Broad Front versus Narrow Front: Who was Right?

[Triple C]

The title almost says it all. Do you think Eisenhower made the right call? Or do you think Monty or Bradley was right?

For those of you who want a recap, Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander of European Theater of Operations mandated that the final assault on Germany was to be made by armies of equivalently equal strength over a wide front. His generals, Bradley and Montgonmery, objected vigorously.

Eisenhower's plan was roughly as follows. The 21st Army Group was to take the main effort throught the Flanders. The 12th Army Group was split into two forces: the Ninth and First US Armies deploy north of the Ardennes and attack via the Aachen Gap; to its right, the Third US Army attack via the Kaiserslautern Gap, with the possibility of turning north near Frankfurt-am-Main (I think) to strike at hearland Germany. Ike did not want all of his eggs in one basket; he wanted each attack to be strong enough so that if anyone failed, the rest could continue to advance on its own.

Montgonmery wanted the 21st Army to be given command over the Ninth US Army. He would make this attack with forty divisions kept in a solid mass in one power drive. 6th Army Group and the Third US Army were to be relegated to a static role. He was given much less and the result was Market Garden. Bradley for his part proposed to concentrate First and Third US Armies, punch through the West Wall, and pivot north. He did not get his wish either. As it actually happened, the First and Third Armies made their seperate assualts and both fluttered out.

Critics speculated that had either Montgonmery or Bradley's proposal been followed, the Allies could have made a decisive breakthrough between September-October 44 and obviate the Bulge and six months of war. Others pointed out that logistically, a concentrated power drive by either 21st or 12th Army Group would leave the other immobalized and vulnerable to German counterattack, while the narrow front attack itself could invite defeat by not having sufficient frontage and contained.

What do you think?

[Exarecr]

The last 8 months of operations in the ETO, where nothing but a battle of ego,s between British and American Generals more worried about their memoirs at the Wars conclusion, than prosecuting a war of quick victory.The American high command was miffed(correctly so),at the power and resources being giving to their British cousins who commanded an Army much smaller than their own. After the failure of Market Garden, it became painfully obvious the allies squandered a chance to end the War early because of Allied bickering and a wastage of valuable resources. This also forced the !st Canadian Army to fight a bitter,protracted action to clear the banks of the Schnelt estuary to open the port of Antwerp,which would ultimately end Allied supply problems. Yes folks ,there were 5 Canadian divisions with Allied units attached that put 1st Canadian Army up to almost 400,000 troops. The Canadian Army held the left flank of the ETO from Normandy to it,s entry into Germany in 1945. Never hear about it though.Typical.

[Triple C]

Sir,

I know. For some reason no one remembered Canada's contribution of the war even though of the two CW armies in 21st Army Group, Canada supplied one. No one says that historical publicity makes any sense.

[dalem]

The key was ignoring Monty. After that it's all sprinkles.

-dale

[clackers]

The title almost says it all. Do you think Eisenhower made the right call? Or do you think Monty or Bradley was right?

Maybe the war could have been shorter. It's sure tempting, Triple C, to give the keys to one person and say 'go for it'. At the start of September 44, with twelve ports still in German hands (some of them until May 1945), and the French railway system having been knocked out by the RAF and the USAAF, trucks were having to come from the beaches way past where the planners had thought the Allies would be ... the River Seine. Backing one effort with the men and material needed could be seen as the best way to deal with competing demands ... prioritize, and go with your decision.

Ike's way was probably the safest, though, and no different from what Stalin did on the Eastern Front. One army getting out too far ahead of the others, even further away from the supply dumps and air support, is a good target for a German riposte like the Battle of the Bulge (originally planned for September against Patton's Third Army!). By February 1945, virtually the whole left bank of the Rhine was in the hands of about six different Allied armies, which was much too difficult for even a very good general like Model to defend.

[clackers]

The key was ignoring Monty. After that it's all sprinkles.

What? For starters, if he'd been ignored on D-Day, the landing would have been attempted with three divisions instead of five!

[clackers]

The Canadian Army held the left flank of the ETO from Normandy to it,s entry into Germany in 1945. Never hear about it though.Typical.

Canadians landed at Dieppe, they were at Juno Beach (second only to Omaha in strength of opposition) and did very tough fighting digging out the enemy along the Scheldt estuary then pushing to the Rhine ... not sure which texts dealing with NW Europe leave these out, Exarecr. As a commander, Harry Crerar was unfortunately no Arthur Currie, but that's not his fault! :)

[Rumrunner]

I think the broad front idea was the best plan available to conquer the large battlefield of the ETO. While a large and concentrated thrust can and probably would have overwhelmed the combined Nazi/Axis forces, any small corridor it opened would have been very vulnerable to counterattack and the potential of stranding an entire contingent of your forces deep within enemy territory.

A wide front that stretches your forces over a wide area also does the same to your enemy, and after that its a supply and manpower war - one Germany could not win.

[dalem]

What? For starters, if he'd been ignored on D-Day, the landing would have been attempted with three divisions instead of five!

Well, the question involved the post-D-Day strategy, but even granting that, I am no fan of Monty in any theater at any time. No fan at all.

-dale

[clackers]

Well, the question involved the post-D-Day strategy, but even granting that, I am no fan of Monty in any theater at any time. No fan at all.

Well, I'd like to know your reasoning, Dale.

IMHO, for all his lack of tact with colleagues (who he used his more diplomatic Chief of Staff 'Freddie' de Guignand to deal with), of the Allied army group commanders in Europe - himself, Bradley, Alexander, Devers and Clark - he was the best.

[Triple C]

Ike's way was probably the safest, though, and no different from what Stalin did on the Eastern Front. One army getting out too far ahead of the others, even further away from the supply dumps and air support, is a good target for a German riposte like the Battle of the Bulge (originally planned for September against Patton's Third Army!)

That is my biggest doubt about narrow front strategy as well. If Ike gave 21st Army Group gasoline by taking it away from 12th Army Group, Patton would have been immobilized just in time for Blaskowitz's September counteroffensive.

For starters, if he'd been ignored on D-Day, the landing would have been attempted with three divisions instead of five!

Monty & Ike's Neptune plan also added the drop of three airborne divisions which was absent in the original plan.

[clackers]

That is my biggest doubt about narrow front strategy as well. If Ike gave 21st Army Group gasoline by taking it away from 12th Army Group, Patton would have been immobilized just in time for Blaskowitz's September counteroffensive.

Yes, Triple C, and 21st Army Group may have been ripe to have been attacked on any of three sides if it had crossed the Rhine in September anyway. Arnhem was a tragedy for the British 1st Airborne Division, but there may have been a bigger blow waiting in Germany if Market Garden had 'succeeded'. Monty's advance past the Seine actually matched the 1940 German Blitzkrieg in pace, and as the Osprey book on the Arnhem campaign says, "Second British Army had also outrun its own supplies, its tactical Intelligence, and most of its air support. Almost half of 2nd Tactical Air Force was tied up with First Canadian Army [slogging it out against the Antwerp estuary defenders], and the rest was searching for suitable airfields in Belgium."

I think it's almost fortunate that Market Garden caused a pause in proceedings. Monty's real error at that time was looking to end the war before Christmas instead of cutting off the Fifteenth Army as it withdrew further along the coast of Holland. Patton missed a similar chance to clean up Army Group G as it withdrew from the Anvil landings ... but his eyes - and hence his tanks - were pointing eastward, not south.

Monty & Ike's Neptune plan also added the drop of three airborne divisions which was absent in the original plan.

Yeah, originally it might have been assumed that Alexander would have been put in charge. A brave man, got on with everyone, but not really a commander, I'm afraid. Alan Brooke (as CIGS the British equivalent of George Marshall) insisted on using Montgomery, who he thought "Britain's outstanding tactical commander, and sufficiently ruthless in pursuit of victory".

After inheriting the position of chief planner, Montgomery looked at the precedent of Salerno and decided that the invasion front had to be really wide and the units able to quickly link up with each other.

Ike's Chief of Staff told the New York Times that he was 'getting tired of this damned nit-picking about Monty ... he conceded he'd been 'difficult to handle' ... but 'there wasn't anyone else who could have gotten us across the Channel and ashore in Normandy. It was his sort of battle.'

Eisenhower himself agreed: "No one else could have got us across the Channel"

[Albany Rifles]

Logistics and the Broad-Front

The Broad Front Approach was driven by the reality of the logistics siutation in the early autumn of 1944.

Excellent analysis is given in this book.

And the book points out correctly, that FM Montgomery did not intend Market Garden to be a single thrust to Berlin since it could not be supported logistically.

And Exarecr, I don't understand your claim that people do not know about the Canadian Army in Northwest Europe, especially on the WAB.

[dalem]

Well, I'd like to know your reasoning, Dale.

IMHO, for all his lack of tact with colleagues (who he used his more diplomatic Chief of Staff 'Freddie' de Guignand to deal with), of the Allied army group commanders in Europe - himself, Bradley, Alexander, Devers and Clark - he was the best.

My reasoning? He was a poor field army commander - he was MacLellan reincarnated. I rate him far below the other names you mentioned.

-dale

[Triple C]

Dale,

Not very sure I agree with you there. Monty could concentrate mass like no other, and his pursuit of the Germans across the Flanders was as ruthless as any Allied commander. The rivers he leaped there was thought to be far tougher tank obstacles and the British proved the anticipation wrong. I think the real handicap to Montgomery's generalship was not his caution, but the weak infantry strength of the 21st Army Group and want of good Corps commanders.