What Is The Legal Rationale For PREDATOR?

[IHM]

PTV-- Pakistan Television Network, the state-owned channel-- just broadcast that Hakim Ullah Mehsud passed away. He was hit in a drone attack on Jan 14, 2010. Taliban also kidnapped a doctor from Hangu for his treatment, but he couldn't sustain his injuries and met his fate today.

[S2]

IHM Reply

We've a thread going on H. Mehsud that's up right now in this section.

[badil]

tactical short term victory to longterm questionable outcome(time will tell)

"The placement of law as the objective sought during the course of a war is what is happening now."

So it would seem. It seems clear, for instance, that we knew something WRT intelligence about H. Mehsud that the Pakistanis didn't know. We valued the target sufficient to strike but not sufficient to strike with ground forces inserted for the purpose of killing and doing so with a higher degree of certainty to their objective purpose.

A ranger company inserted to the objective would have unquestionably, with support from our gunships, laid waste to the target and positively identified the results to OUR satisfaction. We don't have that and the reason is our choice of means to prosecute the target.

What governed that? Risk to the troops vs. the need of assured destruction of the target? Had we called in a flight of B-2s to carpet-bomb a relatively discrete area (i.e. Shaktoi village) that, too, would have afforded a higher degree of certainty without need of exposing troops. Nobody questions PREDATOR's accuracy but its effect is limited to a small, finite burst radius of the weapons employed.

Seems functional consideration was laid to the wayside given those two alternative approaches for the least intrusive means of attack we had available.

We've seen the effect of insurgent sanctuary on ostensibly neutral lands in war and even used it ourselves- i.e. PKK sanctuary on lands in northern Iraq, mujahideen sanctuary on Pakistani lands in the Soviet-Afghan war and, obviously, NVA/VC sanctuary on Cambodian and Laotian lands during the Vietnamese war immediately come to mind.

We've seen cases of advising and consulting allies for strikes that would likely cause casualties and death upon their citizens in war, i.e. the French gov't in exile as we made plans during W.W.II for the invasion of France.

We've even, IIRC, approached judaic scholars when concerned or certain that our bombings upon hostile lands may cause casualties. The last two examples in cases of clear moral authority to prosecute our objectives in the midst of total war.

The French, as I recall, affirmed our right to do so. So too the judaic scholars. I presume that we weren't asking for their permission but, if so, why did we bother to ask at all?

Today, Pakistan is (ostensibly) an ally-much like France in W.W.II-that has forces and leadership councils of our mutual enemy on their soil. They haven't given us their permission. Not publically anyway and, instead, have asked for the technology to do so themselves.

So, I'm full circle with nothing still. Somebody somewhere has accumulated the legal rationales for our actions but I've not found a reasonably concise treatise explaining such. My personal preference might be the declaration of war upon Pakistan as I've long sensed duplicity of purpose to their actions.

We haven't done that either. Clearly we fear doing so and I can only guess that it stems from our logistical vulnerabilities. So we don't fully prosecute the target. We don't even partially prosecute the target. We've instead chosen the absolutely least intrusive means available that I can see.

Failing to be able to positively confirm the success or failure of such an attack isn't new and, likely, stems back to the Clinton raids of the late nineties using cruise missiles.

Anyway, I'd still like to see our justifications/rationales put forth in a lucid, concise argument that might be followed by this layman.

centre of gravity of interneational collation lies in strength of collation( all partners) even sometimes at the cost of delayed victories. Short term drone casualities ( being regularly replaced without much change in agenda and resolve of each new leader) may not give real long term posative results, specially when one partner in being denounced for that action. Let that partner handle it, strengthen the partner to win his part. Give him the drone and he will do it for himself and takes the blame on himself from his public.

[badil]

perceprtion based on past USA- Pak relations

"The placement of law as the objective sought during the course of a war is what is happening now."

So it would seem. It seems clear, for instance, that we knew something WRT intelligence about H. Mehsud that the Pakistanis didn't know. We valued the target sufficient to strike but not sufficient to strike with ground forces inserted for the purpose of killing and doing so with a higher degree of certainty to their objective purpose.

A ranger company inserted to the objective would have unquestionably, with support from our gunships, laid waste to the target and positively identified the results to OUR satisfaction. We don't have that and the reason is our choice of means to prosecute the target.

What governed that? Risk to the troops vs. the need of assured destruction of the target? Had we called in a flight of B-2s to carpet-bomb a relatively discrete area (i.e. Shaktoi village) that, too, would have afforded a higher degree of certainty without need of exposing troops. Nobody questions PREDATOR's accuracy but its effect is limited to a small, finite burst radius of the weapons employed.

Seems functional consideration was laid to the wayside given those two alternative approaches for the least intrusive means of attack we had available.

We've seen the effect of insurgent sanctuary on ostensibly neutral lands in war and even used it ourselves- i.e. PKK sanctuary on lands in northern Iraq, mujahideen sanctuary on Pakistani lands in the Soviet-Afghan war and, obviously, NVA/VC sanctuary on Cambodian and Laotian lands during the Vietnamese war immediately come to mind.

We've seen cases of advising and consulting allies for strikes that would likely cause casualties and death upon their citizens in war, i.e. the French gov't in exile as we made plans during W.W.II for the invasion of France.

We've even, IIRC, approached judaic scholars when concerned or certain that our bombings upon hostile lands may cause casualties. The last two examples in cases of clear moral authority to prosecute our objectives in the midst of total war.

The French, as I recall, affirmed our right to do so. So too the judaic scholars. I presume that we weren't asking for their permission but, if so, why did we bother to ask at all?

Today, Pakistan is (ostensibly) an ally-much like France in W.W.II-that has forces and leadership councils of our mutual enemy on their soil. They haven't given us their permission. Not publically anyway and, instead, have asked for the technology to do so themselves.

So, I'm full circle with nothing still. Somebody somewhere has accumulated the legal rationales for our actions but I've not found a reasonably concise treatise explaining such. My personal preference might be the declaration of war upon Pakistan as I've long sensed duplicity of purpose to their actions.

We haven't done that either. Clearly we fear doing so and I can only guess that it stems from our logistical vulnerabilities. So we don't fully prosecute the target. We don't even partially prosecute the target. We've instead chosen the absolutely least intrusive means available that I can see.

Failing to be able to positively confirm the success or failure of such an attack isn't new and, likely, stems back to the Clinton raids of the late nineties using cruise missiles.

Anyway, I'd still like to see our justifications/rationales put forth in a lucid, concise argument that might be followed by this layman.

history quotes ceto sento rcd and USA left pakistan in 1971. Now again how pakistan can afford enemy afghan on one side, US nuclear supported India enemy on other side with USA disappearing fron scene as in 1971.

[S2]

badil Reply

You are off-topic. Derailing threads by failing to adhere to the topic is treading dangerous ground. Please stay to the topic. If you can only manage near incoherant rants then you'll fast find yourself ignored.

Thanks.

[badil]

legal or not viz a viz implications

when enemy is confirmed logic is there to engage

what is front line state

from last four years pakistani helicopters are engaging targets in 6 tribal areas
then why not pakistani drones (if given to them) can engage the targets

imlications on allies must also be considered and then results achieved may be compaired

if US drone attacks the public allegation is US policy is being followed
if Pakstani drone goes engages the same target successfully= US mission acomplished- pakistan's political implication removed

ally leader ship comfortable and can cooperate further.

[Officer of Engineers]

I've asked you to take the time to compose your thoughts instead of gibberish. Apparently, you don't take instructions very well.

[Bluesman]

More on this topic, because I just found an article that squarely addresses the OP.

http://volokh.com/2010/03/09/drone-w...ty-conference/

[Bluesman]

Oh, and make sure you go through the comments, too, because not all are worthless.

[Stitch]

when enemy is confirmed logic is there to engage

what is front line state

from last four years pakistani helicopters are engaging targets in 6 tribal areas
then why not pakistani drones (if given to them) can engage the targets

imlications on allies must also be considered and then results achieved may be compaired

if US drone attacks the public allegation is US policy is being followed
if Pakstani drone goes engages the same target successfully= US mission acomplished- pakistan's political implication removed

ally leader ship comfortable and can cooperate further.

All I can say is . . . . . wow . . . . . was that English?

[Bluesman]

Another article that squarely bears on the OP's question:

Drone Strikes Are Legal, U.S. Official Says - The Lede Blog - NYTimes.com

Hit that link, because there's some other good stuff attached to that page.

[S2]

Bluesman Reply

Thanks.

The links are valuable as they continue the argument. As suspected distinction and proportionality remain the measuring stick. I'll need to read Peter Bergen's report as I'm dubious about any claims to accurate casualty counts as relating to drone attacks-both supporting or diminishing my views.

[Bluesman]

And another valuable piece:

The Volokh Conspiracy A Follow-on Drone Hearing

[zraver]

why is this even a question? LOAC is driven by 4 factors- belligerent status, military necessity, proportionality, and distinction.

1. A-Following 9-11 the US was obviously a belligerent under the LOAC and entitled to wage defensive war to prevent another attack and prosecute those who attacked us, those who sheltered them, funded them, and in any way aided them where every they are. B- Pakistan is a co-belligerent in the GWOT. While attacking an allies territory is unusual at first glance, in fact it is quite common. We bombed South Vietnam, Kuwait, France, Holland, Belgium, Norway etc in the pursuit of common enemies.

2. A- Killing senior enemy commanders strikes directly at this and might directly help us achieve the aims of our war effort. B- Not going after them, opens up NATO and ANA troops to attack and enables more of the deadly bombings killing afghan and Pakistani civilians.

3. Drone strikes are proportional- they are a small amount of explosive (compared to an air craft bomb) that can be used with pin point precision- able to take out a house rather than the block. This is far less than could be legally used. Senior Taliban commanders may have thousands of lives worth of blood on their hands and be responsible for hundreds or thousands of fighters. This puts the standard of proportional pretty damn higher. A hellfire is actually restraint on our part.

4. Distinction- by being able to target individual buildings and sparing the neighborhood we can use incredible distinction. Legally speaking, given the precision of the hellfire vs the threat they eliminate the neighborhoods of the safe houses would be valid military targets.

Those are the only legal factors that matter. Lets say reports of AQ being in and operating from Iran turn out to be true. We could legally attack them since Iran would have abrogated its duties as a neutral power. In fact any state providing material assistance and not interning AQ/Taliban fighters is in violation of the LOAC. The only way we could not use the drones or other military means would be for a country like Iran to not supply our enemies and intern and declare as internees those members of AQ/Taliban they have in their possession.

[S2]

Harold Koh Articulates The Administration Position

Recently at the annual meeting of the American Society Of Internat'l Law, Harold Koh, legal advisor to the U.S. Dept. Of State, articulated the U.S. government position WRT the use of drones-

Complete Text Harold Koh-March 25, 2010

"In the same way, in all of our operations involving the use of force, including those in the armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, the Obama Administration is committed by word and deed to conducting ourselves in accordance with all applicable law. With respect to the subject of targeting, which has been much commented upon in the media and international legal circles, there are obviously limits to what I can say publicly. What I can say is that it is the considered view of this Administration—and it has certainly been my experience during my time as Legal Adviser—that U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.

The United States agrees that it must conform its actions to all applicable law. As I have explained, as a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law. As a matter of domestic law, Congress authorized the use of all necessary and appropriate force through the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). These domestic and international legal authorities continue to this day.

As recent events have shown, al-Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack us. Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks. As you know, this is a conflict with an organized terrorist enemy that does not have conventional forces, but that plans and executes its attacks against us and our allies while hiding among civilian populations. That behavior simultaneously makes the application of international law more difficult and more critical for the protection of innocent civilians. Of course, whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses. In particular, this Administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles, including:

First, the principle of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack; and

Second, the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
In U.S. operations against al-Qaeda and its associated forces-- including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles-- great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.

Recently, a number of legal objections have been raised against U.S. targeting practices. While today is obviously not the occasion for a detailed legal opinion responding to each of these objections, let me briefly address four:

First, some have suggested that the very act of targeting a particular leader of an enemy force in an armed conflict must violate the laws of war. But individuals who are part of such an armed group are belligerents and, therefore, lawful targets under international law. During World War II, for example, American aviators tracked and shot down the airplane carrying the architect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, who was also the leader of enemy forces in the Battle of Midway. This was a lawful operation then, and would be if conducted today. Indeed, targeting particular individuals serves to narrow the focus when force is employed and to avoid broader harm to civilians and civilian objects.

Second, some have challenged the very use of advanced weapons systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, for lethal operations. But the rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict-- such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs-- so long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war. Indeed, using such advanced technologies can ensure both that the best intelligence is available for planning operations, and that civilian casualties are minimized in carrying out such operations.

Third, some have argued that the use of lethal force against specific individuals fails to provide adequate process and thus constitutes unlawful extrajudicial killing. But a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force. Our procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets are extremely robust, and advanced technologies have helped to make our targeting even more precise. In my experience, the principles of distinction and proportionality that the United States applies are not just recited at meetings. They are implemented rigorously throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations to ensure that such operations are conducted in accordance with all applicable law.

Fourth and finally, some have argued that our targeting practices violate domestic law, in particular, the long-standing domestic ban on assassinations. But under domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent with the applicable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute 'assassination.'”