What if Britain lost the 'Battle of Britain'? Would America still have declaired war?

[Officer of Engineers]

Z,

Two Canadian infantry divisions with full gear with orders to opposed any landing. From my view, anti-Dieppe times 4. Come on, Z, no one has actually done an amphib assualt before the US Marines. Push comes to shove, your German corps would have been wasted on the shores. There is absouletley no way the Germans can land a corps on Great Britain, not when two fresh Canadian divisions were facing them.

[tankie]

Z,

Two Canadian infantry divisions with full gear with orders to opposed any landing. From my view, anti-Dieppe times 4. Come on, Z, no one has actually done an amphib assualt before the US Marines. Push comes to shove, your German corps would have been wasted on the shores. There is absouletley no way the Germans can land a corps on Great Britain, not when two fresh Canadian divisions were facing them.

And dont forget Capt Mainwarings highly trained troops at Warmington on sea to lead the way ( soz couldnt resist ) :whome:

[1979]

One of us has bad info, I am not aware of the paras beign in that bad of shape. They saw little action in France and the low countries. IIRC the 7th saw action mostly in Denmark not France.

As per feldgrau :

The Germans never came up with a lightweight air dropped or transportable vehicle to equal the Allies' jeep. They did use motorcycles, usually 750 CC engine BMW's, equipped with sidecars for reconnaissance. The motorcycles were also equipped with a towing hook so they could tow light anti-tank or artillery weapons. However, towing strength for such a combination was low and cross country performance was poor. The German Fallschirmjaeger also made limited use of the Kettenrad, a semi-tracked vehicle based on a motorcycle. The Kettenrad had a motor cycle wheel in front and a track on each side of the rear. With a 1500 CC engine and a weight of 1200 kilograms it had better cross country performance and power reserves than a motorcycle but was still of limited value and difficult to load and unload from a JU 52.

Feldgrau :: Weapons and Equipment of the Fallschirmjäger

Basicly once dropped, they are foot soldiers.

[1979]

We know a German div. needed ~ 200 t /day of supplies(later in the war they handled with much less).To keep 6-7 divs+para's they'll need to send some 1500t/day across the channel,assuming they land,they beat the defenders on the shores and manage to establish a beachhead.The question is of course if they were capable to send those supplies and unload them in a port?

In average.

When inactive armored divisions used some 30 tons per day and 700 tons when engaged, the infanterie divisions used between 80 tons ( when inactive) and 1100 tons ( engaged ).

But how about getting them across in the first place ?
A infantry division requires between 50,000 and 70,000 gross registred tons for sea transportation ( in average 5-6 tons per man ) .
As for BigFella comment regarding loading and unloading under fire:
Loading or unloading a 2000 grt ship takes 16 hours in normal conditions in ports !

Take a look at the folowing link.
HyperWar: Handbook on German Military Forces (Chapter 6)

[zraver]

Z,

Two Canadian infantry divisions with full gear with orders to opposed any landing. From my view, anti-Dieppe times 4. Come on, Z, no one has actually done an amphib assualt before the US Marines. Push comes to shove, your German corps would have been wasted on the shores. There is absouletley no way the Germans can land a corps on Great Britain, not when two fresh Canadian divisions were facing them.

Sir losses would have been heavy, but if Germany was determined it would have possible. Other than Wake Island and Dieppe I am not aware of any other landing attempts that were repulsed. It would all depend on where the Germans landed and if the Canadians broke.

Of the two divisions, only the 1st has been in England for any length of time. The 2nd is still a patchwork quilt of units, and in August is still arriving from Canada with almost no training under its belt. Even the 1st is not well trained.or supported. To these two dominion units there is a mix of homeguard units with almost no heavy weapons, a few tanks including some WWI era MK V+, training units, anti-aircraft units, and few small cadres.

The German's can deliver more experienced and effective combat troops via transport and glider (7th Flieger, 1st Gebirgs and 22nd Luftlandie) than there are on the whole of the isle of Great Britain at the time. Those paras and glider troops would have taken a beating, but they would have allowed the landing troops a much easier time. If the German infantry gets ashore its up to the Royal Navy and I have my doubts they could do it even if the government survived.

[Mihais]

Plus combat ready units cannot be both on defensive positions onshore and deployed to counter airlandings.Also the Germans are not compelled to carry the air assault simultaneously with the sea assault.Meaning that those airborne div's will have the entire LW bomber force on CAS for a while(1-2 days).It would be a lot harder than in Crete,thanks to the RAF,but the Germans can lose half of LW with no remorse if they are to win the beachhead.

[Skywatcher]

Plus combat ready units cannot be both on defensive positions onshore and deployed to counter airlandings.Also the Germans are not compelled to carry the air assault simultaneously with the sea assault.Meaning that those airborne div's will have the entire LW bomber force on CAS for a while(1-2 days).It would be a lot harder than in Crete,thanks to the RAF,but the Germans can lose half of LW with no remorse if they are to win the beachhead.

So would Operation Sealion turn out to be a pyrrhic victory for the Germans?

[Parihaka]

Interesting scenarios yet I'm still to see how the Luftwaffe achieves air superiority, even under the classical scenario of defeat of 11 Group. The Luftwaffe has no way of destroying or even effectively attacking 12 Group or 10 Group. At least 2/3rds of 11 Group still survives. The Luftwaffe cannot provide other than token support of the beachheads and are committed to protect the supply/reinforcement routes. Sounds, looks and smells like a turket-shoot to me.

[zraver]

Interesting scenarios yet I'm still to see how the Luftwaffe achieves air superiority, even under the classical scenario of defeat of 11 Group. The Luftwaffe has no way of destroying or even effectively attacking 12 Group or 10 Group. At least 2/3rds of 11 Group still survives. The Luftwaffe cannot provide other than token support of the beachheads and are committed to protect the supply/reinforcement routes. Sounds, looks and smells like a turket-shoot to me.

Oh come on Pari, the Luftwaffe had almost twice the number of fighters and her pilots were much more effective. Fighting just over the coast of Southern England, the channel and the french ports evens out the range and magnifies the LW's numbers advantage. It puts the bulk of Fighrer Commands planes at the extemes of their range.

[redco]

I remember reading about a series of simulations carried at Sandhurst(??) .Brits always won.No idea how.

The wargame was fixed...though not in the way you might think.
The umpires had agreed that the invasion force should be allowed to face only minimal interference from the RN for the first two days, as otherwise the invasion would be over before it began

However,Stukas did ok in Crete.

They sank a few ships over a number of days but they failed to stop the RN sinking the seaborne invasion force and then evacuating the Allied troops off Crete. Not that impressive if you remember that the Luftwaffe would have only hours to try and stop any RN ships attacking the invasion convoy

The 2 Cad Divs+Monty's 3d Inf(IIRC the only combat ready Brit Div at the time) are still a shallow force.Assuming the German para's manage to land and get an airfield the Commonwealth on the shores have 3 airmobile divisions in the rear with 4-5 assaulting from the sea,with the entire Luftwaffe bomber force on CAS and interdiction.

If they invade in September the number of effective British and Commonwealth divisions is nearer 15, and only 4 German divisions will land on the first day, 3 via the beaches and 1 airborne, It will take the Germans another 10 days to land all of the 9 infantry divisions of the first wave.

Even if the first German wave suffers heavy losses,they must only get a beachhead.Once the first Panzer regiment is on shore,the game is over for any defense on the coast.

Seeing that the first Panzer regiment is not due to start landing until after the first wave is ashore, its going to be over 10 days before the Brits have to worry about that.

Then it becomes a game of protecting the LOC's for the Germans and trying to cut them for the Brits.RN+RAF vs Kriegsmarine+ME 109's+all Stukas fighting in range of the German fighters.My bet on that one is 2/3 on the Germans.

How does the Luftwaffe stop the RN if it attacks at night ?

IMO,Sealion was as risky as could be.Assuming the services were convinced to actually work together instead of each coming with a plan that ignored the others it was however feasible.The strategic benefits were bigger then the drawbacks so it should have been carried out.

The reason none could come up with a plan that was feasible was quite simple...they wasn't a feasible way to successfully invade Britain with the forces they had

[redco]

Oh come on Pari, the Luftwaffe had almost twice the number of fighters and her pilots were much more effective.

At the start of the battle the Luftwaffe out numbered Fighter Command in single seat fighters by 3:2, by September the numbers were almost equal, by October the RAF had the advantage. The Luftwaffe single seat fighters might have shot down the RAF fighters at a rate of 1.2/1 but due to the fact that the Luftwaffe replacement rate was far lower, the number of operational BF 109's fell while the British increased the number of operational Hurricanes and Spitfires during the battle

Fighting just over the coast of Southern England, the channel and the french ports evens out the range and magnifies the LW's numbers advantage. It puts the bulk of Fighrer Commands planes at the extemes of their range.

The RAF only has to protect the RN for a few hours then its all over.

[redco]

Equipment levels of the British army post Dunkirk

British Equipment losses at Dunkirk and the situation post Dunkirk

[Parihaka]

Oh come on Pari, the Luftwaffe had almost twice the number of fighters and her pilots were much more effective. Fighting just over the coast of Southern England, the channel and the french ports evens out the range and magnifies the LW's numbers advantage. It puts the bulk of Fighrer Commands planes at the extemes of their range.

Z, I really don't know where you're getting you figures from but a simple read from wiki should tell you your source is wrong in every aspect.

Attrition statistics

Overall, by 2 November, the RAF fielded 1,796 pilots, an increase of over 40% from July 1940's count of 1,259 pilots.[172] Based on German sources (from a Luftwaffe intelligence officer Otto Bechtle attached to KG 2 in February 1944) translated by the Air Historical Branch, Stephen Bungay asserts German fighter and bomber "strength" declined without recovery, and that from August - December 1940, the German fighter and bomber strength declined by 30 and 25 percent.[3] In contrast, Williamson Murray, asserts (using translations by the Air Historical Branch) that 1,380 German bombers were on strength on 29 June 1940,[173][17] 1,420 bombers on 28 September,[174] 1,423 level bombers on 2 November[175] and 1,393 bombers on 30 November 1940.[175] In July - September the number of pilots available fell by 136, but the number of operational pilots had shrunk by 171 by September. The training organisation of the Luftwaffe was failing to replace losses. German fighter pilots, in contrast to popular perception, were not afforded training or rest rotations unlike their British counterparts.[176] The first week of September accounted for 25 percent of the Fighter Command, and 24 percent of the Luftwaffe's overall losses.[177] Between the dates 26 August - 6 September, the Germans destroyed more aircraft than they lost on only one day (1 September). Losses were 325 German and 248 British.[178]

Luftwaffe losses for August numbered 774 aircraft to all causes, representing 18.5 percent of all combat aircraft at the beginning of the month.[179] Fighter Command's losses in August were 426 fighters destroyed,[180] amounting to 40 percent of 1,061 fighters available on 3 August.[181] In addition, 99 bombers and 27 other types were destroyed between 1 and 29 August.[182]

From July to September, the Luftwaffe's loss records indicate the loss of 1,636 aircraft, 1,184 to enemy action.[173] This represented 47 percent of the initial strength of single-engine fighters, 66 percent of twin-engine fighters, and 45 percent of bombers. This indicates the Germans were running out of aircrews as well as aircraft.[183]

Throughout the battle, the Germans

greatly underestimated the size of the RAF and the scale of British aircraft production. Across the Channel, the Air Intelligence division of the Air Ministry consistently overestimated the size of the German air enemy and the productive capacity of the German aviation industry. As the battle was fought, both sides exaggerated the losses inflicted on the other by an equally large margin. However, the intelligence picture formed before the battle encouraged the German Air Force to believe that such losses pushed Fighter Command to the very edge of defeat, while the exaggerated picture of German air strength persuaded the RAF that the threat it faced was larger and more dangerous than was the case.[184]

This led the British to the conclusion that another fortnight of attacks on airfields might force Fighter Command to withdraw their squadrons from the south of England. The German misconception, on the other hand,

encouraged first complacency, then strategic misjudgement. The shift of targets from air bases to industry and communications was taken because it was assumed that Fighter Command was virtually eliminated.[185]

Between the 24 August and 4 September German serviceability rates, which were acceptable at Stuka units, were running at 75% with Bf 109s, 70% with bombers and 65% with Bf 110s, indicating a shortage of spare parts. All units were well below established strength. The attrition was beginning to affect the fighters in particular."[186] By 14 September the Luftwaffe's Bf 109 Geschwader possessed only 67 percent of their operational crews against authorised aircraft. For Bf 110 units it was 46 percent; and for bombers it was 59 percent. A week later the figures had dropped to 64 percent, 52 percent, and 52 percent.[183] Serviceability rates in Fighter Command's fighter squadrons, between the 24 August and 7 September, were listed as: 64.8% on the 24 August; 64.7% on 31 August and 64.25% on the 7 September 1940, indicating a slow decline.[181]

Due to the failure of the Luftwaffe to establish air supremacy, a conference assembled on 14 September at Hitler's headquarters. Hitler concluded that air superiority had not yet been established and "promised to review the situation on 17 September for possible landings on 27 September or 8 October. Three days later, when the evidence was clear that the German Air Force had greatly exaggerated the extent of their successes against the RAF, Hitler postponed Sealion indefinitely."[187]

What you are suggesting is that an inferior force in all but numbers (where it has slight numeric advantage) switches from surprise raids to defence of ground and sea operations. In other words committed to a known time and place.
The RAF on the other hand which has thus far only used less than half its fighter force gets to deploy its torpedo bombers and ground attack aircraft for the first time and, given the make or break nature of stopping the invasion engages it's entire fighter strength rather than the less than half that it had used up til that point.

Turkey shoot which would have destroyed the Luftwaffe had they been mad enough to go along with it, which of course Goring was.

Edit: About the range thing: The south of England and the channel were not at the 'extreme range' of the midlands, as Leigh -Mallory demonstrated when assembling his big-wings for up to half an hour before even moving to defend the southern airfields.

Also, the RAF had practised extensively operating out of temporary forward airfields (road, paddock) while in France prior to Dunkirk.

[zraver]

They sank a few ships over a number of days but they failed to stop the RN sinking the seaborne invasion force and then evacuating the Allied troops off Crete.

Kind of misleading since the invasion force was protected by a single destroyer and had to travel much farther. The LW beat off the first two sorties by the RN.

Not that impressive if you remember that the Luftwaffe would have only hours to try and stop any RN ships attacking the invasion convoy If they invade in September the number of effective British and Commonwealth divisions is nearer 15, and only 4 German divisions will land on the first day, 3 via the beaches and 1 airborne, It will take the Germans another 10 days to land all of the 9 infantry divisions of the first wave.

The bulk of those divisions are unarmed, untrained and in the wrong location. Nor do the Germans have just the 7th, they also have the glider trained 22 Luftlandie and 3rd Gebirgs plus at least 1 regiment of glider trained engineers. While these formations are low on artillery and the 7th/22nd comboined lost about 1200 men in the Low countries, they are far more experianced and have the same ampunt of direct fire capability as a British infantry division.

How does the Luftwaffe stop the RN if it attacks at night ?

Subs and mines for the most part.

The reason none could come up with a plan that was feasible was quite simple...they wasn't a feasible way to successfully invade Britain with the forces they had

I dissagree, I think the biggest obstacle was the divided nature of command in the Nazi regime.

At the start of the battle the Luftwaffe out numbered Fighter Command in single seat fighters by 3:2, by September the numbers were almost equal, by October the RAF had the advantage. The Luftwaffe single seat fighters might have shot down the RAF fighters at a rate of 1.2/1 but due to the fact that the Luftwaffe replacement rate was far lower, the number of operational BF 109's fell while the British increased the number of operational Hurricanes and Spitfires during the battle

As I said if the fight isn't over friendly territory, the number of avaible pilots for the RAF will take a big hit.

The RAF only has to protect the RN for a few hours then its all over.

It took the RN several attempts to reach the Crete convoy, it would be far more than a few hours since most of the crossings will be during the day under the wings of the LW. Sorties at night will be attempts to shell the ports and beaches. Similar raids by the Japanese at Guadalcanal had minimal effect.

[Parihaka]

The bulk of those divisions are unarmed, untrained and in the wrong location. .

So the German attack also has to be a surprise one.

BTW, did you happen to notice what happened to the German paratroopers on Crete, even with total air superiority and aigainst a force with no heavy arms or transport to speak of?