Ticking Clock Demands Innovation But Have The Marines Gone Rogue (Again)?

[S2]

A tale of two operational areas and competing views regarding population-centric strategies shaped by an environment dominated by a ticking clock.

USMC forces have been operating with a semi-autonomous mandate in Helmand that demonstrates their political pull reaching back to Washington D.C. Helmand is increasingly becoming a a U.S.M.C. A.O. yet the call of the sirens points to Kandahar, not Helmand, as the enemy's center of gravity. Are the Marines, therefore, leaning eastward towards Kandahar? No. Instead, they're in the process of establishing a major operating base in Delaram (eastern Nimroz Province) further west-

"'This is a place where the enemy are moving in numbers,' he said, referring to increased Taliban activity along a newly built highway that bisects the province. 'We need to clean it up.'"

At Afghan Outpost Marines Gone Rogue Or Leading The Fight Against Counterinsurgency?- WAPO March 14, 2010

In some ways it's difficult to tell if the article's title was intentionally mis-leading. "Leading The Fight Aganist Counterinsurgency"? Really?

Therein, though, lies the twist. If McChrystal's population-centric strategy is prominent, what the hell are the marines doing in Helmand and why are they leaning west into the big nothing when THIS is the picture in Kandahar-

Kandahar Slides Into Lawlessness As Taliban Attacks Force Government Into Retreat-WAPO March 14, 2010

Now I confess to great confusion. I've argued against "population-centric" strategies that seemed premised on conceding vast swaths of Afghanistan as in-country sanctuary to our enemy. The demographics suggest that Afghanistan is rural-agarian still. Less than 20% of the population is concentrated in the top fifty largest towns. IIRC, that list covers cities between 2,000,000 plus to 2,000.

I further confess to confusion when, after much hullabaloo made about this approach, we run off to Helmand for our first two post-strategy operations. A part of me is quite cool with that-after all, there's no denying the Brits have their hands full in Helmand, opium cultivation is concentrated there, and there are unquestionably bad-guys galore to be dispatched. Yet Helmand's total population is 800,000-900,000 people in a nation of 29,000,000-about 3% of the overall populace. Bang for buck is people-low if opium/sanctuary high.

"They also became believers in Helmand's strategic importance. 'You cannot fix Kandahar without fixing Helmand,' Nicholson said. 'The insurgency there draws support from the insurgency here.'"

Okay. If you say so, General Nicholson. But you also say this-

"'The clock is ticking,' Nicholson told members of an intelligence battalion that recently arrived in Afghanistan. 'The drawdown will begin next year. We still have a lot to do -- and we don't have a lot of time to do it.'"

I'll look forward, as always, to the thoughts of others. There's more here than I've amplified. Only the broad highlights but the real story reaches to who really controls these troops, what the mission really should be, and, oh yeah, that ticking clock.

[Tarek Morgen]

Obviously I am a complete amateur on the subject but might the marines find areas with less population simply more attractive as the use of heavy weaponry is less likely to cause civilian death then in an urban enviroment?

[S2]

Tarek Morgen Reply

The ROEs aren't controlled by the Marines. Even they've got to adhere to those requirements and it's stuff that's unavoidable even in Marjah where a small population is drawn down further still before battle even commences.

No slack regardless of the A.O.(area of operations). Finally, there are SOME civilians in Nimroz and the taliban will make use of them for cover just as they have in Marjah and elsewhere. They've very carefully observed and understand what we can and can't do and have tailored their tactics to full advantage of such.

[Mihais]

Sir,regarding the population centric strategy,it can work only if enough respite is provided for the reconstruction to begin and the locals start to think in our terms instead of the Taliban's .The stuff the marines do,attacking the enemy sanctuaries,aggresive moves against their financial support,foot patrols etc... does that .It goes hand in hand with winning hearts.Look at what they do at the police academy.They recruit local people recommended by the elders.Those recruits will return to their villages and provide the security force that will be the real war winner when the reborn Talibans will try to return.The same principle as that advocated by SF Major John Gant.Go local as much as you can.I don't know how much the US Army used females to win the local womenfolk.I know we did and it worked.Having a woman doctor treating the sick local ladies turns both them and many times their husbands and children towards us.They provided invaluable insight.The Marines do just that. Disrupting the opium disrupts the enemy finances.That may disrupt their whole strategy.This assertion may be a bit of a stretch on my part.However,I don't think I'm wrong by saying you need overwhelming force to win a place.Marines seem willing to send overwhelming forces.Dispersing troops may comply with letter of the strategy,but it doesn't respect the spirit of it.If Marines win Helmand in a year,the effort can be shifted to other places.If you give up the war in 2011 we've lost anyway,regardless of the events in Kandahar or Helmand.But the Marines will return home with their victory.Plenty of war memoirs titled ''Stabbed in the back'' are to be expected in that case.

[JAD_333]

S2:

I see why you might be confused. If one had a prior expectation that we'd focus on larger population centers, one would wonder why we're doing it in sparsely populated areas instead. Before the buildup began I expected the same, but had no expectations of how it might be achieved. After reading the Wash Post article, which BTW I felt was good news no matter how the reporter intended it to be, I too wonder at the approach we're taking.

But I sense there is a method to the madness. For one thing, a quick, successful demonstration of our new game plan to the Afghan people would smooth the way as we move on to more challenging areas. Put another way, if the jungle drums say we are following through on promises of economic assistance and meeting local concerns, local elders in those more challenging areas might be better disposed to cooperate with us.

So, if you want a positive image to precede you, where better to shape one than in an area where it is relatively easy and quick to do it?

[S2]

Mihais & JAD_333 Reply

Mihais,

I'm very happy the Marines have their police academy in Marjah and, yes, I'm aware of the value that women can hold in the community. I'm unsure where the army is on that project but, no doubt, they've awareness and, I believe, a comparable program either up and running or in the works.

Larger question are the jungle drums and in which direction the message is being sent-east or west from Helmand?

As my initial post mentioned, there's more in the articles than what I laid forth. The marines could arrive quickly. In some respects they were an organization in search of a mission. Helmand came up. Does that mean their assets remain outside the operational loop?

What if it's not in the larger interest to head west into Nimroz even if many of the taliban do? Population-centric says there isn't much of a population there. Some? Yes, of course. Afghanistan, though, is a big country with lots of little villages. There'll always be someplace to hide and take shelter. Taliban also fled south along the Helmand River valley towards Pakistan and east into Kandahar. We can follow lots of remnants in lots of directions.

With the Danes (1), Marines (6), and Brits (7) Helmand currently has 14 battalions operating throughout its various locales while leaning west into Nimroz and, ultimately maybe Farah as well. Is west into Nimroz and Farah the best direction and do the marines have the latitude to make that determination?

Until a STRYKER battalion, 1-12 Inf. arrived last summer, Kandahar (and all its citizens) was the A.O. of a single operational battalion-currently the PPCLI. We're now up to three battalions in the A.O. with 2-508 Inf. (Airborne) taking over 1-12 Inf mission in the Arghandab valley and 1-12 Inf now conducting LOC security ops on the main Kabul-Kandahar highway.

That's three battalions for all of Kandahar.

The Canadians will be leaving in about five months and they're required to be gone, en toto, by the end of the year. So too the Dutch in Oruzgan.

I could say more but I'll simply suggest that our nat'l security objectives aren't going to be met in the time alloted and in the manner we've sold to the American public. Each mis-step within that time-frame makes it all the more unlikely.

I see mis-steps galore.

[S2]

Mihais Reply

"...regarding the population centric strategy,it can work only if enough respite is provided for the reconstruction to begin and the locals start to think in our terms instead of the Taliban's."

I'm unsure it'll work even then.

Sir Robert Watkins-Deputy Commissioner U.N.A.M.A.

Just a little more strategic incoherance to toss into the mix between the U.N. and ISAF, the force designated to implement the U.N. mandate. Mustn't contaminate the NGOs or U.N. with those dirty soldiers efforts and, of course, security must be assured before they'll begin their good work. Oh! And until it is you ISAF guys take care of those filthy refugees who are caught in a war-zone and trying to get on with their lives.

[Mihais]

Sir,like you say its more it meets the eye.Call me a conspiracy theorist(national disease)but neither the politicians told the American people the truth nor the military at the behest of the politicians can come out of the blue and say it.Off-topic,the situation resembles in a sense the early days of Nam,described by Gen. McMaster's book ''Dereliction of duty''.
You remember we had this talk before,when the strategy was made public.We agreed then that the timetable is too short.It's not the military that made the timetable,it was there at the demand of the politicians.Now,if we here,more or less chairborne troopers(in the sense that we're not on the ground),are aware that the war cannot be won in 1-2 years,even with the reinforcements and the new approach,I bet every penny in pocket that Petraeus,McChrystal and the whole cohort of brilliant staff officers and civilian advisors are also aware.So the implementation on the ground is a big compromise.I notice that what the marines are doing follows the strategic principles laid by McChrystal,albeit on a small scale.The chasing of the Taliban wherever it goes is also a sensible move.Plenty of them will be killed.With fewer population in the West they will be easier to spot than in a densely populated Kandahar.
IMO what's we see now in Helmand is the schwerpunkt.The rest is just a force economy mission.It may be a rehearsal for the rest of A-stan and a sample of success for the politicians and the American people.

Regarding the ups and downs of the strategy and the whole ISAF ,UN and whatever else,is not much I can say.We have very few cards to play.There may be good or bad,but the if we want to play...
On a side note I'm increasingly convinced that we'll come home tail between our legs.But we'll return in 15-20 years with a vengeance,unless our civilization will be completely cojones-less by then.You,Sir,are the guilty one for making me think of such depressing things.

[S2]

Mihais Reply

"You,Sir,are the guilty one for making me think of such depressing things.:))"

I'll take that as a compliment.;)

[Kasmir]

Until a STRYKER battalion, 1-12 Inf. arrived last summer, Kandahar (and all its citizens) was the A.O. of a single operational battalion-currently the PPCLI. We're now up to three battalions in the A.O. with 2-508 Inf. (Airborne) taking over 1-12 Inf mission in the Arghandab valley and 1-12 Inf now conducting LOC security ops on the main Kabul-Kandahar highway.

That's three battalions for all of Kandahar.

First, a mild correction, perhaps. 1-17th is the Stryker battalion you're referring to, which I well know because it's my son's unit. They were deployed to the Arghandab River Valley area of Kandahar province. I'm sure you meant to point out that they're the only battalion (other than the Canadian's and the Kandaks) deployed near Kandahar *City*. The 8-1 Cav Sqdrn of the 5/2 SBCT is also in Kandahar province on the Pak border at Spin Boldak, and 2-1st IN BN was deployed to Maiwand down river from Arghandab on the provincial border with Helmland. 4-23rd, the other line battalion of 5/2, was initially deployed in Zabul province on the Kandahar border, but they're apparently all in Helmland now, as is A-Co of the 1-17th for that matter.

All that said, I completely agree with your puzzlement at the decision to concentrate so many resources in Helmland when Kandahar is so apparently more strategic and so much larger than Helmland. Not to mention that 1-17th (and the Canadians) were simultaneously given the mission to secure the Kandahar approaches originally scoped for a brigade and a half. Many lives were lost: 21 KIA and 60+ WIA in 1-17th in the 5 months before they were were relieved by 2-508th and retasked with route security.

I'd like to believe there's a master strategy behind all of this that will be revealed over time.

[S2]

Kasmir Reply

"First, a mild correction, perhaps."

Totally correct except that I don't see 5-2 Inf but I imagine ISOW is having a hard time keeping up right now. Thanks for the correction. I believe I was in a hurry and missed an entire brigade element in the A.O-

Afghanistan Order Of Battle-March 2010-Institute For The Study Of War

By my count TF STRYKER and TF KANDAHAR have seven battalions operating from Spin Boldak to the northern end of the province and over into Helmand.

"I'd like to believe there's a master strategy behind all of this that will be revealed over time."

I'd like to as well. Hate to rain on anybody's parade but I'm unsure. Thus, the thread.
Hope your boy's hanging in there.:)

[Kasmir]

"First, a mild correction, perhaps."

Totally correct except that I don't see 5-2 Inf but I imagine ISOW is having a hard time keeping up right now. Thanks for the correction. I believe I was in a hurry and missed an entire brigade element in the A.O-

Afghanistan Order Of Battle-March 2010-Institute For The Study Of War

By my count TF STRYKER and TF KANDAHAR have seven battalions operating from Spin Boldak to the northern end of the province and over into Helmand.

"I'd like to believe there's a master strategy behind all of this that will be revealed over time."

I'd like to as well. Hate to rain on anybody's parade but I'm unsure. Thus, the thread.
Hope your boy's hanging in there.:)

5/2 is the Stryker brigade designation. I keep forgetting about 1-12th IN BN out of Fort Carson, which has been in the mysterious Zhari district of Kandahar for a while now. Not sure what their mission is, and don't hear much about them. Zhari itself is hard to find on a map.

I think the count in province is 6 line battalions, the 1st Princess Pats, 1-12th, 2-508th, 2-1st, 1-17th, and 8-1st Cav. 4-23rd is now in Helmland along with A-CO of 1-17th. The Romanians are in Zabul.

My son's due to depart for his 15 day leave tomorrow. :)

[JAD_333]

Sir,like you say its more it meets the eye.Call me a conspiracy theorist(national disease)but neither the politicians told the American people the truth nor the military at the behest of the politicians can come out of the blue and say it.Off-topic,the situation resembles in a sense the early days of Nam,described by Gen. McMaster's book ''Dereliction of duty''.

Like the beginning of Nam...that's an interesting observation. Having lived through that period, it does not seem the same. The dribble toward greater escalation is not there, but who knows what's in store when the all crucial year is up.

You remember we had this talk before,when the strategy was made public.We agreed then that the timetable is too short.It's not the military that made the timetable,it was there at the demand of the politicians.Now,if we here,more or less chairborne troopers(in the sense that we're not on the ground),are aware that the war cannot be won in 1-2 years,even with the reinforcements and the new approach...

Gen Nicholson is fond of telling his men that we cannot win the war, and after they get over their shock, he explains that their job is to make it possible for the Afghans to win it. What generals say to their troops is a good indicator of thinking behind the scenes. But if after 1 year we are making good progress, another year will be easier to sell to the public. Obama isn't going to walk away with the cake half-baked, especially if the news is good.

[S2]

Tick-tock Goes The Clock

A couple of neat stories to highlight how we've too little, too late for too much of the countryside. Stars & Stripes portrays an element of the 173rd Airborne Bde. operating in a funky lil' locale known as the Tangi Valley.

Things aren't going so well no matter how nice-nice we play it. Nothing getting done, Afghans frustrated and in a total CYA mode with the taliban shabnamah presence to always remind them of the consequences of cooperation/collaboration and nary an afghan official to be found-

Uphill Battle To Win Over The Villagers In The Tangi Valley-Stars & Stripes March 18, 2010

"'These people don’t want our help,' one specialist said during a recent patrol in the Tangi Valley. 'They just want us out of their [expletive] country.'”

Meanwhile, further north in Kunduz, we'll be picking up the slack for the Germans. They've 1100 troops and nary to be seen other than some carefully stage-managed construction projects in an area where the MSR running from Tajikistan into Afghanistan is critical to ISAF and Afghanistan's resupply. Meanwhile, the A.O. around them has gone to sh!t so we'll provide three times their forces from those we're sending over to do whatever the fcuk we're doing until we leave in a year...

...as if any of it matters-

As Taliban Make Comeback In Kunduz, War Spreads To Northern Afghanistan-WAPO March 19, 2010

The party starts when we depart. Count on it. Until then smoke and mirrors...

[JAD_333]

The party starts when we depart. Count on it. Until then smoke and mirrors...

Or. if it doesn't, I'll be very interested to see how we got from "we're here not to win the war, but to help the Afghan's to win it" (Gen Nicholson). The inescapable fact is the Taliban will not be withdrawing their troops from country ever. And fact two, the national government lacks the leadership at the top to get the second part done.