day in 1864.

maybe, but I am 100% in the opposite of that statement. I think losses would have been much higher and the physical shock of the loss would have paralyzed the AoP and set off a storm in Washington. McClellan would have used the situation to roast Lincoln over an open fire.

AR,

Those peasant armies managed to defeat several European armies. In the field, and in siege. Not every non-European was a Boxer. They often had levels of infantry firepower on the assault comparable to the Union armies as well. Heck what a feudal peasant army did at the battle of Adwa should speak volumes. Adwa, Impal, Rorke's Drift, Kandahar, Kabul, Jellabad... the natives proved they knew how to press an attack at least as vigorously as any European or American.

The Gatling properly employed in its initial outing against massed union troops would look like 1915.

[zraver]

of course, in any scenario where the ANV has gatlings in any number, you can bet your bottom dollar that the AoP will have them...and in greater numbers, too.

But until the ANV unveils them effectively why would they have them, the USAR didn't want them.

[astralis]

can't imagine it would be unveiled in mass. more likely the ANV would give it a trial run, and see if it was worth getting.

of course if the gatling proved to be a smashing success that would give the AoP a heads-up too...

[zraver]

can't imagine it would be unveiled in mass. more likely the ANV would give it a trial run, and see if it was worth getting.

of course if the gatling proved to be a smashing success that would give the AoP a heads-up too...

Disagree, the CSA didn't have the luxury of testing in small batches. If an idea worked on the drawing board and could be translated to a field (not operational) demonstration it was employed aka the petticoat balloon and the CSS Hunley. The defensive minded generals would see how to employ the weapon instinctively. Something that eluded the US because the AoP had an offensive mindset to which the Gatling was less suited.

[Shek]

Disagree, the CSA didn't have the luxury of testing in small batches. If an idea worked on the drawing board and could be translated to a field (not operational) demonstration it was employed aka the petticoat balloon and the CSS Hunley. The defensive minded generals would see how to employ the weapon instinctively. Something that eluded the US because the AoP had an offensive mindset to which the Gatling was less suited.

How do you figure that the AoP had an offensive mindset? It was anything but and was bred and born this way by McClellan. This is why Grant had to micromanage Meade and the AoP following the Wilderness. That isn't to say that you had some portions that possessed an offensive spirit, but by and large, it was a cautious formation.

[zraver]

How do you figure that the AoP had an offensive mindset? It was anything but and was bred and born this way by McClellan. This is why Grant had to micromanage Meade and the AoP following the Wilderness. That isn't to say that you had some portions that possessed an offensive spirit, but by and large, it was a cautious formation.

Operationally and strategically the AoP had to be on the offensive to win. It had to find a way to defeat the ANV and the Southern Will to resist. This was the only way it could win. The ANV had a defensive mindset, especially after Gettysburg when all Lee wanted to do was outlast the North's will to battle. The fact the AoP had to attack must have and did influence how it approached battle and tactical employment of assets.

[Shek]

Operationally and strategically the AoP had to be on the offensive to win. It had to find a way to defeat the ANV and the Southern Will to resist. This was the only way it could win. The ANV had a defensive mindset, especially after Gettysburg when all Lee wanted to do was outlast the North's will to battle. The fact the AoP had to attack must have and did influence how it approached battle and tactical employment of assets.

The AoP had a defensive mindset. McClellan instilled this in the AoP and it lasted through the war. Grant brought the offensive mindset to the East, and the mismatch between Grant's mindset of always looking for a seam / opportunity vs. the mindset of most of his subordinate commanders that looked for set piece actions resulted in numerous missed opportunities. A wonderful anecdote from a minor collapse of Sedgwick's northern flank in the Wilderness perfectly illustrates the tension between Grant's offensive mindset, of always looking for an opportunity, versus the mindset prevalent in the AoP follows:

"General Grant, this is a crisis that cannot be looked upon too seriously. I know Lee's methods well by past experience; he will throw his whole army between us and the Rapidan, and cut us off completely from our communications." Grant seemed to be waiting for such an opportunity and snapped, "Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do."

The anecdote also illustrates the offensive mindset of Lee and the ANV, something that he had instilled in his commanders. As you look at the Overland Campaign and the Petersburg Campaign, you always see rapid and vigorous counterattacks in reaction to any Union offensive, a testament to its offensive spirit.

Just because the North had to fight a total war to win and the South didn't doesn't mean that their primary armies came with the requisite mindset. You cannot conflate the necessary strategy and corresponding mindset with the actual mindset as you have done here.

[Shek]

Granted you won't have regiments wiped out in the communication trenches before they even reach the jump off point but you will still have men mowed down.

If the ANV had unveiled gatlings here that assumption would still hold. I've made mention in this thread that the best way the ANV could have used a few batteries of the weapon was in a surprise unleashing against a massed attack in an election year. I freely concede once the shock wears off the utility of the weapon decreases. Thus the goal is to maximize the shock and thus the political damage to Lincoln.

If he knows, he already has one intelligence failure, the ANV is not spent

Dissagree, highly disciplined troops would not break on contact and would be slow to react to the nature of the new threat. Militia would break and suffer fewer losses but regulars and veterans would be mowed down. Adaptation takes time and the unit that develops the counter is rarely the unit to first encounter the new threat- that unit tends to die.

maybe, but I am 100% in the opposite of that statement. I think losses would have been much higher and the physical shock of the loss would have paralyzed the AoP and set off a storm in Washington. McClellan would have used the situation to roast Lincoln over an open fire.

You're not tracking on what happened. The general assault by and large simply advanced the lines to the last covered position, meaning that the exposure wasn't that great. Thus, your scenario about breaking and running isn't what happened at all. Units by and large advanced and then spontaneously ended their assaults prior to getting to any potential killing fields.

Hancock's Corps suffered the most casualties, but that was due to having the misfortune of a local breakthrough that meant feeding more soldiers into the furnace as well as having the misfortune of having to assault through terrain that canalized them and then forced them to attack uphill - terrain that was well suited for rifle fire from behind entrenchments and breastworks, but not terrain well suited to the Gatling. Thus, where the killing really happened, the Gatling wouldn't have been able to really get into the fight.

Next, you have to account for how well suited TTPs would have been for the design of fighting positions for Gatlings. You're assuming here that it's something that they'd get right the first time, which is a tall bet IMO.

Sorry, but still no sale.

[zraver]

You're not tracking on what happened. The general assault by and large simply advanced the lines to the last covered position, meaning that the exposure wasn't that great. Thus, your scenario about breaking and running isn't what happened at all. Units by and large advanced and then spontaneously ended their assaults prior to getting to any potential killing fields.

over 1800 dead and 4000+ wounded in a single day, most with in the space of 2 hours requires killing fields. You don't have one of the deadliest days in American history by stopping at ye old wood line.

Hancock's Corps suffered the most casualties, but that was due to having the misfortune of a local breakthrough that meant feeding more soldiers into the furnace as well as having the misfortune of having to assault through terrain that canalized them and then forced them to attack uphill - terrain that was well suited for rifle fire from behind entrenchments and breastworks, but not terrain well suited to the Gatling. Thus, where the killing really happened, the Gatling wouldn't have been able to really get into the fight.

Wave's 1 and 2 from Smith's XVIII Corps wrecked two brigades when they were engaged from the front at close range by Oates and by galling fire from both flanks. AP Hill reported that type of destruction all along his front in his report to . The 25th Mass went into battle with 300 men and left the battle with 80 men fit and 139 wounded. 53 men were dead and 28 captured. The regiment was wrecked in minutes.

And why couldn't the Gatling be used there unless you've wedded yourself to the USAR carriage mount. A Gatling mounted to be a defensive vs an artillery weapon might have a completely different profile.

Next, you have to account for how well suited TTPs would have been for the design of fighting positions for Gatlings. You're assuming here that it's something that they'd get right the first time, which is a tall bet IMO.

Tall bet sure, but one that has been made repeatedly through military history.

Sorry, but still no sale.[/QUOTE]

[Shek]

1. AoP casualties for the 3 June assault are 3500. Total casualties for the day are 4500. Both of these figures are lower than your cited 5800+, which inflates the numbers by 30-70%.

2. You cited examples of “killing fields” are the exception that proves the rule. In fact, only 3 of 5 corps participated in the assault. In these 3 corps, only 11 of 27 brigades actually attempted a significant advance (so, 11 of 48 brigades available to the Union participated with any significant attempt at an advance).

Hancock saw 7 brigades advance – as I cited earlier, Hancock saw some initial success, and it was the counterattack that caused the lion’s share of casualties. The terrain here didn’t provide clear fields of fire to where a Gatling would provide any significant advantage over the weaponry the ANV employed here. In fact, if you add in the assumption that the Gatlings did have the fields of fire, then you stop the assault before it becomes ensnarled on the lines, and then the casualties are at worst the same, but more likely than not, they become less.

Wright only had one brigade advance, so you aren’t adding many casualties there, if any at all.

Smith saw three brigades advance and suffered the worst percentage of casualties, and this is the example that you cite. However, the attack formation was divisions in column through a ravine – not terrain well suited to high casualty producing grazing fire. Instead, you’re left with restricted plunging fires that I’d be hard pressed to believe that they would be more effective than double shotted canister, which will cut a larger swath and compensate for any high firing that machine gun firing is prone to.

Additionally, the units most heavily hit are the converted heavies that still had not learned to better use concealment and cover like the veteran regiments – add in any effective machine gun fire, and you’re likely to stop their advance more quickly, reducing their exposure time and limiting potential casualties.

In the end, your scenario still continues to fail. I understand that were doing a what-if drill, but you’re adding so many conditions to it even after assuming away the challenges of logistics, that it’s unrealistic. You want it to be unveiled on the field of battle, you have chosen terrain that doesn’t play to the strengths of machine guns (i.e., why would you choose to employ them at ravines), you’re assuming that they get the tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing them as part of a defense from the get go (i.e., no trial and error to get there in terms of employment), and are assuming that they create carriage technology to match the TTPs that they just pull out of their a$$ and get it right the first time.

In the end, even if you do assume everything in that scenario, casualties are the same or less, and Grant still sidles right.

I think it’s appropriate now to quote from the Book or Rhea, 4th book, 10th chapter, “Stories of fields littered with blue-clad corpses convey distorted pictures of what really happened. A few sectors saw tremendous slaughter, but along much of the battle line Union loses were minor, and many Confederates had no idea that an offensive had even been attempted. The popular image of a massive Union onslaught at Cold Harbor belongs more to the dustbin of Civil War mythology than to real history.” Your scenario tries to play off of that mythology.

[astralis]

that last description makes me curious. assuming the final assault had succeeded, what would have happened?