Originally posted by zraver
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What if - Spain joined the Axis in 1939.
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Originally posted by Doktor View PostOK, since this thread original question is long dead can it be merged with "Could Germany..." or just be closed?
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OoE,
two main rebuttals
1)
Sir, the IJA was not a purely positional army as you claim and I will offer up three examples- 2 operational and 1 conceptual.
1. Invasion of Malaya. The use of tanks, bicycle logistics, and flanking landings to try and effect an envelopment of an enemy protected by water on both sides and very nearly succeeding. With half the men the Japanese drove the UK forces before them. In Malaya Royal Engineers destroyed over 1000 bridges to no avail. it was the UK that was the positional army, they tried again and again to form a line and hold and simply ended up outflanked.
2. Phase 1 (Operation Kogo One/ battle of Central Henan) of Operation Ichi-Go. A single Japanese tank division supported supported by two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade routed 390,000 Chinese troops and got behind the Henan salient. By may 25 the had seized Louyang and reduced the salient greatly shortening their lines and securing the other operations of Ichi-Go. by December of 44 the Japanese had cut China in half and reached Indochina.
3. The Chinese Winter offensive. While ultimately unsuccessful it did a lot of damage to the Japanese and effectively created the stalemate that would persist until 44. One reason it was able to achieve what it did is becuase the Japanese Imperial High Command was in the middle of a massive re-organization of its infantry divisions from a WWI era square division (4 regiments) to a modern triangular division (3 regiments) which is the same basic layout the US and Germany were using and for the same reasons. Flexibility and mobility.
2)
Soviet forces in the Far East were at least as positional as the Japanese. Zhukov's poor showing in 39 proves that. He lost more than a fifth of his force for a gain of less than 100 square kilometers. He managed this dismal showing despite a superiority in tanks and numbers at least as great as enjoyed in 45. However after 39 with Soviet attentions directed to the West the units in the Far East get progressively starved. After 41 they lose whole divisions (not many but some) and stop getting replacements in men and equipment. The Soviets do not finally retire the I-15 and I-16 fighters until 1943- they served on in the east. Even after the East finally got rid of the I-15 and I-16 they likely got cast off Mig 3 and Lagg 3 planes.
As best I can tell (admittedly an estimate) Soviet forces in the Far east in 1941-mid 45) were 45 divisions totaling about 360,000 men with 500 tanks mostly BT-5 and 7 but with some T-26 and Th-26 (flame) but no T-34. They were supported by up to 500 aircraft but possibly as few as 300. The stocks of artillery ammunition likely built up after 39 probably got raided in 41 when divisions moved west and whats left is all there is.
In comparison by 1942-43 the Japanese in Manchuria have near a million of their best men, 1000+ tanks*, and 2000+ modern aircraft.
*Japanese advances in tank tech and tank production since 39 meant that the use of tankettes and non-cannon armed light tanks and armored cars in armored units after 39 decreased significantly. In 39 before Zhukov's offensive the Japanese tank units were only about half cannon armed. By 42 its 100% and Japanese infantry divisions are starting to get organic AFV support in the form of the cast off tankettes and armored cars.
For Stalin to drive East and isolate and capture the IJA in Manchuria he has to find a way to disengage from the Germans enough that he can free up troops, but no so completely that Hitler can breathe. If we are talking 42-43 this means no counter-attack at Stalingrad just an endless meat grinder since its fairly obvious the main Soviet effort in 42-43 was against AGC and so the Rzhev battles are going to go on- especially if Moscow has to be regained.
Stalin has to use this gap to move in at least 1000 tanks, 2-4000 aircraft, artillery, men, cavalry and a huge amount of trucks. But there is a problem- the Soviets simply don't have that amount of stuff yet, especially not if Stalin lost Moscow and its rail nexus in 41.
The forces the Soviets have if they don't strike at Stalingrad are 800 tanks, 1 million men and 1500 aircraft. The Soviets have only received 60,000 trucks so far and assuming the same division of assets here as among tanks and planes between Uranus and Mars and accounting for normal wastage its unlikely more than 15-20,000 trucks max could have been freed up or 5-7000 trucks per operation. That is a problem, Zhukov needed almost 8000 trucks just to support a local offensive that only drove a few kilometers into Japanese territory becuase the Soviet road and rail network in the Far East is so bad...
Stalin has too attack on three sides with commanders and units that through 43 generally failed offensively.
1- An attack from Soviet territory driving generally S/SW to cut off Korea.
2- An attack in the South out of Mongolia driving S/SE to isolate Manchuria from the rest of China
3- An attack across the Manchurian/Soviet frontier driving S to pin the IJA in place to keep them from shifting to meet 1 and 2.
Vatutin can plan it, Zhukov thinks he can, but regardless Soviet failings in logistics, communications, training and experience doom it regardless of who commands.Last edited by zraver; 10 Sep 11,, 19:52.
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Originally posted by zraver View PostSir, the IJA was not a purely positional army as you claim and I will offer up three examples- 2 operational and 1 conceptual.
Originally posted by zraver View Post1. Invasion of Malaya.
Originally posted by zraver View Post2. Phase 1 (Operation Kogo One/ battle of Central Henan) of Operation Ichi-Go. A single Japanese tank division supported supported by two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade routed 390,000 Chinese troops and got behind the Henan salient. By may 25 the had seized Louyang and reduced the salient greatly shortening their lines and securing the other operations of Ichi-Go. by December of 44 the Japanese had cut China in half and reached Indochina.
It was an ALL OR NOTHING Campaign. The IJA either killed Chinese resistence forever ... or she lost!
Originally posted by zraver View Post3. The Chinese Winter offensive. While ultimately unsuccessful it did a lot of damage to the Japanese and effectively created the stalemate that would persist until 44. One reason it was able to achieve what it did is becuase the Japanese Imperial High Command was in the middle of a massive re-organization of its infantry divisions from a WWI era square division (4 regiments) to a modern triangular division (3 regiments) which is the same basic layout the US and Germany were using and for the same reasons. Flexibility and mobility.
The rest of your post has nothing to do with my reasoning. All Stalin wanted was to Japan NOT to win her war in China ... and I believe I have shown that Japan cannot win.
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Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View PostAll 3 of your examples are flanking, ie maneuver on strength.
Malaya is NOT an example of Deep Battle. Come on, Jason, you know better than this, we are arguing the minute details of Von Mainstein versus Zukhov ... and you bring up Malay?
if the basic concepts of the Soviet Deep Battle are as follows...
1. Diversionary attacks, but diversionary attacks that have their own strategic objective
2. multi-phase operations designed to create a failure of the enemies defensive ability.
3. Unity of purpose
4. inducement of shock
5. use of extensive pre-operation intelligence
6. attacking across the breadth of the enemies defensive means
Malaya did all of these.
1. The invasion from Thailand and the initial landings at Khota Bahru, the hunt for the PoW and Repulse, and the air attacks against the RAF. The combined goal was to uncover Singapore physically and mentally. This would in turn unhinge allied efforts in the Dutch East Indies and secure the coast of China and Japan's merchant traffic.
2. All the Japanese operations supported each other's objectives despite distances of hundreds of km in some cases.
3. The nature and speed of the Japanese offensive paralyzed the Brits.
4. The Japanese knew just about everythign there was to know about the allied preparations, air strength, lack of tanks etc.
5. The Japanese hit the British at sea, in the air, on the ground and most importantly in the mind.
There has been one and ONLY one Japanese Officer who can appreciate Deep Battle and he was shot down on transport by the Americans ... and he was the only Japanese Officer that the Americans respected.
I don't know what you've read but Ichi-Go was the IJA's death knell in China.
It was an ALL OR NOTHING Campaign. The IJA either killed Chinese resistence forever ... or she lost!
A re-org in a middle of a friggin war.
The rest of your post has nothing to do with my reasoning. All Stalin wanted was to Japan NOT to win her war in China ... and I believe I have shown that Japan cannot win.
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Originally posted by zraver View Post
The forces the Soviets have if they don't strike at Stalingrad are 800 tanks, 1 million men and 1500 aircraft. The Soviets have only received 60,000 trucks so far and assuming the same division of assets here as among tanks and planes between Uranus and Mars and accounting for normal wastage its unlikely more than 15-20,000 trucks max could have been freed up or 5-7000 trucks per operation. That is a problem, Zhukov needed almost 8000 trucks just to support a local offensive that only drove a few kilometers into Japanese territory becuase the Soviet road and rail network in the Far East is so bad...
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60.000 is just production and LL deliveries in 1942, by jan 1943 the red army had 380.000 despite the catastrophic losses in 1941-1942.J'ai en marre.
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Originally posted by zraver View PostSir, Malaya was a deep battle or as close to it as you can come given the geographic constraints.
Originally posted by zraver View Postif the basic concepts of the Soviet Deep Battle are as follows...
1. Diversionary attacks, but diversionary attacks that have their own strategic objective
2. multi-phase operations designed to create a failure of the enemies defensive ability.
3. Unity of purpose
4. inducement of shock
5. use of extensive pre-operation intelligence
6. attacking across the breadth of the enemies defensive means
Malaya did all of these.
Originally posted by zraver View Post1. The invasion from Thailand and the initial landings at Khota Bahru, the hunt for the PoW and Repulse, and the air attacks against the RAF. The combined goal was to uncover Singapore physically and mentally. This would in turn unhinge allied efforts in the Dutch East Indies and secure the coast of China and Japan's merchant traffic.
2. All the Japanese operations supported each other's objectives despite distances of hundreds of km in some cases.
3. The nature and speed of the Japanese offensive paralyzed the Brits.
4. The Japanese knew just about everythign there was to know about the allied preparations, air strength, lack of tanks etc.
5. The Japanese hit the British at sea, in the air, on the ground and most importantly in the mind.
Originally posted by zraver View PostThe Japanese had a couple of generals we respected as well.
Originally posted by zraver View PostSir, please go read up on Kogo One- its straight out of a German or Soviet playbook.
After all this, the IJA wasted close to 70% of their warstocks and were in an entirely vulnerable position. They knew CKS was mounting a counter-attack and what's more, there was absolutely nothing that they could do to stop it. The war ended before CKS could do so. Whether or not the counter-attack would succeed is besides the point but the IJA could do nothing to stop a 1 million men counter-attack coming against them.
It was a pyhric victory.
Originally posted by zraver View PostThe US did it, the Germans did it, the Soviets did it. Whats more important is the IJA saw the problem as it might exist given the events in Europe and Mongolia and moved to correct the mistake even though against the Chinese the four regiment division worked.
Originally posted by zraver View PostSorry, thought I was arguing against a Soviet invasion to secure a penal army.
But I was not arguing that.
I was arguing that Stalin has more than enough supplies to keep Chinese armies in the field to keep bleeding Japanese armies to a point that Chinese armies would eventually drive Japanese armies into the sea.
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Originally posted by zraver View PostAs best I can tell (admittedly an estimate) Soviet forces in the Far east in 1941-mid 45) were 45 divisions totaling about 360,000 men with 500 tanks mostly BT-5 and 7 but with some T-26 and Th-26 (flame) but no T-34. They were supported by up to 500 aircraft but possibly as few as 300. The stocks of artillery ammunition likely built up after 39 probably got raided in 41 when divisions moved west and whats left is all there is.
Axis History Forum • View topic - Soviet Far EastJ'ai en marre.
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Colonel David Glantz points out:
In August 1939 at Khalkhin Gol in Manchuria, the Soviets had seriously blooded Japanese forces [a force of 57,000 men under future Marshal Zhukov annihilated two Japanese divisions which had ventured into Mongolia]. The memory of that defeat had lingered. The Japanese also well knew that Soviet fortifications covering the coastal regions were extensive and would require significant forces to overcome. Even after the commencement of Operation Barbarossa, between 32 and 59 Soviet divisions manned these defences.in "If the Allies had Fallen."
... Soviet High Command war planning consistently accorded highest priority to victory in the West. In the unlikely case the Japanese had conducted a limited attack against the Soviet Far East, the Stavka would have required the region to fend for itself and trade space for time until adequate reinforcements became available in 1942. There was of course the clear precedent of the Civil War years, when the Bolsheviks concentrated on prevailing in the key western theatre before restoring its position in the Far Eastern theatre. Soviet interwar years war planning confirmed that strategic position.
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