Navy Ships To Be Decommissioned.

[surfgun]

Seven cruisers and some amphib's are to be decommissioned per this article.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener...%20Big%20Kills

"- The Navy will retire seven aging cruisers and several amphibious warships, saving money on increasingly expensive maintenance and upgrades."

[TopHatter]

Seven cruisers and some amphib's are to be decommissioned per this article.
Pentagon Trims JSF, UAVs, But No Big Kills | AVIATION WEEK

"- The Navy will retire seven aging cruisers and several amphibious warships, saving money on increasingly expensive maintenance and upgrades."

The article doesn't show. I'm guessing you have to register or subscribe. Can you provide some basic details from the article?

[surfgun]

Fixed, try again..:)

[TopHatter]

Fixed, try again..:)

Yes indeed, thanks :)

Only problem is, the article maddeningly fails to name the ships being decomm'ed. Although USS Peleliu (LHA-5) is probably at the top of the list.

[surfgun]

Most likely the last of the Austin Class (two ships), then onto the Whidbey Island Class.

[JRT]

Seven cruisers and some amphib's are to be decommissioned per this article.

Pentagon Trims JSF, UAVs, But No Big Kills | AVIATION WEEK

"- The Navy will retire seven aging cruisers and several amphibious warships, saving money on increasingly expensive maintenance and upgrades."

DoD Defense Budget Priorites and Choices - January 2012 (link to PDF)

Below are some items snipped from that.


--- Maintained the current bomber fleet

--- Maintained the aircraft carrier fleet at 11 ships and 10 air wings

--- Maintained the big deck amphibious fleet

--- Sustained Army and Marine Corps force structure in the Pacific, while maintaining
persistent presence in the Middle East

--- Budgeted to forward station Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore and patrol craft
in Bahrain

--- Funded development of a new afloat forward staging base that can be dedicated
to support missions in areas where ground based access is not available, such
as counter mine operations

--- Funding for the new bomber

--- Design changes to increase cruise missile capacity of future Virginia class submarines

--- Design of a conventional prompt strike option from submarines

--- Upgraded radars for tactical aircraft and ships

--- Improved air‐to‐air missiles

--- New electronic warfare and communications capabilities

--- Retiring 7 cruisers early. 6 did not have ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability,
and the seventh with BMD capability is in need of costly hull repairs

--- Slipping a large deck amphibious ship (LHA) by 1 year

--- Slipping 1 new Virginia class submarine outside the FYDP

--- Reducing Littoral Combat Ships by 2 ships in the FYDP

--- Reducing Joint High Speed Vessels by 8 in the FYDP

--- Retiring 2 smaller amphibious ships (LSD) early and moving their replacement
outside the FYDP

--- Disestablish six Air Force tactical air fighter squadrons (out of 60)
and one training squadron

--- Eliminate two heavy brigades forward stationed in Europe

--- Allocate a U.S. based brigade to the NATO Response Force and
rotate U.S. based units to Europe for training and exercises

--- Forward station ballistic missile defense ships in Rota, Spain

--- Be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an
opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces
are committed to a large scale operation elsewhere

--- This strategic precept puts a premium on self- and rapidly- deployable forces that
can project power and perform multiple mission types. This reinforces the need to
maintain existing numbers of aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious ships, and
bombers. Furthermore, as the Marine Corps withdraws from the ground in
Afghanistan, it will return to an afloat posture, with the capability to rapidly respond
to crises as they emerge. These choices are consistent with our strategic emphasis
on the Asia Pacific region and the Middle East, but are applicable anywhere on the
globe where U.S. national security or vital interests are threatened.

--- The strategic guidance places a premium on forces present or able to rapidly
reposition to deter aggression and respond as needed. It recognizes that we do
not need to retain the airlift capacity to support two large, simultaneous and
rapidly developing ground campaigns. When faced with competing demands, we
can prioritize and phase movements. Air mobility studies have also shown
significant excess capacity in the U.S. airlift fleets.

--- Retiring 27 aging C-5As, resulting in a fleet of modernized 52 C-5Ms and 222 C-17s

--- Retiring 65 of the oldest C-130s, resulting in a fleet of 318 C-130s

--- Divesting 38 C-27s

--- These reductions enable the Department to streamline and standardize our
airlift fleet by reducing the number of different types and eliminating the
need to operate, sustain, and maintain aircraft excess to the requirements
of the new strategy.


--- Under the new strategic guidance, we will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent. This budget protects all three legs of the Triad - bombers that provide both
conventional and nuclear deterrence, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and ballistic
missile submarines. To this end, we are committed to the procurement of a new bomber.
However, we will delay the new Ohio submarine replacement by two years without
undermining our partnership with the UK. While this delay will create challenges in maintaining
current at sea presence requirements in the 2030s, we believe this risk can be managed. An
ongoing White House review of nuclear deterrence will address the potential for maintaining
our deterrent with a different nuclear force.


--- Special Operations Forces remain critical to U.S. and partner counter terrorism operations
and a variety of other contemporary contingencies

--- Unmanned Air Systems - fund enough trained personnel, infrastructure, and
platforms to sustain 65 USAF MQ-1/9 combat air patrols (CAPs) with a surge capacity
of 85; the Predator aircraft was retained longer than previously planned, allowing us
to slow the buy of the Reaper aircraft and gain some savings; we also protected
funding for the Army's unmanned air system, Gray Eagle

--- Sea based unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems
such as Fire Scout - important ISR assets where ground basing is not available

--- Advanced ISR - new unmanned systems with increased capabilities

--- Cyber operations. The strategic guidance highlights the increasing importance of cyber
operations. As a result, cyber is one of the few areas in which we actually increased our
investments, including in both defensive and offensive capabilities.

--- Power projection. Our ability to project power is a key component of our strategic guidance.
We protected important capabilities like the new bomber, upgrades to the small diameter
bomb, aircraft carriers, surface combatant modernization, and cyber capabilities. We also
protected capabilities that allow us to project power in denied environments. In addition to
those discussed earlier, such as funding for the new bomber and increasing the cruise missile
capacity of future submarines, we protected anti-submarine warfare and counter-mine
capabilities.

--- Missile defense. Missile defense programs provide the capability to defend our homeland,
support our allies, and protect U.S. military forces when operating in regions across the globe.
Despite its importance, we were not able to protect all of the funding in this area. We
protected investments in homeland defense and the Phased Adaptive Approach for missile
defense in Europe aimed at protecting our allies. We reduced spending and accepted some risk
in deployable regional missile defense and will increase reliance on allies and partners in the
future

--- Space systems. Space systems are critical to our surveillance, communications, positioning and
networking capabilities. Therefore, we protected funding for upgrades to the Global Positioning
System (GPS), the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) satellite programs.

--- Counter weapons of mass destruction. We protected investment in this area and expanded its
scope in the area of biological weapons.

--- Science and technology. The Department believes that accelerating trends in both technology
development and a dynamic threat environment dictate that we must maintain our edge by
protecting our investments in development of future capabilities. As such, science and
technology programs are largely protected within this budget.


--- Joint Strike Fighter - committed to the JSF program of record that includes all three
variants, but slowed procurement to complete more testing and make
developmental changes to minimize concurrency issues before buying in significant
quantities

--- Army Ground Combat Vehicle - delayed by protest¸ thus freeing up available
funding for other priorities

--- Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS)
curtailed due to concerns about program cost and operational mobility

--- Joint Air to Ground Munition (JAGM) significantly reduced, but limited funding
sustained to enable lower cost alternatives such as Hellfire

--- Global Hawk Block 30 - terminated

--- Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) - terminated

--- Army aviation - delayed helicopter modernization by three to five years

--- Commercial satellite imagery - reduced purchases for capacity excess to
requirements, but will still be substantially increasing coverage beyond today's
capability

--- HMMWVs - terminated upgrades and focused modernization resources on the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle


--- Reduce the size of the active Army from a post 9/11 peak of
about 570,000 in 2010 to 490,000 and the active Marine Corps
from a peak of about 202,000 to 182,000. The Army plans to
remove at least eight Brigade Combat Teams from its existing
structure; however, the future organizing construct of the Army
is under review. Even with these reductions, the Army and
Marine Corps will be larger than they were in 2001.

[surfgun]

Any bet that the one BMD equipped cruiser to be decommissioned, is USS Port Royal?

[TopHatter]

Any bet that the one BMD equipped cruiser to be decommissioned, is USS Port Royal?

*sigh* The youngest one of the bunch. Damn that grounding!

[ArtyEngineer]

*sigh* The youngest one of the bunch. Damn that grounding!

I thought that name sounded familiar when Surfgun mentioned it. Damn, the whole hull must have got "Tweaked" in some way.

Regards

Arty

[JRT]

Any bet that the one BMD equipped cruiser to be decommissioned, is USS Port Royal?

If it was still in production it would probably cost at least $3B to replace. With ~1/3 of its useful service life left to be utilized, a loss of ~$1B of replacement value.

Thats in addition to the $18M of shipyard work that was sunk into it immediately prior to the grounding, and the $40M that was sunk into post-grounding repairs which presumably were not adequate enough for the ship to continue to be utilized.

Hawaii-based ship’s grounding detailed

By William Cole
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Honolulu Advertiser

A misinterpreted navigation system, a sleep-deprived skipper, faulty equipment and an inexperienced bridge team led to the grounding of the Navy guided missile cruiser Port Royal on the night of Feb. 5, according to a Navy Safety Investigation Board report.

The very visible and very embarrassing four-day grounding of the Port Royal in 14 to 22 feet of water off the Honolulu airport's reef runway caused an estimated $25 million to $40 million damage to the ship.

Capt. John Carroll, skipper of the Navy's guided missile cruiser, had only 4 1/2 hours of sleep in 24 hours, and 15 hours of sleep over three days as he pushed to get the warship under way after shipyard repairs.

Carroll was qualified for the job, but was not proficient, the report said. He was at sea in command for the first time in nearly five years.

The 9,600-ton cruiser's fathometer, which measures water depth, was broken, and both radar repeaters, or monitors, on the bridge were out of commission.

A shift in the ship's navigation system led to erroneous information on the ship's position. The switch from a Global Positioning System to a gyroscope caused a 1.5-mile discrepancy in the ship's position and set off alarm bells that were continuously disregarded.

During the transfer of personnel back to shore that night using a small boat, the operations officer took a binocular bearing to the harbor landing from the boat deck and noted a discrepancy.

He tried unsuccessfully to radio others and then headed back to the bridge, where he immediately realized the cruiser was in the wrong spot.

Waves were breaking forward of the bow, and silt was visible in the water.

At 8:03 p.m., the Pearl Harbor ship was "soft aground" with the bow's sonar dome on the reef a half mile south of the reef runway.

Waves forced the 567-foot ship firmly onto the reef as the crew tried to free it. "Backing bell" and "twist" maneuvers using one screw, or propeller, failed.

The board found many equipment malfunctions and human errors — but said there were enough working sensors and visual cues to prevent the grounding.

"Bridge watch team, navigation, and (Combat Information Center) team did not work together to assess situation and keep the ship from standing into danger," the report says.

The safety investigation report, obtained by The Advertiser, said the ship ended up shifting two miles to the east.

The officer of the deck had been qualified for only three months, and had no experience operating at night in the vicinity of the reef.

According to the internal report, the quartermaster of the watch had stood three months of watch on a deployment a year earlier, but could not plot fixes in near-shore waters, so another sailor, a navigation evaluator, took over to plot the ship's position.

The navigation evaluator subsequently lost "situational awareness," officials said.

Qualified lookouts were on board for watch duty the night of the grounding, but they were working in the mess as food service attendants and were not allowed to assume the watch.

Set and drift were not calculated, the report states.

Carroll, the captain, "did not receive forceful recommendations to improve the navigation picture."

SUBJECT TO CHANGE

Names were not included in the report, the purpose of which is to enhance safety. The report says the information is still in the endorsement process and subject to change.

Capt. W. Scott Gureck, a spokesman for U.S. Pacific Fleet, yesterday said he would not comment on the safety board report.

Gureck said the report was not intended to be released to the public.

Norman Polmar, an analyst, author and authority on naval issues, said the safety investigation reveals a series of red flags that indicated that the Port Royal was potentially straying into danger.

"Three things should have caused an alarm bell in the skipper — no matter how little sleep he had," Polmar said.

"One is if you are operating in that area without a fathometer, you are in trouble.

"Item two, when you switch from one (navigational) system to another and it shows a significant discrepancy, you are in trouble.

"... And the third thing is when the operations officer came in, what he should have done is just dropped anchor right there (and) turned on all the lights."

Polmar also was incredulous that Carroll, the Port Royal's skipper, hadn't been to sea in command in nearly five years.

"That's the system that's wrong," Polmar said. "The system should have said if you are not at sea in three or four or five years ... he should have gone out in an identical ship with another captain. He should have been a rider for a day or two."

According to the report, the Port Royal was in the shipyard since Sept. 24, 2008, for maintenance and repairs. It was originally scheduled to leave dock Jan. 21, but the sea trials were delayed for two weeks, and scaffolding on the bridge wing was not removed until 30 minutes before the ship got under way on Feb. 5.

Carroll said he had 15 hours of sleep in three days before the ship got under way, and admitted that he was tired and the subsequent small boat operations added to his fatigue, according to the report.

Carroll appeared at a Navy hearing on the grounding and was given "nonjudicial punishment for dereliction of duty and improper hazarding of a vessel," the Navy said in June.

CONSEQUENCES

Carroll was relieved of his command soon after the grounding and was reassigned to the Pacific Fleet staff. He was appointed captain of the Port Royal in October 2008 and had commanded the frigate Rodney M. Davis out of Everett, Wash., in 2002.

Along with Carroll, executive officer Cmdr. Steve Okun appeared at the hearing and was given nonjudicial punishment for dereliction of duty, the Navy said.

Two officers and an enlisted sailor appeared at a separate hearing and also were given nonjudicial punishment for dereliction of duty and improper hazarding of a vessel, the Navy said. Their names were not released.

Damage to the Port Royal was estimated at $25 million to $40 million. That does not include damage to the reef, which the Navy has begun to repair.

Checks were commenced 72 hours prior to the under way. At sea, the ship performed under full power, steering and helicopter flight operation checks. Carroll spent most of his time on the bridge or in the Combat Information Center, the report states.

To foster a "strong relationship" with aviation assessors, who were requested on short notice, the ship's command added boat operations at night to return the passengers to shore, the report states.

The earlier navigation shift in the ship's "Voyage Management System" meant the Port Royal had a position error throughout its time at sea. The bridge team did not recognize the input difference, officials said.

The report also said bridge watchstanders silenced or ignored alarms calling attention to the position discrepancy.

The Port Royal is expected to remain in drydock into September for repairs including the refurbishment of the shafting, running gear, propellers, painting of the underwater hull, replacement of the bow sonar dome and its internal elements, and repairs to damaged tanks and superstructure cracks, U.S. Pacific Fleet said.

The Safety Investigation Board concluded that training was inadequate in a number of areas.

Its recommendations included a supervisory-level navigation course, as well as an "operational pause" of at least 96 hours between shipyard availabilities and sea trials to ensure crews are adequately rested and prepared for underway operations.

[ChrisV71]

According to US Defense 2013 Budget Proposal Released the ships to be cut are:

Retirement of seven guided missile cruisers: USS Cowpens (CG 63), USS Anzio (CG 68), USS Vicksburg (CG 69), USS Port Royal (CG 73), in FY13; and USS Gettysburg (CG 64), USS Chosin (CG 65) and USS Hue City (CG 66) in FY14. Two Amphibious Dock Landing Ships will also be retired during the FYDP: USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) and USS Tortuga (LSD 46). All nine ships will be retired before the end of their service lives which is consistent with working more efficiently and cost-effectively in this resource-constrained environment.

Stupidly, the list includes 7 of the 11 newest cruisers, but the older ones have probably had their mid-life rebuilds and these haven't yet... (excluding Port Royal, we all know why she's on that list)

[TopHatter]

USS Tortuga...commissioned 19-effing-90.

[ATF83]

USS Hue City...commissioned 19-effing-91. I was there

[TopHatter]

USS Hue City...commissioned 19-effing-91. I was there

That one really hurt. She's one of the three active-duty warships I've ever visited.

[SlaterDoc]

--- Be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an
opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces
are committed to a large scale operation elsewhere

Something that makes it clear that "COMMON SENSE" was cut in previous budget considerations!
How the @#$&% do you do that while reducing forces and cutting your Navy???
Oh yea! They are talking in code! That's why the emphasis is on all those "unmanned" increases! Now we know why they want to change the role of women in combat!