Eastern Front, WWI.

[Triple C]

How does the German experience on the Eastern Front during WWI influence the development of German military doctrine during the Great War and beyond? It is sometimes argued that the German military learned and refined infiltration tactics specifically the use of Stosstruppen in the East. But what are the broader operational implications of warfare on the Eastern Front?

[1979]

the germans in the early stages of the war lacked a proper infantry gun to suport stormtropers operations , they used the 37mm sturmkanonone made by krupp in a sturmabteilung made up by two combat enginers companies but suffered severe losses in minor attacks.
this lead to the development of the infanterie geschuts (infantry support ) a 7.62mm cut-down field guns captured from the russians.
as for tactics my undestanding is that they were tested and improved at Isonzo
and Cambrai offensive.
the number of available stormtroopers had never bean quite enogh for a major offensive to develop in ww1.

[clackers]

Just as there are factions in any organization, senior officers in the German Army could be regarded as 'easterners' or 'westerners'.

Successes such as Tannenberg in the East and failures like the Marne and Verdun in the West led to Ludendorff and Hindenburg taking over the army from Moltke and Falkenhayn. Gamblers' instincts came with them, and when their prestige let them essentially take over the running of the entire German state, their U-boat strategy not only failed to defeat Britain but brought the US into the war as well.

Tactically, an artilleryman named Bruchmuller developed German predictive shooting, using aerial photography to dispense with the usual ranging shots. The aim would not be to destroy targets (as the British found, too difficult a task against prepared defenders even with a week of unprecedented intensity of bombardment) but to suppress return fire and interdict the arrival of enemy reserves. Both Bruchmuller and Oskar Hutier (the victor of Riga) were brought across by Ludendorff for the 1918 offensive in the West.

In January of that year, every officer down to battalion commander level was given a manual called The Attack In Position Warfare that tried to put together the lessons learned at Riga, Caporetto and Cambrai. Light machine guns and mortars were issued to the dwindling number of divisions thought capable of being converted to storm tactics. Aircraft numbers were now 2,600.

Unfortunately, Ludendorff was still sceptical about the Allied enthusiasm for tanks, and versus the 100,000 rubber-tyred trucks the Allies had, possessed only 23,000 vehicles riding on steel wheels. If 'successful' the spearheads were not only going to have to advance beyond friendly artillery range, but couldn't be resupplied.

More ominously, in a strategy reminiscent later on of Kursk or the Battle of the Bulge, there were clear schwerpunkts - directions of attack - that after identifying, the defender could simply lay his reserves in the path until the attacks were blunted with heavy casualties.

This was precisely what Foch did calmly to the Spring Offensives (even as his British allies panicked), which in the opinion of David Stevenson, probably finished the Great War a year earlier.

[troung]

It is sometimes argued that the German military learned and refined infiltration tactics specifically the use of Stosstruppen in the East. But what are the broader operational implications of warfare on the Eastern Front?

The change in infantry tactics was an evolution overtime on the western front. Germany formed ad hoc units on the western front before the used them in Riga. Stormtroop units saw action in Verdun. France also changed up their squads and platoons around LMGs, GLs and hand grenades back in 1916. Saying Germany learned and refined it on the Eastern Front excuses why the British got rocked in the Micheal Offensives.

[Hides from British members]

[clackers]

Saying Germany learned and refined it on the Eastern Front excuses why the British got rocked in the Micheal Offensives.

The Germans chose their attack sector wisely, Truong. The overall British commander Douglas Haig was a cavalryman by trade who was ill-suited to the realities of position warfare.

The general at the front itself was Hubert Gough, another cavalryman, a favourite of Haig's, and his army had not yet properly adopted the Defence In Depth technique that the other Allied sectors had implemented.

One of the two men had to be sacked for the failing, and how often it is in business or warfare that the subordinate ends up getting the blame! :-(

[troung]

IIRC units on the Eastern Front sent officers/NCOs to learn those storm trooper tactics and then bring them back to use over there.

[Triple C]

What about war making at the operational level? Was the Eastern Front operations distinct in their conduct when compared to the Western Front?

[troung]

What about war making at the operational level? Was the Eastern Front operations distinct in their conduct when compared to the Western Front?

I'll come back with something in a week - sorry I missed this :slap:

[Mihais]

Re stormtroops,the first were established by a captain named Willy Rohr in the West,in 1915.Those in the East were partly inspired by the Russian assault battalions that were used by Brusilov.
Everyone developed similar concepts,although the British were slower than the rest.

Operationally,Luddendorf learned the wrong lessons,in essence not to care about operations.In Russia this approach first meant that the German army did not tried a deep envelopment in 1915,thus the Russian army survived for another 2 years.But because the russians eventually collapsed OHL and more importantly Luddendorff had problems connecting the dots between tactics and operations.In the East a series of unrelated battles that exhausted the Russians were enough.Thus Operation Michael,which could have been a great success ended with a fuss.British LOC went through Amiens,but this wasn't designated as an objective,because Luddendorf only cared about the breakthrough.And not the breaktrough as a mean,but as purpose in itself,thus the futile attacks around Arras.

[AdityaMookerjee]

I was reading the part on Barbarossa from the book, German Panzers of WW2, by Chris Bishop. It occurred to me, the best that Stalin could do, was to put as many armed forces in strategically important areas, and wait for Hitler to meet them. It seems, Stalin had twice the number of troops more than Hitler, counteracting Barbarossa. But, the Soviet forces had a paucity of leadership, and this was the main problem faced by Stalin. If Stalin had wanted to resist, he should have done this, at least. I think the Soviet soldiers were good, and it turned out, their Generals were even better, later. Also, the Soviets were loosing everything, before they fought for Moscow. What does this suggest? That they didn't need their Generals, more than they needed Stalin. I mean, Stalin was the main military personality in Moscow, apart from, I suspect, Zhukov, but I don't know this.

[Tarek Morgen]

If I understand you correctly, and I might very well do not, you are mixing up your world wars.

[AdityaMookerjee]

If I understand you correctly, and I might very well do not, you are mixing up your world wars.

I am sorry, I saw WW2, instead of WW1, in the heading, because I didn't look properly.

[cape_royds]

Mihais, I just finished reading von Falkenhayn's memoir (English translation is titled General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its Critical Decisions). Falkenhayn goes into considerable detail about his strategic considerations of the 1915 offensive against Russia, and why he decided against a deeper operation. He considered it enough to damage the offensive potential and positioning of the Russian forces, and was sceptical of claims that a knock-out of Russia was possible in 1915.

When you read of Falkenhayn's agonizing over every division transferred from one front to another, it's not hard to understand his opinion that the Central Powers' margin was too narrow to admit of any grander conceptions than of those which were attempted.

Any who are familiar with the 1944 Allied controversies, of the "broad front" versus "pencil line thrust" on the Western Front after Normandy, might well enjoy reading Falkenhayn's discussion of strategic options in the East, and his repeated wrangling with Hindenburg & Co. (who went political behind his back to try to get their way). Perhaps in the afterlife Eisenhower and Falkenhayn have commiserated a little?

I might recommend Falkenhayn's memoir as all-round excellent WWI reading. His summaries of the general military, political, and economic considerations underlying his strategy, and his exposition of the various options, are concise and lucid. While he is not always completely candid regarding his relations with his colleagues and subordinates, nevertheless there is less apologia and disingenuousness than one usually finds in the memoirs of superseded commanders.