Vietnam: Looking Back - At The Facts

[Red Seven]

America could have made different & better choices, but there is no guarantee that any of those would have changed the final outcome.

And there, my Children, is the profound, succinct and salient point. Yes, we could have invaded the North with 6 divisions, airborne assaults, amphibious hooks, massive air and sea bombardments...and the NVA would have melted away into the hills and jungles from where they would have conducted a long-term sustained guerrilla campaign for another ten, twenty or thirty years, and the "final outcome" would have been the same--except perhaps, for another fifty thousand names on the Black Wall.

[Bigfella]

And there, my Children, is the profound, succinct and salient point. Yes, we could have invaded the North with 6 divisions, airborne assaults, amphibious hooks, massive air and sea bombardments...and the NVA would have melted away into the hills and jungles from where they would have conducted a long-term sustained guerrilla campaign for another ten, twenty or thirty years, and the "final outcome" would have been the same--except perhaps, for another fifty thousand names on the Black Wall.

Thanks Red Seven, you make a good point. I've never been convinced that invading the Nth was really the answer. As it was the war became unsustainably unpopular by the time the 'body count' reached 30,000. In Korea it had been even lower than that. An invasion will lead to a sharp spike in deaths. Given the timelines (this is going to have to take place in 1965-67) there is no way the RVN & its armed forces are going to be up to administering or pacifying the Nth - they could barely be said to be administering the Sth & they definately weren't pacifying it. After all they had fought for it seems unlikely that the leaders of the DRV would just roll over, and whatever their thoughts on the commuists, most Northerners are going to see this as invasion, not liberation. Give it another year or two 10,000 dead per year & see what the polls look like in America.

This was a Vietnamese war involving Americans. Unfortunately too many Americans still see the Vietnamese as background scenery in their own country. The presumption that the war was won & lost in the White House, Pentagon or news rooms of New York may be understandable, but overlooks too much.

[Officer of Engineers]

I think it was you who stated that before the LBs, the population of the North was also getting tired of war. Most certainly after Tet, there was panic in Hanoi that nothing stands in the way of a counter-American invasion except for the threat of a Chinese intervention ... and the Chinese were going home to get ready for their war against Moscow.

There was definitely a morale drop in the north as families buried an entire generation and even a few have no more sons to give even if they wanted to and few wanted to to that incompetence who planned Tet.

South Vietnam was North Vietnam's Vietnam. They were running out of volunteers and most of all, the will to prevail. They knew that they were going to be alone soon as their allied communist giants were going to duke it over. Ironically, it was the LBs that galvanized their will to resist, turning Hanoi's incursions into the South as one of national survival.

Had the Americans just keep smashing Northern armies, I see the North tiring of war before the Americans. Their losses were greater and getting intolerable.

[astralis]

I see the North tiring of war before the Americans. Their losses were greater and getting intolerable.

unfortunately that's really a hindsight judgment. the Pentagon had been saying that since roughly 1966-1967, and when Tet rolled around it was the Americans whom ultimately blinked first.

[Officer of Engineers]

unfortunately that's really a hindsight judgment. the Pentagon had been saying that since roughly 1966-1967, and when Tet rolled around it was the Americans whom ultimately blinked first.

Ironically, the Pentagon was right. Tet was their last roll of the dice before American public opinion gave them not only breathing room but more importantly nerve to rebuild.

I don't think it is revisionist history to state that Hanoi was scared to death of a counter invasion.

[Red Seven]

South Vietnam was North Vietnam's Vietnam....Had the Americans just keep smashing Northern armies, I see the North tiring of war before the Americans. Their losses were greater and getting intolerable.

Very interesting point of view.

The problem was, there were no "Northern armies" amassed or static enough to "keep smashing." If only there had been the smashing would have been so much easier. The dispersion of NVA and VC regiments, their knack for breaking up into smaller units for infiltration and regrouping at rendezvous points for attack and then dispersing again into small elements made it extremely difficult to pummel them in larger configurations. This was the kind of thing that so frustrated such a hopelessly conventional and unimaginative commander like Westmoreland.

In spite of the losses sustained by the North, I can't agree with your contention that the North would've tired before the Americans. The North was very well aware of the power and influence of the anti-war movement in the US, a movement that grew even stronger and more inclusive after Tet. All they had to do was hold out. And for an incredibly patient people like the Vietnamese, holding out was almost a national trait.

[Officer of Engineers]

The problem was, there were no "Northern armies" amassed or static enough to "keep smashing."

They were coming. The thing is that guerrilla warfare alone could not win Hanoi's victory. Sooner or later, they need those armies. Mao figured this out during his civil war in China. Giap, a must able student, thought the same.

If only there had been the smashing would have been so much easier. The dispersion of NVA and VC regiments, their knack for breaking up into smaller units for infiltration and regrouping at rendezvous points for attack and then dispersing again into small elements made it extremely difficult to pummel them in larger configurations. This was the kind of thing that so frustrated such a hopelessly conventional and unimaginative commander like Westmoreland.

And it's a casualty intensive tactic. Make no mistake, Giap's tactic was to outbleed the Americans. My point is that they were at least running out of willing blood, even if they still have unwilling blood to spare.

In spite of the losses sustained by the North, I can't agree with your contention that the North would've tired before the Americans. The North was very well aware of the power and influence of the anti-war movement in the US, a movement that grew even stronger and more inclusive after Tet. All they had to do was hold out. And for an incredibly patient people like the Vietnamese, holding out was almost a national trait.

Actually, no. Hanoi suffered an anti-war movement far, far, far worst than the Americans. It took them 2 years to rebuild and only with North Vietnamese bodies. Those vaunted VC regiments. They disappeared forever after Tet. Those was no recruiting pool to replace those losses. After Tet, instead of an allied North supporting a southern insurrection, it became the North's war against the south.

This being said, it was the greatest stroke of luck that the American anti-war movement also stopped American military expansion of that war. Giap may have claimed that his Tet Offensive caused the American anti-war efforts but there is no way in hell did he ever planned for it.

[Red Seven]

Hanoi suffered an anti-war movement far, far, far worst than the Americans.

Honestly, OoE, that's an extraordinary statement. I'm not saying you are wrong. I may just not have had access to the same sources. But in all my reading about the war and from my personal experience with ARVN Regional Force infantry, I can't remember ever encountering details of any anti-war "movement" in North Vietnam, and certainly not one that would have eclipsed that which raged in the United States. Having said that, however, I'll freely admit to you that my focus of study has largely concerned itself with American and South Vietnamese military operations, joint ops and US Marine COIN operations in SVN and elsewhere. I've never thought to seek out information on a North Vietnamese anti-war movement because I never knew there was one of any consequence.

Any anti-war movement on the scale you describe, in a highly militarized nation with a Communist regime, had to have been extremely muted. And that is what makes me think that your contention is a bit overstated.

I do agree with some of your other points, regarding the high casualties suffered by the VC/NVA during Tet and the fact that larger formations indeed "were coming" as they would be needed for the Easter Offensive of '72 and eventually for the final invasion of the South once the American withdrawal had sufficient negative impact on ARVN warfighting capabilities.

I can confirm that the two-year rebuilding effort after Tet that you've mentioned was very successful. With willing (or unwilling) bodies, by early 1971 NVA fighting prowess, power and high morale were very much in evidence. Specifically evident during Lam Son 719, an operation I was in position to observe, the ill-fated incursion into Laos by a number of elite South Vietnamese divisons--including SVN Marines and Rangers--backed by a robust array of US fixed-wing and rotor aircraft and other support elements.

[astralis]

Red,

Any anti-war movement on the scale you describe, in a highly militarized nation with a Communist regime, had to have been extremely muted. And that is what makes me think that your contention is a bit overstated.

think the good col is referring not to northern opinion but to southern opinion. after Tet, the indigenious southern supporters for northern unification died and never came back.

re: this point by the col, though:

Ironically, the Pentagon was right.

the problem was that the Pentagon was only technically right after Tet, and was incorrect in '65, '66, '67, and '68. that's one reason why today's commanders always seek to temper expectations.

of course what i'm really surprised about is how south vietnam suddenly went under in '75. even accounting for foreign support for the north and non-intervention on part of the americans...the south vietnamese were remarkably well-armed in 1975-- at least on paper. to hear that south vietnamese units, towards the end, were running short on small arms ammo and needing to buy their own grenades...makes me wonder WTH happened there.

[Red Seven]

Red,



think the good col is referring not to northern opinion but to southern opinion.

Astralis, my apologies to the good Colonel, if he meant to write Saigon instead of Hanoi. But I think he did mean the North as he references them throughout the following paragraph:

"Actually, no. Hanoi suffered an anti-war movement far, far, far worst than the Americans. It took them 2 years to rebuild and only with North Vietnamese bodies. Those vaunted VC regiments. They disappeared forever after Tet. Those was no recruiting pool to replace those losses. After Tet, instead of an allied North supporting a southern insurrection, it became the North's war against the south."

after Tet, the indigenious southern supporters for northern unification died and never came back.

Certainly some wind gone from their sails but not out of the fight by any means, (if, by "indigenous southern supporters," you mean the Viet Cong).

of course what i'm really surprised about is how south vietnam suddenly went under in '75. even accounting for foreign support for the north and non-intervention on part of the americans...the south vietnamese were remarkably well-armed in 1975-- at least on paper. to hear that south vietnamese units, towards the end, were running short on small arms ammo and needing to buy their own grenades...makes me wonder WTH happened there.

That's a good question and to understand WTH did happen you have to consider just a few of the factors in play, like the firmly entrenched military and political corruption on a vast scale throughout the South, a North Vietnamese intelligence network that was pretty effective and downright treachery among various ARVN officers. You can have all the weapons in the world, but if your General has made a secret deal with NV agents to make it unavailable (by selling vast quantities of it on the Black Market), it's not going to do you much good. And there were many officers who were very busy planning their personal post-war contingency options once it became evident that the US was planning to get out.

I know about corruption and treachery in the ARVN officer ranks. I also remember the looks on the faces of my ARVN counterparts when my teammates and I boarded a CH46 in a dry rice paddy in May '71 for the last time...and thinking right then that "these people will not make it alone." ARVN morale was already very low then.

[Officer of Engineers]

Allow me to clarify.

First off, the military situation was damned precarious. Only the threat of a non-existing Chinese intervention was stopping the Americans.

2ndly, that big Tet effort was a disaster. The Northern population was hearing for months, especially about Kai Sang and Saigon and how the south was uprising. When it became clear that they lost, no amount of propaganda was going to sway the reality and the loss of such a committement.

3rd, and most importantly, Northern families were burying their sons by the 1000s. Mothers were crying over lost sons in a disastrous effort that resulted in nothing but the loss of their sons. The funerals alone dried up any immediate replacement armies and in fact, it took Hanoi 2 years to find replacements before they could venture forth again.

4th, the VC was destroyed and the south dried up as support. There would be no uprising in the south and the effort required now was bigger than Tet ever was.

The situation was that for 2 years, the Americans did not take advantage of Hanoi's military weakness. Imagine what would had happen had Stalin gave Hitler 2 years breathing space after Stalingrad. Well, the Americans gave that to Hanoi.

[DOR]

I was too young for the Vietnam draft, by about 14 months, but I remember the time and I’ve studied the history with people who were there, and from more than one side of the conflict. I did research for a guy named Doug Pike who was the chief Hanoi watcher in the US embassy in Saigon, and have read up on the Chinese participation, as noted below. I’ve been to Vietnam several times since 1992, and I’ve also got several (mostly European) friends who were journalists during the war, and have lived in Asia ever since. So, my sources are varied and I think my views are well-informed.

I have tremendous respect for those who put their lives at risk, with or without a weapon in their hands, but also recognize that unless someone was in a bird’s eye view position for many years, the perspective is probably an excellent understanding of a very narrow, limited part of the story. That’s why scholars write books and explain what happened, and why generals and academy cadets read those same books. Perspective.

My two cents:

-o- After 20+ years of civil war, the 8-month-old People’s Republic of China had zero interest in a war in Korea. All the Chinese sources I’ve seen say that they were not consulted but merely informed, and late. They moved troops into the North-east in 1948-49 to take control of surrendering Nationalist soldiers, establish governments and prevent the Soviets from further looting the industrial machinery that the Japanese had installed in what used to be ManZhuGuo. Only in October 1950 did they begin moving troops into Korea.

-o- Mao told Ho Chi-minh that he expected Vietnamese communists to win first, and then help Chinese communists win their own war in China. Since it went the other way, he felt obligated to help Ho.

-o- China had over 120 generals and hundreds of thousands of troops and workers in Vietnam for over a decade prior to the Cultural Revolution. The entire Dien Bien Phu battle wouldn’t have taken place had not PLA General Wei Guoqing convinced Viet Minh Sr General Vo Nguyen Giap not to drive down the coast, but to find and destroy a significant French force, purely for the political impact it would have on public opinion in France.

-o- The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was the blueprint for yellowcake and other “intelligence” designed to convince Congress to go along with the Administrations' war. Maybe people involved really thought they were doing the right thing by manufacturing an excuse to expand military operations, or launch an entire war against another sovereign nation. I have my own views on the matter.


-o- The USSR and PRC were at loggerheads, and worse, in the early to mid-1960s; it erupted into armed conflict in 1969. The possible invasion of China mentioned earlier in this thread was a Soviet proposal to destroy Chinese ICBMs and research facilities, which the US turned down (and, later leaked to the Chinese). The US never seriously considered invading the Chinese Mainland after 1953, and used the Soviet suggestion and some classified satellite photos of Soviet troop placements and movements to convince the Chinese that (as the old Vulcan saying goes) Only Nixon Can Go To China.

-o- Until I got to grad school, I thought the domino theory was a bunch of bull. But, as I began to piece together the timeline of various South-east Asian insurgencies and the abrupt shift in the fortunes of communist rebels in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Burma just as the GPCR was getting underway, I came to change my mind.

-o- The Tet Offensive was a failure for the North Vietnamese, but Southern / US intelligence was so poor we didn’t know that we could have drove straight through to Hanoi with minimal resistance throughout the Spring.

-o- Regardless of whether the US or the US plus others could have kept any South Vietnamese government in power for more than a few years, the war stopped China from pushing revolution throughout South-east Asia in the last decade of Mao’s life.

That was probably worth the price we paid.

[astralis]

col yu,

The situation was that for 2 years, the Americans did not take advantage of Hanoi's military weakness.

given that the LBJ administration always ruled out an invasion of the north, what steps could the US have taken otherwise to bolster the position? there was an attempt at Vietnamization but for some reason it didn't go too well.

[Red Seven]

Allow me to clarify.

First off, the military situation was damned precarious. Only the threat of a non-existing Chinese intervention was stopping the Americans.

2ndly, that big Tet effort was a disaster. The Northern population was hearing for months, especially about Kai Sang and Saigon and how the south was uprising. When it became clear that they lost, no amount of propaganda was going to sway the reality and the loss of such a committement.

3rd, and most importantly, Northern families were burying their sons by the 1000s. Mothers were crying over lost sons in a disastrous effort that resulted in nothing but the loss of their sons. The funerals alone dried up any immediate replacement armies and in fact, it took Hanoi 2 years to find replacements before they could venture forth again.

4th, the VC was destroyed and the south dried up as support. There would be no uprising in the south and the effort required now was bigger than Tet ever was.

The situation was that for 2 years, the Americans did not take advantage of Hanoi's military weakness. Imagine what would had happen had Stalin gave Hitler 2 years breathing space after Stalingrad. Well, the Americans gave that to Hanoi.

Yes sir, thank you for clarifying. I agree 99% with the points above as stated and apologize if I misinterpreted your last. The 1% I'd question you about would be "the VC was destroyed." Hurt very badly during Tet, I agree, but not finished. They did manage a partial resurgence and by '71 were conducting bolder operations with larger units than in the years immediately after Tet.

[Red Seven]

there was an attempt at Vietnamization but for some reason it didn't go too well.

Permit me a stab at this, astralis. There were a lot of reasons. I think the main one is that "Vietnamization" was not the step-by-step, gradual transition of force that it should have been. It would have taken way too long to do it right. And even then, there were so many variables, some that I've touched on above, the situation was so complex and so gone-to-hell by that time that "Vietnamization" was not much better than an ad slogan.

I'm not sure about the Army, but most US Marine ground combat units in I Corps were gone by June 1971. The "transition" that took place was not a transition, it was a pack-up, roll-up and get-out-of-town. When your unit's turn came, there was, for OPSEC reasons, very little warning. You burned what you didn't need, you left what you couldn't carry and you got on the helo. Xin chao, xin loi.