Sir Carl Quote of the Week

[Shek]

The next installment of the CvC quote of the week follows, and once again is from Book 1, Chapter 2 (page 92):

... the original political objects can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable consequences.

This one is a gem IMO. It highlights the fact that one must not become fixated on the original war aims. Thus, it defines that what starts off defining a "W" in the win-loss column is not necessarily what should define a "W" later on during the war. As two examples, the ACW morphed from the original war aim of preserving the Union to maintaining the Union and abolishing slavery, the root cause of secession. In Vietnam, the Nixon administration settled for a decent interval in exchange for triangulating the USSR and China to achieve broader foreign policy goals (I'd argue that the Vietnam War wasn't necessary to allow the US to do this, but it did create the conditions for an executive team with the vision to realign American foreign policy away from a monolithic view of communism to be elected).

In modern terms, it provides an argument against those who use the rhetoric of "winning" to solely define US war aims in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[S2]

"In modern terms, it provides an argument against those who use the rhetoric of "winning" to solely define US war aims in Iraq and Afghanistan."

It's in this context that I find the greatest value and relevance. A variation of CVC's dictum might be-

"... the original political objects can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally [be rendered irrelevant] since they are influenced by events and their probably consequences."

Our objectives have morphed beyond our original mission to destroy those whom attacked us on 9/11. I'm not certain that mission has lost its importance but the compass directing our actions has absolutely swayed away from that bearing. It remains, however, on the lips (if not in the actions) of those who insist upon our continued presence in Afghanistan and engagement with Pakistan.

Pouring untold billions of dollars into Afghanistan and Pakistan has neither made America safer nor altered the political landscape of either country closer to an alignment with the west.

We need a serious rethink premised on CVC's above comment.

[Albany Rifles]

I found Shek's Christmas Gift when its published!!!


http://clausewitzforkids.wordpress.c...nature-of-war/

[Shek]

After a multiyear absence, I will try and resurrect this and make necroposting an art form . . .

From Page 606:

If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war, and this may reach the point where war attains its absolute form . . . Policy, of course will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle.

Tactics and operations are slaves to strategy, which in turn, is a slave to policy.

[astralis]

don't you find it a bit strange that the homeland of CvC pretty much ignored this very statement in just about every major war she's been in?

[Shek]

don't you find it a bit strange that the homeland of CvC pretty much ignored this very statement in just about every major war she's been in?

Von Moltke the Elder rejected Clausewitz's notion that policy should extend its influence into operations. Given his success, subsequent officers hued his notion of the separation of strategy and policy during the conduct of the war.

In contrast, Eisenhower was very much enamored by Clausewitz, and Patton bought a copy of On War in Paris during his honeymoon.

[Officer of Engineers]

Colonel,

Any recommendations on books bridging the gap between operations and strategy, especially between the WWI-WWII era. Would like to see the evolution of thought between the two eras.

[astralis]

shek,

on Moltke the Elder rejected Clausewitz's notion that policy should extend its influence into operations. Given his success, subsequent officers hued his notion of the separation of strategy and policy during the conduct of the war.

frankly this was an issue with German/Prussian thinking from the wars of Frederick the Great to the Napoleonic Wars. the one time when it -didn't- happen were the wars of German Unification/the Franco-Prussian Wars...which makes Moltke the Elder's rejection stranger still.

[astralis]

Colonel,

Any recommendations on books bridging the gap between operations and strategy, especially between the WWI-WWII era. Would like to see the evolution of thought between the two eras.

perhaps one of the best books i've read regarding this:

http://www.amazon.com/Military-Innov.../dp/0521637600

[Officer of Engineers]

First book I've ordered from Amazon. I think I'm going to start a libarary again.

[Shek]

shek,

frankly this was an issue with German/Prussian thinking from the wars of Frederick the Great to the Napoleonic Wars. the one time when it -didn't- happen were the wars of German Unification/the Franco-Prussian Wars...which makes Moltke the Elder's rejection stranger still.

He was probably too pissed at Bismark to realize that Bismark had created the favorable strategic environment and then kept the Prussian Army from experiencing too much operational success, which would have then resulted in counterbalancing that could have eliminated the Prussian strategic gains.

[Shek]

I've had that one on the shelf for years and have yet to get to it. However, I do know that it's widely used when looking at the Interwar Period.

I'd offer the following book, which looks at your question from an American operational art perspective and traces how U.S. professional military education at the staff and war college level evolved: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0806141565

The synopsis of the book can be found in the video below, which allows you a trial run before deciding to buy the book.

[Albany Rifles]

Shek,

I was going to recommend that excellent video as well. You recommended it to me about a year ago and have rewatched it several times.

For much of these discussions the entire library is very robust and enjoyable.

Recommend to all.

[S2]

Nice video. Excellent anecdotal backdrop to the development of an Americanized operational art. Thank you.

[Shek]

Page 605 - "War Is an Instrument of Policy"

". . . war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense."