British Troops' Problems in Afghanistan

[Officer of Engineers]

Yes! As could anyone who did at least 'O' Level history.

And I'm sure anyone who did an 'O' Level History would tell you, the first thing the Dominions did was to tell Lord Kitchener to take a hike.

However, from what you wrote, it seems that the war aims of WWI were at least always changing, from defeating the Kaiser's Army before Christmas, to the restoration of the borders to the final victory. In other words, it was confusing then as it is now in Afghanistan.

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And I'm sure anyone who did an 'O' Level History would tell you, the first thing the Dominions did was to tell Lord Kitchener to take a hike.

However, from what you wrote, it seems that the war aims of WWI were at least always changing, from defeating the Kaiser's Army before Christmas, to the restoration of a e borders to the final victory. In other words, it was confusing then as it is now in Afghanistan.

I am in London right now and my personal library is in Johannesburg, so you have me at some disadvantage. I am really interested to hear that there was some dissent in the Dominions about entry into WW1. This is this first that I have ever heard about it. (Excepting the dissents amongst Quebecqois), so I would be pleased to know more.
That the Dominions should tell Kitchener to 'take a hike' is especially surprising as he only became Minister of War AFTER the declaration of war and was not in charge of strategy. Having earlier, since 1909, warned very much against involvement in a European War as it would cost "Down to the last million" in troops. A sentiment he repeated in his tours of Canada and Australia during the period.
I do know that Kitchener had a bit of a bad reputation with Australians after leaving Breaker Morant out to dry in the Boer War, but what was the beef with Canadians? He always spoke well of Canadian troops in the Boer War and there is a fine military cemetary outside Lydenburg that I have visited that has an inscription from Kitchener to the valour of Canadian troops that were killed in one of the battles there. They even named a town after him in Canada after he died--didn't they?

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However, from what you wrote, it seems that the war aims of WWI were at least always changing, from defeating the Kaiser's Army before Christmas, to the restoration of the borders to the final victory. In other words, it was confusing then as it is now in Afghanistan.

I think that you will find that the phrase "Home before Christmas" came from "THE UNION JACK" magazine--one of Harmsworth's publications. Nothing to do with a war aim or a government.

To the real point. Yeah, War Aims may change in detail, but not in overall substance ( e.g. Protect belgium equals defeating Germany/ defeating Germany means regime change..and so on). My beef was that the mission in Afghanistan has changed completely. If, back in 2000, Nato governments had proposed sending troops on a ten year mission to ensure that Afghan girls went to school and the sale of DVDs were allowed, at the cost of a couple of thousand casualties--would anyone have bought in to it?

[Officer of Engineers]

This is this first that I have ever heard about it. (Excepting the dissents amongst Quebecqois), so I would be pleased to know more.

Kitchener wanted a repeat of the Boer War armies where Dominion Regiments were broken up and inserted into British Formations. Both Canada and Australia butted heads with Kitchener to allow the Canadian and Australian Corps to fight as the Canadian and Australian Corps ... and to have their own COs instead of British COs.

They even named a town after him in Canada after he died--didn't they?

Kitchener, Ontario, fomerly Berlin, Ontario but changed their name during WWI ... for obvious reasons.

If, back in 2000, Nato governments had proposed sending troops on a ten year mission to ensure that Afghan girls went to school and the sale of DVDs were allowed, at the cost of a couple of thousand casualties--would anyone have bought in to it?

The mission ojectives have not change but the methodology has. The mission has been and always will be to deny Afghanistan as a base of operations to Al Qaeda and by extension, the Taliban. The Taliban wins, Al Qaeda will return and the only way to make sure the Taliban doesn't win is to pick a side and help them to win.

Girls going to school and DVD sales are not mission objectives. They are indicators. Indicators that the population are no longer afraid of the Taliban to risk their children and their lives.

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Kitchener wanted a repeat of the Boer War armies where Dominion Regiments were broken up and inserted into British Formations. Both Canada and Australia butted heads with Kitchener to allow the Canadian and Australian Corps to fight as the Canadian and Australian Corps ... and to have their own COs instead of British COs..

I really think that you have the wrong war, the wrong Commander and the wrong Urban Legend here.
In 1899 and indeed in 1914, the Dominions had no regular Armies as such ( compared to the European powers). Canada and Oz had colonial militia, often officered by local 'gentlemen' who were effectively amateur soldiers.
In the Boer War 'regiments' were raised left, right and centre by enthusiastic amateurs, Brabant's Horse, Hannay's Scouts, Rimington's Guides and dozens of others. A lot of these were heavily populated by Uitlanders with a strong representation of, especially Australians, African and Indian-born British and a smattering of Canadians and Americans. All fantastically Brave and enthusiastic and very effective in small scale actions, but unskilled in the more complex arts of strategy and logistics. ( See the remount and fodder scandal)
The numbers of troops promised by the Dominion Governments was swamped by volunteers who were de facto recruited and paid for by the Imperial Government. The initial number promised by Canada was 1000 troops, not exactly a Corps--naturally such a small number could not fight as an independent force and the plan was to incorporate them into British regular units. But additional volunteers totalled 8000 and, as far as the Canadians were concerned, so many were--literally, raw recruits that a large number of Imperial Officers were seconded to help train them on their arrival in the Cape at the express request of Lt Col Otter the Canadian CO.
When the Canadian and Australian 'official' contingents went into action they did fight as their own units under their own officers and their own COs. e.g. Paardeburg, Doornkop, Lilianfontein. But the nature of the war, naturally a brigade strength unit would include elements from various contingents ( including hendsoppers, joiners, Basotho and Ghandis Ambulance Corps. Kitchener was actually the one who did his best to enhance the identity of Colonial/Dominion troops against the attitudes of Milner and Roberts, so much that he appointed Otter as commander of the Western Transvaal in the "drive" phase of the war. An Australian, Col. Umphelby was also the most senior staff officer in the Battle of Modder River, commanding British troops.
It was also Kitchener that, after the Boer War, promoted the establishment of an Officer Training School in Australia to make up for some of the shortfalls seen in the Boer War.

In WW1 the dominion units were also ensured their own identities from the outset, but obviously with a highest establishment rank of Brigadier not too many Dominion officers were slated for the General Staff and as the original BEF of 1914 only numbered 75,000 there was not much opportunity for Corps-size action by Dominion expeditionary forces.
As we all know, by 1915, 75000 was more of a casualty count than an army and the Dominion and Empire formations became more important and to a degree more independent.

To the urban legends.
1/. There is a myth that the British General Staff used Dominion and Colonial Troops as cannon fodder. Withdrawing "British" units and placing 'Colonials' in harms way. The fact is that the Canadians, at Vimy, South Africans at Delville Wood and Australians at Fromelle took such heavy casualties as the Generals were putting the best troops in the toughest spots. By 1915 the Regular British Army had been destroyed and Kitchener's volunteer army already being reduced to the toothless and beardless. The Dominions could still supply big, strong (and enthusiastic) men.

2/. Another myth is that stupid Blimpish British officers squandered the lives of Dominion troops over and over again.
This is worth a thesis, but regarding the Canadian situation, the myth comes from the scapegoating of General Edwin Alderson initial commander of the Canadian Corps. Although he was personally selected for command by Sam Hughes the Canadian Minister of Militia, they soon fell out. He thought Hughes' politically appointed officers substandard, particularly Hughes son, General Garnet Hughes, the Canadian Ross rifle useless and the training of the troops inadequate. From being Alderson's supporter, Sam Hughes became his biggest enemy. He had personally approved the Ross rifle ( it is suspected that he had a financial interest in its production and who wants to know that his darling son is an idiot?) During the Battle of Ypres in 1916 there was the first gas attack and Canadian troops were left alone as Algerian native troops ran for it. Garnet Hughes and his 2/ic Turner wrongly informed HQ that the Canadian line had also broken and set off for the rear in a blue funk. Actually the Canadians held twice the length of line that they were supposed to for two days with the rotten Ross rifle but took terrible casualties. There were additional examples of Hughes Jnr and Turner making lousy decisions and causing their troops to take huge casualties and each time Sam Hughes personal representative in Europe, Col.John Wallace Carson blamed Alderson and lauded Hughes jnr and Turner. When Alderson discovered that the Canadian infantrymen took the first opportunity to throw away their Ross rifles and use Lee-Enfields he tried to have the weapon replaced and set off a politically motivated campaign that would have him sidelined. Turner and Hughes Jnr were soon also transferred to positions where they couldn't have men killed needlessly. But within Canada, the whispering campaign that the "British were to blame" continued for years.

3/. There is one element of truth to the Cannon-fodder story.
By 1917 British and Commonwealth forces had incurred over 1.2 million casualties. They were desperate for manpower and needed American manpower desperately. The US was urged to put its troops under British command and integrate them with British and Commonwealth formations to make up losses. Pershing refused and insisted that Americans would fight only in American formations and under American command and refused British training, determined that Americans would be trained by Americans and would not go into action until they had their own Artillery, air corps, command structure and supply chain. (The US did not even join the Allied command and fought as an 'associate power').
This had two effects. Despite the US declaring war in April 1917 the first units only got into action in May 1918 ( and then in support of depleted British and French units) and the first 'real' American offensive only took place in September 1918.
By not co-operating with the French and the British, Pershing also failed to learn the lessons of mass frontal attack that the other armies had given up and threw away lives as carelessly as Haig and Foch had done three years earlier.

Wandered a little off of war aims haven't I?

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The mission ojectives have not change but the methodology has. The mission has been and always will be to deny Afghanistan as a base of operations to Al Qaeda and by extension, the Taliban. The Taliban wins, Al Qaeda will return and the only way to make sure the Taliban doesn't win is to pick a side and help them to win.

.

Going to be there a long, long time then! 20% of the current Afghan 'parliament' are "Taliban".

[Officer of Engineers]

I really think that you have the wrong war, the wrong Commander and the wrong Urban Legend here.

Nope.

From SAM HUGHES - The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916

In Decemeber 1914, Colonial Secretary Lewis Harcourt suggested to Lord Kitchener that the Canadian Contingent should be dispersed to "train them in different places with the better portions of your new army. I do not believe that you will dare use them as a single unit together at the front." The next month Kitchener tried to do exactly that, and he was supported by Canada's High Commissioner Geroge Perley. Kitchener thought that some of the CEF units should be attached temporarily to British formations. But Hughes quickly stopped the disintegration and insisted on training for the entire contingent as a unit. Again three months later, over a different question of service appoints, the Minister bluntly told Kitchener that Canada had "supreme control of her troops."

From Far From Home, Canadians in the First World War

"'Sir, do I understand you to say that you are going to break up these Canadian regiments that came over? Why, it will kill recruiting in Canada.' Kitchener answered: 'You have your orders, carry them out,' and I replied: 'I'll be damned if I will,' turned on my heel and marched out."

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

Going to be there a long, long time then! 20% of the current Afghan 'parliament' are "Taliban".

And girls are going to school and DVD sales are up. If they're "Taliban", then they're not the type of "Taliban" Al Qaeda wants to associate themselves with.

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Kitchener and Hughes

Thanks, I shall read both books.

[tankie]

More than 50 British soldiers have had limbs amputated after being wounded on duty in Afghanistan, a Ministry of Defence (MoD) spokesman said.

The official figure released by the MoD does not cover the last few months which have seen heavy casualties among British troops.

The Ministry of Defence spokesman said: "As of 31 March 2009, a total of 51 UK service personnel have suffered amputations due to injuries sustained while on operational deployment on Operation Herrick."

The former commander of the British forces in Afghanistan, Colonel Richard Kemp CBE, was said to be horrified at the number of servicemen who had lost limbs since Operation Herrick began in 2003.

He told the Sunday Mirror: "This is a shockingly high ratio of the number of British troops deployed at any one time in Afghanistan."

The figures were released as it emerged the son of one of the country's most senior military commanders, who lost a leg in Afghanistan, had to have his second leg amputated.

Doctors battled for two weeks to save the right leg of Captain Harry Parker after he lost his left limb in a bomb blast whilst on patrol in Afghanistan.

The 26-year-old is the son of Lieutenant General Sir Nick Parker - the Army's third most senior officer - who will become Deputy Commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan in September.

Capt Parker is currently being treated for his wounds in Selly Oak Hospital, Birmingham. It is understood his right leg was amputated below the knee.

He was injured as he led a foot patrol of the 4th Battalion The Rifles in Helmand on July 18

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Nope.





And girls are going to school and DVD sales are up. If they're "Taliban", then they're not the type of "Taliban" Al Qaeda wants to associate themselves with.

From The Telegraph today.

In a damning report, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee concludes that the conflict has delivered "much less than promised" and that the effort of British troops is being "significantly diluted" by lack of coherent vision and strategy.

"The UK deployment to Helmand was been undermined by unrealistic planning at senior levels, poor co-ordination between Whitehall departments and crucially, a failure to provide the military with clear direction," the report concludes. It demands that the Government urgently issue a statement setting out what lessons have been learned from "the mistakes made by the international community over the last seven years".

From The Sunday Herald

Are we losing Afghanistan?
By John Bynorth
Part one: The expert’s warning

A LEADING military analyst with the Ministry of Defence's own think tank warned that Nato was on the "precipice of failure" in Afghanistan unless it swaps throwing "money and troops" at the country's problems for a more coherent approach.

Dr Michael Williams, head of the transatlantic programme at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, said the peacekeeping force's aims of bringing stability, and in turn prosperity, to the country were achievable, but added its "chaotic and unfocused" approach would end in "strategic loss" in Afghanistan.

Williams criticised the lack of clarity in the West's approach to the country in an article for the institute's Newsbrief magazine entitled Security In Afghanistan: More Than A Job For Nato, which was published last year. He said that increases in troop numbers announced by the US and Britain as part of the organisation's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of 41,700 troops would "not fix the wayward mission to rebuild Afghanistan".

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Food for thought from 1878

Hansard HL Deb 10 December 1878 vol 243 cc406-522

Earl Grey Secretary of State for War and Colonies

Successive Rulers of the country, its Chiefs, and its people, were all united in their strong objection to allowing an English Envoy to reside among them. And, with their passionate love of independence, they were quite right in this objection. I do not believe that it would be possible for an Envoy of the Indian Government to reside in Afghanistan without his being led to interfere in its internal affairs in a manner which would gradually bring that country under the control of the Indian Government. You must remember that civil war is almost a chronic disorder in Afghanistan, and especially when the death of its Ruler leaves the succession to be fought for by the many competitors who always come forward to contend for it; when civil war is not actually raging intrigues and feuds go on among the different Chiefs and parties, and in their disputes a British Envoy must find it hardly possible to avoid interfering, while his doing so would lead little by little to the power he represents being brought into play and assuming the control of the Government. It may be true that this would be greatly for the advantage of the Afghans; that they would gain greatly by being placed under such a system of administration as our Government would be capable of introducing; and that it would be much better for them than living under such a barbarous Government as they now do; but surely we have already enough upon our hands without undertaking the task of accomplishing by force the internal reformation of Afghanistan. And, certainly, it is not what the Afghans want. It was said by one of themselves that they could endure anarchy, civil war, rapine, and bloodshed, but they could not endure a master; and seeing that the residence of a British Envoy among them is the first step to their being brought under the yoke of a foreign master, they are passionately opposed to it. I submit that when this is their feeling, and when they have more than once been promised that they should not be asked to receive a British Envoy against their will, it was not wise to turn round 413 on our former declarations, to insist on sending them an Envoy, and to make war upon them when they refused to receive him. Surely this is not the way to make Afghanistan friendly to us. We know the effects of the former war; we know for how many years the enmity and hatred it engendered against England survived in the minds of the Afghans......................Afghanistan is described to us as one of the most rugged and impracticable countries in the world. It consists mainly of ranges of high and rocky mountains divided by narrow defiles, with some good land in the valleys, but scarcely able, on the whole, to produce enough food to maintain its inhabitants, who are brave, fierce, barbarians, utterly averse to the restraints of a settled Government. It is a country from which it is simply impossible to draw a revenue of any consequence towards paying the expense of governing it; while it is so unfavourable for the operations of regular troops, that the cost and difficulty of governing it against the will of the people would be enormous. Whatever little revenue it might be pos- 414 sible to levy would have to be collected with the aid of military force, which would also be required every time that an act of violence or disobedience to the law had to be punished; so that considering the warlike habits of the people I am informed that, in the opinion of men well qualified to form a judgment on the subject, 30,000 men, of whom one-half must be British soldiers, is considered to be the smallest number that would be required for the maintenance of order. Have you considered what the cost and inconvenience of this would be? If not, you ought to do so before you undertake so ungrateful and so unprofitable a task, which, in the end, you will probably be compelled to abandon. I do not mean to say that the Afghans will be able to drive you out of their country by force; no, but the troops you could maintain there would be so harassed and worn down by the continual hard work imposed upon them, the difficulties of governing the country would be so great, that in the end you would find it practically impossible to persevere in the attempt.

[Parihaka]

Perhaps a better opinion of attitudes on the ground than reading the comments of a Colonial administrator from 130 years ago would be to ask the actual Afghans themselves

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/h..._poll_2009.pdf

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Perhaps a better opinion of attitudes on the ground than reading the comments of a Colonial administrator from 130 years ago would be to ask the actual Afghans themselves

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/h..._poll_2009.pdf

Still Master Debating I see!
The object of my post is I R O N Y!
What does your post mean anyway? I thought the language of the site was English.

[Parihaka]

Still Master Debating I see!
The object of my post is I R O N Y!

The irony being that you regard a 130 year old opinion by a colonial administrator seeking to justify failure as more pertinent to this situation than the current opinions of the Afghan peoples themselves?

What does your post mean anyway? I thought the language of the site was English.

Your reading comprehension or lack thereof is not my concern.

As regards the Master Debating comment, this and your previous use of it are clear contraventions of forum rules. If you don't like those rules, don't let the door hit your arse on the way out.

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The irony being that you regard a 130 year old opinion by a colonial administrator seeking to justify failure as more pertinent to this situation than the current opinions of the Afghan peoples themselves?

1/. No I don't!
2/. Suggest you look up Irony in a dictionary, or ask someone to help.
3/. Lord Grey was not a colonial administrator.
4/. As you brought up a flawed poll of 0.04% of Afghans, try reading it! Not that its got anything to do with the waste of young men's lives in a pointless war.

Your reading comprehension or lack thereof is not my concern.

I can read---you can't write. But then, there is a well-known reason for woolly language in New Zealand.

As regards the Master Debating comment, this and your previous use of it are clear contraventions of forum rules. If you don't like those rules, don't let the door hit your arse on the way out.

Took you long enough to work that one out--didn't it!

you're an anti-semitic cnut.

And you are an offensive Cameronian: a total Hoon.
(You might have to look these nouns up!)